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Abstract
This thesis concerns the Islamist movement in Algeria and takes the form of a
political history. It traces the modern origins of the movement from the role Islam
played in resistance to French colonial rule, through the formation of the influential
Association of Ulama in the 1920s and 1930s and looks at the important contribution
the movement made to the war of liberation against the French between 1954 and
1962. It then focuses on the role Islam and the successor movements to the
Association played in the independent Algerian state, how they were largely
repressed and co-opted in the 1960s and 1970s, but how they survived and began to
grow again in the 1980s. The latter and larger part of the study examines in detail the
dominant role Islamism played in Algerian political life following the regime's decision
to allow greater political pluralism from 1989. In particular, the role played by the main
Islamist political party, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) is considered and analysed.
Attention is paid to the party's remarkable success in multiparty elections in 1990 -
1991, how this could be accounted for and how the Algerian regime and the other
political parties responded to this development. The FIS's party political agenda is
examined, as is the strategy it adopted to achieve its goals. The events surrounding
the 1991 legislative elections, are explained, notably the Algerian military's decision
to intervene and cancel the elections following the FIS's sweeping gains in the first
ballot. The last chapter deals with the Islamist movement's response to the army's
effective coup d'atat and its subsequent proscription of the FIS. It looks at the
development of armed Islamist resistance to the regime and how the regime and the
various splintered parts of the FIS and the wider Islamist movement have sought to
find a resolution to an increasingly bloody conflict.
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xii
MAJD	 Mouvement Algerien pour la Justice et le Developpement
(Algerian Movement for Justice and Development)
MDA	 Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algerie (Movement for
Democracy in Algeria)
MIA	 Mouvement Islamique Armee (Armed Islamic Movement) see
also MAIA
MNI	 Mouvement de la Nanda Islamique (Islamic Renaissance
Movement)
PAGS	 Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste (Progressive Socialist Party)
RCD	 Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie (Rally for
Culture and Democracy)
RDN	 Rassemblement Democratique National (National Democratic
Rally)
SIT	 Syndicat Islamique du Travail (Islamic Labour Union)
UGTA	 Union Generale des Travailleurs Alger-lens (General Union of
Algerian Workers)
Glossaryi
colons
fatwa
had]
hedjab
ijitihad
jihad
Mandi
majlis shura
mudjahedin
rai
sharia
shura
taricia
umma
wilaya
European inhabitants of Algeria under colonial rule
Official ruling on a point of Islamic law
Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca
'Islamic' women's clothing
Independent reasoning or interpretation of the Quran and
hadiths
Struggle for Islam. Often implies 'holy war'
Awaited divinely guided figure, who will lead Muslims to Islamic
righteousness
Consultative council
Warriors for Islam
Popular Algerian fusion of traditional and modern music
Islamic law
consultation
Sufi brotherhood
The Islamic nation
Administrative departments
1 Where Arabic words, place names and names of people are used in the text, no
systematic form of transliteration has been followed. Instead, the most common or •
recognised spelling and form have been adopted. Where direct quotes are used, the
original form is kept, even if it is inconsistent with usuage in the main text (e.g. Quran
and Koran or Sharia and Sha'riah)
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INTRODUCTION
Few countries have undergone as dramatic a series of changes over such a
short period of time as Algeria. In the space of just five years from 1988, what
was perceived as one of the most stable states in both Africa and the Arab world
was transformed into a arena of political chaos and extreme violence that had
claimed the lives of an estimated 40,000 people by 1995. The Front de Liberation
National (FLN) the political party that had exclusively dominated Algeria since it
had famously wrested independence for Algeria from the French in 1962, had
effectively disintegrated during these five short years. Algerian foreign policy,
long a respected pillar of Third World diplomacy, withered away as the country
became absorbed by its own internal crises. The socialist planning and rhetoric
that had represented the cornerstone of Algeria's political, social and economic
life since independence had by the 1990s become an irrelevance. In short, all
that had outwardly characterised Algeria, for the first quarter of a century of its
independent existence, had disappeared.
What had precipitated the rapid demise of these hitherto iron-clad constants
and what, if anything, had replaced them? To the outside world, two things
characterised Algeria after 1988. Firstly, there was the unprecedented shift by the
country's leaders from a single-party state to a political system allowing the
participation of political parties of all descriptions in apparently unfettered
elections to all the political institutions of the state. Secondly, and more
dramatically, there was the emergence of a large, vibrant popular movement
which swept all before it in elections through its political party, the Front Islamique
du Salut (FIS). The ideological basis of this movement was Islamism. This was an
ideology which could, and for current purposes will, be defined as being one
which derives its world view and vision from a fresh reading of Islam and its
sources. It was one that was articulated both through individuals, but increasingly
1
2also through popular movements, such as that which arose in Algeria, which
emerged in states across the Muslim world. From the 1970s, in particular, these
movements became increasingly vociferous and popular and more explicitly
political in their demand that the authorities in the countries in which they
organised respond to their calls for state and society to be fully founded in their
vision of Islam. Increasingly in states across the Middle East, North Africa and
Asia these movements became the main source of organised opposition to the
established regimes.
A wealth of literature exists on the origins, ideology and overall nature of
both Islamism and Islamist movements. 1 However, no more detailed explanation
or analysis of the wider phenomenon of Islamism is given here since it is intended
that this will become apparent as the specific case of Algeria is explored. Whilst
sharing the general experience of Islamism with countries across the Muslim
world, Algeria's specific historical experience largely determined the timing and
particular nature of its own Islamist movement. It is this individual historical
experience that will be examined in the hope that it will not only explain the
origins and nature of Algeria's own Islamist movement, but also that it will
contribute to further understanding of the wider Islamist movement and
phenomenon generally.
In the Algerian context, the importance of the Islamist movement was not
only in its popularity and success in elections but also in the fact that it was the
banning and repression of the FIS in 1992, as it stood on the edge of real
national political power, that was seen to be the cause of the bloody conflict that
subsequently gripped Algeria.
1 See for example Nazih Ayubi: Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab
World (Routledge, London, 1991); Dilip Hiro: Islamic Fundamentalism (Paladin,
London, 1988); Bruno Etienne: L'Islamisme Radical (Hachette, Paris, 1987)
3The pace and unforeseen nature of these developments left most outside
observers searching for a coherent explanation. Foreign governments,
particularly those facing Algeria across the Mediterranean and those sharing
Africa's northern coast, were suddenly acutely aware of Algeria's importance.
European governments were conscious of Algeria's geographical proximity - it
was less than 100 miles from Spain and Italy. Economically, several southern
European states had come to rely on Algeria's extensive oil and gas resources
and exports. Politically, France was suddenly apprehensive about the effects
Algeria's domestic upheaval would have on its own resident Algerian population
which numbered nearly a million. In North Africa, the governments of Tunisia,
Morocco and Egypt viewed with increasing alarm the developments in Algeria
fearing that such chaos could similarly overwhelm their own countries. Not only
was Algeria the largest state of all on the North African coast, but all three states
had their own Islamist movements and nascent political pluralism that might ignite
in a similar fashion as Algeria's had. Further East, in the Levant and Arabia,
governments were uneasy at the possible spread of popular Islamist movements
that could topple them and change the whole nature of this strategically and
economically vital region.
Searching for a considered and historically-rooted explanation for the
dramatic events in Algeria, as they developed, was difficult. Comparatively little
literature on the subject of independent Algeria existed outside of the country,
particularly in the English-speaking world. What little did appear usually took two
forms. Firstly, studies that appeared fairly soon after 1962 and which dwelt
significantly on Algeria's long and bloody struggle for independence against
France (about which significant amounts had been and was to be written).
Secondly, there were studies that examined Algeria's attempts at development,
usually from the standpoint of leftist political economy. Both these groups of
writings, whilst shedding partial light on the events in Algeria after 1988, failed to
4provide any real explanation for the two fundamental features of the period -
political liberalisation and Islamism.
This deficit of information and explanation has largely been rectified in
France, where since 1990 there has been an increasing flow of books and writing
on the whole subject of contemporary Algeria. Inevitably, the English-speaking-
world, which has traditionally seen study of Algeria as a French academic
preserve, has been slower to react. In the USA, a number of academic articles
have been published and the occasional book. In Britain there has been, with the
notable exception of a succession of detailed articles by Hugh Roberts, very little
produced outside of the broad sheet press. It is for this reason that I have worked
to produce this study on the Islamist movement in Algeria.
I have chosen to concentrate on specifically the Islamist movement (rather
than, say, political pluralism) for two reasons. Firstly, because after 1988 the
story of the Islamist movement became increasingly synonymous with the wider
story of political developments in Algeria and from 1990 became the element that
determined the turns of events. Secondly, the Algerian Islamist movement, in
contrast to the extensive coverage that had been given to similar movements in
other Arab and Muslim states, had been largely neglected. This had largely been
due to the fact that, as will be shown, the movement had a very low profile until
1988 in comparison to the movements in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and, of course,
Iran. However, when it became clear by the 1990s that it was Algeria that
appeared to have the largest and most popular movement in the region, some
study of it was clearly needed.
Subsequent studies of the movement have been produced in France. These
have dealt in detail with the various aspects of the movement: its composition, its
ideology, its discourse and its senior figures. There is, however, as yet, no
extended analysis of the whole origins, history and development of the
movement. This is why I have attempted to write what amounts to a political
5history or 'interpretative chronology' of the Islamist movement in Algeria. The
historical approach has been chosen for several reasons. The French approach
towards the subject has been characterised, as indicated, by analysis of aspects
of the movement often in a fairly philosophical and abstract sense. The emerging
approach in the United States has been to deal with the topic using the
established tools of political science - comparative studies, models of
explanation, structural analysis. Both of these approaches have contributed
significantly to an understanding of the subject. On their own, however, they risk
disregarding the vital features of chronology and linear development which are
central to a full understanding of such a subject. Only a historical approach can
really remedy these short-comings. Without a historical perspective, there is the
potential to forget the importance of the unique sequence of events that produce
a unique set of circumstances and the assumption that developments are
inevitable becomes unwisely acceptable. Teleology, the interpretation of the past
through current events, produces a warped vision of the past and threatens to
subject proper academic analysis to the political fashions and exigencies of the
day. AJP Taylor, the distinguished historian, famously challenged in the 1960s
the hitherto unquestioned orthodoxy that the outbreak and early course of the
Second World War had been meticulously planned and executed by Adolf Hitler.
By simply questioning the notion that one man, one party or even one state could
orchestrate every twist and turn of European diplomacy for over a decade, he
revolutionised study of the subject. Whilst I would not even attempt to claim to
provide a similar service for the academic study of Algeria's Islamist movement, I
am persuaded of the need and place for a historical treatment of the subject.
The study is divided into seven chronologically defined chapters. The
opening chapter charts the origins and precursors of the Islamist movement as it
emerged during the long period of French colonial rule. It looks at how the
movement found its first modern institutional expression in the Association of
6Algerian Ulama and how this Association became increasingly involved and
contributed to the Algerian national struggle against France, culminating in the
war for independence of 1954-62. Chapter two studies how the movement fared
in the new Algerian state and how it was substantially marginalized by the new
leaders of Algeria through co-option and repression, particularly during Houari
Boumedienne's thirteen year presidency between 1965 and 1978. The third
chapter examines developments in the decade following Boumedienne's death,
how it began to grow in strength and influence whilst still being kept in check by
the state. Chapters four, five and six deal with the birth and legal life of the Front
Islamique du Salut which became the main vehicle for Islamist activism and
demands following the decision by the regime to politically liberalise after severe
civil unrest and upheaval in October 1988. They detail how the creation and
direction of the FIS was not unanimously endorsed by senior figures in the
movement, but also show how and why the party became far-and-away the most
popular and influential new political party in Algeria. The response of the regime
to the FIS's emergence and success is considered and the extent to which this
contributed to the remarkable advances the party made. The decision by certain
elements within the Algerian regime to end the period of political liberalisation
and thus forestall the accession of the FIS to national political power in 1992 is
also explored and explained. The final chapter is concerned with the course of
the Islamist movement following the formal dissolution of the FIS by the
authorities in March 1992, how it re-organises itself, how elements of it enter into
increasingly bloody armed struggle with the regime and how various parts of it
attempt to solve the conflict either through dialogue with the authorities or through
the pursuit of military victory. Internecine disputes and even conflicts within the
movement during this period are also charted.
Throughout the study four broad areas are routinely, if unsystematically,
looked at in the context of the general history of the movement. The movement's
7ideology, bases of support and external influences are considered as is the
attitude and response to the movement of the various colonial and post-
independence regimes that have governed Algeria. As a reasonably
comprehensive history of the movement, the study attempts to bring together as
wide a selection of sources as possible. Existing literature on the subject is
drawn on, particularly for the early chapters, and comes predominantly from
writing in Britain, France and the United States. From 1988 onwards greater use
is made of Algerian sources, particularly newspapers, which from 1989 became
much more free to openly report political developments within Algeria. Use is also
made of the British and French press, which became far more attentive to Algeria
in this period. Unusually for a study of a part of the Arab World, only very slight
use has been made of Arabic sources. Algeria, however, is itself unusual in being
effectively bi-lingual. A substantial part of the Algerian press publishes in French
and large sections of Algerian academia and the intelligentsia actually prefer to
use French rather than Arabic, as does the important Kabyle region. The
historical scope, particularly the early part, of the study has also necessitated the
use of predominantly secondary sources. The increasing violence and political
uncertainty within Algeria since 1992 has made the gathering of direct material
from Algeria and from interviews with individual Algerians difficult. Nevertheless, I
have drawn on a number of interviews with several influential and knowledgeable
figures who were either involved or closely observed events. These include both
senior political figures as well as ordinary individuals Algerians. Several of these
have necessarily spoken to me on the condition of anonymity.
The question of 'balance' also arises in this context - the extent to which fair
coverage is given to differing views and standpoints, particularly with regard to
the bitter conflict that has raged inside Algeria since 1992. Whilst I would not
claim to, nor wish to, give exactly equal attention and credence to every section
of opinion on the debate, I have attempted to look at as big a cross-section of
8views and writings as feasible. Consequently, my bibliography includes both
literature produced by the FIS in exile as well as Algerian newspapers notoriously
hostile to the Islamist movement. My interviewees have included members of the
Islamist movement, sympathisers with it and figures who are critical and
profoundly wary of its nature and agenda.
IORIGINS: RESISTANCE, REFORMISM AND NATIONALISM
1830 - 1962
To appreciate the nature and reason for many of the developments in recent
Algerian history and politics, some reference to Algeria and the wider Maghreb's
considerable historical background and heritage, stretching back many centuries
even millennia, is both useful and necessary. A number of relevant studies
examine this history in far greater detail and scope than can be dealt with here.1
Only the briefest of summaries, focusing on the most important developments,
can, for reasons of space, be given here.
A: INSURRECTION AND RESISTANCE 1830 - 1871
1. Background: Islam and Algeria
Islam first arrived in the part of North Africa now occupied by the modem
state of Algeria in the second half of the seventh century. Brought by Arabs from
the religion's birthplace in the Arabian peninsula, Islam had effectively
established itself under Arab rule by about 710 A.D. However despite the fact that
Islam as a religion was accepted by the native population, resistance to Arab rule
from the indigenous mainly Berber, population of the region was amongst some
of the fiercest encountered by Arab armies during this period. This partly
1 See for example Charles-Andrô Julien: History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970); Jamil Abun-Nasr: A
History of the Maghreb in the Islamic Period (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1987)
9
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explained the subsequent embracing of the Kharijite schism of Islam by the
Berbers as part of their rebellion against their more orthodox Arab masters in the
early part of the eighth century - the more ascetic and egalitarian doctrines of
Kharijism providing an attractive, as well as dissident, rallying point for the
rebellion. Although the Kharijite Berber kingdoms established in the wake of the
rebellions were eventually to disappear and Kharijite practices only persisted in
small peripheral communities, it is argued that these and other historical
developments were to give Maghreb' Islam an importantly heterodox complexion
even after the orthodox Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence came to
predominate in the region.2
The most visible indications of this heterodoxy could be seen in the
emergence, persistence and importance of various manifestations of what was
broadly termed 'popular Islam' in the region. This 'popular Islam', which did not
explicitly dissent from orthodox Islam, ranged from the variety of Sufi
brotherhoods and orders (tariqas) present in the Maghreb through to the more
unorthodox marabouts or 'living saints.' The sufis, with their emphasis on the
more mystic expressions and experiences of Islam, and maraboutism which
involved veneration of the lives and deeds of certain individual Muslims
supposedly blessed with divine grace (baraka), together gave a less scripturalist
and orthodox dimension and hue to Islam in the Maghreb. More tangibly, the sufi
tariqas, in particular, through their series of informal structures and networks,
acted as mediators between localised Maghrebi society and the succession of
different rulers the region witnessed over the centuries. Such a role for the sufi
brotherhoods was another more peculiar feature of Maghrebi Islam, sufism
elsewhere in the Muslim world playing a far more quietist and less activist part in
society. In times of particular popular grievance with the ruling order, the tariqas
2 John Ruedy: Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Indiana
University Press, Indianapolis, 1992) pp.12-13; Julien: p.19 & pp.336-337
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and the other elements of 'popular Islam' actually supplied the organisational
basis and leadership of resistance to the authorities. The most prominent latter
example of this came with the revolts that occurred under the reign of the
Ottoman Turks (who had dominated the central Maghreb region since the early
sixteenth century) during the opening decades of the nineteenth century in
reaction to increasing tax burdens being imposed on the local populations by the
Ottoman administration.3
These maraboutist and sufi-led revolts against the Ottomans were soon to
be eclipsed by events of far greater significance. The arrival of nearly forty-
thousand French troops on the coast of Algeria in June 1830 signalled the
beginning of an incursion into Algerian history as dramatic and far-reaching in its
impact as the arrival of the Muslim Arab conquerors nearly 1100 years earlier.
The effect of the French presence in Algeria was to be direct, through the
processes of colonisation and imperial rule, and near absolute over the next 130
years, leaving a legacy that is still deceptively pervasive in independent Algeria.
Resistance and capitulation on the part of the native Algerian population
both played their parts in early reactions to the French take-over of various parts
of Algeria, but it was the tariqas that once again organised and led the most
significant opposition to the French in the early years of their presence in Algeria.
However, whilst the revolts against the Ottomans had been against fellow
Muslims, the significance of the resistance against the French was that it pitted
Muslim against non-believer.
3 Ruedy pp.28-29 & pp.40-41
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2. Abd al-Qadirs Revolt
At the forefront of the resistance to the French was that of the movement led
by Amir Abd al-Qadir, from the important Qadiriyya sufi order which had played a
leading role in the revolts against the Ottomans. Lasting for fifteen years from his
election as Amir of the tribes of the western province of Oran in 1832 to his final
defeat by and capitulation to the French in 1847, Abd al-Qadir's revolt was
significant for three reasons. Firstly, it was far-and-away the most successful
campaign of resistance to the French. Secondly, Abd al-Qadir founded and ran
an independent native Algerian state for several years ruling over a substantial
part of the territory covered by modem Algeria. Thirdly, and most important of all,
Abd al-Qadir conducted his war against the French and organised his nascent
state under the banner of Islam, explicitly stressing throughout the religious
motivations for his struggle against the French and for the establishment of his
independent state.
The importance of Islam in the struggle against the French was 'almost
inevitable, it being difficult to conceive of any other framework in which resistance
to the Christian invader could be so effectively mobilised. Nevertheless, it was
certainly the case that Abd al-Qadir specifically emphasised Islam in his
campaign. Abd al-Qadir's specific use of the term 'Amir derived from the fuller
title Amir al-Muminin (Commander of the Believers), was indicative of the Islamic
context in which he both clothed and conducted his struggle. He used it in
preference to other less religious titles he could have assumed. His use also of
the term jihad to characterise his campaign against the French was clearly much
more than the expedient rallying cry of previous conflicts. This was underlined by
his requesting of fatwas from the ulama at Fez in 1837 on a number of issues
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relating to the conflict. 4 In the state he briefly led, set up following a temporary
truce with the French in 1837, the application of Sharia law became an important
part of Abd al-Qadir's rule there; the Amir believing that every Muslim within the
areas he controlled should be subject to his prescriptions. Hence alcohol,
tobacco and gambling were prohibited and prostitution and homosexuality
suppressed. Similarly, soldiers in his army were obliged to be as devoted as their
commander was in performing the set of five daily prayers of the devout Muslim.5
However, the period of peace with the French lasted just two brief years
before conflict was once more resumed in 1839, this time resulting in the final
defeat of Abd al-Qadir and his forces in 1847 and the end of what might be
termed the first independent Algerian state.
The precise nature of Abd al-Qadir's campaign and fledgling political entity
has been argued over by historians of this period of Algeria's history; points of
issue ranging from the extent to which the Amir was a proto Algerian nationalist, a
genuine religious zealot or simply a traditional opportunist who sought 'to use
religious symbols and language to establish some form of political hegemony
over Algeria's varied and divided population. Whilst opportunism undoubtedly
played its part there can be no mistaking the genuinely religious nature and intent
of much of his period of influence. Islam and freedom from French domination
became essentially inseparable notions for most Algerians during this time. The
exigencies of politics frequently pushed Abd al-Qadir into compromises and
expediencies that were not necessarily strictly related to Islam and the sharia but
such actions frequently could be seen as serving the greater goal of preserving
his fiefdom and with it the unhindered practice of Islam within it. 6
4 Raphael Danziger: Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance and Internal
Consolidation (Holmes & Meier, New York and London, 1977) pp.51-63 and
p.130
5 Ibid. p.183
5 Critics of Abd al-Qadir's portrayal as an exclusively Islamic leader point to, for
example, his willingness to cede Muslim held land to the French as part of the
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3. Other Revolts and Movements 1845-1871
Abd al-Qadir, whilst the most prominent, was not the only element of
resistance to the French that leaned heavily on Islam for its inspiration and
orientation. Whilst active opposition in Algeria's large towns was mainly aimed at
defending the established Ottoman-constructed social and political order,
resistance in the country's smaller towns and rural areas invariably took on a
much more religious form. From the 1840s a number of revolts occurred that were
led by individuals who claimed religious inspiration. In 1845 a serious insurrection
developed in the Dahra mountains led by a young charismatic figure, Bou Maza
or the 'Goat Man', who proclaimed himself to be the Mandi come to lead and
deliver Algeria's Muslims at the apocalypse. A number of smaller successor
movements, invariably Mandist in inspiration, sprung up in the wake of this
uprising which was finally crushed in 1847. The most notable of these was that
led by Bu Ziyan who claimed to have had visions from the Prophet Mohammed
telling him that he was the Mandi and who enjoyed considerable support in Ziban,
Aurês and Hodna before his eventual defeat in 1849. 7 The last significant
uprising against the French in this period took place in 1871. Sparked by
economic hardship and famine, and encouraged by the defeat of the French
Second Empire in Europe, the revolt once again was spearheaded by religious
elements - this time the important Rahmaniyya sufi brotherhood whose support
had been solicited by the revolt's leader, Mohammed al-Hajj al-Muqrani. Some
truce he signed at Tafna with them and which allowed him to form his 'state.'
This was seen as theologically inconsistent with the jihad he had proclaimed
against the French. Similarly his continued use of non-Islamic courts and legal
officials to administer secular law, alongside Islamic judges or qadis , in the areas
he controlled was likewise seen as incompatible with his stated intent of creating
a state founded on Sharia law. Danziger p.125; p.183; pp.192-193
7Ruedy pp. 65-68
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historians have viewed the assumption by Muqrani, of the title of Amir al
Moujahadin (leader of the holy warriors) and his proclamation of jihad as pure
personal opportunism, but there is little doubt that the widespread support the
revolt attracted was the result of Muqrani's ability to use the mobilising power of
Islam. However, despite this significant popular support the rebellion suffered the
fate of all those before it. It was crushed in such a significantly brutal fashion that
it ensured that such resistance would not be seen in Algeria again for another
generation.8
These later revolts differed from that headed by Abd al-Qadir in that they
laid claim to the concept of Mandism in Islam, whereas al-Qadir, although
charismatic, had never attempted to portray himself in this way. Nevertheless, all
these rebellions shared the common characteristics of being both intensely
traditional and Algerian in origin and inspiration. The Islam that they expressed
and sought to defend in the face of the French imperial onslaught was very much
the popular Islam that had come to dominate and characterise Algeria over the
centuries. Abd al-Qadir had emerged from the traditional rural strongholds of the
sufi brotherhoods and marabouts in the west of the country. The messianism and
millenialism of the various mandist revolts reflected the even more mystic trends
present in the remote and peripheral mountain and semi-desert area in which
they predominantly occurred.
Although these movements spearheaded indigenous resistance to the
French and, moreover, drew on Islam for their legitimacy and core ideology, it
was not these traditional elements that became the true forefathers and founders
of Algeria's Islamist movement. It was developments in twentieth century Algeria
that produced new elements in Algerian Islam that provided the real starting point
8 John P. Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized (Westview, Boulder,
1986) p.31; Ruedy pp.78-79; Julien p.255
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in the history and development of Algerian Islamism.
B: REFORMISM AND NATIONALISM: 1871 - 1962
1. Capitulation and Co-optation
The decades following the crushing of the revolt of 1871 were primarily
characterised by a push by France to make Algeria something more than just
another distant imperial possession. The pursuit of the policy of Algerie Frangaise
involved much more than a facilitation of greater European immigration and
landowning (both of which doubled in the 1870s). It signalled an intention to
transform Algeria into a quite different society: socially, politically and
economically. As part of this process Algeria, became increasingly assimilated
administratively, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, to metropolitan
France.9
The implications of this for Algerian Islam were mixed. The defeat of the
revolt of 1871 and the ruthless pace of colonisation, and the parallel destruction
of Algerians' own institutions and social order in its wake, left Algeria's Muslims
demoralised, leaderless and confused, incapable of organising any political,
religious, cultural, let alone military, resistance to the enforced transformation of
their society. For most the only option was acquiescence and co-operation. The
French for their part, though, still feared the mobilising power of Islam and
sought a two-pronged approach to vninat settlers, colonial administrators and
metropolitan politicians alike viewed as the main potential threat to colonial
authority in Algeria. 10
 Firstly, as an integral and natural part of the policy of
9Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.32; Charles-Robert Ageron:
Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present (Hurst & Co, London, 1991)
pp.53-57
10 Abun-Nasr: p.270
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assimilation with France, the practice and teaching of Islam were curtailed: many
Quranic schools were closed and religious festivals and pilgrimages were
monitored and controlled. 11 More importantly, the whole of the education system,
as John Entelis points out, became "designed to submerge the Arab-Muslim
identity."12 This policy of suppression of Islam and its manifestations dovetailed
with the second part of the approach to the perceived 'threat' of Islam: official
control by the colonial state of religion. Perhaps recognising that Islam could not
be eradicated, at least in the short run, France decided to emasculate it by
creating and maintaining its own Muslim clergy which it trained in its own 'Muslim'
colleges and through whom it felt it could control the teaching and observance of
Islam in the mosques.13
However, whilst such a policy worked in the mosques of the urban centres
of Algeria, control of Islam and Islamic observance in the rural areas was more
problematic. Indeed the tightening control of the colonial authorities on the
religious establishment (which invariably saw no alternative to co-operation) in
the towns and cities could well explain the growth in membership at the end of the
nineteenth century of the sufi brotherhoods which attracted the support of
Muslims alienated by the collaboration of the urban imams with the French. 14 The
colonial administration was not unaware of this development. Although it could
not exercise the same authority over the Sufi tariqas and rural marabouts as it
could over the urban religious establishment, it was able to 'tame' the former
through a combination of stick-and-carrot policies operated by its rural
administrators. 15 Interestingly, John Ruedy argues that such co-optation of rural
Islam, which ironically of course had provided the backbone of resistance to the
1 1 Ageron: Modern Algeria p.71
12Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.33
13Ageron: Modern Algeria p.71
14Ruedy p.101
15Abun-Nasr p.271
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French earlier in the nineteenth century, was facilitated by the growth in
popularity and membership of these organisations. This influx of support, he
argues, diluted the orthodoxy of the brotherhoods in particular and led to
"eclecticism, superstition and charlatanism", making them more susceptible to the
overtures of the colonial authorities. 16 He concludes on this development:
"Historical process combined with colonial policy to produce the irony that, in
the twentieth century, the colony depended for much of its religious support
upon the movement that had been the principal mobilizer of resistance to its
implantation in the nineteenth."17
2. The Advent of Reformism
The capitulation of both establishment and rural 'popular Islam to the
assaults of the French colonial authorities marked something of a watershed for
the role of Islam in modern Algerian politics. Maraboutism and the taricias
subsequently ceased to be the leading forces in resisting French domination and
asserting Algeria's Muslim identity. The reason for this was not only the
emasculating effect of co-optation by the colonial state. Far more importantly, in
terms of the history of Islam and politics in Algeria, these more traditional forms of
Islam were eclipsed by new Islamic ideas and movements which gained ground in
Algeria after the turn of the century.
It was the ideas of the salafiya movement of thinkers, writers and activists
that came to have a profound effect on the Islamic political thought and
organisation in both Algeria and the Maghreb generally during the early years
and decades of the twentieth century. Emerging in Egypt towards the end of the
nineteenth century the new movement was essentially an intellectual response to
the challenge of European superiority - Egypt, in common with the Maghreb
having largely succumbed to the domination of the European colonial powers of
16Ruedy p.102
17Ibid.
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Britain and France respectively. The movement stressed the need to return to the
pure, original religious practices of the first Muslims or forefathers (salafiya) as
being the appropriate and best response not only to Western domination but to
the generalised sense of moral and civilisational decline and inferiority which
many in the Muslim World had begun to perceive. The doctrine of salafiya argued
that the problems and failures of the Muslim world were not a function of the
Muslim religion itself but rather its corruption through dilution and blending with
other ideas and values which had led to backwardness and superstition. More
importantly, perhaps, for Muslims demoralised and confused by the technological
superiority of the Europeans, salafiya stressed that Islam was not opposed to
scientific and technical progress. Indeed, Islam should not be afraid to borrow
selectively from western ideas to enhance itself and hasten the inevitable
recovery and pre-eminence of Islam once it had rediscovered its true roots in the
Quran and Sunnah. In essence this new set of ideas represented a development
on previous Islamic thought in that, whilst it stressed a return to the practices and
principles of the earliest Muslims, it stressed the importance of progress and
renewal rather than just a preservation of some existing or previous order.
The ideas of the salafiya movement were brought to the Maghreb by both
native Maghrebis who had travelled, worked or studied in the Arab East and by
some of the thinkers and activists of the original movement itself. The Egyptian
Mohammed Abdu, one of the most central figures in the whole salafiya movement
visited Tunisia in 1884 and returned again nearly twenty years later in 1903, this
time travelling to Algeria itself as wel1. 18 His stay in Algeria in 1903 came to be
viewed as an important starting point and inspiration for what has been termed
the 'reformist' movement in Algeria which based itself on the teachings of the
salafiyists like Abdu - salafiyism stressing the need for the 'reform' and renewal of
18 Abun-Nasr p.355
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Islam. 19 Some other writers have stressed that many of the ideas that Abdu
brought with him echoed traditions and ideas already present in Algeria 20 , but
there can be little doubting the symbolic and exemplary effect of his visit on many
of the Algerians he came into contact with.
3. Ben Badis and the Association of Algerian Ulama
Among the people that Abdu met during his brief visit was a young
Algerian named Abdelhamid Ben Badis. 21 From a respected Constantine family
with a long tradition of political and religious leadership, Ben Badis became, over
the next forty years, the leading and most influential exponent of the type of
reformist ideas expressed by Muhammad Abdu. Ben Badis emerged as the most
prominent figure amongst small groups of Algerians that were attracted to
reformism and which had begun to meet in the universities from the 1890s.22
Many of these individuals, having come into contact with reformist ideas through
time spent living and studying outside Algeria in the Arab east and Tunisia (Ben
Badis himself studied at the Islamic University in Tunis), became increasingly
active and organised in and around Constantine by the 1920s. Newspapers were
established, notably Shihab (The Meteor) in 1925, which served as fora for
debate on Islam and the ideas of reformism as well as a means of spreading the
reformist message. It was through writing in these journals that Ben Badis swiftly
established himself as the movement's leading thinker and visionary. From the
outset he promoted the idea of some form of more formal organisation for what
was still a fairly disparate and largely unorganised group of intellectuals. This, he
19Ruedy p.102; Abun-Nasr pp.333-334
20 Allan Christelow: Algerian Islam in a Time of Transition in Maghreb Review
(Volume 8, 5-6, 1983) p.128
21 Abun-Nasr p.334
22 Ernest Gellner: The Unknown Apollo of Biskra: The Social Base of Algerian
Puritanism in Muslim Society (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981)
p.158
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argued, would enable the movement to harmonise their efforts and doctrine in a
much more effective fashion. His efforts finally resulted, after nearly six years of
theological debate in the pages of Shihab and the other journals of the movement
in the formal founding of the Association of Algerian Ulama (often known by its
French acronym - AUMA) in May 1931. This organisation succeeded in attracting
the support and membership of the majority of the country's reformists. 23
In its founding articles the Association described itself as "an association for
moral education" and gave as one of its primary aims the fight against the "social
scourges" of "alcoholism, gambling, idleness, ignorance." It also declared its
intention "to open 	 centres, circles and elementary schools" 24 and indeed,
these activities formed the centrepiece of the Association's work over the next
two decades and attracted the involvement of growing numbers of Algerians.
Although the Association itself remained numerically fairly small and elitist (the
question of restrictive membership had been one of the main impediments to the
founding of an Association before 1931 25) the expansion of the movement's
educational establishments, in particular, brought many more people into contact
with the ideas of the reformists. The Association's clubs and intellectual circles
23 Ali Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman en Algarie de 1925 a 1940 (Moulton &
Co., Paris, 1967) p.79 and pp.119-120. Merad advances several possible
reasons as to why Ben Badis was particularly convinced of the need to create a
formal association. Besides the references in the Quran to the Hizb Allah (party
of God) he suggests that Ben Badis may have been influenced by the formation
of similar organisations in Tunisia (where he had studied) and Egypt (where many
other reformists had studied). It is also possible he was impressed by the efficacy
of the Catholic Church in Algeria and by the formation and function of European
style political parties and associations. Ibid. pp.120-124
24Claude Collot and Jean-Robert Henry: Le Mouvement National Algerien: Textes
1912-1954 (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1978) pp.44-47
25 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.126. The debate over membership
centred around fears for the doctrinal purity of the movement if maraboutist
elements joined the Association.
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grew and spread in a similar fashion, and by 1934 the Association had some form
of presence in virtually every urban centre of note in the country.26
The type of people attracted to the AUMA and its various activities appears
to have varied greatly. Ali Merad, the principal biographer of Ben Badis and
documentor of his reformist movement, found that its following differed in nature
from place to place in Algeria, being frequently determined by factors peculiar to
the individual area - such as family politics and the individual person who had
originally introduced the reformist message. There was also a geographical
dimension to the movement's support. It enjoyed a presence across the country,
but was strongest in eastern Algeria, in and around Constantine, the home of Ben
Badis and most of the senior figures in the Association, and was correspondingly
weakest in the western areas of Algeria. Nevertheless, Merad concluded that
reformism did appear to particularly attract certain sectors of the population more
than others. Petit bourgeoisie intellectuals and tradesmen formed, according to
him, "the principal support - material and moral - of the reformist cause."27 This
support was attributed to the relative openness of such people to new ideas and
the progressive image that the Association projected. This contrasted with the
superstitious and backward image of the more traditional forms of Islam which
these mobile and mainly urbanite sectors of the population were already little
attracted to. The clubs and intellectuals circles established by the Association
became, in the view of one writer, the "gathering places of the Algerian-educated
classes."28 The schools and other educational establishments set up by the
reformists were also popular with sections of Algeria's petit bourgeoisie and
traders. Not only did they provide an alternative to the archaic traditional schools
which were the fall back for those unable to gain access to the limited places in
26Ibid. p.192
27ibid. p.206
28Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.44
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the more prestigious French run schools, but they also provided a means of
opting out of the French administered education system altogether. 29 The Islamic
madrases emphasis on the Arabic language and on religious instruction certainly
pleased conservative Muslims concerned by the cultural emphases of the French
administrated schools, and many of these Muslims contributed financially to their
maintenance. More importantly, they were also attractive to many Algerians for
the simple reason that they represented some form of cultural and educational
bulwark to the march of Algerie Frangaise.30
4. The Assault on Traditional Islam
A major feature of reformist Islam was its emphasis on doctrinal orthodoxy
strictly based on Islamic scripture. This approach deviated from and contrasted
markedly with the strong elements of mysticism and doctrinal eclecticism found
within the traditional Algerian Islam of the marabouts and the Sufi brotherhoods.
For Ben Badis and his reformers in the AUMA, these more indigenous religious
phenomena were anathema and, in their view, blocked the way for Algerian Islam
to become vibrant and progressive again. Consequently, Ben Badis and his
followers launched a concerted campaign across Algeria to combat and discredit
maraboutism and mysticism. Arguing that these practices and traditions were
alien to Islam, primarily because of their emphasis on intermediaries between
God and Man, and led to decadence and superstition, the reformists shifted the
focus of popular Islamic leadership away from the marabouts and taricias and
towards their own organisation and agenda. 31 This drive had significant success
in some areas resulting often in the 'conversion' of marabouts to the reformist
cause. In areas such as the western region of Algeria, though, where
29 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.208
30 Abun-Nasr p.334
31 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.44; Ruedy p.102
24
maraboutism and sufism had always been strongest, the Association of Algerian
Ulama made least headway.32
One of the implications of the advances reformist Islam had made against
traditional Islam was that Algerians' perceptions of themselves as Muslims took
on a far broader and more national perspective. By its very nature traditional
Algerian Islam with its emphasis on holy men and living saints had been highly
parochial in nature. Reformism, facilitated by its nation-wide network of schools
and clubs and established dogma, had a much wider and more uniform impact.33
This further contribution towards the creation of a more genuinely national
Algerian identity for Algerians, in addition to that provided by the Association's
emphasis in its schools on the country's Arabic and Islamic heritage, undoubtedly
helps explain its burgeoning popularity in the 1930s. However, it also shifted the
reformists further towards addressing the whole issue of French colonial rule.
5. The Reformists and French Colonial Rule
The Association of Algerian Ulama had made clear in its founding articles in
1931 that it was an association concerned with "moral education" and thus would
confine its attentions and activities to the cultural and educational fields. The
eschewal of the field of politics was not just simply implied, it was explicit. The
founding statutes stated unambiguously that "all political discussion" and "all
intervention into political questions" was "rigorously forbidden."34 The new
Association was to be one exclusively taken up with the task of propagating the
reformist message and returning Algerian society back to the true path of
scriptural Islam.
32 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.207
33 Hugh Roberts: Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The
Embattled Arians of Algiers in Third World Quarterly (Volume 10, No.2, April
1988) p.561
34 Collot & Henry p.45
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This apolitical stance goes some way to explaining the co-operative and
even 'loyalist' position the reformist Ulama took towards colonial power in the
years following the AUMA's creation. As early as the mid 1920s Ben Badis had
argued on the pages of the reformist newspapers for good relations to be
established with the French. He even argued that rule by France was beneficial
for Algeria: a weak nation like Algeria needing to be taken "under the protective
wing" of a strong state such as France. At the same time Ben Badis quite clearly
saw the reformists' role as being to provide a mediating role between the colonial
authorities and the Algerian people: "to explain to the government the aspirations
of the Algerian people; to plead for their rights favourably and in all sincerity."35
However, the Association's expressed goal of re-establishing 'true' Islamic
beliefs and practices, which Ben Badis and the other leaders of the Association
did not see as necessarily incompatible with French colonial rule, inevitably
clashed with the stated goals of the French. The reformists' emphasis on the
reassertion of Arabic language and culture as well as the Islamic religion ran
counter to French efforts to slowly eradicate the Arab-Muslim identity of Algeria's
pre-colonial population. Tolerance characterised official attitudes towards
reformist Islam in its early years, the colonial administration seeing little threat
from this relatively small and explicitly apolitical movement. This attitude began to
shift in the 1930s. On 16 February 1933 an official circular by the Secretary
General of the Algiers prefecture gave voice to the growing concern within the
colonial administration:
"Most heads of orders and saintly families venerated by the natives are
sincerely converted to our domination and see themselves threatened by a
grouping which, by an active and skilful propaganda, recruits new adherents
daily.... It is not possible to tolerate a propaganda which, under the mask of
Islamic culture and religious form, hides a pernicious orientation....
35 Al Muntaqid (forerunner to Shihab ) quoted in Merad: Le Reformisme
Musulman p.392
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Hence I ask you to survey with most careful attention meetings and
lectures organised by the Association of Muslim Scholars presided over by
Ben Badis..."36
The reference made in the circular to the 'threat' felt by "heads of orders and
saintly families. ...converted to our domination" indicates that the reformists'
campaign against traditional Islam also had political implications. The French
were sensitive to assaults on the allies that they had so successfully tamed and
co-opted since the turn of the century. The reformists' critique of traditional
Islam had been overtly religious in nature, but the French were aware of the
linkage that much of their anti-maraboutist and sufi propaganda implied. Not only
was there the obvious implied accusation that the Administration was fostering
heretical and impure forms of Islam, but more importantly and politically, there
was an increasing tendency to point to the representatives of traditional Islam's
collaboration with the colonial authorities as an indication of their degeneracy.37
This implied criticism of French colonial rule, whilst not articulated by those
at the head of the Association, indicated to the French the willingness of the
Association to tap into popular resentment of the French in order to enlarge their
appeal. The early months of 1933 consequently saw a series of measures taken
by the authorities which aimed at curtailing the Association's influence. Foremost
of these was the Michels Decree in March which sought to prevent all but
officially sanctioned imams from preaching in the mosques of Algiers - thus
attempting to deny Ben Badis and his followers an important outlet for their views.
38 Such measures provoked significant protests from the movement and its
followers. Further measures in 1934, notably restrictions on and closures of the
36 Quoted in Gellner p.167
37 Abun-Nasr p.335
38The main cause of this particular measure against the reformist ulama was said
to have been the inflammatory preaching of one of the senior figures in the
Association, Tayyib Uqbi, who had become renown for his verbal assaults on
maraboutism. Allan Christelow: Ritual, Culture and Politics of Islamic Reformism
in Algeria in Middle Eastern Studies (Volume 23, No.3, July 1987) p.262
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reformists' press and newspapers, led to more protests. Demonstrations in
Tlemcen and Constantine, for example, in May attracted estimated crowds of
5,000 and 10,000 respectively. 39
Fears that such demonstrations of the reformists' popular support could
provoke the authorities into expanding their offensive against the movement and
through that potentially destroy it, prompted efforts from some of the ulama to
avert this threat. Taking the opportunity of the appointment of a new, less
combative French governor in 1936, Tayyib Uqbi forged a deal with the
authorities which amounted to a truce being agreed between the two sides. Under
this the Administration agreed to cease its attacks against the reformists. In
return Uqbi, who it should be noted had always been a firm advocate of
apoliticism for the Association, agreed to tone down the political content of the
Association's propaganda. 40 A further concession won by the French was the
dismissal, from the post of secretary general of the Association, of Lamine
-Lamoudi, a figure who had been a strong promoter of the Association co-
ordinating their activities with other Muslim groups. Official interest in securing
this last point was indication of the growing concern that the various organised
manifestations of Muslim opinion in Algeria would come together to form some
form of common front against the colonial administration. 41 Indeed, it was this
issue of co-operation with other Algerian organisations that came increasingly to
preoccupy the Association of Algerian Ulama from the mid 1930s onwards.
39 Charles-Robert Ageron: Histoire de L'Algerie Contemporaine (Press
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1979) Volume II, pp.343-345
40 Tayyib Uqbi had declared in the 1920s: "Since the beginning of the World War
I have shunned politics, and I will continue to shun it until the Day of
Resurrection" Shihab 31.12.25 quoted in Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman
p.126
41 Ageron: Histoire de L'Algerie pp.345-346
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6. The Association of Algerian Ulama and the Opposition Movements
Besides the birth of the Association of Algerian Ulama, the 1930s had also
witnessed the emergence of a range of other indigenous Algerian associations
that concerned themselves more explicitly with Algeria's political situation. As
explored earlier, the decades following the crushing of the revolt of 1871 had
witnessed a concerted assault on the identity and structure of the Muslim
population of Algeria depriving them, through political, economical and
educational domination, of their leadership and consciousness as a community.
The years following the First World War, however, had seen (in common with
large parts of the colonised world at this time) the growth, or perhaps resurgence,
of Algerian Muslim organised opinion. Declining economic conditions in the
1930s combined with hostility aroused by the triumphalism of French celebrations
marking the centenary of French colonial rule in 1930 resulted in these
movements achieving greater attention and popular support.
Despite its official shunning of political activity, the Association of Algerian
Ulama participated in the first significant act of co-ordination between these
groups which took the form of the convening of a Muslim Congress in Algiers in
June 1936. Encouraged by the accession of a left-wing government in
metropolitan France, the Association joined with the Federation des Elus
Indigenes (an increasingly influential organisation of mainly middle class
Algerians) and the Algerian Communist Party in drawing up a programme of
demands set out in a political charter. These demands essentially constituted an
appeal for political and economic equality with the European colon population of
Algeria to be achieved by formal integration of Algeria into France. The aim was
to abolish the existing ambiguous arrangements and replace them with a unified
system which would give the same set of rights to colons, native Muslims and
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metropolitan Frenchmen alike, thus ending the effective second-class 'citizenship'
that the second of these groups experienced.42
The support of the Association for this agenda was curious not only in the
unlikely partners it gave them in the shape of the irreligious communists, but also
in the essential integrative vision of the Congress's political charter. Whilst
demands such as the separation of Muslim worship from state control and the
ability of Algerians to retain their status as Muslims even after receiving French
citizenship were in tune with the Association's views, total integration did not
appear to be so. In early 1936, prior to the Congress, Ferhat Abbas, the leading
advocate of this policy of assimilation and senior figure in the Federation des Elus
Indigenes had written an article in his own journal Entente which explicitly denied
the existence of Algeria as a distinct nation and nationality. He claimed that he
had "examined history" and found no evidence to support such an idea. 43 Such a
position fitted in well with and reinforced his argument for full integration with
France: the idea of a separate Algerian nation and identity would of course
provide a natural obstacle to integration with France. For the reformist Ulama,
though, this view was anathema. Their cultural and religious agenda quite clearly
and unashamedly stood for all those elements that marked Algeria's native
population out from the European and French population: Arabic culture, Arabic
language and, most importantly, Islam. In Shihab Ben Badis unequivocally
rebutted Abbas's denial of the existence of an Algerian identity:
"History has taught us that the Muslim people of Algeria... .have their
history, illustrated by noble deeds; they have their religious unity and their
language; they have their culture, they have their customs. ..The Muslim
community is not France; it cannot be France, it does not want to be France.
Its population is very far from France in its language, its life and its religion; it
42 Ageron: Modern Algeria p.96
43 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.38
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does not want to incorporate itself in France. It possesses its fatherland
whose frontiers are fixed, and this is the Algerian fatherland."44
That this rebuttal did not create an obstacle for either the Ulama's
participation in the Muslim Congress of 1936 or for their adherence to the
resulting political charter is unusual, although it can be speculated that the
Association's support was temporary and tactical: making use of the broad front
of the Congress to advance their own agenda and aims. Indeed, when a
delegation from the 1936 Congress travelled to Paris to present their charter, Ben
Badis, accompanied by a sixteen member delegation from the AUMA, also
presented their own separate set of demands. These included calls for
recognition of Arabic as an official language and for allocations to be made to
Muslim associations from the public purse for the upkeep of mosques.45
Support for efforts aimed at co-ordinating native Algerian opinion from the
Association continued despite the evident ideological differences they had with
groups such as the Communist Party and individuals such as Ferhat Abbas. The
main reason for this was the attitude of the French administration. Not only did
Paris appear to buckle under adverse pressure from the colons over the granting
of any of the demands of the Muslim Congress, but official attempts at
suppressing the Association resumed again in the late 1930s. Although the
authorities had considered proscribing the organisation in July 1937 and had
been dissuaded from this by the prefect in Constantine (who presumably felt his
city stood in the front-line of any potential backlash - an indication of the
perceived strength of the Association there 46), they introduced a series of
measures aimed at curtailing its activities. Members were arrested, premises
searched, individual associations placed under official control and a ban placed
44 Quoted in Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.44
45 Abun-Nasr p.337
46 Ali Merad had remarked that "By 1931, the province of Constantine as a whole
had been won over to reformism." Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.141
31
on the opening of any unauthorised schools. It was these measures (particularly
the last, which threatened the very core of the Association's work) together with
the authorities' failure to move on any of the demands of 1936 (particularly the
refusal to retain Muslim personal status for those few Algerians granted French
citizenship) that finally pushed the Ulama and the reformist movement into
political opposition to French colonial rule. 47 Calling the law against the schools
(introduced in March 1938) "the darkest day in the history of Islam in Algeria"48
Ben Badis effectively signalled the end of his long-standing policy of co-operation
with the authorities, when he called on the Federation des Elus Indigenes to
cease all collaboration with the governing authorities in 1938. 49
7. Changes and Developments: 1940- 1954
Two events occurred that changed the landscape for the reformists. The
first was the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 leading to the
dramatic fall of metropolitan France to the Germans eight months later in May
1940. The second, and more immediately important, event was the death of
Abdelhamid Ben Badis in April 1940.
The involvement of France, the colonial power, in a major war appeared to
open up the potential options for both the Ulama and Algerians generally. For the
Association, Ben Badis had officially declared neutrality towards the conflict,
stating that it was a conflict that did not concern Muslims. However, he was
reported to have told another senior figure in the Association that if Italy were to
join the conflict then he himself would not hesitate to lead an insurrection against
the French. 50 Both these stances, the official and the private, were a final tangible
indication of the AUMA's break with its policy of co-operation with the colonial
47 Ageron: Histoire de L'Alg6rie p.347
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. p.579
50 Ibid.
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authorities. A year before the outbreak of the war, Tayyib Uqbi had officially
resigned from the Association in protest over its refusal to send a message
confirming the Association's loyalty to France as events in Europe took an
ominous turn in September 1938. 51 The departure of Uqbi, the foremost and most
strident defender of the principle of apoliticism signalled that the reformists were
now committed to the political aim of securing, at the very least, a loosening of
the French grip on Algeria.
Despite raised hopes the war did not initially bring much benefit to the
movement. Many of its senior leaders were interned in 1939-40 over suspicions
of a potential willingness to collaborate with the Axis powers and were generally
not released until after the arrival of British and American troops through the
North African landings in 1942-43. Ironically, the administration set up by the
metropolitan Vichy government between 1940 and 1943 opted not to release
them although the hated March 1938 decree on the establishment of schools was
abolished. The emergence of the Free French under General de Gaulle led to
some hopes of change but it soon became clear that the prevailing attitude in
liberated France was for an effective status quo ante beflum in Algeria.
The death of Ben Badis, although not unexpected, was an unmistakable
milestone in the history of Algerian reformism. The loss of the man who had not
only been the Association of Algerian Ulama's founder but also its guiding spirit,
was clearly likely to affect the future course of the movement. However, although
Ali Merad judged that reformist Islam failed to break any new ideological ground
in the wake of Ben Badis's death, the doctrine of the Association having been
synonymous with that of its founder, it made significant organisational progress
in the 1940s following the release of its leaders.
51 Ibid. p.347
52 Ibid. p.580
53 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman pp.213-214
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At the end of the 1930s the Association probably ran something in excess of
one hundred institutions (schools, intellectual circles, clubs) across the country
and in the view of the prefect of Constantine could count on no more than 1800
actual members - a fact that was used to justify easing repression of the
Association since it was no longer seen as a threat. However, the Association
subsequently saw a rapid rise in the number of its institutions which multiplied to
several hundred by the end of the 1940s54. Much of this growth was the result of
the work of Ben Badis's successor as leader of the AUMA, Bashir Ibrahim'.
Despite lacking his predecessors charisma and vision Ibrahimi worked hard at
raising funds for the movement and building and expanding its institutional
structures and supported organisations. Particular emphasis was placed on the
Association's educational work - the 1940s witnessing the establishment of the
movement's first important upper school: the Ben Badis Institute. The academic
programmes of the schools were standardised and teachers working in them
were able to move from one part of the country to another within the system. 'This,
following in the wake of the reorganisation of the Association itself in 1937 when
a central bureau and departmental committees were created, led one historian of
the movement to speak of it becoming "bureaucratised" in this period.55
Politically, the Association lent continued support to those groups
campaigning for greater rights for native Algerians and retained only the demand
for separation of religion from the control of the colonial state as the centrepiece
of its own agenda. The AUMA participated in the formation of the Amis du
Manifeste et de la Liberte. (AML) in 1944 which sought to create another broad
front for all the various Algerian parties and groupings. The leadership of the
AUMA still favoured the general position of Ferhat Abbas, which in the face of
54 Ageron: Histoire de L'Algerie p.337 and p.579
55 Christelow: Ritual, Culture and Politics pp.264-265; Ageron: Histoire de
L'Algdirie p.346
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French and co/on intransigence had shifted from assimilation to federation of
France and Algeria. However, there was a growing popularity in the movement for
the far more radical agenda being propounded by figures such as Messali Hadj
who also supported the AML. Arguing for full independence for Algeria, Hadj and
his Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) articulated an unambiguously nationalist
platform that became increasingly popular as time and French intransigence wore
on.
Despite a temporary rift with the PPA following large-scale violent unrest at
Setif in May 1945, which had largely been the work of Messali Hadj's supporters
and which resulted in the deaths of several thousand Muslims and the arrest of
Bashir Ibrahinni, the Association grew closer to the PPA and the nationalist cause
from the late 1940s into the early 1950s. There were two main reasons for this,
in addition to the ongoing reluctance of the French administration to make any
concessions to the Muslim population. Firstly, the growing strength of
nationalism and desire for independence in the neighbouring Maghrebi states of
Tunisia and Morocco in this period impressed the pan-Arab sensibilities that
formed part of the ideology of reformist Islam. The consequent involvement of
senior members of Algeria's AUMA in region wide organisations, Bashir Ibrahimi,
for example, becoming president of the Comite d'unite et d'action Nord Africain in
1952, further helped convince many inside the Association of the efficacy and
importance of forming common fronts with other groupings. 56 A second impetus
towards unity with the nationalists was the rise to prominence within the
Association of Algerian Ulama of younger more radical figures who did not share
the older leadership's reticence over political activism. This stance was shared
with most of the Association's younger supporters in the schools and clubs.
Prominent among these were Tewfik Madani and Larbi Tebessi, the latter
becoming official leader of the Association inside Algeria following Ibrahimi's self-
56 Ageron: Histoire de L'Algerie pp.580-581
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imposed exile from Algeria in 1951 resulting from charges of misuse of funds
being brought against him. It was with Tebessi's assent that supporters of the
Association began seizing back control of the mosques from officially appointed
imams beginning in the reformists' heartland of Constantine in 1952.57
8. The War of Independence: 1954-1962
The launching of a series of attacks against institutions and members of the
colonial administration on 1 November 1954 marked what is now acknowledged
as the start of the armed struggle by native Algerians against French rule and for
independence. This seemingly inevitable development was generally welcomed
by Ibrahimi and those leaders around him who endorsed the rebel programme
shortly after the initial insurrection.55 The Association's general assembly which
convened in January 1955 published a manifesto in which it denounced
colonialism, declared that the only route to a peaceful solution would be through
recognition of the Algerian nation with its own government and institutions and
stated that the authorities should negotiate a truce with the leaders of the revolt.53
This backing for the nationalist insurrection was, however, soon to be put
under strain as the conflict grew and became more brutal on both sides and gaps
began to appear between the positions of Ibrahimi abroad and some of the
younger more nationalistic leadership inside Algeria. Use of terror by the FLN
(Front National de Liberation), the nationalist grouping that launched the struggle,
led to Ibrahimi retracting his initial endorsement and moving to an official position
of neither supporting nor opposing the uprising. In contrast, Tewfik Madani, in
line with his more radical and nationalist views, vigorously defended the armed
57 Christelow: Ritual, Culture and Politics pp.267-268
58 Henry F. Jackson: The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary
Society (Greenwood Press, Westport USA, 1977) p.28
59 Henri Alleg, Jacques de Bonis, Henri J. Douzon, Jean Freire and Pierre
Haudiquet: La Guerre d'Algerie Volume 2 (Temps Actuel, Paris, 1981) p.188
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campaign. It was thus of little surprise, in the face of a deepening of the conflict
and significant efforts on the part of the FLN to unite all of Algeria's native
organisations under its banner, that Madani announced his formal adherence to
the FLN in Cairo in April 1956. Joined in his declaration by Ferhat Abbas, these
adherences gave to the FLN the hegemony they wished and effectively rung the
death knell of the independence of both the Association of Algerian Ulama and
the various parties that had existed around Abbas. 60 By absorbing the other two
major trends that had existed alongside nationalism within native Algerian opinion
from the 1920s the nationalists of the FLN became increasingly the exclusive
embodiment of Algerian Muslim opinion after 1956. The gradual adherence of
virtually all of the AUMA's former supporters to the armed struggle of the FLN,
which frequently used them to set up its own religious apparatus, resulted in the
Association of Algerian Ulanna formally ceasing to exist after 1957.61
The subsummation of reformism into the FLN provided the latter with the
means of imbuing their struggle with religious legitimacy, clearly an important
goal for them and one that demonstrated the impact of the AUMA on Algeria.
From the initial attacks of November 1954 the rebels had assumed the
Islamically-inspired title of moujahadin - 'fighters of the faith.' Moreover, the FLN
proclaimed as one of its aims on the eve of the revolt: "The restoration of the
sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic
principles."62 Once the struggle matured from the early sporadic revolts and
guerrilla attacks, Islam continued to provide a symbolic underpinning for the war.
Jihad was frequently referred to and the importance of the observance of
Ramadan was emphasised by many military commanders, evoking echoes of Abd
al-Qadir's moral prescriptions for his troops in their fight against the French over
60 Jackson p.28
61 Christelow: Ritual, Culture and Politics pp.256-258
62 Quoted in Ruedy p.159•
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a century earlier. Islam too was used to coerce the less fervent in the struggle
through threats couched in religious terms. Jean-Claude Vatin describes these
developments as the reintroduction of Islam, by the leaders of the revolt, as a
"strategic weapon" to rally Algeria's Muslims to the cause. 63 Nevertheless, it
should not be ignored that many of the prominent leaders and top military
commanders in the struggle had devout religious backgrounds or legitimacy.64
Tewfik Madani and Taalbi Tayeb, another former member of the Association, sat
on the FLN's parliamentary body, the CNRA, following their joining of the party
and, more importantly, Madani was named as one of members of the GPRA, the
FLN's 'government-in-waiting' which was announced in September 1958 in
Cairo.65
Organisationally, the AUMA provided significant support to the FLN's cause.
The continued expansion of the Association's education network - the number of
schools it administered doubling from 90 in 1947 to 181 by 1954, with its
madrases alone providing an education for 40,000 pupils - provided important
logistical bases for the rebels. 66 Together with the reformist-run mosques they
also provided useful collection points for funds and centres for the spread of
information and the nationalist message. Sermons during the month of Ramadan,
in 1956 in particular, helped to stoke patriotic fervour and popular support for the
struggle. This contribution of the Association to the rebellion was acknowledged
by the French who shut down the group's newspaper, El Bacair, in April 1956 and
progressively shut down its institutions and seized its assets, sending some of its
63 Jean-Claude Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power in Algeria in
Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Editors): Islam and Power
(Croom Helm, London, 1981) p.146
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members to prison camps. By 1957 the Association ceased to have any real
institutional manifestation in the country.67
C: CONCLUSIONS
The eventual victory in 1962 of the Algerian nationalists in their war against
the French colonial state and the final achievement of full political independence
clearly opened a whole new chapter in both Algerian history and the role of Islam
and Islamism in it. However, it also closed a chapter: that of the role of Islam in
the colonial period.
1. Changes and Developments 1830-1962: From Traditional to Reformist
Islam
As has been shown, the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth
century in Algeria witnessed the rise of movements that explicitly based
themselves on the Islamic religion and which made significant incursions into the
field of politics and whose impact there was considerable.
However, these movements appeared to fall into two distinct camps that
were divided not only by their ideology, origins and social and geographic bases,
but also by their separate periods of dominance. The nineteenth century was
dominated by groups and movements that had their roots firmly in the institutions
and expressions of what has been broadly termed as 'traditional Islam' - that
which manifested itself through marabouts, sufi orders and the more mystical
expressions of Islam that had come to predominate in Algeria. Its nature and role
has been succinctly summed-up by Allan Christelow who has said it could be
defined as "ecstatic in style, predominantly rural in social foundations, and,
historically, as a major factor in resistance to the French colonial invasion up until
67 Alleg p.188; Christelow: . Ritual, Culture and Politics p.266
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the 1880s and as strongly tinged with collaborationism from World War I
onward."68
The effective crushing by the French of these movements by the 1880s and
the resistance they organised and articulated created a vacuum into which
eventually another movement stepped, one which although similarly basing itself
on Islam differed significantly from earlier movements. The reformist movement
that achieved eventual institutional expression through the Association of
Algerian Ulama was distinct from those of Abd al-Qadir, Bou Maza and the
various Madhist movements that had risen against the French in the mid
nineteenth century. It grounded itself theologically in scripturalist interpretations
of Islam, rather than ones based on entrenched local traditions and mysticism
and drew its inspiration from foreign thinkers and movements. It also emerged in
and appealed to a different section of Algerian society. Reformist Islam's open
hostility to the manifestations of these more traditional expressions of Islam
further underlined these differences.
The reasons for this shift from traditional to reformist Islam and its success
can be explained by reference to these fundamental distinctions between the two
forms. Whilst Traditional Islam played an important role in mobilising resistance
against the French in the nineteenth century, its roots were still essentially and
overwhelmingly Maghrebi and Algerian. The rise of Islamic reformism in the
twentieth century, in contrast, reflected ideas and movements whose origins
stretched wider and beyond North Africa. John Entelis, for example, sees the
growth of Islamic revivalism and reformism in Algeria as part of "the broader
awakening of Arab-Muslim consciousness that was taking place among the
peoples of the Middle East and North Africa during the inter-war period." 69 The
1920s, the decade which witnessed the first real growth and spread of reformist
65 Christelow: Algerian Islam p.124
69 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution institutionalized p.42
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ideas in Algeria, was also the period which saw the founding of the Muslim
Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. Whilst far more influential throughout
the Muslim world than Ben Badis and his followers, and differing in some
important ways from the movement in Algeria, the Brotherhood shared several
characteristics with the Association of Algerian Ulama: notably its emphasis on
such things as doctrinal purity, Arabic-Islamic education and moral social
behaviour. Both, of course, operated in the context of European colonial rule.
A second major feature of the shift from traditional to reformist Islam was
the change in the type of people involved in Islamic activism. As explained
earlier, when looking at the revolts of the nineteenth century, 'Islamic' resistance
to the French (according to a useful typology by John Ruedy) could be separated
into three basic types determined largely by geography: the defence of the old
deyical establishment in the larger towns and cities; the sufi-inspired movements
of the plains and small towns of the interior (of which Abd al-Qadir's was an
example) and Mandist uprisings of the more remote areas of the mountains and
the Sahara. 70
 It was quite clearly these last two that had a greater impact overall
and, moreover, had a greater and more recognisable 'Islamic' content than the
resistance in the towns and cities which was arguably more about the
maintenance and protection of the dominant social and political order.
The rise of reformist Islam in the twentieth century was largely an urban-
based phenomenon. Hugh Roberts explains the assault conducted by Ben Badis
and his followers on the doctrinal impurity, backwardness and collaborationism of
the marabouts as representing a clash between "urban, literate, bourgeois
society" and the "massively illiterate rural population."71 The victory and
subsequent "hegemony" established by the former over the latter was a new and
important development. This eclipsing of the old rural religious order has been
7° Ruedy p.67
71 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.561
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explained through reference to the rapid changes that occurred in Algeria's
economic and social geography from the closing decades of the nineteenth
century. French colonial policy, with its large-scale appropriations of Algerian-
owned land and its centralising of administrative controls in Algeria's towns and
cities, contributed, along with inherent demographic trends, to the growth in
importance of Algeria's urban areas. The more cosmopolitan nature of towns and
particularly cities (such as Constantine) opened Muslim inhabitants up not only to
ideas emanating from the Arab east, such as reformism, but also to European
and Western ideas that also contributed to the rise of reformism. 72 All Merad
argues that whilst the specifically religious aspects of Islamic reformism might not
have been particularly attractive to some Algerians, the movement's philosophical
utilisation of Western concepts of modernisation and individualism appealed
especially to the young. Such a stance contrasted starkly with the perceived
backwardness and ideological stagnation of the marabouts and the other
representatives of Traditional Islam. Nevertheless, Merad observes that the great
debate between reformism and 'maraboutism' in reality left the vast majority of
ordinary Algerians unmoved. It could therefore be concluded that it was the
qualities of reformism itself that attracted people rather than its perceived
advantages over Traditional Islam. The latter was neither ideologically,
organisationally nor demographically ready to form the basis of a vibrant and
influential Islamic movement in the twentieth century. That role could only
seriously be provided by a more urban, progressive and organised vehicle such
as that provided by Islamic reformism and Ben Badis's Association of Algerian
Ulama. As much as reformism appealed to "urban, literate, bourgeois society", it
also fed off of it. The involvement of the urban bourgeoisie, with their awareness
72 F. Colonna: Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria
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of modern ideas of mobilisation, organisation and propaganda (which of course
were growing in Europe in the inter-war years) meant that the Islamic movement
became more cohesive, more orthodox and was able to spread effectively its
ideas and recruit support from the other sections of society.74
In addition to its bourgeois following, significant support for the reformist
movement in the 1920s also came from a part of the Algerian upper middle class
which felt itself excluded from social and political advance within the French
colonial state. Whilst some other members of the upper middle class had opted
for 'Frenchification' culturally and educationally in order to achieve such an
advance, this group had not and had instead opted for what Jean-Claude Vatin
terms the "counter-code or counter-strategy" of reformist Islam which stressed the
importance of an Arabic and Islamic culture and identity.75
In noting the differences between 'traditional' and reformist Islam, it is,
however, possible to overstate the divide. Although different in many ways, both
were essentially expressions of the same set of fundamental religious beliefs.
The salafi reformism of Ben Badis and the AUMA certainly did not represent
some completely new variant of Islam. Henry Munson has stressed the actual
continuities that existed between traditional and reformist Islam and suggests that
the latter in many ways developed from the former as a means of combating the
challenge of European domination. He argues that sufism, in particular, had been
historically present in both 'popular' and more orthodox expressions of Islam and
that these links continued into the twentieth century with the rise of reformism. In
addition, Munson argues that the supposed rural-urban divide between the two is
over-emphasised - much of the leadership of the sufi taricias being drawn from
the same urban elite as their critics amongst the more orthodox urban ulama. In
this way, Munson argues that to classify Maghrebi Islam into two separate
74 Ibid. pp.437-438
75 Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power pp.142-144
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historically established camps - divided by ideology and the social and
geographical nature of their support is largely incorrect.76
As indicated, Munson's argument is important in preventing an
overstatement of the divide between popular and reformist Islam. However, in the
Algerian context, this divide was more important than Munson would assert.
Munson was writing specifically about the experience of Moroccan Islam and
although the continuities of experience between Algeria and its western
neighbour are historically substantial, Algeria was different in certain key ways.
Firstly, the various expressions of popular Islam were more deeply rooted in
Moroccan society as a whole and thus were more likely to have influence upon
other ideas, such as reformism, that arrived in Morocco. It is important to note
that it was in the part of Algeria that bordered Morocco, the western Oran region,
which provided the starting point for both the rebellions against the Ottomans and
Abd al-Qadir's revolt. As has been shown, both of these insurrections were led
and organised by the sufi tariqas and, moreover, were largely rural, rather than
urban, in origin. In contrast, the Association of Algerian Ulama emerged and
found their main source of support and strength in eastern Algeria around
Constantine where Popular Islam had traditionally been weaker and where more
orthodox forms of Islam had a stronger presence. n Correspondingly, as has been
noted, the movement was least influential in the western areas of the country
where marabouts and several of the tariqas resisted its incursion. 78 It was notable
also that Ben Badis and most of the other senior founding figures of the AUMA
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Haven and London, 1993) pp.81-87
77 One of the reasons for the more orthodox complexion of the Constantine region
of Algeria was its close proximity to Tunisia which was home to a large number of
established centres of Islamic learning which with their emphasis on classical
Arabic and study of the holy texts reinforced more orthodox expressions of Islam.
Abdelhamid Ben Badis as well as many of the other senior figures in the AUMA
had studied in Tunis. Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.193
76 See Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman pp.193-194
44
came from what Abun-Nasr has described as "comfortable urban surroundings
(Italics added)."79
 A second difference with the Moroccan experience was the
relative absence of elements of sufism and popular Islam in the Algerian reformist
movement compared to that in Morocco, the latter retaining many social and
ideological links with the more traditional expressions of Islam. By contrast, there
had been an extended debate within the AUMA during the early 1930s over
whether the Association should retain a highly selective membership in order to
prevent infiltration by maraboutist elements. 80 Both Moroccan and Algerian
reformism came from the same eastern Arab sources and were both hostile to
many of the manifestations of Popular Islam, but the Algerian reformists were far
less qualified in their antipathy than their Moroccan counter-parts.81
2. Reformism and Nationalism
It was the formation of a cultural 'counter-code' that registered as reformist
Islam's greatest impact on Algeria during the colonial period, an impact that
ironically far outweighed any advances they may have made in their central field
of religious education. It is universally acknowledged that the AUMA made a
specific and vital contribution to Algerian nationalism (and thus Algerian
independence) through its defining and forging of an Algerian national identity
and consciousness that was much more accessible and understandable to the
mass of ordinary Muslims than the more complex and essentially foreign notions
and ideas of liberalism and socialism articulated by the likes of Messali Hadj and
Ferhat Abbas. The Association of Algerian Ulama's motto "Islam is my religion,
Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country" succinctly indicated those things
79 Abun-Nasr p.334
80 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.126
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that made Algeria's Muslims distinct from their European Christian rulers. The
particular importance of Islam here should not be underestimated. It could be
argued that a nationalist consciousness could have been formed on the basis of
either or both of the other two parts of the motto: language and territory. All three
elements are almost organically linked (Arabic, for example, being the language
of the Quran) but Islam played the role of an over-arching ideology which had the
advantage over other ideologies, such as Marxism and liberalism, in being truly a
religion and more importantly in being pre-colonial and near indigenous in origin.
As Rachid Tlenncani asserts: "It was the only cultural current able to challenge
colonial ideology which was aimed at the moral conquest of the native population
from the beginning."82 The fact that the French had made at times quite concerted
efforts to undermine, co-opt and ultimately destroy Algerian Islam probably
heightened the importance of it in the popular Algerian mind as something that
stood against French domination.
The role of the French and of French policy did, ironically, contribute
significantly towards the impact made by reformist Islam. The nature of the policy
pursued by the colonial authorities boosted and raised the profile of the AUMA.
Abun-Nasr points to "the failure of the French to assimilate large numbers of
young Algerians culturally" which prevented the rise of a French-educated
opposition movement. 83 Even when those Muslim Algerians who had received a
French education, such as Ferhat Abbas and his liberal assimilationists, tried to
represent Algerian aspirations and interests, the refusal of the French to make
any concessions to them undermined them and their agenda and opened the way
for the reformists. As Entelis points out:
82 Rachid Tlemcani: State and Revolution in Algeria (Zed, London, 1981) PP.51-
52
83 Abun-Nasr pp.271-272
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"The discrediting of indigenous secular movements by the colonial power
allowed Islam to arise as the only legitimate and popular ideological rallying
cry around which all Algerians could unify."84
More fundamentally, Entelis goes on to argue that the simple fact of the
French presence and their policy was more crucial to an understanding of the rise
of an Algerian national consciousness based around Islam than the specifics of
the reformist ulama and their programme:
"There can be no doubt that, however profound the Islamic identity at the
individual or community level remained, it was the disruptive nature of French
colonial policy that ultimately provoked the aggressive reassertion of an
indigenous Algerian identity with strong ties to native Islamic culture.'
Nevertheless, the incorporation of Islamic symbols and themes, alongside
more modern ones, into the programmes and propaganda of overt nationalists
such as Messali Hadj and the PPA was a clear recognition of the important role
Islam had come to play by the 1930s. Their coexistence there with more clearly
Marxist-influenced elements may well have been due to a genuine belief in the
compatibility and importance of Islamic and socialist ideas or perhaps to Messali
Hadj's, for example, involvement in the Sufi brotherhoods in his youth. The most
likely reason for the inclusion of Islamic values and symbols in the nationalists'
agenda, though, was the evident support they had enjoyed when used by Ben
Badis and the AUMA. 66 The first major nationalist unrest at Setif in May 1945, for
example, saw the use of Islamic symbols and rallying cries by the rebels who
spoke of jihad and, interestingly, raised the green and white banner of Abd al-
Qadir.67
 The reformists had clearly won the argument, in the minds of the
Algerian people, with the assimilationists over the issue in the 1930s of the
84 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.42
85 Ibid. p.76
88 Ibid. pp.45-47
87 Home pp.24-26
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existence of the Algerian nation and people. Indeed, Ben Badis's rebuttal of
Ferhat Abbas's article in 1936 had, according to Abun Nasr, "a deep impact on
the political consciousness of the Algerian Muslims." 88 Indeed some historians
have gone further and suggested that "nationalism proper" had been born with
the founding of the Association of Algerian Ulama in 1931.89
3. The Reformist Agenda
The Association of Algerian Ulama's increasing involvement in and eventual
formal absorption by essentially political questions and movements clearly
confused identification of the organisation's central goals and ideology. Ali
Merad speaks of the movement's "progressive slide towards areas certainly far
from its primary vocation."93 This slide was the result of the steady growth in
importance of the issue of the exact status of Algeria and its indigenous
population vis a vis France. The incursion of this overwhelmingly political question
into the considerations and activities of the AUMA, which had unambiguously
declared its intention to avoid politics, was largely the result of a growing number
of its own, predominantly younger, supporters becoming involved in the issue.
More importantly, it was also due to the political implications and impact the
Association's essentially cultural agenda (with its emphasis on Islam and Arabic)
and work had on the whole issue.
Nevertheless, the ease with which the politicians of the FLN, in particular,
were able to subordinate the organisation to its control has led to suggestions
that this indicated that the Association had retained its essentially religious and
cultural character. It had, for example, made no rival bid for the political
leadership of the nationalist movement. 91 Even if such leadership had been
88 Abun-Nasr p.335
89 Ageron: Modern Algeria p.94
Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.433
91 Colonna p.248
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desired, the Association would have been unable to achieve it. Alistair Home,
the foremost Anglo-Saxon historian of the Algerian independence struggle,
attributes the political eclipse of the AUMA during the war as being the result of
its leadership's fundamental unsuitability to political activism because "tied up in
their theological coils, they failed to find pragmatic applications for their
doctrines."92 Abdelhamid Ben Badis had himself addressed issues of a political
character in his writings, in Shihab, in particular, but these did not contain many
tangible proposals for a future Islamic political order (preferring to stick largely to
broad principles and a critique of the existing order). 93 The death of Ben Badis in
1940 deprived the AUMA not only of its leader but of any more detailed thoughts
and ideas he may have produced in reaction to developments in the political field.
It was an area he had only just begun to venture into at the time of his death, and
one which was to come to overshadow so much of the Association's activities in
the following two decades.
If, then, the reforrnists of the AUMA succeeded in fundamentally retaining
their original religious character and agenda, what advances did they make in
this, their chosen field during this period? The reality was that only fairly limited
progress had been achieved in the Association's central stated objective of
spreading the reformist message and reviving scripturally based belief and
behaviour amongst Algeria's Muslim population. All Merad believes that the
popularity of the movement in the 1930s, which surpassed that of all other native
movements in the inter-war period, was due not to its religious agenda but to its
presentation of a range of principles (such as cultural renewal and
disInctiveness, social progress) that could find support even amongst those "still
92 Home p.38
93 For a detailed analysis of Ben Badis's writings on politics and political issues
see All Merad: Ibn Badis: Commentateur du Coran (Librarie Orientaliste Paul
Geuthner, France, 1977) pp.202-217.
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indifferent to religious propaganda." 94 For young Algerians in particular who might
otherwise have been put off by the severity of some of the Association's moral
prescriptions (alcohol, tobacco, dancing, music and sport being "rigorously
condemned"95) "the reformist movement of Ben Badis represented more of a
source of political enthusiasm and cultural emotion than a school of moral and
religious discipline."96
The failure of the reformists to inculcate a significant section of the Algerian
population with their specific ideas and values was counter-balanced by the
obvious success that had been achieved in making people considerably more
aware and appreciative of Islam generally, as indicated by the nationalists' use of
religious symbols and language. However, it was also argued that through its
ferocious assault on the traditional expressions of Algerian Islam, the Association
actually served to weaken the implantation and observance of Islam in the
country. By attacking, on religious grounds, the most deep-rooted forms of Islam
in Algeria it perhaps deprived many areas of an Islamic tradition that might be
essential to the survival of the religion in the face of future non-religious
challenges.97 The rapid progress that secular forms of nationalism made both
during the war of liberation and afterwards were perhaps in part facilitated by this
aspect of the reformists' agenda.95
94 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.435
95 Home p.38
96 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman p.209
97 Ruedy pp.1 35-1 36
95 Merad: Le Reformisme Musulman pp.438-439
2
ISLAM IN THE NEW STATE: 1962 - 1978
A: BEN BELLA'S REIGN: 1962-1965
1. Independence
The final achievement of independence in June 1962 shifted the whole
focus of Algerian activity and attention away from the all-consuming struggle
against the French and towards the construction and consolidation of their new
state. Fracturing inevitably occurred in the institutional front and hegemony that
the FLN had been able to forge during the nearly eight years of the war of
liberation as different ideological, regional, personal and factional interests
engaged in a struggle for pre-eminence. However, whilst liberals, Marxists,
internal and external army commanders, the wilaya commanders, the imprisoned
leaders and Berber-based factions entered the political and occasionally armed
competition for influence, an independent and identifiable lobby arguing for a
specifically Islamically-based Algeria was notably absent. The Islamic current, so
robustly represented by the Association of Algerian Ulama in the two decades
preceding the war of liberation, had been sidelined during the struggle, its
absorption by the FLN, in contrast to other groupings that joined the front, having
deprived it of its independent voice and agenda.
As has been shown (see previous chapter) the religious and cultural
nature of the AUMA meant it presented no serious challenge to the organised,
specifically political, elements within the FLN. Moreover, the formal adherence of
the majority of the members of the Association from 1956, together with France's
resultant dissolution and break-up of the Association's institutional base of
schools and clubs, effectively ended the AUMA's existence as a distinct and
independent entity. The death and dispersal of many of its senior figures during
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the war further accelerated this process leaving the tendency as a whole in no
real position to assert itself following independence.1
Yet as had been the case in the run-up and during the war, it was the
AUMA's ideological rather than institutional contribution to the Algerian political
scene that was its most important achievement in the period following
independence. The presence of powerful competing ideas inside the FLN
ensured that the specifically Islamic state, based upon sharia law, was never
likely to be achieved. Such a demand had been made by Tewfik Madani and
other former members of the AUMA during debates in the various organs of the
FLN during the war, but these debates had proved inconclusive. Nevertheless,
Islam and Islamic symbols were still clearly present in the debate and formulation
of the new state. 2 In the initial power struggles between the various factions and
leaders of the FLN in the wake of independence reformist Islam was regularly
invoked by all the main contenders to bolster the legitimacy of their claims to
power. This both recognised and reinforced the ideological primacy of reformism
in both the foundations of the new state and in the popular perceptions of
ordinary Algerians.3
The adoption of the AUMA's slogan 'Islam is my religion, Arabic is my
language and Algeria is my country' as independent Algeria's national slogan was
tangible recognition of the contribution reformist Islam had made to the national
struggle.4 It was notable that it was specifically reformist Islam, rather than just
Islam generally or the traditional Islam of the marabouts and sufi brotherhoods,
that was accorded this recognition. The detailing in Algeria's first post-
1 Christelow: Ritual, Culture and Politics p.268
2 This issue of an Islamic state had been debated notably at the meeting of the
CNRA (the FLN's parliament in exile) in Cairo in August 1957 where Tewfik and
his supporters had clashed with elements demanding a European style liberal
parliamentary regime. Jackson p.49
3 Peter R. Knauss: The Persistence of Patriarchy: Class, Gender and Ideology in
Twentieth Century Algeria (Praeger, New York, 1987) p.101
4 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.42
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independence constitution that Islam was to be the religion of state and that the
country's president must be a Muslim5 was further evidence of this significant
ideological influence. It overid the strong liberal, Marxist and nationalist strains
within the FLN were naturally inclined towards more secular forms of state and
constitution.6
Any renewed attempt on the part of reformist Islam, to play a more tangible
and active role in both the formulation and governing of the new Algerian state
was, however, precluded. Tewfik Madani was given a minor ministerial position
(that responsible for habous or religious trusts) in the post independence
governments but he remained the sole and increasingly pliant representative of
the former AUMA in the new regime. This effective exclusion from influence was
attributable to two main factors, in addition to the explained weakness of the
movement in 1962. Firstly, the desire of the FLN during wartime to subordinate
religion and the AUMA to the party's control persisted into the designs and
structures of the new state. Religion and all groups or tendencies referring to or
basing themselves on Islamic principles were effectively co-opted and controlled
by the authorities of the new state. 7 This desire on the part of the FLN to
dominate nearly all aspects of Algerian life, including religion, after independence
was certainly partly due to the thinly disguised ambition of several of the major
figures in the party who strove to control the FLN and through it the new state
itself. However there were other, ideological, reasons for this tendency which
explain the second major constraint on the ulama in the period after
independence.
5 William b. Quandt: Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1969) p.217
6 Ernest Gellner argues that support for a formally secular independent state
declined when it became clear, following the flight of the virtual entirety of
Algeria's European inhabitants at independence, that independent Algeria's non-
Muslim population was likely to be negligible in size. Gellner pp.167-168
7 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.81; Vatin: Religious
Resistance and State power p.123
53
2. 'Muslim Socialism'
The reformist ideology of the AUMA, whilst prevailing over other
expressions of Islam in independent Algeria, was challenged by another, secular,
ideology which threatened to hold sway in the counsels of the leadership of the
new state. The ideology of socialism in its various doctrinal forms had first
become prominent in Algeria in the inter-war period, finding particular
manifestation in the work, ideas and organisations of Messali Hadj. During the
war of independence itself, a remarkable consensus emerged amongst the FLN
and its constituent elements that independent Algeria would be socialist. 8 This
was a conviction common to most other nationalist movements in the
decolonising world of the 1940s, 50s and 60s; socialism being viewed as the
most appropriate means of achieving social and economic progress.
An outspoken advocate of Algeria's adoption of socialism was Ahmed Ben
Bella the senior FLN figure who triumphed in the power struggle against other
FLN leaders and who duly became independent Algeria's first President. Three
months before the official proclamation of Algerian independence, the future
President unambiguously declared that "Algeria will have a socialist
government: 19 However, whilst he pressed ahead with what he saw as a 'socialist'
programme, largely involving the take-over of land, businesses and property
abandoned by the departed colons (which in many ways made socialist-style
nationalisation unavoidable) the more fundamental question of state ideology
needed to be addressed. Although Ben Bella's government initially adopted no
coherently recognisable or defined socialist ideologylo, many of the basic tenets
8 Raymond Vallin: Muslim Socialism in Algeria in I. William Zartman: Man, State
and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib (Pall Mall Press, London, 1973)
50PP- 51-
9 Agence France-Presse despatch, 1.4.62 quoted by Vallin p.50
10 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.58
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of socialism as practised in other countries, particularly the inherent secularism
and atheism of more Marxist ideas, appeared to clash with the influential religious
ideology of reformist Islam.
Ben Bella was aware of this potential clash and how potentially damaging
it could be to popular support for and perceptions of his new government.
Reformist Islam had made a considerable contribution to the popular and
psychological foundations of the new state. Ben Bella had himself appealed to
Islamic sentiments and symbols to aid his victory in the leadership struggle.
Consequently, he set about trying to 'merge' the ideology of socialism with that of
Islam. Undoubtedly building on Gamal Abdul Nasser's concept of 'socialism in
Islam' in Egypt, Ben Bella constantly pushed the concept of 'Islamic socialism'
and the compatibility of Islam and socialism. To elaborate on this theme Ben
Bella made particular use of the official press as well as Tewfik Madani, who, as a
minister, proclaimed in January 1963 that "Islam is a socialist religion, it is a
religion of equity." 11 More formally, the Algiers Charter of 1964, which aimed to
clarify the organisation and make-up of the new state, declared socialism to be
totally consistent with the nation's Arabo-Islamic heritage.12
3. The Rise of Islamic Opposition and Criticism: 1962-1965
Ben Bella's efforts to create his vision of a socialist Algeria were continually
hampered over the next few years by an awareness on the part of the new
President that many Algerians were far from convinced of his equation of his
socialist programme with Islam. Despite the institutional decline of the AUMA,
attachment to the Islamic values of the Association remained strong in many
quarters, including amongst some senior figures within the leadership of the FLN
and the army. Criticism of his removal of several religious figures from the
11 Quoted by Vallin p.51
12 Ruedy p.204
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government during the first year of his presidency was voiced both outside and,
undoubtedly, within the regime. This prompted Ben Bella to introduce a series of
measures aimed at placating this criticism. The government made the Ramadan
fast and the charity offering that ended it national duties in January 1963. Later
that year the government reversed its liberalisation of the sale and consumption
of alcohol, which had been banned under the wartime wilaya administration of the
FLN, but which Ben Bella had considered unnecessary following independence.
Government decrees of 28 December 1963 forbade Muslims to drink alcohol,
closed down cafés and raised taxes on alcohol.13
Such measures did not succeed in stemming religiously-based unease at
Ben Bella's rule. The government's expanding nationalisation drive provoked
opposition, as Raymond Vallin comments:
"Islamic socialism also caused concern among religious people and
prominent personalities known for their religious zeal, who considered it
imprudent,if not sacrilegious to erase thirteen centuries of consensus on
religious property and fall into an arbitrary collectivism whose origins were
foreign to Algeria and to Islam."14
This concern proved not to be purely passive. As Peter R. Knauss adds:
"Ben Bella appeared to be veering leftward and this provoked Muslim
traditionalists to come out of hiding."15 Some of the first of these 'traditionalists' to
make their opinions known were former members of the Association of Algerian
Ulama itself. Whilst most of the Association had been co-opted and neutralised
by the FLN, there were still those figures who were able and willing to voice their
unhappiness at the course independent Algeria was taking. Prominent among
these was Bashir lbrahimi, the former head of the Association, who had, in
contrast to most of the rest of the Association, kept his distance from the FLN
13 Vallin p.50 & p.55
14 Ibid. p.56
15 Knauss p.105
56
during the liberation struggle (see previous chapter) and thus felt free to use
formal platforms to criticise the government's direction. In the FLN party congress
of April 1964, which was boycotted by a number of sections of the party which
Ben Bella had also succeeded in alienating, Ibrahimi made a clear appeal,
reflecting unease at the growing opposition to the government throughout Algeria.
During the vigorous debate over the relationship between Islam and socialism
that took place at the congress, he declared:
"The hour is grave. Our country is sliding nearer and nearer to hopeless civil
war, an unprecedented moral crisis and insurmountable economic difficulties.
Those governing us do not seem to realise that what our people aspire to
above all is unity, peace and prosperity and that the theories on which their
actions should be founded are to be found not in foreign doctrines but in our
Arab-Islamic roots."16
The former president of the AUMA's message was well received across
many sections of Algerian society but inevitably not by the government itself. Ben
Bella put under house arrest the man whom he had personally welcomed back
from exile in 1962.17
Once again the government felt obliged to show some sign of concession
to conservative religious opinion. In September 1964, the President replaced the
leftist editor of the influential journal Revolution Afticaine with an appointee who
began to put greater emphasis on Algeria's Islamic nature and who drew attention
to the government's programme of rural mosque-building. 18 Later that Autumn,
with opposition to his regime and policies still mounting from all quarters, Ben
Bella pushed several overt Marxists out of the government and in education
'Arabised' the first year of primary school and made religious training
16 Quoted in ArsIan Humbaraci: Algeria: A Revolution That Failed (Pall Mall
Press, London, 1966) p.237
17 Vallin p.57
18 Quandt pp.230-231
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compulsory. 19 Many Algerians were still highly sceptical of the real significance of
these changes, having regarded the references to Islam in the Algiers Charter of
1964 (which in truth were eleventh hour additions) as largely cosnnetic. 2° This
scepticism was undoubtedly reinforced by a renewed drive by the regime to instil
socialist values using both the officially controlled media and its allies in the
socialist labour unions (such as the UGTA which had launched virulent attacks
against Ibrahimi's views). 21
 More importantly, the remaining religious figures in
the government, mainly old AUMA figures, were finally purged in December 1964.
Yet the importance of the AUMA and their views remained amongst the Algerian
population and when Bashir Ibrahimi died in May 1965, his funeral was heavily
attended, a fact interpreted by many as "a veiled demonstration by the more
conservative elements against Ben Bella's socialist policies."22
4. The Emergence of Al Qiyam
Islamic opposition to the regime also took a more organised form during
these opening years of Algerian independence. The Al Qiyam (Values)
association made its first real impact in Algeria by holding a meeting in January
1964 in Algiers which was attended by several thousand people.23 Ostensibly
gathering to protest at the continuing influence of French culture in independent
Algeria and to demand that the government take more steps to promote Arabic
and respect for Islamic values, the association became a focus for both popular
19 Vallin p.59
20 Ruedy p.204
21 Vallin p.60
22 David and Marina Ottaway: Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution
(University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970) p.47n There
are no available figures for the actual attendance at the funeral, but the Ottaways
speak of "an enormous crowd."
23 Estimates vary on the numbers attending. David and Marina Ottaway speak of
3,000 (Ottaway and Ottaway p.179); Raymond Vallin of 3,000-4,000 (Vallin p.56)
and Hugh Roberts states that "up to 5,000" attended the association's various
meetings during this period (Roberts: Radical Islamism p.564).
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protest against the regime and for independent Islamic criticism of the direction of
government policy.24
Using public meetings and its own journals, such as Humanisme
Musulman, Al Qiyam promoted, in much the same fashion as the Association of
Algerian Ulama had done in the inter-war period, their analysis and cure for the
ills of Algerian society. Containing several former members of the AUMA, the
new association consciously presented itself as the inheritor of Abdelhamid Ben
Badis and his movement. 25 Philosophically, the President of the association,
Hachemi Tijani, secretary-general of the University of Algiers, affirmed in an
interview in 1964 that he identified with the views of the main pillars of the Islamic
reformist movement such as Jamal al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (who of
course had had a substantial influence on Ben Badis and the leaders of the
AUMA).26
Hachemi Tijani also specifically identified with more recent writers, thinkers
and activists, such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, who took a far more
radical view of the need and means of reintroducing Islamic values back into
Muslim societies. Qutb, for example, a senior member of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, comprehensively rejected the conviction of reformist Islam that
western technology and ideas could be used selectively to promote Islam and
combat western influence and dominance. Instead, as he outlined in his book
Signposts, Qutb argued that Muslim societies had become so polluted by western
and non-Islamic influences that nothing short of a 'revolution' to drive out such
alien influences could succeed in restoring them to the point which they could
24 Ottaway and Ottaway p.179n
25 Jean-Claude Vatin: Popular Puritanism Versus State Reformism: Islam in
Algeria in James P. Piscatori: Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1983) p.104
26 Francois Burgat and William Dowell: The Islamic Movement of North Africa
(Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Texas at Austin, 1993)
pp.253-254
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again be seen as truly 'Islamic' societies. 27 Such radicalism was indeed reflected
in both the publications and occasionally the activities of Al Qiyam, members of
the association distributing tracts by al-Banna and Qutb as well as other radical
Islamist thinkers such as the Pakistani Abu al-Ara Maududi. 28 All non-Islamic
influences, ancient and modern, were anathematised by the association.
Members of Al Qiyam were involved in an attack on statues in a Roman theatre in
Guelma29 and more seriously Humanisme Musulman declared, for example, in
1965 that:
"All political parties, all regimes and all leaders which do not base themselves
on Islam are decreed illegal and dangerous. A communist party, a secular
party, a Marxist party, a nationalist party (the latter putting in question the
unity of the Muslim world) cannot exist in the land of Islam:9'3
The actual impact made by Al Qiyam is difficult to assess. Peter Knauss
characterises the association as an "organisation of teachers, businessmen,
salaried workers, and imams" and it is certainly true that it had a fairly
distinguished and middle-class membership profile. 31 Indeed it had a number of
sympathisers within and close to the regime including Mohammed '<hider, one of
the 'historic chiefs' of the revolutionary FLN, who often spoke in support of the
objectives of the association and attended the January 1964 meeting. 32 Many
27 For a fuller explanation of the ideas and work of Sayyid Qutb see Gilles Kepel:
The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt (Al Saqi, London, 1985)
pp.43-59
Abderrahim Lamchichi: L'Algërie en Crise (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1991) p.322
29 Mohammed Arkoun: Algeria in Shireen T. Hunter: The Politics of Islamic
Revivalism (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988)
pp.172-173
3° Humanisme Musulman August 1965. Translation from Roberts: Radical
Islamism pp.563-564
31 Knauss p.104
32 Quandt p.223n. There were several known sympathisers of Al Qiyam and its
agenda within Ben Bella's cabinet and close to the President himself, such as Ali
Mahsas, Safi Boudissa and Mohammed Seghir Nekkache. Mohammed Harbi:
L'Islamisme dans tous ses Etats (Arcantere, Paris, 1991) p.133
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contemporary observers, however, believed that the conservative and morally
severe nature of the association's vocabulary and agenda would not only limit its
appeal to the progressive minded but also laid it open to ridicule from the
Government and socialist press. 33 Al Qiyam's reliance on French to promote their
ideas (the French language edition of Humanisme Musulman, for example,
outsold its Arabic edition) was also seen as undermining the association's
demand for greater use of Arabic.34
The influence of the association was, however, certainly greater than
these observers estimated. Many, particularly young, Algerians may well have
been put off by the anti-modernism of Al-Qiyam, but many more shared the
unease of the association at the direction of Ben Bella's government. Far from
undermining its position, Al-Qiyam, by publishing in French, was clearly aiming
to achieve a wider audience for its ideas.
More fundamentally, the activities and ideas of Al Qiyam put further
pressure on Ben Bella's increasingly isolated and beleaguered regime, which
although never directly challenging the state, served to undermine the legitimacy
of those in govemment. 35 The concern with which the regime viewed the
activities of Al Qiyam was demonstrated by the eviction of the association's
president, Tijani, from his post at the University of Algiers in 1964. 36 The rise of
the association was also a symptom as well as a cause of Algeria's growing
problems at this time. For Hugh Roberts the emergence of the association was
evidence of the regime's loss of control of the important "religious sphere" of
33 See Vallin p.56
34 Ottaway and Ottaway pp.45-46
35 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.563; Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power
p.136
36 Abderrahim Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algdrie (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1992)
p.95
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Algerian politics and life, Ben Bella being unable to find a single senior religious
figure to condemn Al Qiyam on religious grounds.37
5.Boumedienne's Coup
Al Qiyam and the body of opinion it represented was just one of the
sections of Algerian society that became increasingly hostile to Ben Bella during
the first years of independence. Lack of any coherent progress in the area of
economy, constant political manoeuvring and shifting of alliances and
government personnel and the doctrinaire policies he seemed intent on pursuing,
gradually deprived the President of any true allies outside his close personal
circle and elements of the far left. Such isolation meant that when the army, which
had become increasingly and fatally alienated from the government, finally
ousted Ben Bella in a bloodless coup on 19 June 1965, there was virtually no
public protest or resistance.
The leader of the coup and the new president was Colonel Houari
Boumedienne, the vice-president and the commander of the army. A large part of
Boumedienne's critique and opposition to Ben Bella, which became increasingly
open in the closing stages of the latter's period of rule, was couched in religious
terms. Boumedienne, who had attended both an Islamic school and the Ben
Badis Institute in Constantine38, used many of the arguments articulated by the
regime's religious opponents from both the dissident elements of the old AUMA
and even Al Qiyam to attack Ben Bella's policies. His stress on the importance of
Algeria's Islamic roots won him significant support amongst the Islamist camp
many of whom explicitly welcomed Ben Bella's downfall, sending an official
communique proclaiming their solidarity and support for the new 'Council of the
37 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.564
38 Knauss p.87
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Revolution' and thus becoming the first group to publicly come out in favour of the
coup.39
The Ulama were mistaken in believing that Boumedienne and the army
acted primarily to defend the place of reformist Islamic values in Algeria. Despite
his religious background and the support many in the army had given to the
Islamists' critique of Ben Bella's rule 40, Boumedienne was aware of the extra
popularity and support he could gain by 'playing the religious card.' He did not
hesitate to use it in his growing struggle against Ben Bella; a feud which had its
origins more in personal and political rivalry than in attachment to Islam. As David
and Marina Ottaway comment, "Boumedienne's opposition to Ben Bella's policies
was veiled behind a pseudo-religious argument over the compatibility of Marxist
socialism."41 Boumedienne's stress on the importance of Algeria's Arab and
Islamic past and identity and his support for the Islamic criticism of the influence
of foreign ideas reflected more a nationalism on the part of himself and the army
(whose leadership had received favourably Ibrahimi's statement at the 1964
Congress) than anything more clearly religious. Their criticism of the principles
of the 1964 Algiers Charter was based more on their dislike of the principles'
foreign origins than any unhappiness at their lack of basis in the Quran and the
hadiths. 43
39 Quandt p.238; Knauss p.107
4° Jackson p.181
41 Ottaway and Ottaway p.179
42 Humbaraci p.237
43 Ottaway and Ottaway pp.179-180. Boumedienne and the army's hostility to
Marxism was also due to a concern that Ben Bella's strenthening links with the
Algerian Communist Party and the UGTA would give the President the allies he
needed to oust Boumedienne and the other army commanders.
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B: THE BOUMEDIENNE ERA: 1965 -1978
1. Boumedienne and the Islamic Opposition 1965-1971: Incorporation and
Repression
Given Boumedienne's opportunistic use of Islam it was not surprising that
once again the Islamic tendency in its various shades found itself largely
excluded from the centres of power in the new regime. However, aware of the
damage the current had been able to inflict on Ben Bella, Boumedienne's new
government sought to handle this exclusion with more deftness than its
predecessor. The new strategy of dealing with the Islamic 'movement' that
Boumedienne adopted from 1965 has been characterised by Hugh Roberts as
having two main elements. Towards Al Qiyam, in particular, the new government
pursued a strategy "combining the suppression of the association with the
selective incorporation of its programme."44
The 'selective incorporation' of Al Qiyam's agenda was arguably the more
important part of the strategy, since it appeared to succeed in presenting an
Islamic image for the government whilst not appearing to be making token and
cosmetic concessions as the Ben Bella government had done. From the outset
Boumedienne's new government took care to put the regime on a broader footing
including many of the elements and interests that Ben Bella had excluded and
which eventually had caused his downfall. In practical terms this meant, for
example, the appointment of Bashir Ibrahimi's son, Ahmed Taleb, to be a director
of national education. 45 More subliminally, this policy meant a more meticulously
built-up Islamic image for the regime which culminated in the Autumn of 1970 with
the announcing by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Mouloud Kassim, of a major
44 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.564
45 M. AI-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau and Franck Frêgosi: L'Algêrie par ses
Islamistes (Karthala, Paris, 1991) p.25
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campaign on the part of the state against the 'degradation of morals' in Algeria.
Publicised through a significant three-month campaign in the media involving
interviews and round table discussions, the campaign skilfully wove together
nationalist and Islamic concerns arguing that the social evils of "alcoholism",
"semi-nudity" in dress and the break-up of families were directly attributable to
the West and its pernicious values.47
In tandem with this 'selective incorporation' of the Islamic agenda, the
authorities also embarked on a progressive repression of the institutional
manifestations of the Islamist movement. A prefectoral decree in September
1966 ordered the dissolution of Al Qiyam in the wilaya (region) of Algiers and
three-and-a-half years later a ministerial decree banned altogether the
association in Algeria. Although the timing of both moves was prompted by
specific events, the sending of protest letters to Nasser following his execution of
Sayyid Qutb in 1966 and continued attacks against 'improperly dressed' women
on the streets in 1970, this repression was clearly part of a general plan on the
part of the regime to neutralise Islamic opposition to the regime.48
These policies of repression and incorporation were usefully combined in
the crushing of social unrest that occurred in Mostaganem in eastern Algeria in
1968. Led by the Alouia sufi brotherhood, these disturbances presented the
government with the opportunity of moving against religious-led opposition whilst
being able to clothe its repression in Islamic garb. The government press and
officials rejuvenated the original rhetoric of Ben Badis and the Islamic reformists
of the 1920s and 1930s by railing against the 'mysticism', 'obscurantism' and
48 Ahmed Rouadjia: Les Frères et la Mosquee: Enquéte sur la Mouvement
Islamiste en Algèrie (Karthala, Paris, 1990) p.22
47 El Moudjahid 29.9.70 & 25.12.70 quoted in Bernard Cubertafond: La
ROpublique Algêrienne Democratique et Populaire (Presses Universitaires de
France, Limoges, 1979) p.88-89
48 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algèrie p.95; Bruno Etienne: L'Islamisme Radical
(Hachette, France, 1987) p.219
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'neo-paganism' of the sufi brotherhoods and the marabouts, thus appearing to
align themselves with the heritage of Ben Badis and the AUMA.49
2. The Reassertion of the State
The period 1965-71 was marked by the government's success in controlling
the growth of a sizeable opposition movement based on Islam. The use of the
twin pronged strategy of repression and incorporation had meant that far from
'bowing to the demands of the Islamist lobby, the government had effectively 'de-
fanged' organisations like Al Qiyam by undercutting their agenda and then
moving to break them up. 50
Other factors besides this central strategy helped Boumedienne's regime
achieve this. The new President's "opportunistic remobilisation of nationalist
fervour", in the view of Hugh Roberts, was useful in staving-off the growth of
Islamically based opposition. This was particularly the case with Algeria's
successful 'riding out' of the psychological storm which hit the Arab world
generally following the Arab states' catastrophic and comprehensive defeat by
Israel in the Six Day War of June 1967. For many states, particularly in the
eastern Arab world, the defeat presaged a significant growth in Islamic opposition
groups within states as the abrupt breaking of the ideological spell of Nasser's
Arab nationalism left many Arabs believing that it was the secular nature of their
regimes, which had turned their back on Islam, that was largely to blame for the
rout on the battlefield. Boumedienne, however, maintained and even rallied
support for his regime by roundly criticising Nasser's capitulation to the Israelis.
He was helped in this by the recentness of the Algerian revolution which gave the
Algerian regime far greater popular legitimacy than the regimes of the Arab east
49 Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power p.136; Vatin: Popular Puritanism
Versus State Reformism p.116
5° Roberts: Radical Islamism p.565
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that had come to power largely through coups, colonial patronage or quasi-
dynastic succession. Boumedienne built on this legacy through nationalisations
and the building-up of local government in the late 1960s which undoubtedly
added to his popularity and legitimacy in the public's eye.51
Boumedienne was also infinitely more skilful than his predecessor in
handling religious opinion towards his still essentially secular political, social and
economic programme. Much greater effort and care was taken to marry and
merge leftist and socialist concepts and policies to Islam. For example, the
government showed more sophistication in arguing that the doctrine of selective
use of westernisation and progress inherent in the reformist Islamic thinking of
Afghani, Abdu and, of course, Ben Badis, was essentially the same as that found
in socialist ideas of modernisation. Both employed the central idea of the
transformation of society through progressive thinking derived from doctrine.52
Whilst generally this approach appeared to be successful in so much as it did not
provoke any high profiled rebuttal of the sort given by Bashir lbrahimi in April
1964, it did not always go unchallenged. In 1968, for example, Boumedienne and
his health minister were forced to back down when their plans to introduce birth
control were met with a united front of opposition from religious and traditionalist
opinion.53 There were clearly some policies that could not be sold, at least not
yet, by the regime and the government was wise enough not to try and press
ahead with such a policy and thus risk provoking opposition to the regime.
By 1970 Boumedienne and his government had recovered the new state
of Algeria from the situation of crisis that Ben Bella had enmeshed it in so soon
after independence. Islamic opposition to the regime, expressed both through
specific organisations such as Al Qiyam as well as more generally through public
51 Ibid. pp.562-565
52 Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power p.134
53 Ibid. p.136
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unrest, had posed a genuine threat to the government in 1964-65 but, through
careful handling, the threat had virtually disappeared over the following five
years. As Hugh Roberts comments:
"In this context, the Al Qiyam agitation was a false dawn, reflecting not a
crisis of Algerian nationalism but merely the temporary breakdown of the
state-society relationship, as a consequence of the incoherence of the Ben
Bella regime."54
3. The Revolution Socialiste and the Rekindling of Islamism
The period 1970-71 witnessed a number of developments which helped
stimulate Islamist sentiment once again. For Hugh Roberts this period was
marked by the embarkation by the Boumedienne regime, after a successful
period of control of Islamic activism, "upon a course of action which made the
revival of Islamist agitation not only possible but inevitable." This course of action
on the part of the regime, he argues, had two parts: a generalised leftward shift in
government economic policy after 1970 and the continued push for the
'Arabisation' of Algeria's educational and administrative systems.55
Both of these elements formed part of the new political initiative that the
President launched in November 1971. Employing unusually Marxian rhetoric,
Boumedienne had declared the need to "radically change the social relations and
the ownership of the means of production" and to achieve this he declared the
beginning of "the second stage of the Algerian revolution from this point." 56 Thus
was launched the Revolution Socialiste, which embodied Boumedienne's policy
for the 1970s. Comprised of three constituent planned 'revolutions', in the fields
of industry, culture and agriculture, the Revolution Socialiste contributed to the re-
54 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.565
55 Ibid. p.566
56 Quoted in Tlemcani: State and Revolution in Algeria p.125
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invigoration of an Islamist tendency in Algeria through the workings and effects of
at least two of these component 'revolutions.'
I. The Agrarian Revolution
The Revolution Agraire or Agrarian Revolution was the most comprehensive
and most genuinely 'revolutionary' element of the Revolution Socialiste.
Essentially it involved the nationalisation of many of Algeria's large estates which
were then turned into collectives and by 1974 this policy had also necessitated
the take-over by the state of the wholesaling of agricultural produce. Over and
above the specific economic and social successes and failures of this policy, the
effect it had on the Muslim landowners from whom the land was expropriated and
the wholesalers whose trade was nationalised was substantial. 57 What was
significant was that much of the opposition to this policy was expressed in
religious terms, even by those not necessarily materially affected by the changes.
Quranic endorsement of the concept and legitimacy of private ownership
formed the basis of much of this criticism of this policy. As various members of
the AUMA had done under Ben Bella, many Islamic leaders including Sheikh
Noureddine, formerly a senior member of the AUMA, came out against
Boumedienne's policy. 58 Rumours circulated over whether prayers said on
nationalised land were valid and the government had to call in civil and religious
leaders alike to defend his policy. In 1972 the President himself felt obliged to
declare that "It should be specified that no religious text prevents application of
the Agrarian Revolution."59
The relationship this debate had to the Islamist movement is interesting. It
is clear that many Islamists opposed the nationalisations for the scriptural
57 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.568
58 Vatin Popular Puritanism Versus State Reformism p.104
59 Quoted in Burgat and Dowell p.255
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reasons given above. However, it appears that the Agrarian Revolution did
receive support from those elements of the Islamist movement which came from
poorer and peasant backgrounds and who clearly stood to benefit from the
reforms. 60 There was also an element of opportunist self-interest amongst those
Islamists and ulama who opposed the land nationalisations. A form of alliance
emerged between the landowners and the ulama (particularly the older ulama)
whereby the ulama would act as the ideological spokesmen for the landowners
through attacking the nationalisations on religious grounds. In return, the
landowners agreed to finance the construction of a significant number of
mosques as well as fund various religious and cultural organisations. 61 The
Agrarian revolution also benefited the Islamist movement in another, indirect, way
by concentrating official attention on the rural areas and away from the urban
areas where, as will be shown, the Islamists began to build up their support and
organisation in the mid 1970s.62
II. The 'Revolution CuHurdle' and the Impact of Arabisation
The Revolution Culturelle, with its essentially nationalistic aim of
establishing a distinct cultural identity for Algerians in place of the
overwhelmingly French one that 130 years of colonial rule had imprinted on the
country, primarily influenced the growth of the Islamist movement through its core
objective of securing the linguistic 'Arabisation' of Algeria. Algeria's programme of
Arabisation had actually begun as early as 1964 with Ben Bella's Arabisation of
60 Ibid. p.256
61 AI-Ahnaf, Botiveau and FrOgosi p.25 This alliance between the private sector
and the Islamist movement was a fairly long standing one that had been
established during the time of the AUMA (see previous chapter). Allan Christelow
argues that it was government nationalisations in the period after independence
that undermined the private sector thus depriving the Islamists of one of their
main social and financial bases of support and explains their relative weakness in
the 1960s and 1970s. Christelow: Ritual, Culture and Politics p.268
62 Rouadjia: Les Frdres et la Mosquee p.34
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primary education and introduction of compulsory religious instruction. It was
under President Boumedienne, however, that Arabisation became a real priority
for the Algerian government.63
Arabisation aimed to make modern literary Arabic the national language of
Algeria through the important state-controlled channels of education and the
administration. However, whilst Arabisation proceeded quite rapidly through the
education system it advanced at a far slower pace through Algeria's large state
administration. The net result of this was that the education system was turning
out far more Arabic speaking students or 'Arabisants' than could be absorbed by
the administrative sector which in many places was largely still Francophone.
There were few jobs too for Arabic-only speakers in the state sector and the large
corporations. The corporations, in particular, preferred students fluent in French
or other European languages to deal with their mainly western clients and
suppliers.64
The implications of this problem for the government and for the potential
revival of Islamist agitation and sentiment were several-fold. Two particular
groups suffered from the lack of employment opportunities for Arabic-educated
students. A high proportion of Arabisants came from poor, originally rural families
which had migrated in large numbers to Algeria's large towns and cities over the
past few decades. Not only, then, did this increasingly frustrated group become a
significant source of agitation in urban areas, but moreover, in coming from the
rural hinterland they retained much of the religious conservatism of those areas
(which had largely been left untouched by the modernist ideas of the post-
independence governments) and thus were more likely to be sympathetic to
63 Rachida Yacine: The Impact of French Colonial Heritage on Language
Policies in Independent North Africa in George Joffe: North Africa: Nation, State
and Region (Routledge, London and New York, 1993) pp.228-229
64 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.566
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Islamic activism and ideas. 65 The fact that it tended to be poorer more rural
Algerians that became Arabisants, whilst the wealthy, more urban groups stayed
largely Francophone (through choice), also meant that the social and economic
cleavages between the two groups widened as the language preferences of both
met with differing success in the job market, enhancing already present social
tensions.66
The second group that appeared to be adversely affected by the
Arabisation policy and who consequently presented a potential threat to the
government came from a different social background to that of the rural migrants
and the possible challenge they represented was different to that of mass unrest
that the new urban poor represented. A significant proportion of 'Arabised'
students, particularly from wealthier and better-educated backgrounds, chose to
study Arabic and Islamic law and literature at university rather than follow more
Francophone-based courses in science and technology. This, however, ‘ did not
do much more to improve their job opportunities than the poor Arabisant school
leavers. The potential danger that this posed for the regime was that it created a
significant number of well-educated but unemployed graduates whose intellectual
training and political awareness could help mobilise opposition.67
It was thus almost inevitable that both frustrated groups would find
themselves identifying with opposition to the government which identified itself
with Islamic values, since not only were both groups far more aware, through their
education, of Arabo-Muslim ideas and concepts, but both believed that it was the
persistence of secular and French influences that was responsible for their
frustration. A return to the sort of Islamic, Arabised order advocated by most
Islamist critics of the government would clearly be in their interests. Indeed, Jean-
66 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.567; Ruedy p.197
66 Ruedy p.228
67 Burgat and Dowell p.257
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Claude Vatin indicates that calls for greater Islamisation of Algeria, which clearly
grew amongst Arabisants in the 1970s, were linked to calls for Arabisation "as a
mere device for gaining access to those jobs more or less monopolised by their
French-speaking co-religionists."68 A further possible reason for the growth of an
Islamist sentiment amongst the Arabisants was the influence of Arabic teachers
brought in from outside of Algeria to compensate for the lack of suitably qualified
native teachers. These teachers frequently brought with them the sort of Islamist
ideas that were increasingly influential in the eastern Arab world in the late 1960s
and 1970s.89
The link between Arabisation and Islamism is, however, not entirely clear.
Whilst it appears that Islamist-type movements in the universities in the late
1960s largely recruited from amongst students of Arabic and Islamic studies who
felt bypassed by the educational systemm, Rachid Benaissa, an Islamic activist at
that time, maintains that most of the students attending the mosques and involved
in Islamic groups were Francophone. The sermons in the mosques were
delivered in French and it was not until later that Arabic students came to both
the mosques and the organisations. More generally, Benaissa points out that the
Arabic press in Algeria at this time "was more violently anti-Islamic than the
Francophone."71
By the mid-1970s, though, Arabisation and Islamism were increasingly
closely linked. The years 1974, 1975 and 1976, for example, all witnessed violent
68 Vatin: Popular Puritanism Versus State Reformism p.100
eG Etienne p.219
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71 Quoted in Burgat and Dowell p.257 The reason for the relatively late arrival of
Arabaphone students to the Islamic organisations at this time may, of course,
have been due to the fact that the Arabisation of education was still in its infancy
and its effect on the education system as a whole was only just beginning to be
felt. However, this does not detract from the fact that there already was an
Islamist tendency and movement in existence which Arabisation served to feed
rather than create.
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clashes between Arabophone and Francophone students at Constantine
University over whether Algeria should adopt a traditional Islamic or modern
secular legal system.72
Arabisation was not the only element of the Revolution CultureIle that
served to bolster the Islamist movement. The regime's emphasis on the religious
aspects of the Arabo-Muslim identity of Algerians, whilst reinforcing the state's
control over the religious sphere, also increased awareness of Islam and Islamic
themes thus preparing more fertile ground for the Islamist message. This was
certainly true of the Campaign Against the Degradation of Morals of 1970 which,
as has been shown, articulated many of the religious and moral themes of the
Islamist agenda.
This was equally the case with the launch of the government backed review
Al Asala in March 1971, a publication which sought to put the government's point
of view across with regard to religion. Employing several former members of the
AUMA, the review propounded the ideas of Ben Badis and his followers referring
extensively to all the major figures in the movement including figures such as
Bashir Ibrahimi who had not been an enthusiastic supporter of the liberation
struggle or secular nationalism. Such coverage and personnel suggested that Al
Asala enjoyed a degree of autonomy from state control. However, whilst the
themes in the review were unambiguously supportive of Islamic reformism and
the Islamic agenda, Luc-Willy Deheuvels who conducted a comprehensive study
of it, concluded that Al Asala failed to provide a pole or personality around which
Islamists could unite. The experience of the liberation struggle and the
dominating personality of Houari Boumedienne had totally changed the
landscape and deprived the AUMA of its previous prestige and influence. 73
72 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.93
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74
The issue of Islamist sympathisers within the regime itself is an important
one. As seen earlier, Al Qiyam had a number of sympathisers within Ben Bella's
government and although Boumedienne kept a much tighter and more personal
grip on Islamist activity outside the institutions of the state, this internal Islamic
opinion remained. Their presence, particularly former members of the AUMA,
was tolerated by the regime in return for help in providing religious legitimacy for
the regime. Certain sections of the administration, notably those dealing with
culture, religion and education (the traditional areas of concern of the Islamic
reformists) contained significant numbers of personnel supportive of the broader
Islamic agenda. 74 In this context, the Revolution CultureIle, particularly its central
plank of Arabisation, was largely the work of these elements.
It would be mistaken to say that there was real collusion between these
figures within the administration and the more radical elements of groups, but it
was certainly the case that individuals such as Mouloud Kassim and his
successor at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Abderahame Chibane, discreetly
encouraged both the Arabisants and the Islamists. 75 The supporting ideological
link between the two Islamic parties was evident. The writers of Al Asala, for
example, although never-attempting criticism of the existing regime, provided "an
anchor" for the Islamist current, in the view of Francois Burgat, through their
exposition of religious ideas. 76
4. Government Reaction and the National Charter
By 1976 the regime appeared to show the first signs of being aware of the
gradual swell of Islamic opposition it was building up against itself. One strand of
the Islamically-based criticism of the government was its lack of consultation with
74 Deheuvels p.273; Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94
75 Rouadjia: Les Freres et la Mosquee p.35
76 Burgat and Dowell p..254
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the people, enshrined in the Islamic concept of shura. This criticism had first been
raised by Bashir Ibrahimi when he had voiced his more general concern over the
direction of the Ben Bella government in April 1964 calling for a "return to the
principles of consultation so dear to the Prophet."77 In 1974 tracts had appeared
in Algiers bearing essentially the same message. Indeed it appears that a
growing number of Algerians were increasingly restive at not only the doctrinaire
attitude of the government but also at the prolonged period of unconstitutionality
which had been operating since the coup of 1965.78
In apparent concession to this opinion Boumedienne held both a
constitutional referendum and a Presidential 'election' (in practice also a
referendum). The new National Charter of 1976, which the constitutional
referendum 'endorsed', gave Islam the status of state religion. This change came
in the wake of other concessions that had been made to the Islamic 'lobby' earlier
in the year. In March the government had outlawed gambling and in August 1976
Friday had replaced Sunday as the official weekly holiday. Religious festivals
were also declared official holidays with government backing being given to their
full observance.79
These concessions were more gloss than content. References to Islam
were largely brief and perfunctory with socialism instead providing the explicit
ideological heart of the whole document. The brief sub-section of the Charter
that dealt with religion was entitled 'Islam and the socialist Revolution' and was
contained within the larger section headed 'Building the socialist society.'
Furthermore, the new Charter went on to directly refute one of the core tenets of
the Islamist and reformist movement when it stated:
77 Quoted in Humbaraci p.237
78 Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.571-572
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"The decline of the Muslim world is not attributed to purely moral causes
There is only one way for the Muslim world to regenerate itself: it must go
beyond reformism and advance towards social Revolution."80
This 'social revolution' clearly aimed to surpass and indeed absorb Islamic
reformism and religion generally within the ideology of the state. Almost to
demonstrate this stance, Boumedienne, in a reshuffle of his government in early
1977, reduced the Ministry of Religious Affairs to a sub-section of the Presidency
itself.81
The revolutionary drive and rhetoric produced added problems for the
government not only because it attracted the usual Islamic criticism of being too
attached to secular and Marxist doctrines (such accusations increased when the
regime developed closer relations with the communists of the PAGS party) but
also for more subliminal reasons. Hugh Roberts argues that Boumedienne's
fostering of a revolutionary, millenialist mentality and spirit among young
Algerians in particular, encouraging them to mobilise against elements within the
regime itself who resisted this 'revolution' "legitimised a radically critical attitude
among the younger generation towards the existing bases of authority in the
society. "82
Contrary to their design, some of the apparent concessions the regime
made served to boost Islamist opinion in the country. The apparently symbolic
and insubstantive recognition in the National Charter of Islam as the religion of
state gave the Islamists a potential new platform for their views. They could now
appeal to the Charter itself to press openly for their agenda of Arabisation,
Islamisation and application of the Sharia since Islam was now officially endorsed
as the religion of state.a3
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5. The Islamist Movement 1970-1978
I. Atomisation: The New Groups
The exact shape, form and strength of the Islamist 'movement' in the 1970s
is difficult to assess. The government's banning of Al Qiyam in March 1970 meant
that organised focus for Islamic opinion and opposition to the regime
subsequently became much more disparate and more covert. The official
proscription of Al Qiyam removed only the organised manifestations of the
grouping leaving a still significant number of activists committed to continuing to
promote their agenda. These activists appear to have regrouped from the late
1960s in a series of successor organisations over the following few years such
as Ansar Allah (which was broken up by the authorities) and then Dawa wa
Tabligh.84
The forcibly atomised nature of the movement from the late 1960s led also
to the emergence of other trends within the Islamist opposition which established
groups for themselves in various parts of Algerian society. Several were inspired
by and enjoyed close links with the rapidly growing and influential Islamist
movements of the Arab east, particularly those of Egypt. A group of young
Algerians, led by a secondary school teacher Mahfoud Nahnah, Mich had begun
to organise themselves during Ben Bella's presidency, had strong doctrinal and
personal ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 85 Similarly, in 1974-75 tracts
began to appear on the streets of Algeria's cities by a group calling itself Takfir
wa Hijra, the same name as that given to a radical Egyptian faction. The
84 El Watan 28.2.94
es Harbi p.133 Mahfoud Nahnah's contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood and
their ideas were apparently established through Egyptian professors he
encountered during his time at Algiers University. Rouadjia: Les Fitres et la
Mosquee p.64
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similarities in the extremist messages these tracts bore to the ideology of the
Egyptian grouping suggested clear inspirational and possibly organisational links
between the two namesakes.86
Another, more intellectual group of mainly students began to meet under the
patronage of the former Director of Higher Studies in the Ministry of Education,
Malek Bennabi, in the Central Faculty of the University of Algiers from the mid
1960s. Encouraged by Bennabi, a leading Islamic intellectual who had been
involved with Al Qiyam, this unusually Francophone group undertook to establish
a mosque in the faculty in 1968 where five years later they set up their own majlis
shura. Despite their small, secretive and elitist nature, this group also published
a review in which their cerebral discussions on Bennabi's key themes of
civilisation and the compatibility of Islam and science were aired. The more
domestic origins and influences of this grouping earned it over time the sobriquet
of the Djazaira or Algerianists. 87
II. The Universities
Bennabi and his followers formed part of a general trend by Islamists of
organising themselves in the universities in the 1960s and 1970s. An indication of
this development came with the wearing of the hedjab by women students. The
first began to appear on the Algerian campuses in 1967, although this practice
was for several years largely restricted to small groups such as those around
Bennabi. These developments indicated that the universities were becoming the
new repositories of Islamist sentiment in Algeria. However these groups were
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neither very extensive nor particularly strong over the next few years. Not only
was the movement largely confined to certain faculties in certain universities but
its quite considerable efforts at proselytism appeared to meet with little success,
fellow students possibly being put off by the dogmatism of its stance and
propaganda.88
The Islamist organisations in the universities also had to contend with the
far stronger leftist movements which dominated the campuses in the late 1960s
and 1970s. Part of the reason for the growth of Islamist student organisations in
the late 1960s had been government toleration and reliance on them to combat
leftist influence in the universities at this time. However, with the advent of the
Revolution Socialiste after the turn of the decade, Boumedienne appeared to
reverse this policy as he recognised the leftists as potential ideological allies in
the struggle to introduce his more radical and socialist policies. Consequently,
Islamist support waned and declined back to its original base of small scattered
groups of activists .89 Those Islamists that did remain were largely driven out,
silenced and excluded from the campuses by the ascendant, largely Marxist,
left.90 As a persecuted minority in the early 1970s the Islamists retreated from the
campuses and increasingly focused their activities in the mosques themselves,
retaining a low profile except for the occasional contribution to the Arabisation
debate. 91 Arabisation, though, did signal something of a reassertion of the
Islamist movement in the universities with increasing clashes between
Arabophone and Francophone students from 1974. As already shown, Arabic
had become increasingly associated with Islamism whilst leftist students were
88 Vatin: Popular Puritanism Versus State Reformism pp.99-100 It is interesting
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largely Francophone and secularist. This resurgence was further boosted by
another switch in government policy in 1976 which reverted once more to using
the Islamists against Mat the regime perceived to be an overly strong leftist
element on the campuses.92
III. The Mosques
The forced retreat from activism in the universities and the refocusing of
their activities in the country's mosques gave the various Islamist groups a much
more secure base to work from and one which it worked to expand. One of the
main features of their work in the 1970s became the construction of mosques.
Able to secure official recognition as associations for each project, the Islamists
worked to not only convert large numbers of buildings into mosques and build
new purpose-built places of prayer, but more fundamentally sought to carve out
their own independent institutional framework free from the control of the state.
This was particularly achieved by securing non-governmental funding for projects
which enabled them to establish so-called 'free' mosques outside of state control.
93 By 1976-77 many of the various 'discussion circles' established by the different
groups had managed to escape the watchful eye and control of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs and relocated themselves in the mosques.94
The growth in the numbers of mosques, both free and otherwise, also
provided centres of contact between the various Islamist groupings. The Islamist
'movement' in the early 1970s was a fairly atomised affair with individual
associations running their own preaching and teaching activities largely in
isolation from each other. Abdallah Djaballah the leader of a grouping in eastern
Algeria, which was active in the construction of mosques and opening of prayer
92 Rouadjia: Les Fréres et la Mosquee pp.34-37
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rooms in Annaba and Constantine, speaks of him and his group having had
contacts with the Djazaira in the universities but there being little overall co-
ordination during this early period. % However, most of the 'Sheikhs' of these
different associations, including Djaballah, began to meet informally from the mid
1970s in the private mosque of Abdelhamid Chentli in Constantine, which
together with the eastern region as a whole remained the centre of Islamist
activity in Algeria.%
C: THEMES AND ASPECTS
The unexpected death of Houari Boumedienne in December 1978
effectively marked the end of the first chapter of Algeria's independent history -
his personality and policy decisions having dominated this early formative period.
This initial period was the first in several centuries in which Algeria's Muslims
were able to conduct their own affairs. What then can be concluded about the
role of Islam and Islamic sentiment during these years?
1. Islam and the State
The new rulers of independent Algeria, both Ben Bella and Boumedienne
and their supporters, quite clearly realised the value and importance of Islam, not
just through its contribution to the independence struggle but also through its
potential contribution to the construction of the independent Algerian state. The
Islamic reformism of the Association of Algerian Ulama had been absorbed by
both the Algerian people during the war and in the view of one commentator more
or less became "the political language" of the new state. Its use by the various
competitors for power in the period 1962-65 provided evidence of this. The state,
P5 Author's interview with Abdallah Djaballah, London, 7.10.94
% Rouadjia: Les Fréres et la Mosquee p.156. Djaballah states that Islamist
activity as a whole was restricted to the east and central (Algiers) region of the
country during this period. Author's interview with Djaballah, 7.10.94
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under both Ben Bella and Boumedienne, tried to incorporate this reformism into
the state itself: its policies, its propaganda and its internal battles. This creation of
the idea of what was widely termed 'state reformism' became a perceived source
of legitimacy for those both in power and those aspiring to it.97
Those in power were primarily concerned with both retaining power and in
advancing their own political, social and economic agendas. As has been shown
in the case of both Ben Bella and Boumedienne, these agendas frequently had
little to do with anything recognisably Islamic but owed more to essentially
secular and particularly socialist-style programmes and ideas. Through these
programmes, notably Boumedienne's 'social revolution' of the 1970s, the
politicians hoped to mould and transform what at independence was still a fairly
divided and fragmented society. As John Entelis points out, Islam's role in this
was to be fairly limited: "A secular state with an Islamic cultural component would
thus be the manner in which a nationalist synthesis would be achieved.'98
This 'nationalisation' of Islam, though, did not go unchallenged. The view
of the political leadership that "Islam was to serve as an identity-forming
instrument, not as a legal code by which to order state and society" profoundly
contradicted much traditional and reformist Islamic thinking and teaching in
Algeria.99 Abdallah Djaballah was prompted to form his Islamist organisations in
the 1970s because of official attitudes towards Islam. Popular ignorance of Islam
was widespread and the government appeared happy to exclude it from Algerian
social life and even made jokes about those who attended the mosques.= This
clash between religious opinion and political authority, seen throughout the post-
independence period, in many ways reflected a tradition in Algerian politics and
97 Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power pp.133-134
98 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.81
99 Ibid.
1 °° Text of speech by Abdallah Djaballah to Nanda Party Conference, Sanoba
Club, 7-9.9.94
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society that stretched back well before independence. It can be seen in the
nineteenth century revolts against both the Ottomans and the French and in the
key, if initially reluctant, role the AUMA played in the run up to the war of
I iberation. 1 01
The view that Islam and Islamist activism is a means of articulating more
generalised opposition to the government, is an interesting and important one. It
seems important, then, to ask how far Islamist groups and opinion in the 1960s
and 1970s were promoting a clearly 'Islamic' agenda and to what extent they
were an expression and vehicle for wider grievances against the state. During
Ben Bella's period of power, it would seem that whilst the criticisms of his regime
voiced by Sheikh Ibrahimi and Al Qiyam were essentially Islamic in nature, they
reflected the growing crisis in the regime generally. Without this crisis it seems
unlikely that such criticism would have received the attention it did. Under
Boumedienne, the new president's broadening of the base of the regime and his
use of nationalism dispelled the crisis that had built up under his predecessor and
thus cut away much of the ground-swell of public unrest that Al Qiyam had briefly
ridden on. 102 It is instructive that the two issues that brought the Islamist
movement to the fore in the 1970s, Arabisation and the Agrarian Revolution, both
had their origins in socio-economic as much as religious grievances.
Nevertheless, even if it had found its strength and voice in alliance with
wider issues and grievances, the Islamist movement still retained and developed
its own ideology and agenda over this period.
2. Ideology and Agenda
The achievement of independence by Algeria in 1962 clearly changed the
context in which Algeria's Islamic movement operated. The colonial European
101 Vatin: Religious Resistance and State Power pp.122-123
102 Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.563-575
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threat to Islamic identity, culture and practice was removed but the imperative of
returning Algerians to the teachings of pure scripturally based Islam remained for
the supporters and members of the old AUMA. As has been seen, a section of
this grouping was effectively co-opted into the state apparatus by the post-
independence governments, particularly that of Boumedienne, and worked to
contribute an Islamic element to the Algerian state. The section that remained
outside this official framework, however, became increasingly radical in their
outlook both towards the state and society in general.
This was evident from a fairly early stage of Algeria's independence.
Despite explicitly claiming to be the inheritors of the legacy and ideals of Ben
Badis's AUMA, Al Qiyam was a clearly more radical organisation. The
association's hostility towards non-Islamic ideas and organisations illustrated
earlier displayed, as Jean-Claude Vatin and Jean Leca rightly argue, "a fanatical
fundamentalism, quite foreign to the thought of the founder of the Association of
Ulama."103 This hostility and radicalism was present not only in the writings and
the propaganda of the organisation's leaders, Al Qiyam calling for the closure of
shops at times of prayer, the exclusion of non-Muslims from public service and
particularly the restriction of female emancipation. 104 It was also carried through
to the actions of some of its members. Not only were members of Al Qiyam
responsible for continued harassment of 'immodestly' dressed women on
Algeria's streets, but threats were also issued to owners of bars selling alcohol in
the capital. Such actions did not halt with the final dissolution of the organisation
103 Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin: L'Algerie Politique: Institutions et Regime
(Presses de la Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1975) p.308
104 Ibid. The role of women in independent Algeria became an important theme
of much Islamist discourse after independence. Bachir Ibrahimi had complained
about the participation of young women in tennis skirts at the independence
celebrations (Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94), Al Qiyam had called for a restriction
on women's employment as a solution for male unemployment (Knauss p.104)
and Abdellatif Soltani in his 1974 diatribe attacked the presence of women in
offices and the military (Burgat and Dowell pp.251-252)
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in 1970 and were continued by its former members and successor organisation
into the following decade.105
The other element of this growth in radicalism, besides that addressing the
perceived moral and social decline in independent Algeria, was an increasing
hostility to the Algerian state itself. Official repression and alienation from the
apparatus of the state contributed to this antagonism but it was a fundamental
antipathy towards the perceived ideology of the new state, particularly its
socialism, that underpinned much of this stance. In 1974 one of the former
leaders of Al Qiyam, Abdellatif Soltani, launched a bitter attack on the regime in
the form of an article. Published from exile in Morocco, the article attacked
Boumedienne's socialist policies as "destructive principles imported from abroad."
He equated socialism with heresy and argued that it was responsible for many
social vices such as alcoholism through its support of the planting of vineyards.106
Elsewhere Dawa wa Tabligh, one of the successor organisations to Al Qiyam,
called in its literature for the abolition of socialist regimes in all Muslim
countries. lw
 More generally, a view increasingly propagated privately in the
schools and mosques loyal to the Islamists was that the victory of Islam against
the French in 1962 had been "confiscated at independence by a coalition of
communists and atheists."108
The near total ideological breach with the whole foundation of the Algerian
state that this last view implies has certain echoes of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb in
Egypt. However, despite the Qutb-inspired calls for overthrow of the regime and
the installation of an Islamic state through force of arms in the tracts distributed
105 El Watan 28.2.94; Aissa Khelladi: Algêrie: Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir
(Editions Alfa, Algiers, 1992) p.117
106 Harbi pp.135-139
107 El Watan 28.2.94. The group proposed that such regimes be replaced with a
return to the Caliphate applying sharia law.
106 Quoted in Rouadjia: Les Frdres et la Mosquêe p.147
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by Algerian Takfir wa Hijra in the mid 1970s109, there appeared to be no real
evidence of Islamist opposition to the Algerian government adopting a violent
course of action. Dawa wa Tabligh were reported to have been responsible for
the death of a policeman in Algiers in January 1971 and one Islamist was caught
and convicted of sabotaging telegraph poles in opposition to the National Charter
of 1976. Even though this last figure was the influential Mahfoud Nahnah, his was
not a serious offence and these remained isolated or unsubstantiated
incidents.110
The reasons behind these shifts are several fold. Much of the radicalism
had to do with the movement's political and institutional alienation from the
Algerian regime, official repression, in particular, providing a natural dynamic
towards more radical positions. The movement's greater concentration on more
specifically moral issues (such as those relating to women) and away from more
egalitarian issues once utilised by the AUMA, has been seen as the result of the
increasing monopolisation of egalitarian themes by the regime's socialist rhetoric
and policies. 111
 A second reason for the movement's radicalisation was
undoubtedly the influx of more extremist ideas from other parts of the Muslim
world, especially Egypt, which came in with far greater ease following the
achievement of Algerian independence and notably, as has been shown, with the
teachers brought in for the Arabisation programmes. The death of Malek
Bennabi in 1973 deprived the movement of probably its most profound
indigenous thinker since Abdelhamid Ben Badis and consequently turned both
his followers and other groups even more towards the wider Muslim world for
guidance. 112 Links with other Muslim countries were further cemented by growing
financial as well as ideological ties. Saudi Arabia became an increasingly
Jeune Afrique 13.8.92
110 El Watan 28.2.94; Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frègosi p.26
iii Burgat and Dowell p.250
112 Lamchichi: L'Algdrie en Crise p.322
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important source of funds for Algeria's Islamists by the 1970s: Islamist leaders
made frequent trips to the Kingdom to exploit Saudi fears of the perceived
atheistic tendencies of the Algerian regime which were fuelled by the latter's
close relations to the godless Soviet Union.113
D: CONCLUSION
In the context of events both inside Algeria and the development of the
Islamist movement across the Muslim world as a whole, Algeria's Islamists
remained strictly peripheral during this period. Despite enjoying a brief broader
platform with Al Qiyam in the first few years of independence their influence from
1965 remained very limited. Inside the regime the few minor ministries that
contained Islamist sympathisers and co-opted former members of the AUMA saw
very slight advances of the Islamist agenda. Outside, the fragmented and largely
covert Islamist movement only really made itself felt through pockets of ,unrest
and activism on the university campuses. Numerically, the movement remained a
small-scale affair, a reflection of a more general decline in religious observance
and awareness in the 1960s and 1970s that also spoke of the Islamists' failure to
publicise their agenda. 114 Boumedienne's state building policies - his grand
industrial and economic projects, the active and prestigious role he forged for
Algeria in international and particularly third world politics - were clearly the main
113 Rouadjia: Les Fréres et la Mosquee pp.69-71
114 Writing in 1964 Raymond Vallin wrote of "a feeling of decline in popular
religion 	 Beneath the respect paid to it lies a good deal of indifference. People
no longer pray in public, the pious are ridiculed, and the faithful are becoming
rare, less than 1% from personal observations in Algiers" Vallin p.57 This was
particularly true of Algeria's younger population where secular and nationalist
ideas were more prevalent. A survey of students in 1968 showed that only 17% of
those questioned identified the term 'Arabo-Islamism' with 'a state governed
according to the rules of Islam' whilst 81% identified it with 'the affirmation of the
Algerian national personality'. Leca and Vatin p.307
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pre-occupations for both Algerians and observers of the country in the 1960s and
1970s.
Similarly, whilst the 1970s witnessed the growth of significant and muscular
Islamist movements in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Iran and indeed most
other Middle Eastern states, Algeria appeared to be resistant to this trend. It was
totally justified for one writer in 1980 to describe Algeria as marching in "the
rearguard" of the international Islamist movement and thus seek to write a piece
seeking to explore the subliminal reasons why Algeria had not developed such a
movement in this period.115
115 Peter von Sivers: National Integration and Traditional Rural Organisation in
Algeria 1970-80: Background for Islamic Traditionalism? in Said Amir Arjomand:
From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Macmillan, London, 1984). The main
reasons that von Sivers identifies as being behind this absence include the
exposure through prolonged colonial rule to European ideas, low levels of Arabic
literacy, the proletarianising of parts of the rural population under the French, the
small size of the traditional urban class, and the rigour of state control and
planning.
3
THE RISE OF ISLAMISM: 1979 - 1988
1. From Boumedienne to Chadli
The fairly small-scale and largely clandestine nature of the Islamist
'movement' in the late 1970s meant that the Islamists' reaction to the sudden
death of President Bounnedienne in December 1978 was neither widely
canvassed nor considered amongst the main concerns of Algeria as it sought to
assimilate the fact that the dominant and shaping force of its post-independence
history was now gone. Most attention focused on the succession to
Boumedienne, which was resolved without any overt signs of a power-struggle
with the formal election of Colonel Chadli Benjedid as President in February
1979.
Although ChadWs assumption of the presidency initially indicated
continuity rather than any real break with the policies and approaches of his
predecessor, this did not imply that Boumedienne's death would have no,
particularly longer-term, impact on Algeria's Islamists. Nor did it indicate that the
late President's largely successful containment of the Islamist 'challenge' in the
thirteen years of his rule would be continued by the new President. Chadli
Benjedid, although a respected figure, had been a compromise choice pushed
forward by the Algerian military in preference to the two main contenders for the
office. The long-standing military commander of the Oran region, the new
President lacked his predecessor's charisma, intellect and vision; qualities that
had enabled Boumedienne to establish control and unity over Algeria's
traditionally fractious society and polity and which had succeeded in preventing
the emergence of any serious challenge to either him or the Algerian state.
For Algeria's Islamists, the departure of the figure who had espoused so
much that was anathema to them and, moreover, had so successfully suppressed
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and silenced their organisations, was a welcome development. With a
strengthening and expanding (if still relatively small-scale) institutional base in
the country's mosques and universities, the various groups and associations that
made up this still fairly nebulous 'movement' believed this growth was likely to
continue and accelerate under the new regime.
Such thoughts were encouraged by several actions by President Chadli
during his opening years of office. High-profile political opponents of
Boumedienne were released from prison (most notably Ahmed Ben Bella) and,
more significantly, several figures seen as sympathetic to the Islamists' agenda
were appointed to the Govemment. 1 Abderahmane Chibane, a figure who
despite his closeness to the regime had attracted the deference of many Islamists
outside the administration, was promoted in July 1980 to Minister for Religious
Affairs - a portfolio existing in its own right again after four years under the direct
control of the presidency. 2 Committed Arabisants took over the Ministries of
Information and Culture and of Primary and Secondary Education in Chadli's first
government thus boosting this part of the Islamists' agenda and, more
importantly, constituency of support. Evidence of this was seen in the renewed
vigour with which Arabisant and Islamist students began to press their frequently
interwoven agendas. Arabisant high school and university students held a long
strike in the winter of 1979-80 as part of a more general campaign to draw official
attention to the failings of the Arabisation programme, specifically the continued
failure of most Arabisants to make progress in the job market. 3 In the universities
Islamist students also began to adopt a far higher profile.
1 Hugh Roberts: The Politics of Algerian Socialism in Richard Lawless and Allan
Findlay: North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development
(Groom Helm, London, 1984) p.33
2 Abderrahim Lamchichi: Islam et Contestation au Maghreb (L'Harmattan, Paris,
1989) p.152. Rouadjia: Les Frdres et la Mosquèe p.20
3 Roberts: The Politics of Algerian Socialism pp.33-34
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2. The Growth of Islamist Activism: 1979-1982
Having contracted under pressure from the student left in the early 1970s,
the Islamists had begun to expand once more their presence and activities on the
campuses from the middle of the decade (see previous chapter). Clashes with
leftist students continued into the 1980s and also began to occur against the
increasingly vocal and organised Berber student groups on the campuses. This
latter group had also been encouraged by President Chadli's liberalising gestures
and they saw the Arabisation programmes as a threat to their own language,
culture and job prospects (most Berber students were also accomplished
Francophones). Violence against groups allied to the regime itself also became a
feature of Islamist activism in this period. In May 1981 violent Islamist disruption
of several meetings organised by the leftist-led official youth movement (the
UNJA) to commemorate the 'Day of the Student' led to thirty people being badly
injured at one meeting. 4 Islamist willingness to attack symbols and allies of the
regime was also reflected that month in attacks by students on public buildings,
especially university and prefecture buildings, in cities across Algeria including
Abbês, Algiers, Annaba and Bedjaima.5
The new found self-confidence of the Islamist students was not limited to
sporadic violence against other students but also began to exhibit itself in more
concrete and co-ordinated ways. In December 1979 students took over a large
lecture room at the Institute of Law in Algiers and converted it into a mosque.6
The success of this move, which was not resisted by the university authorities,
4 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.578
5 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism p.116. In April 1982 the FLN
headquarters in Oran and vehicles of party officials had also come under attack
from rioting /ycee students, who although essentially protesting about
examination failures were also believed to have been involved with the Islamists.
Knauss p.138
6 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism p.106
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appeared to encourage the campus militants generally who increasingly sought to
make their ideas and presence felt in more and more areas of campus life. Overt
and unsolicited recruitment, involving speeches and pamphlet distributions, in
university and college classes became increasingly common-place and bolder
still, was the forcing of sexual segregation in the classes.7
The influence of Islamist students on university campuses had thus become
considerable by 1982 and could even be said to dominate certain faculties in
certain universities. One non-Islamist student in Oran commented as follows on
the influence of the Islamists at her university:
"They have created an environment at the university where it is dangerous to
be politically involved. Those who speak out risk being silenced by force.
They have gained implicit control of the student ambience."8
The early years of the Chadli Presidency also saw the growth of Islamist
activism in other areas. In 1979, an organisation calling itself the Group for
Defence Against the Illicit (GDAI) was formed under the leadership of Mustapha
Bouyali, an employee of the state electricity company. Collecting together a
number of still fairly autonomous groups based in the mosques of Algiers, this
organisation became significant through its increasing belief in the efficacy of
armed struggle to establish an Islamic state. Under the guidance of Bouyali, a
former FLN fighter, the group began, from 1981, to collect and stockpile
weapons. A network of clandestine cells was established across the country
which Bouyali had divided into various operational regions in probable conscious
imitation of the original wilaya system of the FLN. The martial orientation of the
7 Knauss pp.119-120
8 Ibid. p.119
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organisation was confirmed by its metamorphosis into the Mouvement Algerien
Islamique Armë (MAIA) when it merged with other smaller groups in July 1982P
3. Confronting the Regime: November-December 1982
Throughout the period 1979-82 the Chadli regime had practised a fairly
tolerant approach to the clearly growing Islamist tendency. The reasons for such
an approach were probably linked to the presence of Islamist sympathies
amongst some of the senior personnel in the government but more likely were the
result of wider policy considerations and needs on the part of the regime.10
Initially, Chadli, like his predecessor Boumedienne quietly encouraged the
Islamists to stifle leftist agitation on the campuses. For Chadli, the Islamists could
also be used to combat two further threats to his regime: the newly assertive
Berberist movement and tendency and leftist opponents within the regime itself.
This second grouping consisted particularly of those disciples and supporters of
Boumedienne's more radical socialist policies who were suspicious and hostile
towards the economically liberalising reforms that Chadli had begun to introduce
in this period.11
The regime had still maintained a watchful eye over the movement
particularly those parts of it which tried to make too obvious a challenge to the
authorities. The government intervened in Sidi Bel AbbOs in 1981 following an
aggressive campaign by Islamists there under the leadership of Othmane
9 Lamchichi: Islam et Contestation p.159; Burgat & Dowell pp.265-266; Al-
Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frêgosi p.28 Each cell of the MAIA was headed by an Emir
who provided the ideological imput for the group as well as being the sole point of
contact with other cells. Algórie Actualitê 23.2.93
10 Knauss p.119; Roberts: Radical Islamism p.577 It has been suggested that
the failure of the university authorities to evict the Islamist students who had
occupied the classroom in the Institute of Law in Algiers in 1979 had been the
result of Ministerial level advice. Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State
Reformism p.106
11 Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.577-579
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Mohammed who had sought to take over all the town's mosques from officially-
appointed imams. Significant disturbances, involving at least a thousand people,
following intervention by the local authorities, finally prompted a clamp down and
dismantlement of the group. 12 Official attention was also attracted to the activities
of Mustapha Bouyali and his followers. The security services had noted Bouyali's
rhetorical forays into the area of politics in the occasional sermons he had given
at the El-Achour mosque in the Mitidja region and they monitored his activities.
When Bouyali's brother was shot in a confrontation with the police in April 1982
Bouyali appeared to take the decision to form the MAIA as a more covert and
organised challenge to the regime.13
These moves against the Islamist movement still remained exceptions to the
general policy of tolerance of the Chadli regime. This approach, however, came
under increasing strain throughout 1982 and was finally cast aside in November
1982 following a further outbreak of violence in the universities which had
resulted for the first time in the death of a student. The fatal stabbing of Kamel
Amzel, a leftist, during disturbances following elections to residence hall
committees on the Ben Aknoun campus of Algiers University on November 2nd
led to a significant clamp down by the authorities. Nearly 400 Islamist supporters
were arrested in attempts to quell the unrest.14
The crack down did not, however, dampen the Islamist unrest. In reaction
to the arrests, Islamists organised a prayer meeting at a university building in the
centre of Algiers on November 12th. The meeting attracted several thousand
people (estimates vary considerably 15) and disrupted traffic in that area of the city
for several hours as it overflowed into the streets. Such a significant display of
12 Khelladi: Algêrie: Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir p.118
13 Algerie Actualitd 23.2.93; Burgat & Dowell pp.266-267
14 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.87
15 5, 000 is a figure most frequently quoted (e.g. Burgat & Dowell p.263) but
attendances as large as 100,000 are recorded (Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution
Institutionalized p.87)
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public support for the Islamists was a further clear indication of the growing self-
confidence of the movement and represented something of a challenge to the
Government. 16 This challenge manifested itself not just in the size of the meeting
and its defiance of the threat of a further official clamp down but, more
importantly, was directly articulated by the issuing of a written set of demands by
the organisers of the meeting. This fourteen point document, besides calling for
the release of the arrested activists, contained most of the traditional demands
and rhetoric of the Islamist movement. They included demands for increases in
religious and Arabic education, greater legal status for the Sharia, an end to the
mixing of the sexes in schools and offices and more general railing against the
incursion of Western and colonial influences in Algerian society.17
The regime reacted to this challenge by making further large-scale arrests
including those of the three leaders of the demonstration and signatories of the
list of demands. All three figures were well-established figures in Algeria's
Islamist movement. Two, Abdellatif Soltani and Ahmed Sahnoun, were ageing
well-respected Sheikhs, who had been members of Ben Badis's original AUMA
and had continued to be active and independent through the 1960s and 1970s -
Soltani having been the author of the uncompromising attack on Boumedienne's
socialism from exile in Morocco in 1974 (see previous chapter). The third figure,
Abassi Madani, was younger but had also been involved in Al Qiyam. He had
spent a significant part of the 1970s studying for a Ph.D in Britain, but had
returned at the end of the decade to teach (the sociology of education) at
university in Algiers, where he played a significant role in the organisation and
mobilisation of the Islamist students.16
16 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.579
17 For the full text of the document see Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frêgosi pp.45-48
18 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fragosi p.69; Burgat & Dowell p.263
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The regime also chose this time to strike against Bouyali's MAIA. Following
the discovery of several caches of arms and explosives that the various groups
had built up, twenty-three members of the organisation were arrested in mid
December 1982. This move by the authorities forestalled plans by the MAIA to
launch a series of attacks against various official targets. Scheduled for
December, these plans had included the assassination of the Prime Minister, the
kidnapping of the FLN's number two figure, Cherif Messadia, and attacks against
the headquarters of various organisations (such as the official women's
organisation) and certain public monuments in the capita1.19
The firrnhandedness with which the regime had dealt with the Islamist
movement in late 1982 was curiously not matched by its subsequent actions.
Despite the large scale arrests, no Islamists were brought to trial during the
seventeen months following the unrest. When proceedings finally did take place,
in September 1984, 12 of the 19 defendants, on trial for acts of violence were
acquitted, one was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for the manslaughter of
Kamel Amzel, and the remainder received sentences ranging from 1 to 5 years.20
The apparent leniency of these sentences and the intervening delays appeared
to be at odds with the original tough approach of the authorities.
The reason for this was continuing unease within the Government over the
apparent strength and size of the Islamist movement which appeared to be
undiminished by the repression of late 1982. A dramatic demonstration of the
enduring support enjoyed by the movement occurred with the funeral of
Abdellatif Soltani in April 1984, the ageing Sheikh having died whilst still under
the house arrest he had been sentenced to following his arrest in 1982. Attended
19 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized pp.87-88; Lamchichi:
L'Islamisme en Algèrie p.71 & p.230
20 Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.579-580
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by a crowd of mourners tens of thousand strong (estimates again vary 21 ) the
funeral was another testimony to the mobilising powers of the Islamists. The
Government's decision to postpone trials of Islamists arrested in 1982 from May
1984 (the month after Soltani's funeral) to the following September was clearly
due to concerns that the trials might provoke Islamist unrest. The release of the
other two leaders of the November 1982 demonstration, Abassi Madani and
Ahmed Sahnoun, on the original trial date in May 1984 was a further indication of
official willingness to appease the Islamists.
4. Government Co-optation and Concessions: 1982 - 1986
This policy of the Government of combining repression of Islamism's militant
edges with conciliatory gestures to avoid provoking the wider movement also
encompassed measures aimed at undercutting the bases of Islamist support and
sentiment within the country. Primarily this involved the state in efforts, similar to
those adopted by Boumedienne, directed at incorporating religious activity and
life into the institutional framework of the state as well as including selective
elements of the Islamist agenda in government policy.
Chadli Benjedid had, as has been shown, already made several apparent
concessions (albeit for different reasons) to the Islamists in the early years of his
presidency, appointing sympathetic government ministers and by continuing with
the Arabisation programmes. Such initiatives were continued and intensified in
the aftermath of the disturbances of late 1982. Levels of government funding to
Quranic educational establishments (the construction of which the government
had begun itself to fund) were rapidly increased as was recruitment of young
imams to serve in the mosques many of whom were trained in four new training
21 Al-Ahnaf, Botveau & Frêgosi quote the number attending as 20,000 (p.310);
Roberts cites a figure of 25,000 (Radical Islamism p.579); Entelis uses 100,000
(Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.87)
22 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.579
98
centres for imams that the regime established. In October 1984 the government
opened the Emir Abdelkader University of Islamic Sciences in Constantine -
probably the largest mosque-university complex in North Africa.23
These institutional moves represented not only a desire on the part of the
regime to portray itself as a supporter of Islam. More importantly, they were
attempts to halt the growth in the number of 'free' or independent mosques
staffed by imams who had not been appointed by the state and which, as has
been shown, had been such a feature of Islamist institutional expansion since the
1970s. The issue of Islamist activity and control of mosques had become one of
increasing concern to President Chadli. In 1985 he had told his Prime Minister,
Abdelhamid Brahimi, one of the few members of the Government who still
regularly attended the mosque, to no longer do so. This was the result of an
apparent fear that Brahimi was in agreement with the Islamists. 24 As a
consequence of these concerns, new rules covering the mosques were
introduced requiring all imams to possess a degree from an appropriate
(government supervised) religious institute, and sole authority for the assignment
of Muslim clergy to positions countrywide was vested in the Ministry for Religious
Affairs. 23 The end of official tolerance of the existence of independent Islamist
imams, which had effectively operated since the beginning of the 1970s, was
signalled in a speech given by the President in November 1986. 26
 In announcing
the introduction of measures requiring the construction of new mosques to be
subject to official approval, Chadli had declared that: "We cannot leave the
23 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized pp.88-89; Lamchichi: Islam et
Contestation p.152
24 Author's interview with Abdelhamid Brahimi, Prime Minister of Algeria 1984-88,
London, 19.12.94. Brahimi was the son of Mubarak Mill, one of the senior figures
in Abdelhamid Ben Badis's Association of Algerian Ulama.
23 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized pp.88-89
26 Rouadjia: Les Freires et la Mosquêe p.183 & p.191
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mosque at the mercy of certain pernicious elements who will use it for destructive
purposes."27
There were also continued attempts to dominate and direct the discourse,
as well as the institutional manifestations, of Islam in the country. There was
increased use of religious language and references by government officials and
ministers in their speeches, which often sought to portray the regime and its
leaders as upholders and protectors of Islam. In one speech the Minister of
Religious Affairs, Abderrahmane Chibane, praised President Chadli for striving to
"re-establish the hierarchy of values by placing faith in Allah above any other
allegiance."28 The government made use of the media to achieve its twin aims of
gaining control of the Islamic discourse as well as persuading the populace that it
was not (as the Islamists claimed) forgetting the country's Islamic nature and
heritage. Television programmes on Fridays became almost exclusively devoted
to religious themes and substantial media coverage was given to Sheikh
Mohammed Ghazali, a cleric and former member of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood and new head of the Islamic University of Constantine, who spoke
out against more radical interpretations of Islam claiming Islam to be a religion of
'humanism and progress.' Interestingly enough, almost exactfy the same words
were used to describe Islam in the new Algerian Constitution which was approved
in January 1986.29
The regime also made various concessions to Islamist sentiment and
opinion, the most important of which being the new Family Code passed and
introduced in 1984. The Code, described by John Ruedy as "a blend of Islamic
and traditional Algerian notions" included many stipulations, such as ones
27 E! Moudjahid 12.11.86 quoted in Rouadjia: Les Fréres et la Mosqude p.191
28 Quoted in Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.88
29 Richard P. Parker: North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns
(Praeger, New York, 1984) p.99; Amir Taheri: Holy Terror: The Inside Story of
Islamic Terrorism (Hutchinson, London, 1987) p.182
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defining and restricting women's rights to marriage, divorce and work, that were in
line with Islamist social values but which were, not surprisingly, anathema to
large numbers of Algerian women. 30 The strength and effectiveness of organised
women's opposition had helped prevent the introduction of a similar (although,
ironically, more moderate) Family Code three years earlier in 1981. 31 The
successful introduction, though, of the 1984 Code was attributed to the growth in
the influence of the Islamists in the intervening period. The increased use of
violence and intimidation by Islamists (as witnessed in the universities) explaining
the failure of the women's movement to successfully re-mobilise against the new
code.32
Desire to undermine the Islamists' appeal was not the only reason for these
official concessions. As in the 1960s and 1970s there existed elements within the
regime itself that shared many of the views, if not the increased radicalism, of the
Islamist movement. Chadli Benjedid's appointment of Abderahman Chibane as
Minister of Religious Affairs had been popular with Islamists outside the regime
and the presence of officials from the Ministry at the funeral of Abdellatif Soltani
in April 1984 was evidence of the sympathy with the Islamist cause. 33 Such
sympathies were not confined to individual ministries or officials. The Algerian
legislative assembly - the APN (Assemblee Populaire et Nationale) - although
consisting solely of FLN deputies, produced far more restrictive proposals for
women's personal status following debates over the Family Code than had been
3° Ruedy p.243 Specifically the Code made women the wards of their family until
marriage; prohibited Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims; made divorce
"almost totally a male perogative" (Ruedy) and made a woman's right to work
outside the home subject to the approval of her guardian.
31 1bid. For a fuller account of the debate and struggle over the 1981 Family Code
see Knauss pp.125-140
32 Ruedy p.243; Knauss p.138
33 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.579
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expected by the President. This indicated the strength of Islamic and traditionalist
views in the Assembly.34
5. Fragmentation, Co-operation and Conflict: The Islamist Movement 1979 -
1982
Despite the impact Algeria's Islamists had made on the political scene
between 1979 and 1982 and the alarm this had caused within the regime, the
Islamist 'movement', such as it was, remained as fragmented as it had been in the
1970s. The contacts that had been established between the various groups from
the mid 1970s were retained and even expanded, two mosques in particular
becoming centres for increased co-ordination and co-operation. The Bait al-
Arqam mosque became the base for the work and preaching of both Sheikhs
Soltani and Sahnoun and hosted numerous conferences, lectures and
discussions from 1976-77. The Ben Achour mosque also became an important
focus for Islamist activity and co-operation, providing the forum for what one
contemporary Islamist leader described as "the first important meeting" between
representatives of all of Algeria's major Islamist tendencies and groups in early
1979. However, despite the supposed intent of this gathering to forge some form
of unity between the various factions, the range of views (and undoubtedly
personalities) frustrated any move towards greater co-operation.35
Relationships between the groups were frequently marked by rivalry and
animosity, despite the fact that most of the groups and their leaders were familiar
with each other. Demonstrations of apparent Islamist strength and unity, such as
the November 12th meeting in 1982, frequently obscured divisions and hostility
between different factions. The decision to call the rally, the idea of Abassi
34 Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94
35 Burgat & Dowell pp.261-262 Quotes from Doudi Mohammed Abdelhadi who
preached at both mosques.
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Madani, had been strongly contested by the Djazaira whose majlis shura had
rejected the move. 36 Furthermore, the group's leaders, Mohammed Said and
Thabet Aouel Mohammed, had called on Islamists not to participate in the
planned meeting. This loss of support from the Djazaira, which was still centred
in the universities, led, it is argued, Abassi to solicit the participation of Soltani
and Sahnoun in the show of force thus adding weight to its significance and
resulting charter of demands. Despite the evident success of the move, the
Djazaira proceeded to try and block attempts by Abassi Madani to speak at
mosques in the immediate aftermath of the rally and before he was arrested by
the authorities. 37
On another front, the Djazaira were equally opposed to those Islamists led
by Mahfoud Nahnah whose pan-Islamic ideas and contacts were in conflict with
their nationalist, Algerianist beliefs. More directly, the Djazaira sought to counter
the influence and growing strength of Nahnah's Muslim Brothers on their native
territory of the university campuses.38
The relationship between Mustapha Bouyali and his supporters and the rest
of the Islamist movement is an interesting one. The leader of the MAIA's
involvement in the Ben Achour mosque from the late 1970s indicates that he had
contacts with most of the other major figures and factions in the movement and
indeed it appears that he constantly sought the support and blessing of other
Islamist leaders.39 However, there is no real evidence to suggest that Bouyali
gained such endorsement. It appears that two senior figures actually sought to
stop him from embarking on his campaign of violence. It is alleged that in 1981
36 Labat: Islamism and Islamists p.108
37 El Watan 28.2.94 Abbassi was at this stage not attached to any of the main
groupings within the Islamist movement. He had been a member of Al Qiyam in
the 1960s but subsequently said he had "no confidence" in the notion of Islamic
organisations and thus preferred to work independently. Author's interview with
Rachid Ghannoushi, leader of the Tunisian Islamist movement, London, 18.4.95
38 La bat: Islamism and Islamists p.108
39 AI-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frêgosi p.28
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Abassi Madani used sermons to appeal for people not to involve themselves with
Bouyali's campaign, a message that led on one occasion (in Sidi Bel Abbés at a
mosque controlled by Othmane Mohammed) to him being attacked and
harangued by some of his listeners.43 It has also been alleged, in this case by
one of Bouyali's lieutenants, Ahmed Merah, that Mahfoud Nahnah, who had
received Bouyali on several occasions, had only done so in order to gain
intelligence about the MAIA which he passed on to the authorities.41
6. Bouyali's Campaign: 1983 - 1987
The move against the MAIA by the Government in December 1982, which
was consolidated by further arrests in January 1983 and the break-up of the
command cell of the organisation, did not, however, signal the end of Mustapha
Bouyali's plans for armed insurrection against the state. 42 He himself evaded the
authorities and fled abroad (it is thought to either Iran or Libya) returning covertly
to Algeria at the end of 1984. 43 Re-establishing contacts with many of his old
supporters (92 of whom had been released by the authorities in May 198444)
Bouyali began to reconstitute the MAIA and plan once more for a campaign of
armed resistance.
The first evidence of these plans and the re-emergence of the MAIA came in
August 1985 with two significant operations being mounted by the group . The
first took the form of an armed robbery at a factory near Algiers on 21 August in
which the large payroll was stolen. The second six days later was an attack
against a police barracks in the southern town of Soumma in which arms and
4° El Watan 1.3.94 It was furthermore alleged that Abassi reported this incident to
the authorities thus precipitating the clampdown on the organisation referred to
earlier.
41 Le Nouvel Hebdo 18.11.90 reproduced in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frtgosi pp.66-
68
42 Burgat & Dowell p.267
43 El Watan 1.3.94
44 AI-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.310
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ammunition were taken and a police cadet killed. 45 That these operations were
something more than simple acts of criminal banditry and were aimed at securing
financial and logistic supplies for an armed jihad was indicated by the painting of
the phrase "Allah the Avenger is with us" across the gate of the barracks at
Soumma following the attack there.46
In response to these events the government dispatched a significant force
to the Atlas mountains, where the group appeared to be based, with the intention
of swiftly crushing the group. Despite the relatively small size of Bouyali's band,
they were able to inflict disproportionate losses in clashes with the pursuing
government forces. The group continued its campaign against targets it
considered to be anathema to Islam with Jun-Islamic' buildings such as girls
schools, libraries, restaurants and cinemas being attacked. Bouyali himself
continued to avoid capture and continued to make regular public appearances at
mosques in the region. Aided by his expert knowledge of the mountainous region,
gained as an FLN guerrilla in the war of independence, as well as by the evident
support of the local population Bouyali managed to avoid being tracked down by
the authorities until early 1987 when he was finally killed in an ambush by the
security services.47
The fall of Mustapha Bouyali represented the end of his sixteen month
campaign of armed resistance. Those members of his group who had not been
killed during the course of the campaign were virtually all put on trial by the
authorities in July 1987. Compared to the relative leniency of the sentencing of
those Islamists arrested in 1982, the sentences delivered on Bouyali's
companions this time were far more severe. Reflecting an improved official
confidence in the face of the Islamist challenge as well as a desire to deal harshly
45 Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.580-581
46 Taheri pp.180-181
47 Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.580-581; Taheri p.181; Burgat & Dowell p.267.
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with this first serious attempt at armed insurrection by the movement, the courts
acquitted just 15 of the 202 defendants with five members of the group receiving
the death penalty45.
7. Support for Islamism: 1979 - 1988
Whilst the 1980s witnessed a clear increase in the confidence and activism
of Algeria's Islamists, the degree of popular support the movement actually
enjoyed remained unclear. The absence of any institutional unity in the
movement made any attempt at calculation of support difficult. Of the main
individual groups, one observer estimated that, at most, the Muslim Brothers
support was roughly 20,000 strong across the country. 49 The trials of Mustapha
Bouyali's MAIA gave a more concrete indication of his following, the 202
defendants in the trials of 1987 reflecting in the view of one Algerian newspaper
an activist base of around 600 during the decade.53
For the movement generally, the albeit imprecise figures for attendance at
both the 12th November rally in Algiers in 1982 and the funeral of Abdellatif
Soltani eighteen months later indicate five figure levels of active popular support
for Islamism. However, Hugh Roberts has observed that the significance of this
level of support is reduced when it is remembered that Al Qiyam's public
gatherings in the 1960s had been able to attract similar crowds to that gathered
in November 1982. Similarly, attendance at Soltani's funeral, although more
substantial, was comparable to that at Messali Hadj's interment ten years earlier -
both men being figures largely disapproved of by the authorities. 51 It would
48 Burgat & Dowell p.268
49 Mohammed Boudiaf quoted in Knauss p.121
50 Algèrie Actuante 23.2.93
51 Hugh Roberts: From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and
Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979-1992 in Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby: The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 4: Accounting for
Fundamentalisms; The Dynamic Character of Movements (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1994) p.446
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therefore be fair to assume that the core support for the movement had not really
increased over the whole period although it is probably true that support in the
1980s was up on the level it had declined to during the previous decade.
Nevertheless, the influence the movement appeared to have over Algerian
society generally clearly increased in the 1980s. This was most noticeable in the
areas of dress and public social behaviour with many more Algerians adopting
Islamic dress and observing Islamic mores than had been the case in the 1960s
and 1970s.
Estimating the level of support for the Islamist movement in the 1980s
remained difficult, but identifying the sections of Algerian society that aligned
themselves with the movement became easier as it became more open and
assertive in this period. It appeared that the movement attracted an extremely
wide and heterogeneous cross-section of the Algerian population. Students
continued to provide the most organised and visible manifestation of Islamism,
but the rally held at Algiers University in November 1982 also attracted significant
numbers of workers, minor government functionaries and tradesmen. 52 The
involvement of these groups has been explained in economic terms, liberalising
economic reforms introduced by the government having increased unemployment
in the 1980s thus threatening the livelihoods of these sections of the population
as well as the job prospects of students. 53 However, whilst this probably had an
impact, Islamism also appeared to have a robust following amongst elements of
the bourgeoisie who provided, in the view of one commentator, the main source
of support for the movement outside the universities.54
There appeared to be no particular geographic base for the movement
either. Virtually all of the activism that was witnessed between 1979 and 1982
52 Lamchichi: Islam et Contestation p.158
33 See for example Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism pp.108-109
54 Burgat p.169
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was centred in urban Algeria, but Mustapha Bouyali's campaign of the mid 1980s
was based in and around the foothills of the Atlas mountains away from Algeria's
major cities.55 Bouyali's continued ability to evade capture by the authorities was
in large part due to the support he and his group enjoyed locally in the small
towns and villages of the region. Larbaa, the town in which Bouyali was finally
cornered by the security services, has been described as one "notorious for its
Islamist sympathies."56
 Furthermore, another observer writing in the 1980s
argued that support for the Muslim Brothers was actually stronger in the villages
and small towns of Algeria than in it cities.57
The trial of Bouyali's associates provided further evidence of the
heterogeneous nature of Islamist support. Amongst the 202 defendants, there
were workers (49), agricultural labourers (29), technicians (4), tradesmen (22),
teachers (12), students (8), artisans (5), functionaries (7), several professionals
as well as a number (13) of unemployed.58 This wide cross section of
backgrounds also indicated that even the radical stance adopted by Bouyali had
no greater apparent appeal to one section of Algerian society over another.
One minor qualification to this overall conclusion that the Islamist movement
did not seem to markedly attract particular areas of Algerian society was that age
appeared to become a feature of Islamist support in the 1980s. Details of the
backgrounds of the MAIA defendants give no real indication of their ages, but it
was a noted fact that specifically young men became increasingly involved in
55 Initial units of the MAIA were to be found in Algiers, Oran, S6tif, Skikda but its
real strength was to be found in the Sahel and the Mitidja region. Algerie Actualit6
23.2.93; El Watan 1.3.94
56 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.581 Roberts attributes this Islamist sympathy,
common to other towns in the region, to social dislocation caused by migration
from the hill villages thus enhancing the appeal of the Islamist message and its
certainties.
57 Knauss p.123
56 Analysis by Mohammed Harbi in Jeune Afrique Plus September- October 1990
quoted in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fr6gosi p.28n
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Islamist activism in this period. This was not just confined to the universities. As
Richard Parker observed in 1983:
"..in Boumedienne's time, mosque attendance was like church attendance
in Moscow - the old, the infirm and the idle made up the congregation.
This has changed in the last five years - there is a marked increase in
the number of young men congregating at mosques."m
The involvement of particularly young men in Islamist activism, like the
involvement of students, was a notable feature to be found in Islamist movements
elsewhere in the Muslim World. Increased feelings of confusion and alienation in
societies which have experienced rapid change has been advanced as an
explanation for this phenomenon. This having led the young to take refuge in the
cultural and religious certainties of the Islamists' message. 93 In Algeria it was
undoubtedly the declining economic and employment prospects of the 1980s that
predominantly pushed young men towards supporting groups, such as the
Islamists, who were highly critical of the ruling order.
8. Ideology and Agenda
The rather fragmentary nature of the Islamist movement during this period
makes an effective analysis of the ideology and agenda of the movement, as a
whole, rather difficult. Nevertheless, the various tracts, speeches, publications
and activities of the different groups provided some good indications of the ideas
and inclinations of Algeria's Islamists.51
59 Parker pp.97-98
60 See, for example, Knauss p.123
61 For most of this period the movement lacked a newspaper of its own of the sort
published by Islamist groups in other countries, although in the period of relative
political liberalism under Chadli, before the clampdown of late 1982, a number of
Islamist publications began to appear. Knauss p.120; Rouadjia: Les FrOres et la
MosquOe p.149
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Much of the apparent agenda of the Islamists into the 1980s seemed to
share much of that espoused by earlier Islamists such as Al Qiyam and Ben
Badis's Association of Algerian Ulama. Certain social, cultural and educational
demands remained a central feature of Islamist campaigns and discourse. The
list of demands drawn up by Abassi Madani, Abdellatif Soltani and Ahmed
Sahnoun at the time of the mass meeting of 12 November 1982 contained many
of the traditional Islamist demands of the AUMA and Al Qiyam and, moreover,
reflected the three leaders' past membership of these organisations. Similarly, in
education, demands for greater Quranic instruction and the ending of co-
education and, indeed, of all education for women after the age of twelve, were
regular features in Islamic propaganda and speeches. In other fields calls for
more attention to Islamic themes and issues in the media were frequently heard
as were the perennial concerns about women's social behaviour and dress.62
There were some detectable innovations in the ideology and agenda of the
Islamists. There was a widening, in some sections of the movement, of the focus
and attention of Islamist activism and thought from concentration on specific
religious issues and individual policies of the government (such as those
identified above) to a wider analysis of the whole nature of government and the
state itself. 63 This development, beginning in the late 1970s, in the independent
mosques, was described by one activist who witnessed the change:
"These were no longer lessons dealing with how to pray or perform a fast and
all that. No, these were lessons at a high level in which we explained, or we
searched for a method by which we could live in an Islamic state... .And we
also touched on the problems which the Algerian nation was confronting. We
spoke about everything. Of all the situations, the economy, of all the aspects
of life."64
62 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized pp.85-87
63 Burgat & Dowell p.261
64 Doudi Mohammed Abdelhadi quoted in Burgat & Dowell p.261
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Such new emphasis, as indicated, did not simply refer to the adoption of a
more critical attitude towards the government. As Al Qiyam had done in the
1960s and Soltani in the 1970s, Islamists in the 1980s continued to attack the
regime's espousal of socialism, branding President Chadli 'red' or 'pink' and
condemning alleged corruption in high places. 65 However, by the late 1970s,
Islamists had become increasing critical of the institution of the state itself
arguing that the existing political structures led to glorification of the state rather
than Islam and thus disrupted the unity of the wider Muslim umma.66 Furthermore,
Islamists began to propose an, albeit very unforrnulated, alternative to the
existing Algerian state. The welter of tracts and leaflets produced and distributed
by the Islamists during the unrest in November 1982 frequently called for the
creation of an 'Islamic' republic and the abrogation of the National Charter of
1976 and its replacement, as a constitution, with the Quran.67
This shift has been explained as being largely the result of the rise of
younger militants in the movement who were not only more radical but more
intellectually oriented than the older generation of Islamists such as Soltani, who,
one commentator argues was "partially marginalized" by this new influx. 65 This
influx of new ideas and leaders was in turn largely the result of the continuing and
growing influence of foreign Islamist thought and movements in Algeria.69
65 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.85
66 Vatin:: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism p.106
67 Entelis: Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized p.86; Robin Wright: Sacred
Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (Andre Deutsch, London, 1986) p.212
69 Burgat & Dowell p.259
89 Foreign Islamist thought, it ought to be stressed was itself far from
homogeneous in nature and not all of it was radical in its ideology. The Egyptian
Islamist movement, which had a particularly important ideological influence on
Algerian Islamism, was divided by the 1970s between followers of the more
radical and revolutionary ideas of Sayyid Qutb and the more mainstream Muslim
Brotherhood who officially renounced violence. Given the hostility of Algerian
Islamists to the Algerian regime and the use of violence by Mustapha Bouyali,
John Entelis has observed that Algerian Islamism in the 1980s was "more radical
Ill
Despite this general observation of overall continuity with a more radical
and politicised edge, the segmented nature of the Islamist movement in the
1980s ensured that there was no uniform ideology. Whilst many groups were
influenced by foreign ideas, groups such as the Djazaira, even though they were
numerically much smaller than groups such as the Muslim Brothers, still adhered
to an essentially Algerian Islamist viewpoint. More importantly, whilst violence
became an increasingly common aspect of Islamist activism, particularly in the
universitiesm, Mustapha Bouyali's belief in the necessity and efficacy of armed
struggle to install an Islamic state by force was clearly one that was not shared by
most of the wider Islamist movement, as indicated by Abassi Madani and
Mahfoud Nahnah's opposition to his efforts. 71 The reality was that the Islamist
movement as a whole possessed no coherent programme. Individual groups,
themselves, invariably lacked anything approaching a comprehensive platform.
For all the rhetoric about an Islamic state, no real alternative to the status quo
was produced by Islamists in this period. This was a reflection of the fact that,
unlike most other Islamist movements elsewhere in the Muslim world during this
socially and politically" than the Muslim Brotherhood. Entelis: Algeria: The
Revolution Institutionalized p.85
7° There had been other incidents of Islamist involvement in violence in this
period notably serious clashes that occurred when the authorities tried to use
police to re-establish control over an Islamist occuppied mosque in the town of
Laghouat in September 1981 as well as continued sporadic attacks on
'improperly' dressed women and establishments selling alcohol. Hugh Roberts
offers a more detailed explanation of the Islamists' increasing use of violence in
this period. Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.577-578
71 Frangois Burgat asserts that Bouyali's use of armed violence was something
that the rest of the Islamist movement in Algeria "were far from adopting." Burgat
& Dowell p.268
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time, the Algerian Islamist movement lacked any real intellectual figure of
standing, thus further explaining the reliance on and appeal of foreign ideas.72
9. External Influences
The issue of the impact of developments abroad upon the Islamist
movement in Algeria assumed a new importance from the late 1970s at the same
time as Islamism itself began to attract greater attention from observers both
within and beyond the Muslim world.
I. Iran
The main explanation for both of these developments was the revolution
that took place in Iran in 1978-79. The particularly remarkable and unique feature
of the Iranian revolution, which toppled what had appeared to be one of the
developing world's most muscular regimes, was the clear presence and, indeed,
pre-eminence of Islamist ideas and language in both the revolution's leadership
and in its appeals to the Iranian people who participated in their millions in the
mass demonstrations which finally ousted the regime of the Shah. Furthermore it
was the subsequent assertion of this already dominant Islamist strain of the
revolution in the period after the fall of the Shah which resulted in the actual
founding of an 'Islamic Republic' in Iran.
These developments had obvious implications for Islamist movements
across the rest of the Muslim world as these groups realised that the overthrow of
a ruling regime and the establishment of a society run according to Islamic
principles was possible. This was no less the case for Algeria's Islamists. One of
the main implications of the events in Iran was that they caused an intellectual
72 Such a lack of intellectual leadership was apparently even acknowledged by
Bouyali himself who had stated that he was willing to step aside for a more
learned figure to lead his group. Burgat & Dowell p.265
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break with the essential conservatism that had been a feature of the movement
since the time of Ben Badis. The popular and revolutionary nature of the Islamist
movement in Iran helped also to divest Algeria's Islamists of the label of
reactionaries.73
This helps explain the shift to the much more radical stance towards the
state that the Islamist movement in Algeria adopted from the late 1970s. As has
been shown, the prime movers behind this change were new younger members
of the movement and it certainly appears that the Iranian revolution had a
particular impact on the youth. 74 An illuminating anecdote bearing this out was
told by a western Ambassador who related the story of an English teacher he
knew who, in the early 1980s, asked her class of young students to write an
essay about the country in the world that they most admired. Over 70% of the
class chose to write about Iran.75
This was not to say that older members of the Islamist movement were not
impressed by the example set by Iran's Islamists. In debates over unifying the
Algerian movement, Sheikh Soltani had used the example of the revolution in Iran
to argue the case against the establishment of a formal Islamist political party in
Algeria, pointing out that Ayatollah Khomeini had not had the backing of an
organised religious party when he had toppled one of the mightiest dictatorships
in the Muslim world.76
Paradoxically, the Iranian revolution also appeared to have an impact on
another prominent older Algerian who had hitherto had no involvement at all with
the Islamist movement. The apparent conversion to the ideas of Ayatollah
Khomeini by Algeria's first President, Ahmed Ben Bella, was a particularly
surprising development given his unpopularity with the Islamists during his brief
73 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism pp.106-107
74 AI-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.26
75 Wright p.213
76 Rouadjia: Les Freres et la Mosquêe p.159
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period in power between 1962 and 1965. His founding of the Movement for
Democracy in Algeria (MDA) in 1984 and his launching, from voluntary exile in
Switzerland, of a newspaper Al Badil, aimed at uniting Algeria's various Islamist
groups under a single banner. However, despite the historical weight and
influence that Ben Bella might have wielded through these means, it seems that
they were the result of opportunism on the part of the former President and
indeed this was largely recognised as such by Algeria's Islamists who saw him as
an "unrepented socialist" and had little to do with him. This rendered negligible
his overall influence on the Islamist movement in the 1980s.7
Besides the clear inspiration the Iranian revolution and its aftermath gave
to Algeria's Islamists, evidence of more direct and tangible Iranian involvement in
the activities of the movement was hard to find. The regime was evidently
concerned about the influence of events in Iran and the much talked about
'export' of the revolution. Its recruitment of Sheikh Ghazali was primarily to
combat this influence and it often alleged foreign and Iranian funding of Islamist
groups. 78 It appears, though, that these fears were largely unfounded. As one
observer remarked in 1984, emphasising the important fact that the specifically
Shi'ite nature of the Iranian revolution limited its applicability to non-Shi'ite
countries:
"...while Khomeini may provide an inspiring example...Shi'i missionaries
from Iran do not appear to be active in Sunni Algeria, and it is doubtful
that they would have a following if they did."79
7 Burgat & Dowell p.260; Taheri p.182
78 Taheri p.182. Following the events of late 1982, President Chadli blamed the
disturbances on small groups inspired and paid by foreigners (Arkoun p.173) and
during the same period the authorities published photos of suspects believed to
have been involved in Islamist violence and who were described in the press as
supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini (Knauss p.139). It has also been suggested
that the regime's first attempt at introducing a more Islamic Family Code in 1981
was as a reaction to the Iranian revolution and the more perceptible growth of the
Islamist movement in its wake (Knauss p.125)
79 Parker p.100
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Nevertheless, there does appear to be evidence to suggest, if not
comprehensive links with the Algerian movement, then periodic instances of co-
operation and co-ordination with individual groups. Mustapha Bouyali is believed
to have spent time in both Libya and the Islamic Republic during the period 1983-
84 before returning to Algeria to begin his campaign of armed insurrection.
Furthermore, a statement reputedly put out by Bouyali's group in April 1986
appeared to indicate that the MAIA allied itself with the 'Party of Allah' of Iran and
that six out of the seven leaders of the grouping named by the statement (which
appeared also to announce the group's further metamorphosis into a group called
'Islamic Jihad') had spent time in the Party of Allah's training camps in Iran and
Lebanon.80 Apart from this, though, the only other evidence of Iranian
involvement is the belief by one external observer that some branches of the
Muslim Brothers might be organised by Iranians and the fact that the Iranian
Embassy in Algiers appeared at times to be a rallying point for some Islamists
during the early 1980s.81
II. Other and General Influences
Ideological influence and example, rather than direct involvement and co-
operation, appeared also to be the main contribution made by other external
Islamist influences to Algeria's Islamist movement in this period. Such influence
and example was most obviously demonstrated by the appearance of various
forms of dress, behaviour and demands by Algeria's Islamists which quite clearly
had their origins elsewhere. A particular example of this was the growth in the
early 1980s in the number of petitions to the authorities who ran public buildings
80 Taheri pp.181-182
81 Mohammed Boudiaf quoted in Knauss p.120; Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi
p.26
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and factories that some provision be made for a place of prayer. 82 This provision
had been common in the Levant but was, until the demands by what were
evidently Islamist sympathisers, noticeably absent in the Maghreb. More
established aspects of Islamist activity in Algeria, such as attacks on
establishments selling alcohol and upon women deemed to be 'immodestly'
dressed, which continued in this period also duplicated practices first witnessed
outside Algeria.83
The use of the black chador of the Arabian peninsula by Islamist women
increased notably in the 1980s, from its first rare appearances on the university
campuses in the 1960s, as did other forms of dress from the Arab East. By the
mid 1980s these practices were augmented by the appearance of clothing from
even further east as Algerian volunteers in the war against the Russian army in
Afghanistan gradually returned in 1986-87. They brought back not only Afghan
'fashions' but also militant and violent ideas that the conflict had both attracted
and engendered.84
One of the main reasons for the increasing influence of ideas and examples
from elsewhere in the Muslim world in this period was the discovery and growing
use by Islamists across the Middle East of the audio cassette. By recording and
producing multiple copies of sermons delivered by prominent Islamist preachers,
ideas could be circulated very rapidly throughout the Islamist movement both at
home and abroad. The circulation of these cassettes, usually brought back by
those going on pilgrimage, was not simply limited to the 'religiously active.'
Algeria's Islamists increasingly encouraged their dissemination amongst the
82 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism pp.100-101 Besides the
demand for 'mosque space' these petitions often also included demands that
alcohol be prohibited in canteens and that certain imams be given free access to
the establishment's facilities. Ibid. p.106
83 Parker p.98-99
84 Author's interviews with eyewitnesses.
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general population as well so that the ideas of preachers from as far away as
Egypt, Kuwait and Syria could reach as wide an audience as possible.88
Ironically, the Algerian state itself assisted in the spreading of Islamist
ideas. The media coverage given to Sheikh Mohammed Ghazali in Algeria, whilst
undermining support for more radical forms of Islamism, helped, in many
observers' views, to actually underpin Islamism generally. The large audiences
the Egyptian preacher was able to attract encouraged Algeria's Islamists who
welcomed such a significant platform for religious ideas and also the fact that it
helped legitimise debate on Algeria's Islamic nature and future.86
Beyond this, though, the role external factors played in the development of
Algeria's Islamist movement in this period was limited. Indeed, Algeria's
movement seemed to be more autonomous than similar movements in other
countries. Compared to the Islamist groupings in, for example, Egypt and Tunisia,
the Algerian movement did not appear to receive significant funding from outside
and even its Muslim Brothers did not appear to have as close organisational
connection with the original Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as their namesakes in
Syria, Sudan and Jordan.87
Whilst the ideological contribution of external influences to the Algerian
Islamist movement was substantial and even arguably predominant, the nature,
make-up and strength of Algerian Islamism was very much determined by
domestic factors and events. The evident rise in Islamic activism that occurred in
Algeria from the end of the 1970s had more to do with the death of President
Boumedienne in 1978 than with the Iranian revolution. The precise coincidence
86 Parker pp.99-100; Rouadjia: Les Frdres et la Mosquee pp.177-179
86 Taheri p.182 Although close to President Chadli Benjedid, who clearly
benefitted, from the respected cleric's backing, Ghazali was also known to have
good relations with Abassi Madani during his time in Algeria thus underlining the
links with Algerian Islamists. Author's interview with Hussein Amin, Egyptian
Ambassador to Algeria 1987-90, Cairo, 13.6.94
87 Knauss p.121
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(December 1978) of Boumedienne's death with the effective collapse of the
Shah's regime in Iran makes the disentangling of the relative influence of
domestic and external factors all the more difficult.88
10. The Algerian Regime in the 1980s: Crisis and Decline
The domestic factors and events that had such a determining influence on
the development of Algeria's Islamist movement took the form in the 1980s of a
growing series of difficulties that the Algerian regime encountered and which
clearly aided and facilitated the re-emergence of a more robust manifestation of
Islamism.
The abrupt departure of President Houari Boumedienne, the dominant
figure in independent Algerian history, from the helm of the Algerian state in
December 1978 is clearly significant. Many of the problems the Algerian
government faced politically from the late 1970s (it should not be forgotten that
this period was marked by feminist, leftist, Berberist as well as Islamist activity
and unrest) were as much due to the new regime under Chadli Benjedid lacking
the legitimacy and the charismatic leadership that the Boumedienne regime had
enjoyed as to the new regime's initially less repressive attitude towards dissent.89
The unexpected death of Boumedienne and the consequent demise of his only
semi-implemented plans for Algeria's social, political and economic development
threw Algeria into confusion and opened the way for a growth in the appeal of
Islamism. In the view of Hugh Roberts, this "eleventh hour collapse" of
Boumedienne's ambitious nationalist project embodied in the Revolution
Socialiste (see previous chapter) left many, particularly young, Algerians
politically 'orphaned.' Having been inspired and mobilised by Boumedienne's
"vision of the just society" they found themselves deprived of a guiding influence
88 AI-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.27
89 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism p.103
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and vision when the President so unexpectedly died. Many of these subsequently
found themselves drawn towards the group in society which did appear to offer a
similar "vision of a just society." Ironically, this was Boumedienne's old
adversaries in the Islamist movement who, in turn, were heartened by the
removal from the political scene of the figure who had all but eliminated them in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.9°
Boumedienne's departure also heralded the beginning of a period of
increasing popular disillusionment with and alienation from the government and
regime. For many Algerians Boumedienne's charisma and comprehensive vision
for Algerian society had encouraged them to continue their at least tacit support
for his government and for the time being, until his national 'project' was
completed, persuaded them to overlook the many social, economic and political
shortcomings of the Algerian state. The accession to power of Chadli Benjedid,
who had neither the charisma nor vision of his predecessor meant that these
popular grievances came increasingly into the open.
I. The Political Field: The Absence of Consent
The continued lack of opportunity for political expression outside the strict
confines of the officially ruling FLN, meant that there was bound to be some form
of political unrest as indeed the Berberist, leftist and Islamist unrest of the late
1970s and early 1980s demonstrated. Although Chadli Benjedid had introduced
some degree of liberalisation soon after he had come to power, much of this was
subsequently rescinded following the unrest. Chadli's accession to the
Presidency also signalled an increased role for the military in Algerian politics,
the army, like every other group, having been subject to the dominance of
Boumedienne during the previous two decades. This new influence for the
military heightened popular perceptions of the exclusive and repressive nature of
g° Roberts: Radical Islamism pp.575-576
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the regime, particularly as the President came to increasingly rely on a small
number of senior military figures for advice. 91
Aspects of the Islamist discourse and agenda can be interpreted as
reflecting popular concerns about the political monopoly exercised by the regime
through the FLN: the regular references to the concepts of justice and
egalitarianism in Islamist discourses being linked to the idea of the law. In the
view of many Algerians, the whole idea of the rule of law (Mich, it should not be
forgotten, plays an important role in traditional Muslim society) had been put to
one side by the post-independence regime in its drive towards the
implementation of its revolutionary ideology. This absence of the rule of law
together with the evident corruption, nepotism and abuse of power, which are
inevitable features of closed political systems, produced an increasing popular
resentment against the regime (particularly since the passing of Boumedienne,
under whom such vices grew but were largely tolerated) which found an echo and
a possible solution in the Islamist talk of a return to the rule of law.92
II. The Economic Field: Inequality and Decline
The regime was also gradually losing the confidence of the populace in its
handling of the economy. Boumedienne's ambitious programme of heavy
industrialisation had not produced the promised economic and social dividends
for Algeria. Chadli's progressive abandonment of his predecessor's economic
project in favour of a more liberalised economy inevitably led to the loss of jobs
from overmanned inefficient state industries. Such redundancies boosted already
high (15-20%) unemployment figures which would be inevitably swollen, as time
91 Author's interview with Abdelhamid Brahimi, Prime Minister of Algeria 1984-
88, London, 19.12.94. Brahimi claims that following his 're-election' as President
in 1984, Chadli, who had previously consulted widely on policy, came to rely
almost exclusively on General Larbi Belkheir, who became his Cabinet Secretary.
92 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.586
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progressed, by Algeria's consistently high birth rate. During 1980-84 alone the
population grew from 18.3 million to 21.6 million. % Chadli's liberalisation also led
to greater economic inequalities within Algeria which contrasted badly in the
public perception with Boumedienne's clear commitment, whatever his other
failings, to social and economic egalitarianism 94 Such social and economic
problems, which quite clearly worsened as the 1980s progressed, boosted
support for the Islamists. This was not only because it fuelled disillusionment and
anger at the regime, but also because Chadli's economic policies, even more so
than Boumedienne's, were associated with western influence and ideas - things
traditionally identified by the Islamists as being at the root of many of Algeria's
troubles. As with more politically oriented grievances there was similarly no real
channel for ordinary Algerians to express their growing concern and distress at
their worsening economic position. For many, traditional religion became a
means of both refuge from and protest at the failures of modernity.%
Ill: The FLN: The Decline in Legitimacy and the Challenge of Islamism
The swell of alienation and dissatisfaction with the failed economic, social
and political promises of the regime was not peculiar to Algeria: many other
countries in the Middle East experienced similar popular shifts in the 1970s and
1980s. What marked Algeria out from other countries in this regard were the
implications this shift in popular perceptions had for Algeria in the context of its
revolutionary origins as a state. When the FLN came to power in 1962 at the end
of the bloody eight-year struggle against the French it arguably enjoyed greater
popular support and legitimacy than any other comparable regime in the region,
having proven itself beyond question as the champion of Algeria's Muslim
93 Mahfoud Benoune: The Making of Contemporary Algeria: 1830-1987
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988) p.286
94 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.586
95 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism p.103
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population. Growing realisation of the complete failure of the Party and the
regime amongst the population, which had experienced the war of independence
and hoped for so much in its aftermath, provoked a degree of disillusionment in
the Algerian population unexperienced by the populations of other states in the
region whose regimes had been established by coup or dynastic succession.
It has been argued that this break of confidence with the post-
independence regime had consequently led many Algerians to look around for
some true successor to the spirit and ideals of the original revolutionary FLN.
Several commentators argued that it is in this capacity that Algeria's Islamist
movement showed themselves to be suitable inheritors of the revolutionary and
truly authentic mantle of the Algerian national identity. This inheritance came not
only from the involvement of Ben Badis's Association of Algerian Ulama in laying
the groundwork and allying with the FIN in the independence struggle but also
stemmed from other more concrete continuities with the war of independence.
Chief amongst these continuities is that of personnel. Senior figures in the
Islamist movement of the 1980s, such as Abassi Madani and Mustapha Bouyali
participated in the war as part of the FLN. The fact that Abassi had been one of
the relatively small group of Algerians who had launched assaults against
symbols and institutions of French rule on All Saints Day in November 1954 (the
recognised start of the war of independence) indisputably gave a high degree of
personal legitimacy to both himself and the Islamist movement of which he had
become a senior figure.96
It seems that there was also a certain continuity between the outlook and
behaviour of the historic revolutionary FLN and the Islamists of later years. The
totality of adherence Islamist groups began to demand from their followers, the
methods they used and the absolute conviction with which they conducted their
mission "all vividly recall the behaviour of the wartime FLN" in the view of Hugh
96 Roberts: Radical Islamism p.580
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Roberts. 97 At the same time Islamism had also come to represent a form of
competition to the vision and hegemony of the FLN challenging it by using the
same methods and language that the revolutionary party originally used. Implicit
in this state-FLN / Islamist clash, Jean-Claude Vatin also sees competition
existing, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s between rival forms of Islamism.
These were the socially 'radical' interpretation espoused by the supporters of
Boumedienne who saw no contradiction between his socialist-style policies and
the progressive ideals of Islamic reformism; and the 'conservative' Islam of the
Islamists. However, with the death of Boumedienne and with him his ideological
vision, the more pragmatic and managerial Algerian regime under Chadli
encountered mounting difficulties in dealing with the sort of specifically
ideological questions thrown up by the Islamists.93
11. Conclusions
A number of significantly new developments were witnessed in the
Islamist movement during the decade that followed Boumedienne's death.
Firstly, and most importantly, the Islamist movement was far more active
and assertive during this period than it had been at any time in Algeria's history -
both before and since independence. Whilst lacking the central focus of a single
unified organisation such as the Association of Ulama and Al Qiyam, which had
existed in previous decades, Islamism was by the 1980s much more of a
movement than a vague tendency tipped by a vocal pressure group as had
arguably formerly been the case. Although this movement was numerically no
stronger than it had been in the 1960s and remained fragmented between an
array of groups and tendencies, a significant degree of co-ordination operated at
an informal, if not institutional level. The fact that tens of thousands of people
97 Ibid.
98 Vatin: Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism pp.107-108 & p.119
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turned out for Abdellatif Soltani's funeral in April 1984, despite it occurring just the
day after he died and there having been no mention of the Sheihk's death in the
media, was evidence of the strength and extent of informal links between
Algeria's Islamists.99 The greater influence the Islamists appeared able to exert
in this period was borne out by both the wider popular conformity to Islamist
ideals of social dress and behaviour and by the regime's increased incorporation
of Islamist demands and language into its own programme=
Such activism, at its height during the years 1979-82, was notable not just
for its raised profile (compared to the clandestinity of the 1970s) and its
significant influence in various parts of Algerian society, particularly the
universities, but also for its substantially more radical and militant nature. The
almost habitual use of violence by Islamists in pursuing their aims in the late
1970s and early 1980s represented a break with the tactics of previous periods
and also reflected the movement's new and fundamentally hostile attitude
towards the regime and the state itself. This was in contrast to the stance of the
Islamists in the 1960s and 1970s who had voiced their antipathy only towards
specific individual policies of the state. The petition of demands presented by
Abassi, Soltani and Sahnoun in November 1982 was of great significance since it
set out for the first time a platform for the Islamist movement and thus issued a
direct challenge to the state. In response, the state offered nothing of any
substance that was new in terms of methods of controlling and eliminating the
Islamists. The old approach of combining repression with concession and co-
option was continued with mixed effectiveness.lol
99 Wright p.212
= Roberts: From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition pp.446-447
101 Hugh Roberts argues that although Chadli Benjedid consciously copied the
largely successful twin-pronged strategy of repression and co-option of the
Islamist tendency employed by Boumediene in the 1960s and 1970s, he
embarked on measures of co-option and incorporation of religion before the
activists of the Islamist movement had been properly suppressed. In contrast,
Boumediene had effectively crushed organisations such as Al Qiyam before he
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Discussion as to why there should be an upsurge in Islamist activity during
this period revolves around two broad suggested factors: that it was the result of
the influence of factors and events outside Algeria, and that it was the product of
particular developments within Algeria itself. Both the timing of the emergence
and many of the characteristics of Algeria's Islamist groups have clear and
unmistakable parallels with similar groups and developments elsewhere in the
Muslim and Arab world. However, it seems fairly apparent that whilst external
factors, such as the Iranian revolution, gave shape and direction to Algeria's
Islamist movement, the support it enjoyed and many of its expressions were
overwhelmingly the result of changes in the country's internal political, social and
economic climate both before, but particularly after, the death of Houari
Boumedienne. It was his departure that provided something of a psychological as
well as a political and economic watershed in Algeria's post independence
history.
launched, for example, the 'Campaign Against the Degradation of Morals.'
Roberts thus argues that Chadli's approach left Islamist morale and support
intact. Roberts: Radical Islamism p.579
4THE EMERGENCE OF THE FIS: 1988 - 1990
As Algeria entered the late 1980s it appeared that the regime had
effectively solved its Islamist 'problem.' What notable agitation it had experienced
in 1982-83 had not resurfaced as the decade progressed; the one exception of
Bouyali's campaign being small-scale and geographically confined. In contrast to
most other Muslim countries in this period, notably its immediate neighbour,
Tunisia, Algeria did not see Islamist activism and membership of Islamist groups
increase in the mid to late 1980s. However, by the turn of the decade Algeria was
widely acknowledged as having one of the largest and potentially most influential
Islamist movements in the entire Muslim world. The reasons for this rapid and
unexpected development lay in the chain of events that resulted from the
dramatic crisis that gripped Algeria in the closing months of 1988.
1. The Riots of October 1988
The severe rioting that swept across most of Algeria's major cities in the
first two weeks of October 1988 and which resulted in large-scale destruction of
property and the death of several hundred people constituted a crisis
unprecedented in Algeria's independent history. Not least so for the regime
whose tactics of repression, involving the use of the army's firepower against
protesters as well as torture of those arrested, not only failed to make headway
against the sheer size and heterogeneous nature of the demonstrations (which
had grown out of a wide range of strikes and protests that had built-up through
the previous summer), but also served to fuel the unrest and fatally undermine
the waning popular legitimacy of the regime.
The reasons underlying this explosion of popular anger have been the
subject of intense debate. Particularly between those commentators who point to
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the sharp slide in living standards and growth in economic inequality in Algeria
over the preceding few years as the major cause of the unrest, and those who
see it primarily as an expression of a desire on the part of the Algerian people for
a more liberal political system. 1 More complicating were conflicting suspicions
and assertions that the demonstrations and riots were deliberately orchestrated
by rival elements within the regime itself seeking to use the crisis as a weapon in
internal battles. Furthermore, a significant amount of foreign media attention
during the crisis focused on the role played by Islamists in the protests,
demonstrations and rioting and even on the question of whether this was an
Islamically-inspired uprising.
Much still remains unanswered about the real origins of these Evenements
d'Octobre, as they became known, although it seems clear that they swiftly
mobilised a significant section of the population that harboured deep and bitter
resentments at the failings of the Algerian regime. The riots certainly appeared to
have a political dimension given the fact that buildings and vehicles associated
with the regime were targeted by rioters. However, the fact that there had been a
growing popular perception that senior figures in the government and
bureaucracy had corruptly benefited from Chadli Benjedid's economic reform
programme whilst the rest of the population bore the brunt of Algeria's worsening
economic position, clearly indicated that political and economic factors were inter-
linked. This was demonstrated by the fact that businesses and institutions
believed to have also unjustly benefited during the previous decade became the
subject of attacks during October.
Most informed commentators were, however, united in asserting that the
mainly foreign theories advanced concerning Islamists' role in precipitating the
1 For these two opposing points of view see Mahfoud Benoune: Algeria's Facade
of Democracy in Middle East Report (March-April 1990) and Lynette Rummel:
Privatization and Democratization in Algeria in John P. Entelis and Philip C.
Naylor: State and Society in Algeria (Westview, Boulder, 1992) pp.53-71
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unrest were some way from the truth. Islamist activity and sloganeering were only
witnessed several days into the start of the unrest thus testifying to the reality that
Islamism had had no part in inspiring the demonstrators and rioters and that the
Islamists were merely riding the popular bandwagon?
Algeria's Islamists had, in fact, been largely taken by surprise by the events
and took some days to formulate their response to these clearly portentous
developments. The fragmented nature of the movement meant that, as had been
the case in the 1980s, a response was unlikely to be unanimous and unified. As
many of the senior Islamist figures hesitated over their response, Ahmed
Sahnoun and Abassi Madani met and decided that they should arrange a
peaceful march for Friday 7th both to make their presence felt and to test official
attitudes towards the movement. 3 Attended by an estimated 6-8,000 Islamist
supporters, the march, which took place in the Algiers quarter of Be!court,
attracted immediate attention as it became not only the first politically
homogenous demonstration. More importantly, it became the first to be fired upon
by the army who had been called on to the streets the previous day.4
The deaths of nearly fifty marchers convinced Ahmed Sahnoun that such a
tactic should not be repeated by the Islamists, but the events of the day had
brought to the fore another Islamist leader who took a very different line. Ali
Belhadj, a young, fiery and increasingly popular preacher at the Al-Sunna
mosque in Bab el-Oued had played a significant role both in organising and
whipping up support for the march. Despite the death toll, the young preacher
began to organise a second march to be held just three days later on 10th
October. In the face of vehement opposition from Ahmed Sahnoun, who together
2 See particularly The Middle East 11.88
3 Khelladi: Algerie: Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir p.148
4 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.233
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with the leader of the Djazaira, Mohammed Said, tried to stop the planned march,
the march took place, this time attracting an estimated crowd of 20,000.5
Although this march resulted also in bloodshed, with over thirty people
being shot dead by the army, its repercussions came to benefit the Islamists.
Whether the Islamists were perceived to be leaders or opportunists by the mass
of ordinary Algerians who took to the streets in October 1988 is uncertain. What
does seem clear is that they were identified by the regime as playing a central
role. Whilst this recognition might initially have resulted in greater repression
being inflicted on Islamists on the streets, it rapidly worked to the Islamists'
ultimate advantage. Progressively realising that the situation on the streets was
moving beyond that which could be controlled by a security clamp down, Algeria's
leaders began to search for spokesmen for the largely 'headless' revolt that they
were witnessing, with whom they could strike some agreement to halt the
violence. 6
 The receipt by Chadli Benjedid of an open letter from Ahmed Sahnoun
on October 13, containing a list of measures that the regime should take to end
the crisis, appeared to provide the regime with the appropriate potential
spokesman for the rioters. Consequently, Sahnoun together with Ali Benhaj,
Abassi Madani and Mahfoud Nahnah were invited to see the President to listen to
their grievances. As Francois Burgat remarks:
"The choice was highly symbolic. The president had just admitted the
Islamists were part of the group that would allow him to renew his contract
with civil society:7
5 Algdrie Actualitd 12.10.89; Khelladi: Algèrie: Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir
p.149
6 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frègosi p.29
7 Burgat & Dowell p.270. Sahnoun's letter of 13 October had called for the lifting
of the state of siege that had been imposed from 6 October, greater job creation
and a more equal distribution of wealth. Algèrie Actualitè 12.10.89
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2. Political Reform and the New Constitution
By 13 October civil order had more or less been restored. The President
went on national television to announce the government's intention to introduce a
number of political reforms which would seek to address the grievances that had
given rise to 'the events of October.' This intention initially took effect in the
sacking of several senior figures in the regime, particularly those associated with
the excesses of the brutal security clamp down during the unrest, and making
constitutional amendments to make the government responsible to the National
Assembly. However, it soon became clear that Chad li intended to go much further
than simple constitutional adjustments. Following his formal 're-election' (he was
the sole candidate) as President at the end of December 1988, he set about
drafting and introducing an entirely new constitution which was formally endorsed
by popular referendum in February 1989.
The new constitution's most remarkable and important feature was its
removal of the twenty-five-year-old party political monopoly exercised by the FLN.
The constitution accorded Algerians the right to form 'associations of a political
character.' The implications of this for Algerian political life were clear: Chadli
appeared to be opening up the closed Algerian political system to other groups
and forces who might wish to have a say.
The reasons behind this startlingly comprehensive shift in policy by the
President, more extraordinary given the fact that demands for political
liberalisation of this type had not featured prominently in the unrest of October,
are another source of great controversy. Abdelhamid Brahimi, Chadli's Prime
Minister who was sacked in the wake of the October crisis, believed that the
President's move had been partly the result of pressure from abroad, particularly
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from France, to open up Algeria's political system. 8 However it seems certain that
the main reason for the President's move was a desire to frustrate his opponents
within the Algerian regime.
By the late 1980s the President had clearly lost much of the, albeit modest,
popularity he had enjoyed both within and outside the regime during his first term
as President. Internal opposition appears to have mounted along two axes:
political dissatisfaction with Chadli's rule and increasing dissent with his policies
of economic liberalisation that had been pursued since 1980. On the political
front Chadli's increasingly closed methods of policy making, relying on a small
clique of military officers, had led several senior FLN figures, notably Mohammed
Cherif Messadia, the FLN number two, and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the Foreign
Minister, to look for an alternative candidate when Chadli's second term as
president came to an end in late 1988. According to Abdelhamid Brahimi, this
possibility of not being re-selected by the party led Chadli to instigate trouble in
October 1988 at the end of his second term, thus provoking a national crisis
which allowed him to achieve re-selection by the FLN and the National Assembly
through casting himself as a unifying and reforming figure. 9 The crisis also
enabled the President to sack both Messadia and Ibrahim' as a convenient part of
his efforts to demonstrate a break with the pre-October regime.
The President also faced considerable hostility towards his reforms from
that section of the FLN and the bureaucracy that objected to the abandonment
and dismantling of Boumedienne's socialist project on either ideological grounds
or because of the threat it posed to their own administrative and financial power
bases. It is therefore argued that Chadli seized the opportunity presented by the
crisis of October 1988 (whether or not he deliberately provoked it) to open up the
8 Author's interview with Abdelhamid Brahimi, Algerian Prime Minister 1984-88,
London, 19.12.94
9 Ibid.
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political system to provide competition to his enemies within the FLN and thus
hamper or at least distract their efforts to oppose him. 10 Such a move was also
seen as having similar implications for critics of Chadli's political rule. At the same
time Chadli ensured that his own powers as president in the new constitution
remained substantial and distinct from those of the FLN.
3. The Islamist Response: The Creation of the FIS
The moves towards political liberalisation had obvious potential
implications for the Islamists. Boosted both in confidence and strength by their
participation in the events of October and, more importantly, by the formal
recognition the authorities had extended to them by inviting them to become
interlocutors for the mass unrest, many Islamists believed that this opening-up of
the political system could work to their benefit.
The immediate aftermath of the October crisis saw the creation of the first
body that sought to bring all of the various Islamist groups and leaders together
under one, albeit loose, institutional framework. The Rabitat Dawa (League of the
Islamic Call) did not, however, represent an attempt by Algeria's Islamists to
create an organisation which would seek to take advantage of the regime's new
liberalism (which took time to become apparent). Its creation was a response to
the events of October but aimed more at unifying the ranks of the movement that
had become dangerously divided during the crisis. Abassi Madani's and
particularly Ali Belhadj's swift reaction had created tensions between them and
those leading Islamist figures who had hesitated to become involved. Ahmed
Sahnoun thus became the driving force behind the creation of the Rabitat Dawa
10 Rhys Payne: Economic Crisis and Policy Reform in the 1980s in I. William
Zartman and William Mark Habeeb: Polity and Society in Contemporary North
Africa (Westview, Boulder, 1993) p.161
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to prevent fissures appearing within the co-operating, if not formally unified, ranks
of the Islamists.
It soon became apparent that, despite Sahnoun's efforts, the Rabitat would
not be able to contain the tensions and dynamics that emerged in the Islamist
movement in the wake of the October crisis. The effective entry of several of its
senior figures into the realm of politics during that month had given rise to
various hopes and beliefs that involvement in politics could be to the clear
advantage of the movement, particularly if the significant popular and official
attention and regard they had attracted could be exploited. Such thoughts were
clearly encouraged by indications by 1989 that the regime planned to open up the
political system to other groups and political parties. The essentially apolitical
nature of the Rabitat Dawa, which explicitly sought to work for the defence and
propagation of Islamic values, meant that it was not an ideal vehicle for political
mobilisation. It therefore was concluded that a separate specifically political
Islamist party needed to be formed to take best advantage of the rapidly opening
up political landscape.
Accounts about the precise origins of the idea of an Islamist political party
vary, but according to the newspaper subsequently published by the eventual
party, the idea was originally that of Hachemi Sahnouni, official Imam of the Al-
Sunna mosque. He shared his thoughts with Ali Benhaj, who frequently preached
at Al-Sunna, who had himself been thinking along similar lines and who proposed
putting the idea to the other senior members of the Rabitat. The first figure
Sahnouni and Belhadj approached was Abassi Madani, who Belhadj had become
increasingly close to following October. Welcoming the idea, Madani proposed
that the new organisation be called the Front Islamique du Salut in conscious
evocation of the Front element of the old FLN of which he had been one of the
earliest members.11
11 Burgat & Dowell pp.273-274; Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.30
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The idea was less well-received amongst other Islamist leaders. The
concept of an Islamist party was a controversial one and one that had been
rejected in the past. In the early 1980s Abdellatif Soltani had made clear his
opposition to the formation of an Islamist political party arguing that the whole
idea was associated with factions and divisions. He believed that the informal
movement of various groups served the movement's aims of education and
propagation far better. 12 Similarly, many of the senior figures in the Rabitat
expressed their doubts when approached. Many held to the view that the central
task of the movement had always been and should remain the gradual re-
Islamisation of the Algerian state and society through preaching and education,
rather than through politics. 13 Other reservations were voiced. Mohammed Said of
the Djazaira argued that the movement should wait to see what other political
developments occurred and what other parties appeared before committing itself
in this manner. Abdallah Djaballah similarly counselled patience, his
procrastination like many of the others hiding an understandable reluctance to
surrender control of the groups and constituencies that had been carefully built
up since the 1970s. Mahfoud Nahnah of the Muslim Brothers was more forthright
in his rejection of the idea claiming that there were already enough groups within
the broader Islamist movement. He expressed his fear that such a party might be
led by "kids" rather than the proper and appropriate leadership of religious
scholars.14
This dissent, however, was not sufficient to crush the idea of an Islamist
political party which gained further impetus with the unveiling of the new
constitution on 5 February 1989. Thirteen days later on February 18 the
formation of the Front Islamique du Salut was officially announced, five days
12 Rouadjia: Les Fréres et la Mosquee pp.158-159
13 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.75
14 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frêgosi pp.30-31
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before the new constitution was approved by national referendum. On March 9
the party held its founding meeting. Although the new party, which swiftly became
known by its acronym FIS, attracted a wide array of senior Islamist clerics and
figures, the majority of whom constituted the party's mauls shura, Abassi Madani
and All Belhadj remained the only two truly high-profile Islamist figures who
participated in the launch of the party. There is some speculation as to whether,
given their reservations, the other figures were formally invited to join the party.
Certainly Ahmed Sahnoun when telephoned by a journalist soon after the
founding of the FIS tersely replied: "They did not wait for us. We were not
present."15 Similarly, Abdallah Djaballah, when asked about his 'decision' to not
join the FIS stated simply that 'They left me."16
The absence of senior Islamist figures (which also included Said and
Nahnah) meant that the FIS only represented a part of Algeria's Islamist
movement and this had significant implications for the future development of the
new party. It meant that the new party would be able to pursue a fir more
popular and political course than would have been the case with the involvement
of figures such as Sahnoun, Djaballah and Nahnah. The more intellectual and
specifically religious orientation of these three leaders was a likely handicap in
the sort of multiparty competition for mass support that the new Algerian
constitution heralded. The effective assumption of the top two positions in the
new party by Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, the two Islamist figures who had had
the most experience of popular mobilisation for the Islamist cause (Belhadj in
1988 and Abassi in both 1988 and 1982) was a clear indication that the new party
would pursue a more popular and political direction. It seems unlikely though that
Sahnoun, Djaballah and Nahnah might have been, for the above reasons,
deliberately excluded as some have suggested The three had already expressed
15 Algórie Actualitè 12.10.89
16 Author's interview with Abdallah Djaballah, London, 7.10.94
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reservations when originally canvassed and that Abassi and Belhadj were unable
to see the success that a popular-political strategy would later bring them.17
Nevertheless, it is probable that the new leaders of the F1S had been encouraged
by their political experience and thus were willing to forge ahead with the project
of the political party without the participation of other senior figures. It is also
more than likely that personal ambition had at least some part to play on all sides.
4. Legal Recognition for the FIS: September 1989
Despite the dissenting voices, the newly-formed FIS grew strongly in its first
few months. However, the formation of a political party did not, of itself, guarantee
meaningful participation in Algeria's emerging political system: several potential
obstacles stood in the way of this aspiration. Firstly, the interpretation and
application of the new constitution had to be debated by the National Assembly
(the APN: which, it should be noted, was still made up exclusively of FLN
members) and made into law. More importantly for the Islamists of the FIS, was
the likelihood that the law that emerged on permitting "associations of a political
character" would ban a specifically Islamist political party such as the RS. In both
Egypt and neighbouring Tunisia, two countries that were also making attempts to
liberalise their political systems in this period, steps had been taken to prevent
the participation of an Islamist party in elections. In Tunisia this took the form of
explicitly denying official recognition to the Islamist Nanda (Renaissance) Party
because of its religious basis.
When the new law on political parties finally emerged from the National
Assembly in July 1989, it appeared that the Algerian authorities had closely
followed the example of their Tunisian neighbours. The new law banned
"sectarian practice" and any party organised "on an exclusively confessional
basis." Quite clearly then, the FIS seemed highly unlikely, on the basis of this
17 Hugh Roberts: From Radical Mission pp.449-452
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legislation, to gain the official recognition that would allow it to participate in the
series of multi-party elections the regime appeared to be opening the way for.
Nevertheless, the party, along with a growing number and diversity of other
parties which had also emerged, or in some cases re-emerged, in this period,
filed for official recognition as a legal political party. To the astonishment of
virtually everyone outside the government leadership itself, which took the
decision, the Front Islamique du Salut was formally endorsed and recognised by
the authorities on 16 September 1989.18
Why this decision was taken appeared uncertain. Officially, Chadli Benjedid
stated that to deny recognition to the FIS would be inconsistent with the regime's
new commitment to multi-party democracy. Recognition could not be extended to
the Communists on the one hand whilst denying it to the Islamists on the other,
he argued, as "Democracy.. .cannot be selective." Furthermore, he acknowledged
the legitimacy of a party based upon Islam, which was, after-all, the religion of
Algeria, and answered concerns about whether the Islamists would seek to abuse
the democratic 'opening' by pointing out that 'The activities of the Islamist party
are submitted to precise rules. If they respect them, we cannot forbid them."18
It is possible that Chadli was genuinely committed to full democratisation
and averse to banning any political party, but other explanations seem more
plausible. 20 The haste with which the President gave assent to the recognition of
the FIS, without even waiting for the necessary modifications to the law on
political associations to be made to allow a religion-based party to be endorsed,
led many to believe that other reasons must have been behind the decision. 21 It is
18 Robert Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria in Middle East Journal
(Volume 45, No.4, Autumn 1991) pp.579-580
19 Burgat & Dowell p.274
20 Abdelhamid Brahimi disputes that the President ever had any real belief in
democracy stating: "I know Chadli very well and I know he has nothing to do with
democracy." Author's interview, 6.9.95
21 Ibid.
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likely that Chadli saw recognition of the FIS as a means of actually controlling
and limiting Algeria's re-invigorated Islamist tendency, which one observer had
commented as early as April 1989 had become "a crucial feature of the political
scene since October."22 Chadli was aware of the strength of the Islamists and
took a gamble on including and working with them within the political system in
preference to the possibility of having to fight against them on the streets if they
were excluded from the system. 23 By recognising the FIS Chadli sought to split
the Islamist movement and isolate its radical elements from those willing to work
within the system. 24 Many Algerian Ministers stressed to foreign diplomats that
by bringing the Islamists out into the open it would also give a clearer indication
of the actual strength and make up of the movement. This would allow the regime
to understand and control it better and ultimately repress it if necessary.25
The decision to legalise the FIS was, like the decision to open up the
political system, also related to Chadli's relations with the old FLN. The President
hoped to use the threat of the Islamists to curb opposition to him and/or his
reforms in the FLN.26 Chadli believed that support for the FLN and the FIS was
likely to be balanced in elections thus allowing himself as President to dominate
any future National Assembly since neither party was able to wield a majority.27
The danger of any one party dominating would be further reduced by allowing
large numbers of other parties to participate which would splinter the vote even
more and support the President's strategy of divide and rule. There was
22 Middle East Economic Digest 14.4.89
23 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.580; Author's interview with
Abdelhamid Brahimi, 19.12.94
24 Ruedy p.252
25 Author's interview with Hussein Amin, Egyptian Ambassador to Algeria 1987-
90, Cairo, 13.6.94
26 Ibid.
27 Author's interview with Abdelhamid Brahimi, 19.12.94
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significant evidence to suggest that the regime actually encouraged certain
individuals to create new parties to achieve this end.28
The relative importance of these factors is impossible to gauge. However,
Chadli Benjedid seemed intent on both holding onto the reins of power whilst
reducing the power and influence of the old FLN, whether through a desire to
protect his economic reforms, his own position or even his own vision of a
democratised Algeria. Legalisation of the FIS thus appeared to serve these ends.
5. The FIS Mobilised: 1989-1990
Having achieved official recognition, the FIS lost little time in organising
itself and recruiting new supporters and members in preparation for forthcoming
elections, the first of which were to be held for local government in June 1990.
From the outset it became quite apparent that the new party was a highly
organised and motivated affair. Full use was made of the network of some 9,000
mosques which Islamists had come to control to co-ordinate activity and 'spread
the party's message at the weekly Friday prayers and sermon. 28 Within a month
of its legalisation, the FIS had begun publishing its own paper, Al Mounqid, which
was directly distributed by activists. 30 Leading FIS preachers were also filmed and
the footage distributed across Algeria and at the increasing number of rallies the
party began to organise throughout the country audio-visual equipment was
frequently employed.31
It soon became clear that the FIS enjoyed a substantial level of support
amongst the population. An estimated ten thousand supporters had been present
at the official founding of the party in March 1989 and All Belhadj was able to
28 Author's interviews with Rachid Ghannoushi, London, 18.4.95 and Abdelhamid
Brahimi, London, 6.9.95
29 Ruedy p.253; Bradford Dillman: Transition to Democracy in Algeria in Entelis &
Naylor p.34
30 Rouadjia: Les Freres et la Mosquee p.253
31 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.101; Algerie Actuante 5.10.89
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attract 20,000 people to his Friday sermons at Al-Sunna in early 1989, totals
which could only be added to by the FIS's subsequent higher profile and
recruitment drives. 32 Political campaigning and the mosque network were not the
only means the FIS used to attract supporters. The party incorporated into itself
and its activities the growing networks of medical clinics and social services that
had been established by Islamists in Algeria's poorest urban areas during the
1980s, adding to and expanding their work. The party's activists and doctors
were also the first to arrive on the scene to provide relief td victims of an
earthquake in a region to the west of Algiers in November 1989.33
Despite indications of the Islamist party's following (Al-Mounqid, for
example, was able to sell 100,000 copies of its first issue despite its high cover
price of 5 Dinars34) it was not until the FIS began to organise street
demonstrations and rallies that the true extent of its support became more widely
apparent. In December 1989 a rally called in response to one organised by
Algerian women who were protesting against the Family Code of 1984, attracted
over 100,000 people outnumbering the women's demonstration by several
hundred to one.35 Several other rallies were held subsequently throughout
Algeria. These shows of force culminated in a rally in Algiers on 20 April 1990
which journalists estimated drew an attendance of possibly 600-800 thousand
marchers and which further enhanced the highly-organised reputation of the FIS
by being conducted in complete silence and with great discipline.36
Such huge demonstrations of popular support, which were far in excess of
anything the Islamist movement in Algeria had hitherto ever been able to attract,
32 Summary of World Broadcasts ME10407 i 13.3.89; Lamchichi: Lislamisme en
Algárie p.101
33 Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria :
Interview with Rabia Bekkar in Middle East Report November-December 1992;
Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.579
34 Rouadjia: Les Fréres et la Mosquee p.253
35 Burgat & Dowell p.276
36 Algerie Actualitá 26.4.90
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appeared to be a clear vindication for the decision to form the party. The FIS and
its leaders thus became the most popular and influential Islamists in Algeria.
Those Islamist leaders who had remained outside the party became increasingly
marginalized and lacking in any real influence. Some other Islamists did form
parties distinct from that of FIS, but these proved to be tiny affairs incapable of
challenging FIS.37
The Rabitat Dawa continued to exist but posed no threat to the increasing
political hegemony the FIS exerted over Islamist activism. Abassi Madani actually
participated with Sahnoun, Nahnah and Djaballah in the meeting that formally
constituted a directorate for the organisation in October 1989. When questioned
on the relationship between the Rabitat and the FIS, the leader of the FIS replied
that: 'The one complements the other and one will work for the other because
Islam is all that matters." The other leading figures in the Rabitat were similarly
anxious to reaffirm the independence and apolitical and exclusively religious
nature of the organisation. Mahfoud Nahnah pointedly declared that: 'The .Rabitat
will never be in the service of a tendency, an individual or a party. It will only be in
the service of religion."38
The FIS and the Rabitat, nevertheless, co-operated and joined forces for
the rally and march of December 1989. 39
 However, the influence of those leading
figures who remained outside the new party waned as time progressed. This was
clearly demonstrated in the differences of opinion that emerged over FIS's plans
to hold its march of 20 April 1990 in direct conflict with one planned by the FLN.
Persuaded by the FLN leadership, Ahmed Sahnoun, who continued to be seen by
many as the 'patriarch' of the wider Islamist movement, together with Mahfoud
Nahnah urged the FIS's leaders to call off the march to prevent trouble. Sahnoun
37 For details of these parties see Jeune Afrique 18.12.89
38 Algórie Actualitá 26.10.89
39 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.34
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actually telephoned Abassi Madani from the UAE, where he was making a visit.40
These pleas went unheeded by the FIS, Abassi Madani explaining that "We love
Sheikh Sahnoun very much, but we also love justice. For us, it is justice that
comes first!"41
 The patent failure of these attempts together with the huge triumph
the march eventually constituted led to an inevitable decline in both the status
and influence of both Sahnoun and Nahnah, both figures together with Abdallah
Djaballah, continuing to haemorrhage supporters to the new party.
6. The Response of the Establishment: Government and the FLN
I. The Government: Inaction and Sympathy
The reaction and response of the political establishment to the rise of the
FIS in this period was ambiguous. Gestures of antagonism were frequently more
than matched with ones of tolerance and reconciliation. At times it appeared that
elements within Algeria's ruling strata were actively encouraging and even aiding
the new party.
The reason for these inconsistencies was the increasingly fragmented
nature of the Algerian regime in the wake of the crisis of October 1988. The
largely covert struggles that were waged inside the regime over Chad! i's political
position and economic policies were overlaid from 1989 by the institutional
divisions that were introduced in the new constitution notably those separating
the FLN from the state and carving a more independent role for the President.
Actual government policy in the year following the October crisis was
notable for its increased emphasis on Islam and Islamic themes. The new
constitution of February 1989, as well as omitting references to socialism,
4° Burgat & Dowell p.277; Jeune Afrique 7.5.90
41 Algórie Actualitd 26.4.90 It was also suggested, though, that despite his
eventual enthusiasm for the march, Abassi Madani had had his own doubts about
it, but feared it would go ahead without him and thus undermine his leadership.
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confirmed and stressed the Islamic character of the Algerian state. The National
Charter was no longer the highest authority and the Islamic council was
constitutionally recognised. In other areas too the regime was keen to display an
Islamic orientation. Chadli Benjedid made a high-profile pilgrimage to Mecca in
1989, and in July of that year the 18th Congress of Islamic Thought was devoted
to the revival of Islam.42
Whether this renewed emphasis on Islam represented an attempt by the
regime to improve its severely damaged sense of popular legitimacy in the wake
of the unrest of October 1988, or whether it sought, as it had previously done, to
'spike the guns' of the Islamists whose popularity and profile were clearly on the
rise, is unclear. It seems, though , that whatever the intent behind the measures
the effect was to boost the Islamists. The Law on Political Associations, for
example, whilst containing the provisions against confessionally-based parties,
also obliged new parties to include in their aims "the protection and the
consolidation of the social and cultural blooming of the nation within the
framework of national Arab-Islamic values." This, it was argued, not just further
legitimised Islamist ideas and aspirations, but actually served to strengthen the
FIS's hand against its non-Islamist and more secularist competitors.44
The reaction of the political authorities to the meteoric rise of FIS following
its legalisation in September 1989 was characterised by inaction and even
sympathy. The Government failed to take any real steps to curb the mobilisation
of the F1S even when it ventured into illegality through many of its activists' use of
intimidation against members of other political parties and people seen as not
42 Mohammed Tozy: Islam and the State in Zartman & Habeeb pp.119-120 It was
also notable that the guarantees of female rights contained in the Constitution of
1976 were entirely absent in the February 1989 Constitution. Ruedy p.251
43 Article 3 of the Constitution of February 1989. Quoted in Yahia H. Zoubir: The
Painful Transition from Authoritarianism in Algeria in Arab Studies Quarterly
(Volume 15, No.3, Summer 1993) p.91
44 Zoubir p.91
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conforming to Islamist notions of appropriate dress and social behaviour. At
times the Government appeared to be actually positively encouraging the FIS
through allowing Islamist sermons to be broadcast over state television and by
introducing legislation in February 1990 that allowed the FIS to establish its own
trade union in competition with the official UGTA. 45
 Mouloud Hamrouche,
appointed Prime Minister by Chadli in September 1989, officially denied FIS
involvement in a high profile violent incident involving Islamists in January 1990,
thus appearing to willingly abandon a possible propaganda tool the regime could
use against the FIS.46
II. The FLN Divided
The reasons for this extraordinary policy of the regime, which signified a
complete break with the policy of trying to contain the Islamist movement which
had been pursued by all the governments in Algeria since independence, were to
be found in the complex internal politics of the FLN. The aftermath of the October
1988 crisis witnessed the emergence of three competitive different tendencies
within the historic party as it sought to come to terms with the huge political
changes the crisis had engendered. In existence before 1988 and often
overlapping, these three tendencies struggled for influence in the dual and
paradoxical arenas of the new electoral system where it was technically just
another political party and within the regime itself where, despite its constitutional
de-coupling from the state, its members dominated nearly all the government and
the entirety of the National Assembly.
The first two of these tendencies or factions were delineated essentially by
attitudes towards the President, Chadli Benjedid and more particularly his
programme of liberalising economic reforms. As already explained, Chadli had
45 See Roberts: From Radical Mission p.462
46 Algdrie Actualitd 26.4.90
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been locked for some time in a struggle with elements within the FLN who were
opposed to him and his reforms. The President, however, did not fight this
conflict alone. He increasingly gathered around him a core of supporters who
were particularly committed to his economic reforms and who constituted an
opposing faction within the FLN to those who sought to thwart the reforms.
The third faction that became apparent was one that had been present
much longer than these first two factions. The consistent presence of Islamist
oriented figures within the Algerian regime since independence is one that has
already been noted. This tendency, from 1988, became increasingly vocal,
appearing to shake off its traditionally low profile and pushed far more openly for
the FLN and the regime to adopt a more Islamist agenda. This became
particularly apparent at the extraordinary conference of the FLN held at the end
of November 1989 when a section of delegates made a robust call for the
establishment of more single sex schools and the promotion of Sharia law. A
keynote speech by the influential former foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi,
long seen as on the 'Islamic' wing of the party called for the reassertion of 'Arabo-
Islamic' values. 47
 Besides the support of high profile figures such as lbrahimi, this
tendency (often referred to using the French pun: barbefelenes) appeared to
have a significant bloc of support in the party, one press agency estimating that
close to 60 of the 200 FLN deputies in the APN "espoused the ideas of the
Islamist party."48 Accusations were made that such a significant presence was
evidence of the success of efforts by the FIS to infiltrate the former ruling party.49
Whilst there may have been some degree of truth to this, the reality was that the
Islamist tendency in the FLN had always been present and was only now
47 Middle East Economic Digest 15.12.89 Ahmed Taleb lbrahimi was, in fact, the
son of Bashir Ibrahimi, the leader of the AUMA in the 1940s and 1950s
48 L'Agence France Presse quoted in Jeune Afrique 7.5.90
49 Such an accusation was made by the editor of the FLN journal Revolution
Africaine who was consequently sacked from his job. Algerie Actualite 26.4.90
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beginning to really assert itself within the party. This reassertion was interpreted
by many at the time as being part of an attempt to undermine the FIS by co-opting
its agenda - the traditional strategy used by both Boumedienne in the 1960s and
1970s and by Chadli in the 1980s. However, it seems that this push by the
barbefdlenes was primarily a function of the new political environment both inside
the FLN and in Algeria generally which allowed this faction to press their agenda
and quite possibly also helps explain the concessions to Islamist sentiment made
by the regime in 1988-89. The significance of this group from 1989 became their
relationship with the other two warring factions in the FLN and their relationship
with the FIS.
111. Chadli and the F1S
President Chadli Benjedid continued to feel under pressure from his
opponents within the regime during 1989 despite the measures he had taken to
distract and divide them. The October crisis had drawn several old-guard FLN
figures back into the political foreground who were forceful critics of his rule and
his economic programme and reasserted themselves strongly in the party and at
FLN congresses.93
 In response to this continuing threat to himself and his
policies, Chadli looked once again for a means of damaging his opponents and
decided that the FIS would be his tool for achieving this. It is this which explains
the apparent tolerance and encouragement that was given to the Islamist party
following its legalisation in September 1989. As before, Chadli believed that his
interests would be best served by support for the FLN and the FIS being fairly
equally balanced which would allow him to dominate any future National
Assembly. However, whereas in September 1989 Chadli viewed the FIS as just a
threat he could brandish at his enemies within the FLN which would allow his
allies to predominate, he increasingly appeared to think that a more active
5° Roberts: From Radical Mission pp.463-464
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approach was needed. This took the form of not just smoothing the path for the
FIS in the run up to elections but also of seeking to sabotage the electoral
prospects of the FLN. Furthermore, it seems that the President may actually
have struck some manner of deal with the F1S to achieve this goal.
No concrete evidence exists of any formal agreement having been made
between the FIS and the President, but there are strong circumstantial indications
that this occurred. Chadli Benjedid met formally with Abassi Madani in January
1990 and it is suggested that some arrangement was achieved then. 51 The likely
form of this arrangement is obviously uncertain but given the subsequent
behaviour of the FIS it appears that Abassi Madani, in return for official tolerance,
undertook to avoid criticism of the Government's programme of liberalising
economic reforms and to shift the anti-regime rhetoric and propaganda away from
the person of the President and onto the FLN generally. It was clearly
remarkable, for example, that a fifteen point list of demands submitted by the FIS
following the massive rally of April 20 1990 should be headed by an appeal for
the continuation of the reform programme, rather than any of the more traditional
Islamist demands. It appeared equally strange that the leadership of the F1S were
willing to forego targets such as the President and his economic reforms, both of
which were increasingly unpopular, in their otherwise unabashedly populist push
for votes in the run up to the local elections of June 1990.52
51 It was also rumoured that Chadli Benjedid and Abassi Madani had had a
second, secret, meeting in January in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia where a deal had
been reached on the invitation of King Fand. Author's interview with Hussein
Amin, Egyptian Ambassador to Algeria 1987-90, Cairo, 13.6.94
52 Roberts: Doctrinaire Economics pp.124-126 That January 1990 was the most
likely date on which a deal was struck between Abassi and Chadli was also
indicated by the fact that up until the beginning of that month, the FIS had
criticised Chadli's reformist Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche. Abassi Madani,
for example, had lambasted Hamrouche for his "inability and his incompetence."
Interview with Abassi Madani, Algerie Actualitd 4.1.90
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In seeking to sabotage the electoral prospects of the FLN, Chadli and his
allies sought not just to make sure that the former ruling party did not achieve a
majority (which appears to have been a fear of the President during 1989) but
also sought to shift the regime's unpopularity away from himself and his reforms
and onto his opponents in the FLN. The re-entry of many of his sternest critics
into the ruling circles of the party in 1988-89 provided Chadli with the opportunity
of letting them take on the difficult task of defending the FLN and its record in
government whilst distancing himself from the party. It was notable that the
President was largely absent from the campaign to support the party he was still
a member.
There were also accusations that information damaging to the FLN was
deliberately leaked and publicised. The most prominent of all was the claim in
March 1990 by the former Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, that an estimated
$26 billion worth of funds had been lost from the national coffers over a period of
time through embezzlement and kickbacks by government officials. 53 This
'revelation', which drew to near fever pitch the already powerful popular
perception of the FLN regime being one rotten with corruption and greed, inflicted
further huge damage on the FLN and those who sought to defend its record. The
FIS, in particular, immediately seized on the figure and vigorously publicised it.
Brahimi, however, claimed that his statement did not represent a deliberate or
sudden 'revelation', but was a figure he had quoted in answer to a question put to
him following a speech at Algiers University. 54 The prevalent accusation that the
former prime minister had co-ordinated his remarks with Chadli and Hamrouche
beforehand was also weakened by the facts that Brahimi had been dismissed by
Chadli in 1988 and was fiercely criticised by Hamrouche following the incident.
53 Roberts: From Radical Mission pp.464-465
54 Author's interview with Abdelhamid Brahimi, London, 6.9.95
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Nevertheless, it had provided a potent propaganda weapon for the FIS which it
used to great effect.
There were suspicions that although still a member of the FLN, the former
Prime Minister was interested in seeing a FIS victory in the local elections. This
was not only due to his growing rift with elements of the regime but also because
he may have seen the FIS as being much closer to his own ideals. Alongside
Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Abdelhamid Brahimi enjoyed the reputation of being one
of the more high profile members of the FLN's Islamic wing - sharing with the
former Foreign Minister the religious prestige of being a son of one of the senior
members of Abdelhamid Ben Badis's original AUMA. Clear recognition of this
reputation came with approaches made by the FIS itself at the end of 1989.
Initially wary of such contact, Brahimi finally agreed to meet Abassi Madani in
February 1990 and the FIS's motivations in seeking such a meeting rapidly
became apparent. Although Brahimi made it clear that he was a member of the
FLN and intended to remain so, this did not stop the leader of the FiS from
subsequently making passing public suggestions that the former Prime Minister
could reassume that office in a future FIS administration.55
Brahimi's revelations induced another bout of infighting within the FLN over
who was to blame for this alleged corruption, thus further weakening the party in
the run up to the local elections. 56 Indeed, the multiple splits within the party had
reduced it to a state of near catatonic inaction. As one Algerian newspaper
commented as late as April 1990:
"Since October 1988 the FLN has walled itself in profound silence. It has
rarely taken a position on anything and when it has it has been evasive.
Towards the FIS, it has adopted an approach of extreme prudence."57
55 Author's interview with former senior Algerian minister
56 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.463
57 Algerie Actualitá 26.4.90
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IV. Mehri and the 'New' FLN
A valiant attempt to rally the party was made by its new chief Abdelhamid
Mehri who had sought to renew the party and present it as a new entity to the
public. Increasingly disillusioned with the apparent willingness of his former ally,
Chadli Benjedid, to abandon the party, Mehri fought hard in the months preceding
the local elections to achieve a more robust front for the FLN. His plans for a
counter march by the party on the same day as that of the FIS on April 20,
however, had to be abandoned in the face of enormous official pressure to avoid
bloody confrontations on the streets. This brought further humiliation and division
on the former ruling party. 58 Even when the FLN was able to put on marches
across Algeria the following month, only the one held in Algiers attracted
significant numbers of people and was due mainly to the established
organisational apparatus of the old FLN.59 Conscious of the threat the FIS posed
to their expected domination of the new multi-party system, the FLN took steps to
counter it. These included, for example, an attempted legal challenge by Mehri to
the FIS's use of mosques for partisan and electoral purposes.80
Few concessions, however, were wrung from the Government which
proceeded with its plans. Chadli and his allies clearly believed that the ideal
scenario of a split vote between the FLN and the FIS was likely. On the eve of the
local poll the President told one diplomat that he expected the FIS to poll no more
than 20-25% of the vote.81
58 Ibid. It was suspected that the FIS march was also part of a deal with the
authorities, in which Abassi agreed to not let his followers get out of control.
59 Burgat & Dowell pp.277-278
60 June Afrique 7.5.90
61 Author's interview with Hussein Amin, 13.6.94
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7. The Local Elections of June 1990
The assumption that independent Algeria's first multiparty local elections
were likely to be a two horse race was confirmed by a number of factors. The
announced boycott of the election by two of the more prominent opposition
parties, the FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes) and the MDA (Mouvement pour le
Democratie en Algerie) each led by one of the nine 'historic chiefs' of the war of
liberation, on the grounds that opposition parties had not been given sufficient
time to organise themselves before the poll, obviously narrowed the voting
options.62 More tangibly, the fact that only the FLN and the FIS were able to put
up candidates in all the electoral divisions implied that there was unlikely to be
any breakthrough by a third force or party.63
A third confirmation of the dominance of the two parties came with the
release of an opinion poll by the government, following the FIS rally in Algiers in
April 1990, which reported that between 40-50% of the votes in the local elections
were likely to go to the FLN with 20-30% likely to be won by the FIS. The complex
links between the government and the FLN must inevitably have cast at least
some doubt on the veracity of the poll, but the FLN went into the poll confident of
picking up as much as 55-65% of the votes cast. 64 It was consequently a shock
both to the FLN and most other observers and participants in the poll when it
became clear, as the results of the 12 June voting emerged, that it was the FIS
which had achieved the share of the vote anticipated by FLN.
The nature of the poll, which involved combined voting for both commune
councils (APCs) and regional wilaya assemblies, made overall voting figures
difficult to calculate, but there was no doubting the comprehensive nature of the
FIS victory. The party received 54% of the votes cast in the commune elections
62 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.580
63 Burgat & Dowell p.279
64 Middle East International (MEI) 6.7.90
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and over 57% of those in the wilayas. It consequently took control of 853 of the
1539 commune councils and 31 of the 48 wilayas. The victory was further
compounded by the disastrous performance of the FLN, which managed to poll
barely half of its rival's total, taking just 28% in both sets of results. The
remainder of the votes went to the profusion of smaller parties and independents,
the largest single party vote being just 2% for the RCD (Rassemblement pour la
Culture et la Dómocratie).65
Once the immediate shock of the results had settled in, there was
something of a rush by observers, particularly in the West and the Western
media, to try to suggest that the results were in some way inaccurate and
misleading. Many pointed to the abstention rate of 35% and suggested that much
of this figure and probably a significant slice of the FIS's eventual vote would
have probably gone to the FFS and MDA if these parties had participated and
given the electorate a wider choice than that between the equally unappetising,
FIS and FLN. Other commentators pointed to certain election rules which they
argued artificially influenced the results. The existence of a proxy vote, for
example, which enabled a man to vote on behalf of his wife, served to effectively
double the vote of the F1S, it was suggested. The rule that gave an automatic
majority of seats in the APCs to the leading party, irrespective of whether it had
achieved a majority of the popular vote in the commune, was also cited as
inflating the apparent scale of the FIS's victory. 66 Some simply argued that the
strong presence of FIS activists on the streets on the day of the poll influenced or
intimidated voters into voting for them.67
65 Jacques Fontaine: Les Elections Locales Algerienne du 12 Juin 1990:
Approche Statistique et Geographique in Maghreb-Machrek (No.129, Juillet-
Septembre 1990) p.125
66 See The Economist 16.6.90
67 Francois Burgat and Jean Leca: La Mobilisation Islamiste et les Elections
Algeriennes du 12 Juin 1990 in Maghreb-Machrek (No.129, Juillet-Septembre
1990) p.6. Hugh Roberts argues that the absence of Government officials from
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However, these points were, in reality, of strictly limited significance. The
abstention rate on the day of the poll although significant at 35% was more or
less consistent with non-voting rates in free elections in most other countries. The
participation rate was remarkably high given the negative image voting had
inevitably accrued during the years of meaningless elections that occurred before
1988 when voters had had no effective choices put before them but had still been
obliged to vote. Even though the Islamist party did appear to make particular use
of the proxy system, the assumption that women were necessarily more inclined
to vote against FIS than their husbands is questionable. Large numbers of
women often attended FIS rallies and demonstrations in the run-up to the
elections. 88 On the issue of the 'winner takes all' system operated in the elections,
although it resulted in the FIS winning control of a greater percentage of councils
than their simple share of the popular vote (they won 65% of the wilaya councils,
for example), this did not alter the fact that at both local and regional levels they
had achieved a clear majority of the popular vote. Nothing could really dismiss
this central reality.
8. Support for the FIS: Social and Geographic Bases
The election results provided a valuable and unprecedented insight into
the nature of support for Islamism in Algeria by providing indications of who
exactly had voted for the FIS. More pertinently, it also provided possible evidence
as to what had motivated people to cast their vote in such large numbers for a
party representing a tendency that had been seen as little more than an extremist
fringe movement less than two years previously.
many voting booths on the day of the poll was a conscious policy to allow the FIS
to use such tactics to maximise their vote. Roberts: From Radical Mission p.462
68 Burgat & Dowell p.280 The FIS had also established their own women's
section. Jeune Afrique 12.2.90
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Given the comprehensive dominance of the FIS in comparison to the other
parties in the election, it was almost easier (and, arguably, as instructive) to look
at who had not voted for the FIS. The results showed that several areas had
clearly not come out strongly for the Islamists. These areas were predominantly
the rural south together with a few pockets in the more urbanised north. The
reasons for these areas' resistance to the Islamist tide were relatively easy to
identify. In the rural south the majority of the councils were won by the FLN. Here,
the dominance of the former single party of state was retained partly because of
the continued relative esteem the FLN enjoyed in this traditional area (because of
its role in the war of liberation), and because it had escaped much of the social
and economic problems that had afflicted the urban north. It was also true that the
entrenched FLN control made ballot-rigging more possible. 69 Those pockets of
the north which had not voted for FIS were identified as being ones dominated by
the country's Berber community: notably the communes of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia.
The reasons for this largely lay in the established antipathy of much of Algeria's
Berber community to Islamism: the movement's stress both on the Arabic
language and strict social conformity being widely perceived by the Berber
community as being a threat to their own distinctive language and culture. The
affiliation of the areas of Grand Kabylia and the Soumma Valley (which contained
Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia) to parties other than the FIS was demonstrated by the
particularly low turnout in these areas, which indicated a clear response to the
boycott call by the Kabyle-based FFS. When people did vote in these areas it
was predominantly for the similarly secularist and Berberist RCD which won clear
majorities in both Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia.70
69 Jeune Afrique 20.6.90
7° Fontaine pp.124-133. Keith Sutton, Ahmed Aghrout and Salah Zaimeche:
Political Changes in Algeria: An Emerging Electoral Geography in Maghreb
Review (Volume 17, No.1&2, 1992) pp.3-27. This pattern was also repeated in
the Mzab region which voted predominantly for independent candidates. Fontaine
p.133. Arun Kapil explains this by stressing the persistence of maraboutist and
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On the basis of this evidence it appeared that the FIS vote was
concentrated, with the noted exceptions, in the more urbanised north of the
country. The election statistics graphically testified to this fact. In Algeria's three
biggest cities (all in the north of Algeria), Algiers, Oran and Constantine, the party
attracted shares of the popular vote of 64%, 71% and 72% respectively. 71 The
particularly urban character of the FIS vote was further emphasised by the fact
that the party won control of 90% of the councils and two-thirds of the seats in
urban areas of more than 20,000 people. In contrast, its share of seats fell to
roughly 40% in areas of less than 20,000 inhabitants. 72 Support for the FIS
therefore appeared to be clearly linked to the particular problems of the urban
areas, such as housing and shortages, which had been hit disproportionately
hard by Algeria's increasing economic problems. Indeed, of central importance,
and arguably of far more relevance than any explicitly political factors, in coming
to an understanding of the outcome of the election, is an appreciation of the
social and economic conditions that were prevailing in Algeria at this time. -
It was quite clear that little improvement had been witnessed by the majority
of ordinary Algerians in social and economic conditions since the unrest of
October 1988, which had been fuelled and probably sparked by rapid social and
economic decline. Shortages, overcrowding and price increases at the same time
as wage freezes all continued to be a feature of everyday life for ordinary
Algerians. Unemployment which had risen from 11% to 25% between 1984 and
198873 showed signs of continuing to rise, exacerbated by both the government's
sufi tendencies in the more remote areas of Algeria's south and west (which may
also help explain the FLN strength in the south) and thus their resistance to more
modern and urban Islamism. Kapil: Algeria's Elections Show Islamist Strength in
Middle East Report (MERIP) September-October 1990
71 Burgat & Dowell p.279
72 Fontaine p.132
73 John P. Entelis: Introduction: State and Society in Transition in Entelis & Phillip
C. Naylor: State and Society in Algeria (Westview, Boulder, 1992) p.18
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accelerated economic liberalisation programme (which resulted in the slimming-
down of the workforces of state-owned enterprises) and by Algeria's continuingly
prodigious birth rate. The pyramid-shaped demographic profile that this birth-rate
had produced for Algeria over time meant that the majority of Algeria's
unemployed were very young (most employers inevitably preferred to cut back on
recruitment rather than force redundancies) which in turn meant that there was a
large pool of idle and discontented youth. This section of the population had few
attachments to the ruling political order and had no nostalgic memory of the
achievements of the FLN in the liberation struggle. 74
 It was thus inevitable that
given the opportunity to express their political opinions through the ballot box, this
section of the population, together with other large groups in Algerian society who
had suffered in the worsening economic and social climate of the late 1980s,
would vote heavily to punish the party that represented the existing political
establishment: the FLN. 75 The most effective means of humiliating the FLN was
thus to vote for that party that was best placed to defeat it. Since late 1989 the
only party capable of filling this role was the FIS.
Despite these observations, social and economic deprivation and a
consequent desire to reject the FLN were not the only motivating factors for FIS
voters on June 12. A sizeable bloc of people voting for the F1S that day were
those who were genuinely attracted to and supportive of the Islamist agenda. To
distinguish between these two blocs and thus assess their relative strengths
within the FIS vote is clearly unfeasible, and they may in fact be so closely
intertwined as to be indivisible. As one Algerian youth who voted for FIS
74 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.585
75 It was not just the urban areas that experienced social and economic hardship
and which consequently voted for the FIS. In the area of Jijel the FIS took roughly
75% of the seats despite the fact that the area was not particularly urbanised.
The probable reason for this was that Jijel was one of the most deprived parts of
the country, thus emphasising that deprivation was probably of more importance
than urbanisation (even though the two were often synonymous) in understanding
the nature of the FIS vote. Fontaine p.132
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explained, the FIS's radical and eschatalogical message represented the only
perceived alternative in an otherwise bleak future:
"In this country, if you are a young man... .you have only four choices: you can
remain unemployed and celibate because there are no jobs and no
apartments to live in; you can work in the black market and risk being
arrested; you can try to emigrate to France to sweep the streets of Paris or
Marseilles; or you can join the FIS and vote for Islam."76
Nevertheless, the massive marches and street demonstrations the FIS had
been able to organise in the lead-up to the elections bore witness to the fact that
the party clearly had a large, ideologically committed core of supporters.
Attendance at the FIS's meetings and mosques was notable for the overwhelming
predominance of men between the ages of 20 and 40, but it appears that far from
all of these were unemployed youths.7
 Traders and small business men were
also found to be, frequently financial, supporters of the party and whilst FIS
support electorally had been concentrated in the poorer districts of Algiers, the
party also performed well in some of the higher class areas of the capita1.78
Although having variations in its level of support, the strength of the FIS vote
demonstrated once again the breadth of the apparent appeal of Islamism across
geographic region and social class as shown by its ability to put up candidates in
virtually every division for the elections.79
9. Ideology and Agenda of the FIS
The formation of a political party by Algeria's Islamists and its competition in
elections provided the movement, or at least that part of it which had joined the
76 New York Times 25.6.90 quoted in Mark Tessler: The Alienation of Urban
Youth in Zartman & Habeeb p.98
7 Algórie Actuate 5.10.89
79 Sutton, Aghrout & Zaimeche p.11 & 14; A. Djeghloul: Le Multipartisme a
L'Algerienne in Maghreb-Machrek (No.127, Janvier-Mars 1990) p.199
79 Dillman: Transition to Democracy in Algeria p.34
158
party, with a concrete opportunity to present its agenda to the electorate. Indeed,
multiparty democratic politics demanded it.
An analysis of the FIS between its creation in February 1989 through to its
victory in June 1990 reveals two main things about its agenda and proposed
programme: firstly, the effective absence of any really lengthy or radical political
and economic policy programme, and secondly the continued emphasis by the
party on a number of specific, largely social, themes. This is revealed by looking
at both formal policy statements and documents issued by the party as well as
interviews given by senior party figures during this period.
I. Economic Policy
Several documents advancing FIS's plans for Algeria were issued by the
party from its formation and most of these made reference to economic issues.
The party's first formal policy document Projet de Programme du Front Islamique
du Salut was unveiled at the meeting officially launching the party on March 9
1989 and devoted just under a third of its contents to the FIS's view of and plans
for the economy which were largely reiterated in later policy documents.
These plans attracted a significant amount of criticism and scorn from
opponents of the FIS and Western commentators alike for their lack of apparent
detail.80 It was more true to say that the plans lacked innovation - balance and
moderation characterising their tone and contents with only minor changes and
reforms advocated. The unremarkable content of the programme was exemplified
by the opening statement of the section dealing with the economy:
" The economic policy of the FIS is founded on the search for an equilibrium
between the needs of consumption and the conditions of production, on the -
complementary relationship between quality and quantity, taking account of
,
-,
80 See for example Algerie Actualitd 4.1.90 and Zoubir p.92
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demographic growth and of cultural development and the imperative of
economic independence."81
Such sentiments were likely to be found in the economic programmes of
virtually any political party. The one possible exception to this - the stress on
economic independence - being in the Algerian context similarly unremarkable
because of the nationalism that had traditionally characterised economic relations
with the West. Changes and reforms were advocated by the party but these
tended to take the form of uncontroversial proposals to better harmonise
education with the needs of industry, to introduce more technology and to expand
regional trade. More specifically Islamic proposals were contained in the
programme but these were largely vague and confined to references that a
particular area of the economy or a specific policy should "conform to the spirit of
the Sharia."82 A commitment to the establishment of Islamic banks, which banned
usury, was expressed but few details of how this was to be achieved were given.
Such a rather nebulous impression of the Islamic content of the party's economic
proposals was further added to by Abassi Madani's later assertion that Algeria's
economic crisis did not have a material base and would find its solution in the
recovery of morality and religious faith.83
What was, however, noticeable about the FIS's economic plans was the
apparent support they appeared to give to the private sector and the market.
Reference was made to the rights and conditions of the worker and an overall
need for equity, but the document lambasted the failings of the planned economy
which it argued had served "to discourage the spirit of initiative...to the profit of
mediocrity and incompetence." It correspondingly spoke of the need "to fix
parameters limiting the intervention of the State in industrial ownership and to
81 Projet de Programme du Front Islamique du Salut 9.3.89. Extracts reproduced
in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi pp.179-187
82 Ibid.
83 Algerie Actuante 19.10.89
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protect the private sector." More significantly there was a call for decentralisation
of public enterprises and the encouragement of "competition, the agent of
plenty."84 These last two policies were significant in that they represented the
main planks of Chadli Benjedid's economic reform programme over the preceding
decade. It was thus their presence within the FIS's programme that helped
persuade Chadli Benjedid that the party could be recruited as an ideological ally
in his struggle against the anti-reformists within the FLN. This had further been
confirmed by Abassi Madani's statement at the beginning of January 1990 that:
"The FIS is more concerned than anyone for these reforms and demands
their application."85
So whilst the FIS had sacrificed the propaganda tool of the unpopularity of
the effects of the reforms, it had not been entirely opportunist in tacitly supporting
them. Their inclusion in the programme of March 1989 reflected an established
preference for liberal economics in Islamist economic thought across the Muslim
world and it was thus simply a case of further emphasising them (as shown in the
petition of April 1990) to gain valuable concessions from the regime.86
II. Women, Social Policy and Education
The vast majority of the literature produced by the FIS in the period 1989-90
focused on social, cultural and educational issues and represented a significant
departure from current Algerian Government policy. The traditional Islamist
84 Projet de Programme du Front Islamique du Salut 9.3.89. Extracts reproduced
in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi pp.179-187
85 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algdrie Actualitê 4.1.90
86 It has been argued that it was this preference for liberal economics and support
for the Government's reform programme that led to the exclusion of Abdallah
Djaballah from the FIS at its creation since the Sheikh adopted a far more critical
approach. (Roberts: From Radical Mission p.450) However, it is highly unlikely
that the leadership of the FIS were aware of any potential deal being struck with
Chadli Benjedid as early as the start of 1989.
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concerns over the role of women in society and the need to Islamicise and
Arabise the education system remained central to the programme of the FIS.
The party's initial policy document, Projet de Programme du Front Islamique
du Salut, made clear the new party's view that the Algerian woman's role should
primarily be in the home. It indicated that a woman would thus be given a
financial incentive to stay in or return to the home arguing that "her work at home
must be legitimately considered as a social and educational function, giving her
the right to a pension."87 The importance of this issue to the party was
demonstrated by the FIS's first significant show of force in December 1989 when
it participated in the organisation of a counter demonstration to one held by
women demanding the abrogation of the Family Code of 1984 which (see
previous chapter) had reduced the rights and role of women in Algerian society.
Five months later in April 1990, the role of women was included in the fifteen
point petition the party unveiled following their mass rally on the 20th of that
month. Point 12 of the list of demands argued for the need to "Assemble the
conditions for the protection of the dignity of the Algerian woman" - widely
acknowledged shorthand for the return of women to the home and possible curbs
on their dress and social relations.
Besides emphasising the importance of women remaining in the home to
bring up children and maintain family life, the FIS also argued that this facilitated
the creation of more much needed job opportunities for Algeria's young men.
Such a policy also supported the party's commitment to sexual segregation in
Algerian society, Ali Belhadj arguing that it was actually immoral for men and
women to work together in the same office.89 The ending of co-education was
also an expressed priority for the party. Benazouz Zebda, who became
87 Projet de Programme du Front Islamique du Salut 9.3.89. quoted in Algdrie
Actualite 4.1.90
88 Text reproduced in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi pp.49-51
89 Jeune Afrique 29.1.90
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recognised as the third most senior figure in the party, claimed that the mixing of
the sexes at schools and universities had led to the "proliferation of bastards."93
At the same time the party also made clear its opposition to birth contro1.91
Overall, social policy together with education, provided the party with most
of its favourite themes and it was clear that the FIS aimed to establish significant
control over these areas. As Abassi Madani stated in an interview:
"Our principle concern is with education and the family. It is
impossible to achieve an Islamic society without mastering
education and this equally demands a healthy and conscientious
family."92
Apart from the overriding aim of segregation, the other main concern of the
party in education was to continue Arabisation and spread it to institutions such
as medical schools and schools of technology. Abassi Madani notably rarely used
French in public. 93
Ill. Policy on Political Power and Pluralism
The FIS gave very few indications of the sort of political institutions they
intended to make use of or indeed create when and if they achieved political
power. Abassi Madani referred on several occasions to the party's desire to
establish an Islamic state, although precisely what this might entail was never
properly elaborated. Until the party began to attract the huge popular following
that it did at its demonstrations from the end of 1989, it appears that no serious
consideration was given by the party to the prospect of it taking power. When
asked in October 1989 about the FIS's numerical strength, Abassi Madani gave
the surprising reply:
9° Interview with Benazouz Zebda, Algerie Actuante 23.2.89
91 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 12.2.90
92 Ibid.
93 Jeune Afrique 20.6.90
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" Our numbers are of little importance, the elections are not our aim. Our aim
is the total transformation of the political, economic, social, cultural and
civilisational crisis. All of these because we are in clear crisis. Getting out of
this crisis is our starting point."94
As the elections of June 1990 approached and the party began to realise
that the wielding of eventual political power was a significant possibility,
specifically political demands became an increasing feature of the FIS's
discourse. The petition of April 1990 was dominated by political demands such as
the dissolution of the National Assembly with elections to be held within three
months, the creation of an independent body to oversee elections, the end of the
FLN's monopoly on parts of the media and the creation of an independent
judiciary.% However, most of these demands could be seen as merely facilitating,
rather than explaining, the party's policy. As one Algerian newspaper suggested
at the time, having just attracted such a huge display of popular support, the FIS
perhaps decided that it should push to make best use of this support at elections
on the grounds that it was "now or never.'96
The stunning success the FIS had enjoyed in pursuing the electoral path to
power and influence also seemed to have silenced that, admittedly fringe, part of
the Algerian Islamist movement that had advocated the efficacy of armed Islamist
struggle. Some activity was witnessed such as the attack on a court house by a
small group of Shi'ite Islamists in January 1990 and the reported involvement of
members of Algerian Takfir wa Hijra in the unrest of October 1988, but these
incidents were small scale and peripheral to the main movement. 97 Much of this
94 Algerie Actuante 2.5.91
95 Text of petition in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi pp.49-51
96 Algerie Actuante 26.4.90
97 Lamchichi: L'Algerie en Crise; La Presse 18.1.90. The incident at the Palace of
Justice in Blida involved six men believed to belong to a Shi'ite organisation
called Sunna Wa Sharia.
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was due to the fact that most members of this tendency were still in prison
following their conviction in the wake of Mustapha Bouyali's campaign.
Nevertheless, several former associates and sympathisers of Bouyali did assume
senior positions within the FIS at its creation, the most high-profile of which was
Ali Belhadj himself who had been arrested and imprisoned in the 1980s for his
involvement with the MAIA.98 Indeed, despite public disavowals of the use of
armed struggle99, the party retained considerable sympathy for Bouyali's struggle.
Ali Belhadj referred to Bouyali as being part of Algerian Islamism's historic
heritage alongside Abdelhamid Ben Badis. 100 Abassi Madani argued that Bouyali
had been pushed into the adoption of violence through intransigence and
repression on the part of the regime. 101
 Collectively, the party called for the
release of all Islamist prisoners (implying the MAIA) in both the first issue of its
paper, Al Mounqid, and in its petition of April 1990.102
One aspect of the FIS's thought and agenda which attracted considerable
attention, especially in the aftermath of the June victory, was its attitude towards
democratisation and its attendant values of pluralism and respect for the electoral
process. Of particular concern to those people who were anxious that the
country's democratisation programme be continued were statements made by All
Belhadj. From the outset the young teacher and preacher made no secret of the
fact that he viewed Algeria's new political system strictly as a means to an end
98 Le Monde 24.8.89 Those founders of the FIS who had also been involved in
Bouyali's MAIA included Mohammed Kerrar, Said Guechi, Bachir Fakih and
Abdelkader Moghni. Algerie Actuante 23.2.93
99 Benazouz Zebda, for example, denied the use of armed struggle stating that
the F1S's fight would be "against delinquency and evil." Interview with Benazouz
Zebda, Algerie Actuante 23.2.89
100 Interview with All Belhadj, Algerie Actuante 23.2.89
101 Algefie Actuante 2.5.91 Abassi claimed: "Bouyali was teaching, was preaching,
was thinking that dialogue would succeed... He was shocked when the door of
dialogue was slammed in his face and he was treated with violence."
102 Le Monde 6.10.89; Text of petition reproduced in AI-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frêgosi
pp.49-51
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rather than as any kind of end in itself. 103
 He saw politics as a staging post on the
way to Islam and the rule of 'divine politics.'104 Whilst this view could be
interpreted as expressing, albeit in an unusual way, the legitimate desire of any
political party to see introduced its particular agenda and thus one not
necessarily inconsistent with the principles of liberal democracy, Belhadj was in
fact quite specific in his actual rejection of the idea of democracy:
"Democracy is a stranger in the House of God. Guard yourself against those
who say that the notion of democracy exists in Islam. There is no democracy
in Islam. There exists only the shura with its rules and constraints. ..We are
not a nation that thinks in terms of majority-minority. The majority does not
express the truth."105
Belhadj was similarly forthright and specific in his view on the central
concept of multi-partyism and political pluralism, appearing to issue a clear
warning to those parties that did not make due reference to Islam:
"Multipartyism is not tolerated unless it agrees with the single framework of
Islam 	 If people vote against the Law of God.. .this is nothing other than
blasphemy. The ulama will order the death of the offenders who have
substituted their authority for that of God."106
These were not isolated, polemical statements. It became clear that in
Belhadj's view, which stemmed from his devout and fundamentalist religious
beliefs about the exclusive truth of Islam, there should be no place in Algerian
society for anyone who either did not share these convictions or sought to
express a dissenting opinion or identity. Nor were these views ones that were not
103 Interview with Ali Belhadj, AI-Bayane December 1989 reproduced in Al-Ahnaf,
Botiveau & Frègosi p.71
104 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.33
105 Alger Republicain December 1989 quoted in Catherine Belvaude: L'Algórie
(Karthala, Paris, 1991) p.108
106 Horizons 23.2.89 quoted in Algerie Actuante 4.1.90 Belhadj also wanted the
Constitution changed to link multipartyism to Islam.
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shared by a significant section of the party's supporters. Belhadj's hugely popular
Friday sermons, which attracted up to 20,000 people each week, were full of
denunciations of followers of other religions, liberals, foreign governments and
leaders of other parties.107
For some of FIS's opponents, the practical implications of these views
were felt even before the party was able to wield political power following victory
at the ballot box. The Algerian Communist Party, the PAGS (Parti de l'Avant
Garde Socialiste) obviously occupied a diametrically-opposed position in the new
party political spectrum to that of FIS. Indeed, the Islamist party made combating
the PAGS, which it saw as a party espousing atheism as part of its communist
ideology, a priority. 108 As an almost certain consequence of this, meetings
organised by the PAGS in the Spring of 1989, as it waited like FIS to be officially
recognised, became the target of attacks by Islamic militants, as did those
organised by the avowedly secularist and Berber-based RCD. lce In addition to
this new political dimension there was also a rise in this period in attacks on more
'traditional' targets of Islamist violence. Unmarried couples, unsuitably-dressed
women and establishments selling alcohol all appeared to come under renewed
threats of violence, particularly once again at the universities, in the period 1989-
90. Popular music events in Algiers during this time were cancelled due to threats
from religious militants and there were cases of vandalism to martyrs' graveyards
(tombstones were seen by many Islamists as being 'un-Islamic').110
The FIS's leadership, however, was quick to deny responsibility for such
incidents, blaming "communist infiltrators" as well as the FLN for carrying out the
violence to discredit the FIS. 111
 Foremost in denying FIS involvement in these
107 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Frègosi p.33
los Jeune Afrique 18.12.89
109 Sutton, Aghrout & Zaimeche p.14; Khelladi: Algerie: Les Islamistes Face au
Pouvoir p.112
110 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi pp.144-146
i ii Algeria Actuante. 26.4.90
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incidents was the party leader, Abassi Madani, who actually condemned violence
"from wherever it came" and stressed that his party chose "the path of dialogue
for the settlement of all questions, whether political, economic, social or
cultural."112
 Such language stood in marked contrast to that employed by his
deputy, Ali Belhadj, and like Belhadj, Madani appeared to be consistent in his
stance. When asked Mat the discourse of FIS was, Madani replied simply
"Moderation" and added that "Our doctrine is moderate and centrist because
Islam is a religion of moderation." In further stark contrast to his deputy, Madani
expressed his full commitment to the idea of democracy and when asked about
the thorny question of sharia-prescribed punishments, such as stoning for
adultery and amputation for theft, he replied that such punishments could only
truly be applied in a fully Islamic world where peace, work and security would
eliminate the causes of such crime. Again, on the issue of minority rights, there
was an unambiguous contradiction of his deputy's views: 'We will respect the
minority, even if it is composed of one vote." 113
Such demonstrative differences of opinion and tone within the upper
echelons of the party naturally attracted much debate as to the reasons for this.
For some, particularly opponents and critics of FIS, Belhadj's intemperate
discourse represented the true face of the party: Madani playing the role of a
front man to assuage the fears of would-be voters for FIS, trying to disguise the
party's agenda with woolly talk of tolerance and democracy. This strategy was
exposed, they argued, when Madani, who was the only senior FIS figure who
regularly dealt with the media, was closely questioned and was forced to admit
that the party had qualifications to its endorsement of democracy:
"We will consider that those who have been elected by the people reflect the
opinion of the people. In contrast, what we will not accept is the elected
112 El Moudjahid 26.12.89 quoted in Rouadjia: Les Frdres et la Mosquee p.298n
113 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 12.2.90
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member who harms the interest of the people. He must not be against Islam,
the Sharia, its doctrine and its values. He must not be able to make war on
Islam. He who is an enemy of Islam is an enemy of the people."114
Significantly, in this respect, the leader of the FIS also refused to say what
would happen to the PAGS and the staunchly secularist RCD if the FIS came to
power. 115
 More generally, observers saw the 'double talk' by FIS as a mechanism
by which the party could avoid losing its place in the electoral system (still a
potential threat if the they pushed too far, despite the likely agreement with
Chadli) through Abassi's emollient public statements whilst Belhadj's hard-line
rhetoric would retain the party's popularity amongst the militants on the street.116
As Robert Mortimer observed on Madani and Belhadj: 'The contrasting styles of
these two leaders combined a soft and hard sell that appealed to a wide range of
disaffected Algerians."117
A second reason advanced for inconsistencies in the party's line related to
a belief that such inconsistencies reflected real divisions that existed right at the
heart of FIS between moderates and hard-liners. Such an idea was naturally
dismissed by the party's leaders when it was put to them. Madani claimed that the
idea of factions and tendencies was an essentially Western one and argued that
a form of collective responsibility operated in the party with all opinions being
subject to the approval of the party's ruling council the nnajlis shura, meaning that
neither he nor Ali Belhadj were able to express their own individual opinions.118
However, given the divergence of tone it is doubtful that this mechanism of
114 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algèrie Actualitè 4.1.90
115 jeune Afrique 19.3.90
116 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.33
117 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.579
118 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 12.2.90. When questioned on the
subject of his deputy's hostile view of democracy the leader of the FIS resorted to
a philosophical answer about the different meanings of democracy since its
inception by the Ancient Greeks. Interview with Abassi Madani, Algèrie Actualitè
4.1.90
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collective responsibility operated as well as Madani seemed to claim. Indeed,
despite the apparently well-structured organisation of FIS, there often appeared
to exist a gap between the party's grassroots and the leadership: the strategy of
the leadership often not being clear to the party members and the latter
sometimes acting outside the direction of the leadership (which perhaps supports
the claims of the leaders that the party was not responsible for acts of Islamist
violence and intimidation.)119
10. Structures and Organisation of the FIS
The precise structure and organisation of the FIS remained largely obscure
during the first eighteen months of its political life. According to statements made
at its founding, the party was officially run by a majlis shura consisting of around
35 members. However, apart from a few more high-profile figures, the exact
composition of the council was unknown. Journalists who tried to discover more
about the party received little or no co-operation from the party's leadership.120
With the exception of the occasional interview by All Belhadj and a very few other
senior figures, Abassi Madani was the only leader whom the party appeared
willing to let speak to the media.
Although Abassi claimed in January 1990 that "the structuring of the FIS is
still not achieved", the high degree of organisation and discipline the party
appeared to exert at its rallies and demonstrations indicated a significant degree
of institutional organisation. 121
 More details about the internal workings of the
party were to emerge later, but it appears that it was headed by a four man
National Executive consisting of Abassi, Belhadj, Benazouz Zebda and Hachemi
Sahnouni. This was drawn from the majlis shura which, as indicated earlier by
119 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.32
120 Algeria Actuante 4.1.90
121 Interview with Abassi. Madani,A/gdrie Actuante 4.1.90
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Abassi was the formal decision-making body of the party. Below this the FIS had
a highly hierarchical structure of wilaya, commune and even quartier branches of
the party. 122 This hierarchical structure suggested that authority in the party came
from the top down, although the extent to which this occurred with; for example,
the selection of local candidates for the June 1990 elections is disputed.123
Overall though, the mechanisms of the party, particularly in terms of decision-
making and ideology, remained shrouded in secrecy and thus created the degree
of confusion amongst the rank and file referred to earlier.
11. External Influences and Support
Examination of and speculation about the FIS's ideology and agenda also
prompted questions about the extent to which the party was influenced, and
indeed supported, by Islamist movements and governments elsewhere in the
Muslim world. Inevitably, significant attention focused, as it had done in the
1980s, on links with Iran. There was, however, little evidence to suggest any real
links with the Islamic Republic. Ali Belhadj acknowledged the influence of the
Iranian revolution on young Islamists in Algeria, but termed such influence
"annoyances" and furthermore expressed his important theological differences
with Iranian Shi'ism. 124 Similarly, Abassi Madani, when questioned on the
existence of a branch of Hezbollah in Algeria replied:
"Hezbollah? This is nothing but a label. Behind it there is nothing. It is just a
minority. Algeria is Sunnite."125
122 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en AlgOrie p.102
123 Hugh Roberts claims that selection of candidates for the elections was by the
FIS's majlis shura (Roberts: From Radical Mission p.448) whilst Devoluy and
Duteil claim that the selection was made by the party's regional offices (D6voluy
& Duteil pp.126-127)
124 Interview with Ali Belhadj, Al-Bayane December 1989 reproduced in Al-Ahnaf,
Botiveau & Fregosi pp.70-72
125 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algerie Actualitê 26.4.90
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Of perhaps more relevance were alleged links with Saudi Arabia. On the
ideological level, it was argued that elements of Saudi Wahhabism could be
witnessed in both the attacks by militants on tombstones and in supposed plans
by FIS to ban women from driving cars. 126 On the practical level it was alleged
that the party received funds from Saudi sources, including a reported donation of
$1 million from a Saudi businessman. 127 Support also came from the Saudi ulama
who sought to promote a form of 'moderate' Islamism, capable of participating in
power and thus preventing the movement moving towards a more militant Iranian-
style Islamism. 128 Indeed, rumours that the Saudi King Fand had attempted to
broker a deal between Chadli Benjedid and Abassi Madani in January 1990
spoke of the King being motivated by his fear of Iran which he perceived to be
close to Ali Belhadj. 129
As evidence of the possible competition for influence between these two
states, there were reports of large numbers of cheap books on religious subjects
from both Saudi Arabia and Iran appearing in book shops during this period.130
Abassi Madani, for his part, denied that the FIS was inspired by any models
emerging from Iran, Saudi Arabia or even Sudan. When questioned specifically
about Saudi Arabia, he stated that there were no official contacts between his
party and Riyadh (which, as far as he was aware, still supported the existing
-
128 Jeune Afrique 29.1.90
127 Liberation 11.8.94
128 Belvaude pp.107-108 It was also suggested that Saudi backing for the FIS
was prompted by a long-standing antipathy to the Algerian regime because of its
revolutionary origins and prominent role in Third World politics. There was also a
feeling that Algeria was not truly 'Arab' and that this could be rectified by the FIS's
programme. Author's interview with former Algerian diplomat.
129 Author's interview with Hussein Amin, Cairo, 13.6.94. It is said that King Fand
actually believed Belhadj to be in the pay of Tehran and thus sought to boost
Abassi whom he portrayed to Chadli as a moderate figure.
/3° Belvaude pp.107-108
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regime in Algeria) although he suggested that there might be some now that the
FIS had been legalised.131
As for links with other countries, the ideological links with Egypt appeared to
remain strong. Ali Belhadj cited both Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb as
influences on him. However, the fact that he also cited his former teachers,
Soltani and Sahnoun, indicated the essentially Algerian nature of FIS. 132 It was
also suggested that such ideological links with the Arab east were strengthened
by the sending abroad on scholarships in early 1989 of many of the Islamist
students arrested during the unrest of October 1988. Having spent time in
countries such as Syria and particularly Egypt, these students returned with new
and radical ideas gained from contacts they had established there with local
Islamists. This move by the authorities was portrayed as an exercise in removing
disruptive elements from the political scene. However, there were suspicions that
the idea for the scheme came from Islamist sympathisers within the regime)
However, despite both this and the probable agreement that Chadli had struck
with the FIS, the President was clearly aware of the potential dangers of allowing
the FIS to establish external links and acquire more radical ideas. It was probably
for this reason that Abassi Madani was denied access to the International Islamic
Conference that the Algerian Government hosted in May 1990 and which was
attended by such notable Islamists as Rachid Ghannoushi of Tunisia and Hassan
Turabi of Sudan.134
131 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 12.2.90
132 Interview with Ali Belhadj, AI-Bayane December 1989. Belhadj also stated that
he liked to read the works of ibn Taymiyya, the Islamic thinker and activist whose
ideas were a central inspiration to the Saudi Wahhabist movement, thus
supporting the view that Saudi Wahhabism could be identified in some of the
FIS's ideas.
133 Author's interview with former Algerian diplomat.
134 El Watan 1.3.94	
.
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12. The Failure of the Secular Opposition
One of the marked features of the period from October 1988 through to
June 1990 was the near total absence of any political grouping that effectively
challenged the virtual monopoly that was exercised over the political scene by the
FIS and the FLN. There appeared to be no real third alternative to what many
Algerians saw as these two equally unattractive options. This was not due to any
shortage of political parties, twenty formally applying for official recognition in the
immediate aftermath of the July 1989 Law on Political Associations. Indeed, the
sheer number of non-Islamist opposition parties weakened and divided any
support such a potentially attractive 'third option' might be able to attract. Most of
the secular opposition parties were unable to establish nation-wide grass-roots
organisations in preparation for the elections in contrast to their rivals in the FIS,
who were able to use the mosque network, and the FLN, which took full
advantage of the structures and organisation of the former single party apparatus.
The boycott of the June 1990 poll of the two other parties which did appear to
have a more established following, the FFS and the MDA, served to accentuate
the dominance of the FIS and the FLN which were able to squeeze the potential
vote and support of other parties exploiting the popular fear or dislike of each
other.135
Tactical support was undoubtedly a prominent feature of both the FIS's and
the FLN's vote in the June elections. As already shown, dislike of the FLN made a
huge contribution to the FIS's victory in the poll, but it is also true that many of
those who cast their vote for the FLN did so not as an endorsement of the record
of the FLN, but out of a desire to block the advance of the Islamists. Although
135 The effect of the absence of Ahmed Ben Bella's MDA with its past emphasis
on Islam and the Iranian revolution, on the FIS's electoral performance is
uncertain. It was however notable that the FIS's Projet de Programme du Front
Islamique du Sa/Lit was first published in the MDA's newspaper, Tribune
d'Octobre, on 22 March 1989. Algerie Actualitè 12.10.89
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antipathy towards the FLN ran deep in Algerian society, it ran deeper still in some
parts against the Islamism of the FIS. The party attracted far stronger reactions,
both positive and negative, from people than the FLN did. A graphic illustration of
this was provided by the appearance of Abassi Madani on television during the
election campaign as part of a series of programmes where the main party
leaders were questioned by journalists about their aims and policies. The FIS's
leader appeared to attract not only a larger audience than that for other leaders
but his appearance elicited dramatically varying responses from people watching.
In the telephone opinion poll conducted after the appearance of each leader,
Madani scored an unremarkable 3.5 out of 10 on a scale of approval. However
this figure, an average for all the calls received, hid the fact that out of the 380
calls, 199 gave Madani a score of zero whilst 104 gave him the maximum
possible score of 10.136
The efforts of both the secular opposition parties and the FLN were also
undoubtedly hampered by the high-profile backing the French media gave to
them throughout the election campaign and the correspondingly virulent criticism
it heaped on the FIS. Such support proved to be entirely counter-productive
since it seemed to confirm the FIS's propaganda against the other parties that
they were the vehicles of Western and anti-Islamic values. 137 The FLN was
particularly damaged in this respect since it had long bolstered itself up on the
legitimacy it had gained by winning independence from the French.
13. Conclusions
There can be little doubting that the events of October 1988 and the
changes that occurred in Algeria both subsequently and consequently
represented a watershed of opportunity for Algeria's Islamists. It was an
136 Jeune Afrique 19.3.90
137 Zoubir p.96; Burgat & Dowell p.282
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opportunity they wasted no time in exploiting to the full. Despite significant bursts
of activity at various points during the previous three decades since Algeria won
its independence, the Algerian state had always been able to suppress and
*control it so that it never really represented any substantial challenge to the
political order. That Algeria looked so far away from an Islamist upsurge on the
eve of the October unrest suggests that the movement's growth, despite the
decline in popular living standards that had occurred in the 1980s, was far from
inevitable.
This is not to suggest either, though, that the crisis of October and Chadli's
decision to open up Algeria's political system made the Islamist rise unavoidable
after 1988. Shrewd decisions and moves on the part of Islamist leaders such as
Madani, Belhadj and Sahnouni were clearly important. The movement's swift
exploitation of and high-profile involvement in the latter stages of the unrest of
October, despite having played no part in its instigation, provided a rallying point
of dissent to the regime for ordinary Algerians in the absence of any other
prominent and coherent grouping. The decision to form a political party solidified
this growing support and when the unexpected decision came to allow
participation of the FIS in the political system, the new party had the resources
and the organisation to ensure that it had no secular competitors in the struggle
to provide an alternative in the polls to the unpopular and discredited FLN. Its
exploitation of the offer apparently tendered by President Chadli in early 1990
further boosted itself and its electoral prospects.
The stunning success the FIS experienced in the eighteen months from its
creation led many commentators to observe that the Islamist party had assumed
the mantle of popular legitimacy that had once been worn by the historic FLN
during and immediately after the war of liberation. Lahouari Addi observed that
their were remarkable similarities, in terms of their shared emphasis on populism,
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between the FIS's programme and the FLN's National Charter. 138 However, whilst
such comparisons were often overstated, it was certainly true that this was a line
that the FIS leadership itself sought to promote. In one of the first interviews he
gave following the creation of the FIS in February 1989, Abassi Madani claimed
that the new party was simply reclaiming the lost legacy of Algeria's revolutionary
struggle against France. 'The FIS wants to save the experiences of November
(1954) which have been lost" he stated.139
138 See Lahouari Addi: De /a Permanence du Populisme Algèrien in Peuples
Mediterraneens (Nos. 52-53, July-December 1990) pp.42-43
139 Interview with Abassi Madani in Algerie Actuante 23.2.89
5ISLAMISM AND THE FIS CENTRE STAGE: 1990 - 1991
A: JUNE 1990 - MARCH 1991
1. Reactions to the FIS Victory
Despite the shock of the scale of the FIS victory in the local elections, the
major players did not take long to react and prepare themselves for the next
stage in the political conflict. For its part, the FIS organised massive enthusiastic
demonstrations on the first Friday after the results of the election were
announced. Abassi Madani was besieged by the flow of domestic and foreign
journalists as well as foreign diplomats who came to see him, anxious to hear the
plans and thoughts of the leader of what was now clearly Algeria's most popular
political party)
The size of the FIS victory had similarly taken all the various factions of the
regime by surprise. President Chadli's strategy of encouraging the Islamist party
in an effort to prevent a victory by (and thus damage his opponents within) the
FLN, had clearly seriously underestimated the popular support for the FIS vis
vis the former ruling party. Despite this miscalculation, the President appeared to
remain robustly confident that having defeated his enemies in the FLN he could
prevent the FIS from potentially threatening his power base. He announced at
the end of July 1990 that elections to the National Assembly would take place
some time within the first quarter of 1991 and privately reassured foreign
diplomats, anxious over the potential consequences of a repeat victory by the FIS
in the National Assembly elections, that the party was highly unlikely to do as
well in subsequent elections. The local elections were portrayed as being of little
Burgat & Dowell p.285n and p.284
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consequence and would mark the high water mark of Islamist support which
would ebb away in the forthcoming months.2
One of the reasons Chadli stated for his optimism was his belief that the FIS
would struggle to maintain its level of popular support once it took control of the
majority of local authorities it had won in the local elections. The party, he argued,
would prove incapable of fulfilling the frequently ambitious promises it had made
during the election campaign and would consequently suffer increasing popular
disillusionment.
2. The RS in Local Government
Considerable international and domestic attention became focused on the
activities and performance of the 853 communal (APC) and the 31 regional
(APW) councils that the FIS took control of following their June victories. Of
greatest concern to most observers was the extent to which the party would seek
to impose its vision of an Islamic society on Algeria's daily social fabric and the
extent to which this would appear to threaten and impinge individual liberties.
Within a matter of weeks of the new local administrations taking over,
reports rapidly began to emerge indicating that those councils controlled by the
FIS did indeed appear to be set on imposing their strict ideals on local social life
and affairs. The Provincial Assembly in Constantine and the City Council in
Algiers voted to end co-education. Oran City Council banned a popular 'rai' music
festival in favour of one committed to 'patriotic Islamic music' and suspended
subsidies to cultural associations that were not of a religious nature. In Tipasa,
the wearing of swimming costumes and shorts on the streets was prohibited. In
Jijel the local authority rejected all correspondence not written in Arabic. 3 Across
2 Author's interview with Hussein Amin, Cairo, 13.6.94
3 The Economist 4.8.90; Djillali Liabes: La Democratie en Algèrie: Culture et
Contre-Culture in Peuples Mediterrandens No. 52-53: Algerie vers L'Etat
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Algeria there were reports of a generalised clamp down upon and closing of
cinemas, bars and wine-shops in the areas controlled by the FIS.
The speed with which such reports appeared in both the national official
press and foreign newspapers, however, indicated the readiness of the regime
(as well as foreign governments, particularly the French) to try to discredit the
FIS. Gradually, reservations about and qualifications to such stories began to
appear. It emerged that the bans on swimming costumes and shorts on the
streets of Tipasa and the closing elsewhere of alcohol-selling establishments
were, in fact, measures already introduced by the previous FLN-controlled
authorities and which had hitherto met with little opposition or comment. Other
reports of the so-called 'war' FIS councils had declared on rai music Francois
Burgat characterises as being "often distorted by the government, or simply
fabricated by the government press."4
The reaction of the FIS's leaders when they were questioned about such
stories was frequently one of exasperation. For them, whether the stories were
true or not was not the real issue. As Abassi Madani responded when asked
about what had become known as the 'War of the shorts' in Tipasa: 'The story of
the shorts is not the problem. The things that count are the problems of housing,
unemployment and money."5
 A similar attitude was adopted by Ali Belhadj on the
issue of the supposed clamp down on music: "In Oran there is no drinking water,
but we hear talk of rai. Water and housing come before rai."6
That the FIS wanted, then, to be judged on their managerial performance
and the provision of essential services to the populations in the areas they
Islamique? JulIlet - Decembre 1990, p.47; Dillman: Transition to Democracy in
Algeria p.39
4 Burgat & Dowell p.284
5 Le Figaro 31.7.90
6 Horizons 29.9.90
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controlled did not give them any respite from their critics who were quick to point
at the new authorities' failings and inability to deliver the promises of dramatic
economic improvement that had been made during the election campaign. Some
critics went beyond the standard accusations of incompetence and even alleged
nepotism and corruption. 7 Such accusations were similarly contested by the FIS
and its defenders. On the issue of competence, the fact that within days of the
June election FIS workers were on the streets of Algiers clearing rubbish that
had accumulated during a long strike in the capital, was highlighted. 8 More
importantly, it was clear that the FIS had inherited local administrations which
were in a very poor state following years of appalling FLN mismanagement. 8 As
Abassi Madani explained: 'We have found in the APCs the politics of scorched
earth."10 This, together with the growing demands of the local populations
increasingly pressurised by failures at the national level to produce economic and
social improvements, made it highly unlikely that even the most competent of
local authorities (let alone totally inexperienced ones like those of the FIS) could
make much of an impact in the shorter term, certainly not within the first few
months of taking control when accusations of incompetence were at their height.
It was also clear that the government did all it could to frustrate the new
authorities and ensure that they made little progress. Only two months before the
June elections, local powers had been "spectacularly reduced" (Burgat) by the
government and the newly elected authorities were able to enjoy far less financial
autonomy than their predecessors whose accumulated debts were made the
responsibility of the new administrations. 11 Speakers from the APCs and APWs at
7 See for example Zoubir pp.99-100 and Revolution Africaine 20.6.91
8 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.585n
9 Burgat & Dowell p.283
19 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algerie Actualite 30.8.90
11 Burgat & Dowell pp.283-284; Bouthenia Cheriet: Islamism and Feminism:
Algeria's Rites of Passage in Entelis & Naylor p.202. Local councils also
complained that public enterprises 'threatened' them to get them to pay
outstanding debts owed to them. Horizons 29.9.90
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a local government conference organised by the FIS on 28 September 1990,
complained bitterly of the lack of co-operation they received from the government
and civil servants when they tried to establish agencies and mechanisms to deal
with the myriad problems their local areas faced. 12 Six weeks later on 15
November four thousand FIS councillors presented a motion to the President
formally protesting at the hostile attitude of central government to their
administrations.13
On the issue of corruption and nepotism, it was argued that the FIS-
controlled administrations, far from employing friends or relatives or even party
workers frequently appointed people outside of the party in order to make use of
the most competent people available. 14
 Even if there was corruption and
nepotism to be found in some authorities, though, it was difficult to argue that this
would have been on a scale that even approached that witnessed during the
previous period of FLN control.
The popularity of these authorities can be seen as one measure of the
performance of the local councils. Although any meaningful measure of this could
not be achieved until further elections, there did not appear to be any noticeable
signs of disenchantment with the local authorities. Most people appeared to
continue to blame their worsening economic and social conditions on the central
government. Whilst claims by some FIS activists that local people
"enthusiastically supported local governments with voluntary assistance and
additional taxes"15 should be treated with a certain amount of scepticism, the
inevitable popularity of 'Islamic souks' which many authorities, in conjunction with
12 Horizons 29.9.90
13 Le Monde 17.11.90
14 Burgat & Dowell p.285
15 Anwar Haddam: The Political Experiment of the Algerian Islamic Movement and
the New World Order in Azzam Tamimi (Editor): Power-Sharing Islam? (Liberty,
London, 1993) p.135.
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the organs of the party, set up to provide low cost goods to the poor, can not be
denied.16
Overall, it appears that the FIS's record in local government in the period
following their electoral successes of June 1990 appears relatively
undistinguished in the wider context. The scale of the tasks its councillors faced
and the limited (and reduced) powers that they were able to wield meant that their
impact was at best slight. In terms of the changes it tried to make to social
behaviour at the local level, whilst many of these were, as demonstrated, subject
to exaggeration or fabrication, it seems clear that many local authorities did make
identifiable attempts to try and bring social behaviour closer to its own set of
norms. Non-Islamists in areas won by the FIS spoke of a tangible "atmosphere of
fear"17 developing in the aftermath of the FIS victories of June 1990, but it seems
that no significant draconian social measures were introduced in most FIS-
controlled regions and any changes that did occur usually affected only a small
minority of the population in each area.16
3. The FIS and the Gulf Crisis: The Populist Option
At the same time as the FIS was dealing in the second half of 1990 with
the domestic challenges of local government, events outside of Algeria began to
make a rare and important incursion onto the national political scene. These
events were to have particular implications for the party.
The shock of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the
subsequent dispatch of US. troops to Saudi Arabia, was felt, because of the
region's Arab and Muslim identity, almost as keenly in the Maghreb as it was in
the Mashraq where the crisis itself actually unfolded. In Algeria, the government
16 Burgat & Dowell p.285; Algerie Actualitè 11.4.91
17 Author's interviews with eyewitnesses.
18 Burgat & Dowell p.284
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reacted by calling for Iraq's withdrawal and the removal of foreign troops from
Saudi soil. Initially, this position was shared by the FIS which, although
particularly sensitive to the presence of non-Muslims so near to Islam's holiest
places in Saudi Arabia, wished to offer no support to Saddam Hussein who they
rightly saw as a secular and anti-Islamist Ba'athist. 19 Thus Abassi Madani
condemned the "arrogant" and "colonising" behaviour of the United States whilst
describing the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait as "unacceptable." 20 Following the
traditional Algerian diplomatic role of mediation, both Abassi and Ali Belhadj
embarked on shuttle diplomacy between Baghdad and Riyadh in an effort to
resolve the crisis, hoping particularly to use their links with the Saudis (whose
support of the party provided another incentive for not favouring the Iraqis) to
good effect.21
However, as 1990 drew to a close with no sign of an Iraqi withdrawal and
the likelihood of western military action against Iraq growing, there were
increasing signs that the even-handed stance adopted by both the government
and by the FIS was out-of-step with that of the bulk of the ordinary population. It
rapidly became apparent that most Algerians saw Saddam Hussein, despite
official discouragement from the FIS as well as the government, as a heroic Arab
nationalist standing up to western threats. This perception was sharpened by the
commencement of air strikes against Iraq in mid-January 1991.
The massive popular support which Saddam Hussein enjoyed in Algeria
presented the leaders of the FIS with a considerable dilemma. They recognised
that they faced the risk of losing the substantial electoral support they had
attracted only six months earlier in June 1990, through being seen to be far too
19 Hugh Roberts: A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism in James Piscatori
(Editor): Islamic Fundamentafisms and the Gulf Crisis (The American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, 1991) p.143
20 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algèrie Actualitê 30.8.90
21 Robert Mortimer: Algerian Foreign Policy in Transition in Entelis & Naylor
pp.261-262
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balanced in their antipathy towards Iraq and western military intervention.22
Furthermore, there were fears of being outflanked by other opposition parties,
notably the MDA of Ahmed Ben Bella who had made a high-profile return to the
country in September in 1990, and who had been the first to organise public
demonstrations and call for the dispatch of volunteers to help defend Iraq.23
Forced to choose between preserving the loyalty of its popular base and
staying true to both its Islamist and anti-nationalist doctrines as well as its
Arabian financial supporters, the FIS appeared to make a clear decision to ride
the popular impulses of the Algerian people and unambiguously back Saddam. In
a multi-party demonstration against the war on 18 January, in which most
demonstrators marched under banners calling for peace, the FIS marched under
explicitly pro-Iraqi slogans. Furthermore, Ali Belhadj appeared in combat fatigues
at the rally and called on the government to open training camps for volunteers to
go to Iraq.24 Whilst such unabashedly populist pitches were primarily aimed at
retaining the attention and support of mass opinion, the F1S also made sure that
its domestic interests and agenda continued to be advanced. Thus at a F1S-only
demonstration on 31 January, calls for a date to be set for the National Assembly
elections were mixed in with denunciations of the western powers and messages
of solidarity with Iraq.25
The comprehensive defeat of Iraq within a few weeks inevitably brought an
effective end to the debate in Algeria and attentions returned more fully to the
domestic scene. However, the Gulf crisis as a whole clearly had an impact on the
FIS and revealed something about the party's nature and identity. Hugh Roberts
argues that the crisis appeared to confirm the FIS's "doctrinal shallowness, but
22 Roberts: A Trial of Strength pp.143-144
23 Mortimer: Algerian Foreign Policy in Transition p.262
24 For one Algerian journalist, Belhadj's call for military volunteers had the
second, ulterior motive of creating a well-trained militia for the FIS. Alg6rie
Actualig 24.1.91
25 Roberts: A Trial of Strength pp.141-143; Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.35
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also its militancy and political flexibility" demonstrated by its populist decision to
opt for retaining its popular support in preference to staying closer to its Islamist
doctrines and Saudi supporters. This choice also marked for Roberts "a major
stage in the 'Algerianisation' of the FIS" through its response to domestic rather
than foreign (Saudi) and trans-national (Islamist) pressures and factors.26
B: APRIL -JULY 1991: CRISIS AND CONFRONTATION
As the war in Iraq and Kuwait drew to a close in the early Spring of 1991,
the attention of the FIS began to re-focus on events inside Algeria and
increasingly upon its own internal politics. Very little was publicly known about
the internal workings of the FIS during its first two years of life, with even the
membership of the party's ruling council, the Majlis Shura, being shrouded in
mystery. Throughout 1989-90 Abassi Madani had been the only public voice of
the party, with the occasional interview or statement by Ali Belhadj providing an
exception to this. However by 1991 this monolithic front that the party had been
able to retain began to fissure, not publicly at first, but enough by the middle of
the year to be apparent to everyone within the party and beyond.
1. The Emergence of Islamist Competition
The first signs of discord within the FIS following its victory in the 1990 local
elections emerged over the issue of its relations with and place within the
country's wider Islamist movement. As has been shown (see previous chapter),
far from all of Algeria's senior Islamist figures joined the FIS on its creation in
February 1989. Although most had involved themselves in the far looser and
26 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.144 Roberts actually argues that because of the
relative absence of non-Muslim minorities in Algeria, the FIS were successfully
able to blend the idea of pan-Muslim solidarity with the more popular ideas of
pan-Arab solidarity. p.143
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more apolitical Rabitat Dawa organisation formed the previous November, many
had had doubts about the theological and practical need of a specifically political
party to further the Islamist movement's aims. However, it was several of these
figures who appeared in the wake of June 1990 to rethink their objections and
join the field of political competition. This did not take the form, though, of
responding to an invitation by Abassi Madani in June 1990 to join the FIS, but
rather involved the creation of new and separate Islamist parties.
A number of Islamist type parties were formed in the latter half of 1990, but
only two came to be of any real significance: those formed around Mahfoud
Nahnah and Abdallah Djaballah respectively. Both senior and influential figures in
the Islamist movement since the 1970s, Nahnah and Djaballah officially
transformed their existing apolitical associations into political parties in December
1990. Nahnah's Al-Irchad wal Isiah assumed the Arabic acronymed title of
HAMAS (Islamic Reform Movement) whilst Djaballah's Nanda (Renaissance)
association retained its name, although it was frequently referred to by its full
French title of Mouvement de Nanda Islamique (MNI).
The reasons behind the creation of these two new political parties were
several fold. The most obvious, if base, impulse behind the setting up of the
parties was the realisation by their founders that the astounding success that the
FIS had discovered during the first eighteen months of its existence had pushed
all those Islamist figures who had not joined the party to the political and
organisational margins. Mahfoud Nahnah and Ahmed Sahnoun's abject failure in
trying to prevent the FIS staging its march of April 1990 (see previous chapter)
had been a graphic demonstration of this marginalisation. It was clearly a
calculation on the part of Nahnah and Djaballah that the only means of retaining
any influence within the broader Islamist movement was to join the party political
fray.27
 For both leaders this meant forming their own parties rather than joining
27 Burgat & Dowell p.288
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the FIS, since this latter option risked the final abolition and subsummation within
the FIS of any remaining independent power bases they possessed.
A second consideration was that the new Islamist parties represented
recognisably different strains of Islamism than that embodied by the FIS. Both
HAMAS and Nanda were portrayed as essentially more 'moderate' expressions of
Islamism. A more accurate characterisation was that they operated a far more
cerebral and genuinely religious discourse than that held by the F1S, the
experience of the Gulf War having further demonstrated the latter party's
deepening attachment to political populism. For Mahfoud Nahnah, this more
intellectual approach did appear to imply a more moderate and less demotic
approach. Although the party's name, HAMAS, was an allusion to the HAMAS of
Palestine (the Algerian version was purposely founded on the third anniversary of
the Intifada) the choice of name reflected more a desire for popular attention and
recognition than an indication of the party's espousal of radical ideas and violent
activism. 28 Intellectually, Nahnah proclaimed his belief in an Islam that was "open
to the modem world and founded on ijitihad.." and he made clear his commitment
to the establishment of an Islamic state by stages and "based on dialogue,
removed from violence (and) from political and religious terrorism."29 This
gradualist approach was also reflected in his far more unambiguous acceptance
of the basic tenets of democracy demonstrated by his belief that plurality of
thought represented "maturity" and his declared willingness to co-operate with
non-Islamist parties at elections.33
 This stood in contrast to the frequently
ambiguous signals coming from the FIS. In more specific terms, too, Nahnah and
HAMAS appeared distinct from the party of Madani and Belhadj. Al-Irchad we!
Isiah had had an active women's section and Nahnah was unequivocal in his
28 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.136; Burgat & Dowell p.288
29 Quoted in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & FrOgosi p.38 & p.42
3° Interview with Mahfoud Nahnah, Revolution Afficaine 10.4.91
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support of the right of women to work and for an expansion of the Family Code to
protect their rights, and he was vociferous in his condemnation of violence
against wonnen.31
Abdallah Djaballah's Nanda appeared close to Nahnah's HAMAS in terms
of this more intellectual discourse although Djaballah's differences with the FIS
amounted arguably to less than those between HAMAS and the FIS. Differences
of political strategy towards the institutions of the state and over theological
conceptions of ijitihad have been cited as demarcating the line between MNI and
the FIS, but Arun Kapil, for one, has described them as "purely tactical" and thus
a means to preserve Djaballah's independence. In fact, in places, the MNI's
discourse appeared as radical as that of the radical wing of FIS, making plain its
opposition to the existence of secular parties and its wish to impose the veil on
women, stances both Mahfoud Nahnah and (in public at least) Abassi Madani
had declared themselves to be against. 32
 Like Madani, Djaballah would
nonetheless speak more generally of working within the "framework of democracy
and pluralism."33 One way in which the MNI appeared to differ from both the FIS
and HAMAS was in its vociferous condemnation of the government's economic
reform programme, an issue both other parties had appeared to broadly, if often
tacitly, support. Opposing further privatisations of the public sector, Djaballah
denounced the liberalising reforms which had been accelerated under the prime
ministership of Mouloud Hannrouche since September 1989 as having "opened
the national market to domestic wolves and foreigners."34
A third and far more contentious reason advanced for the entry of HAMAS
and the MNI into the party political arena was that of encouragement and even
31 Burgat & Dowell p.288n; Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & FrOgosi p.38; Lamchichi:
L'Islamisme en Algerie pp.104-105
32 Kapil: Les Parts Islamistes en Algerie p.111
33 Lamchichi: LIslamisme en Algene p.107
34 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.44
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orchestration by the regime. It is argued that the formation of both parties was
seen by the regime as a means of dividing and splintering the large Islamist
constituency that the FIS had been able to monopolise in the June elections.35
Cited as evidence of official collaboration were meetings both leaders had had
with the regime and the fact that both new parties appeared to be well financed
following their creation. Whilst such charges ignored the more genuine
motivations, detailed above, for forming political parties, there was at least some
substance to the claims in the case of Nahnah and HAMAS. In contrast to
Djaballah's criticism of official policy in the economic field in particular, Nahnah
offered little serious criticism of the regime and even often took its side in
subsequent confrontations with the FIS.36 Nahnah had also enjoyed unusually
good relations with the authorities since his release from prison soon after Chadli
Benjedid came to power and his absence from the organised agitation of the
Islamist movement in the early 1980s (see chapter 3) was further indication of his
closeness to the regime.
2. Attempts at Unity
That regime manipulation was not the primary motivating force behind the
formation of HAMAS (or Nanda) was indicated by Mahfoud Nahnah's expressed
belief that the Islamist parties should not compete directly with one another (thus
undermining the regime's desire to fracture the movement). Instead the leader of
HAMAS called for a common front between the parties. Soon after the founding
of HAMAS, he organised a conference to this end on 20 September 1990 to
which he invited over 300 Islamic associations as well as political parties.
However, whilst Djaballah and the MNI were very favourable to some form of
35 Burgat & Dowell p.289
36 Kapil: Les Partis Islamistes en Algene p.110
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'Islamic alliance', the leadership of the FIS made it quite clear that it was not and
did not attend the conference.37
The FIS officially rejected the idea of an alliance on the grounds of it being
essentially divisive. Its leadership maintained that the FIS was the sole legitimate
representative of Islamist political activity in Algeria and thus implied that the
objective of those Islamists that did not join the party was division. Abassi Madani
described Nahnah's initiative as "a call for division under a slogan of unity" and
characterised his subsequent decision to create a separate political party as "a
stab in the back."38 Ali Belhadj rejected Nahnah's initiatives on theological
grounds referring to a hadith to claim that "there is no alliance in Islam" - Islam
having abolished all previous alliances. 39 However, the FIS were far from united
on this view. A growing number of the leadership of the party became attracted to
the idea of such an alliance. This was often because many of them had belonged
to groups established by Nahnah and particularly Djaballah before the creation of
the FIS in 1989 and the idea of rivalry and division left them personally and
theologically uneasy. Such a view became increasingly shared by the FIS's rank
and file who began to chant slogans and display banners to this end at FIS
marches and rallies:4°
The main opponent to the creation of an alliance was Abassi Madani. He
consistently resisted such a move and this explains the party's failure to respond
to Nahnah's overtures. The hostility of the FIS's leader to a common Islamist front
was interpreted by some as a result of personal antipathy Abassi felt towards
Nahnah as the main proponent of the alliance. The leader of HAMAS's lack of an
explicit backing for the F1S in the 1990 elections together with his subsequent
claim that the FIS victory was one for the wider Islamist movement clearly irked
37 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.137; Lamchichi: L'islamisme en Algerie p.107
35 Abed Charef: Algdrie: Le Grand Ddrapage (L'Aube, France, 1994) p.110
39 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.40
40 Charef pp. 109-110 .
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the President of the FIS. 41 He remained suspicious of the Blida-based leader and
his relations with the regime, actually referring to Nahnah in one newspaper
interview as "Chadli's man."42 However, this did not explain why Abassi was
opposed to alliance with Abdallah Djaballah's MM. Not only did Djaballah enjoy
much closer relations with the FIS, but, unlike Nahnah, he had openly called on
his supporters to vote for the FIS in June 1990 and was attributed with securing
victories for the party in his organisation's heartland in eastern Algeria. 43
The main reason behind Abassi Madani's opposition to an alliance was that
the FIS leader feared it would critically weaken both the party's strategic position
as well as his own position as leader. At the time of the creation of the FIS,
Abassi, Nahnah, Djaballah and, of course, Ahmed Sahnoun, had arguably been
the four most senior and influential Islamist figures in Algeria. The fact that Abassi
was the only one of the four to become involved in the new party meant that he
was able to dominate it. The creation of an 'Islamic Alliance' appeared to threaten
this dominance and might appear to put both Nahnah and Djaballah on an equal
footing once again with Abassi (as indeed was their aim).
Although there was a strong element of personal ambition on the part of
Abassi Madani in this regard, there was also a concern that any threat to his
dominance was a threat to the long term strategy he had personally forged for the
41 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.137; Lamchichi: Lislamisme en Algèrie p.105
At the elections Nahnah had only called on his supporters to vote for 'Islamists'
rather than specifically for the FIS. Although as Roberts points out this invariably
amounted to the same thing.
42 Interview with Abassi Madani, Horizons 5.5.91. Abassi's antipathy towards
Nahnah was also shared by some of the more radical elements in the FIS. They
too suspected his relationship with the regime (particularly with regard to the
Bouyali affair - see chapter 3) and disliked his apparent moderation. Following
the party's creation there were incidents of FIS militants tearing down HAMAS
posters, interrupting the party's meetings and attempting to prevent Nahnah
himself speaking. Violence was also used in attempts by FIS members to wrest
control of mosques that were controlled by HAMAS supporters. Al-Ahnaf,
Botiveau & Fregosi p.42
43 Kapil: Les Partis Islamistes en Algórie pp.110-111
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FIS. Abassi's belief and determination that the FIS could win at least a share in
political power had been clearly demonstrated by the populist tactics the party
had employed during the Gulf War. The involvement of figures such as Nahnah
and Djaballah potentially put at risk the 'electoralist strategy Abassi had forged.
The more intellectual and religious orientation of both leaders made them more
ambivalent towards the aim of full political power as their failure to form political
parties before 1990 amply demonstrated. Their involvement might also
complicate and weaken Abassi's relations with the reformist elements within the
regime, Abdallah Djaballah's hostility to the economic reform programme
providing a potentially major impediment to continued co-operation.44
As 1991 progressed Abassi Madani came under increasing pressure from
both the FIS's Majlis Shura and its ordinary members to respond to these appeals
of unity. The leader of the party became progressively isolated only able to resist
pressure on the issue by relying on the personal loyalty of his deputy Ali Belhadj
whom many claimed was actually personally in favour of an alliance.45
The internal conflicts within the FIS came by the Spring of 1991 to become
entwined and complicated by developments in relations with the regime which
had the effect of creating further fault lines within the party and further weakening
the position of Abassi Madani.
3. The New Electoral Law of Spring 1991
Following the FIS's victory in June 1990 relations between the party and
President Chadli and his supporters in the government had clearly cooled as
44 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.467
45 Abdallah Djaballah claimed that Belhadj had supported the idea of a union
when it was initially put to him. Khelladi: Algerie: Les lslamistes Face au Pouvoir
p.178 Pressure for unity also came from Ahmed Sahnoun and the Rabitat Dawaa
which continued to meet in this period (see chapter 4). From the Spring of 1991
Sahnoun began to hold weekly meetings to get the parties to present a single list
at the forthcoming legislative elections. Horizons 5.5.91
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disputes over local government and the country's stance on the Gulf War had
demonstrated. Nevertheless, whilst there appears to have been no renewal of the
covert arrangement Chadli had fashioned with Abassi in early 1990 to defeat his
enemies in the FLN, the leader of the FIS again met discreetly with the President
in the aftermath of the local elections. There the leader of the FIS secured a
commitment from Chadli that the regime would proceed to hold elections to the
National Assembly in similarly unfettered conditions under which those at the
local level had been held. In addition it was alleged that there was even an
indication from the President that he might even be willing to co-operate and
share power with the FIS following the legislative elections.46
How genuine this alleged commitment from Chadli Benjedid to Abassi
Madani was is dubious. If the FIS were to repeat their triumph at the local level at
the national level the President clearly would want to retain good relations with
them. However, Chadli did not anticipate this happening and from 1990 worked to
ensure that the FIS would not achieve a majority in the elections. By late 1990
his initial hope that FIS difficulties in local government would lead to a decline in
the party's popular support showed no clear cut signs of occurring. Similarly, the
emergence of HAMAS and the MNI had made no obvious inroads into the FIS's
base of popular support. Turnout at HAMAS-organised rallies, for example, was a
fraction of that which the FIS could expect to attend its own events. 47 It thus
became apparent to the President that he would need to look for other means of
reducing the FIS's popular support.
In March 1991 a new electoral law was presented to the outgoing national
assembly (APN) for approval. It was quite clearly aimed at strengthening potential
FLN representation in future elections to the National Assembly (now scheduled
46 Author's interview with Rachid Ghannoushi, leader of the Islamist Tunisian
Nanda party, London, 18.4.95. Ghannoushi was in self-imposed exile in Algeria
during 1990-91 and had close contacts with the FIS.
47 Burgat & Dowell p.289
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for June following postponement due to the tumult over the Gulf crisis) at the
expense of the main Islamist party.
The electoral bill's main proposal was to increase the number of seats in the
assembly from the current 295 to 542. Whilst this did not in itself appear to favour
any party in particular, the fact that the new extra seats were allocated
disproportionately to the south of Algeria, the only region where the FLN had
performed well in the 1990 local elections, revealed the obvious intent behind the
move. The effects of this manipulation of the electoral boundaries for political
purposes, known as 'gerrymandering', were most starkly illustrated by comparing
the electorates of the proposed districts: 7,000 voters in some southern areas
being accorded the same representation as parts of Algiers containing 75,000
electors. Inevitably, the new districts with the largest electorates, mostly in
Algiers, were ones that had voted most heavily for the F1S in 1990.4B
It was no surprise, then, that the APN, which was still exclusively
composed of FLN deputies, approved the bill. It had even amended it to further
favour the FLN over the FIS. Originally providing for a second ballot contested by
the leading three candidates who emerged from a first ballot in each district, the
electoral bill was amended by the assembly to reduce the second ballot to just
two contesting candidates. Such a change was perceived as likely to aid the FLN
since the second ballot was most likely to produce a contest between the FIS and
the FLN as the two largest parties nation-wide. In such a situation, it was
believed, the bulk of the votes which had gone to the smaller (predominantly
secular) parties eliminated in the first ballot would flow to the FLN as the lesser
evil to the FIS.49
The effectiveness of this strategy by the government received apparent
confirmation by a series of opinion polls that were conducted soon after the
48 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.588
49 Ibid.
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passing of the electoral law. They revealed similar levels of support for the two
main parties overall, but showed clearly that in a straight fight between an FLN
and a FIS candidate in a second ballot, most voters would back the FLN. Thus
even if the first ballot showed, as one poll suggested, a 33-24% lead for the FIS
over the FLN, a second ballot would transform this into a 54-46% (45-38% if
abstentions from the first round are considered) victory for the former ruling
party.50
4. The Battle for the General Strike
Faced with such a blatant attempt to sabotage their electoral chances
(which were clearly deemed good following the party's triumph the previous
summer) the FIS leadership responded with angry protests. The party branded
the new electoral law "high treason" and Abassi Madani, for the first time
attacking the President in person, accused Chadli of betraying the agreement he
had struck with the FIS in which he had promised to conduct the electoral process
openly and fairly. 51 At the beginning of April the leader of the FIS held a press
conference at which he made a set of demands. These included the abrogation of
the new electoral law, more opposition party monitoring of the process, which
should be free from government and APN interference, and a call for the holding
of presidential elections within three months of the assembly elections.52
For Abassi Madani the regime's new plans for the electoral law dealt a
heavy blow to his central strategy of achieving political power through the ballot
5° Algerie Actuante 9.5.91. A poll published three weeks later showed an even
larger second ballot split of 62-38 (51-32) in favour of the FLN. Algerie Actuante
30.5.91
51 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.588; Burgat & Dowell p.293; Jeune
Afrique 5.6.91
52 El Moudjahid 3.4.91
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box.53 His fury at Chadli Benjedid's betrayal was evident in both his personal
attacks on the duplicity of the President (whom hitherto he had avoided any
criticism of) and in his calls for early presidential elections. 54 Yet the regime
appeared impervious to the loud protests both from the FIS and many of the other
opposition parties. It seemed that Abassi Madani's personal and political strategy
for achieving power had been irreparably damaged. Not only did the FIS look
unlikely to gain even a simple majority in elections to the National Assembly, but
any presidential ambitions Abassi must inevitably have harboured were similarly
threatened by the fear that an FLN victory could pave the way for a fourth
presidential term for Chadli Benjedid.55 Within a few days, the FIS leader
appeared to have produced a potential solution to this dilemma. From early April
Abassi began to threaten that the FIS might launch a general strike in order to
force a change in the new electoral laws.56 Typical of these, and of the new more
radical tone he had adopted was his speech to a party rally in Oran on 1 ,May:
"We are ready to embark on elections, but with guarantees... the first of which
is not to act according to these repressive (electoral) laws, as we cannot
achieve legitimacy through illegitimacy, unless the President of the Republic
complies with the opinion of the Islamic Salvation Front. One of the
characteristics of the (FIS) is to demand and to struggle. When making
demands does not prove convincing enough, striking to achieve what is right
Rachid Ghannoushi observed that "Abassi Madani realised after the changes
to the electoral law that the electoral system could not lead to an Islamic state.
Author's interview with Rachid Ghannoushi, London, 18.4.95
54 When asked in the previous August (1990) about whether the FIS would
demand Presidential elections following ones to the National Assembly, Abassi
Madani had replied that this was a "secondary" issue compared to that of the
National Assembly. Interview with Abassi Madani, Algerie Actuante 30.8.90
55 Khelladi: Algerie: Les lslamistes Face au Pouvoir pp.177-178 Abassi Madani
was almost certainly aware that an opinion poll at the beginning of May had
shown that nearly 60% of those questioned perceived him to be the most popular
party leader, as against 12% for Hocine Ait Ahmed of the FFS and 11% for
Abdelhamid Mehri of the FLN. Algerie Actuante 9.5.91
56 See for example Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/1041 A/18 9.4.91 &
ME/1048 AR 17.4.91.
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becomes necessary, God willing. It is a general strike, a political strike, not a
conventional union one for limited demands:157
In issuing such warnings Abassi Madani did not have the formal approval of
the leadership of the party, having not formally discussed the issue with the Majlis
Shura beforehand. His motivations in both making this unilateral move and in not
consulting widely were several fold. First and foremost, Abassi saw a general
strike, or the threat of one, as one of the only means of persuading the
government to abandon its attempt to electorally hobble the FIS through the
election laws. He considered the other two possible options open to the party,
that of acceptance of the changes and that of a boycott of the forthcoming
elections as being equally damaging. The first of these alternatives would have
led to defeat and humiliation for the party, whilst the second risked charges of
being unwilling to play the democratic game and may even have led to the
sidelining of the party politically. 55 Abassi had witnessed the effectiveness of a
general strike that had been called by the main Algerian trade union federation,
the UGTA, in the previous March and saw it as a potentially effective political
tool.59 The fact that the idea of a general strike had also been canvassed by a
coalition of several of the secular opposition parties also clearly influenced
Abassi, not least through the fear of being outflanked by such a move.60
A secondary motivation for Abassi Madani in calling for a general strike was
that it could prove to be a useful weapon in his internal battles with the rest of the
FIS leadership. Not only would it provide a means of distracting attention from the
increasingly pressing issue of alliance with the other Islamist parties, but by
leading the strike call Abassi hoped to forge more direct links with the FIS's mass
membership and thus strengthen his hand against opponents nearer the top of
57 SWB ME11062 N14 3.5.91
55 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.146
5° Charef p.135
60 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.468
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the party. 61 During the first few days of May, Abassi's opponents had made
increasingly public their unhappiness with the independent nature of his
leadership. On May 1, in a move clearly aimed at limiting Abassi, a declaration
emerged from the Majlis Shura stating that "Declarations and important political
decisions can only be taken by the Majlis Shura." 62 A week later, in an article in El
Mounqid, the Majlis issued a communique restating their desire for a common
front with the other Islamist parties:
"The FIS regards, in all sincerity, that the unity of the Islamic ranks is a duty
in order to prevent (the emergence of) contradictory political positions
capable of thwarting the desired Islamic solution.'
Abassi Madani was aware that the party's supporters had repeatedly
demonstrated their enthusiasm for mass action through rallies and marches and
thus he undoubtedly hoped his general strike call would prove popular and
increase his standing with the FIS's rank and file. More generally, such a strategy
could also serve to reinvigorate support for the party overall and thus counter any
slippage of support that may have occurred since the previous June.
Having more or less unilaterally taken the decision to stage a general strike,
Abassi Madani was faced with the difficult task of persuading the Majlis Shura to
back him. For many on the FIS's ruling council, the electoral law was not the
crucial issue that Abassi perceived it to be. Despite participating in the original
party political project that was the FIS, a significant section of the party's
leadership remained more committed to the doctrinal rather than the strategic
aspects of the party. 64 Loyal to the original specifically religious objectives of the
Association of Algerian Ulama, the achievement of political power was a
61 Khelladi: Algètie: Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir p.180
62 Quoted in Charef p.112
63 Ibid.
64 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.468
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secondary consideration. As a result, many viewed Abassi's proposal of a general
strike with apprehension fearing that such a confrontational policy could threaten
the significant gains and influence the party had already achieved. 66 Rachid
Ghannoushi, the leader of Tunisia's Islamist party, Nanda, spoke for many in the
FIS's Majlis Shura when he tried to dissuade Abassi Madani from pursuing such a
course:
"I tried on many occasions to persuade him against such a course of action,
telling him, 'This path can only lead to prison.' I asked him why he wanted to
take this risk when the FIS ruled so many councils. 'Even if the changes to
the electoral districts work against you, the FIS will remain the strongest
party' 	 However, he was absolutely convinced'66
Abassi Madani worked hard to persuade the Majlis Shura of the wisdom and
efficacy of a general strike. Finally, following a stormy meeting of the Majlis Shura
on 23 May, Abassi Madani was able to declare formally the party's intention to
call a general strike to commence two days later on 25 May having promised
members that the strike would only last three days. 67 However, it was reported
that as many as seventeen members of the ruling council had opposed the move,
leaving Abassi Madani with a bare majority of the 38 strong membership backing
his initiative.68
5. The General Strike
The strike commenced as threatened on 25 May, the government having
remained unmoved by its prospect. It soon became apparent, however, that the
65 L'Hebdo Libere 19.6.91 reproduced in Maghreb Machrek (No.133 Juillet -
Septembre 1991) p.125
66 Author's interview with Rachid Ghannoushi, 18.4.95
67 Charef p.114; Severine Labat: La "Greve Sainte" de Mai-Juin 1991 in
Reporters Sans Frontiéres: Le Drame Algerien (La Decouverte, Paris, 1994)
p.141
ea Roberts: From Radical Mission p.466
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strike call had elicited only a very weak response. As one journalist observed,
"shops and cafés stayed open, schools and universities continued giving classes,
buses and trains ran on, and the wheels of industry failed to grind to a halt."69
There were some reports of the petroleum sector being hit by the strike, but the
only part of the workforce which appeared to respond to the strike was that
working for the FIS-controlled local councils. 70 Officially estimated participation in
the strike was just 5%• 71 This figure could not be seen as a reflection of a general
reluctance to strike on the part of the Algerian workforce: the general strike called
by the UGTA, less than three months earlier in March had been a recognised
success. The fact that the FIS's opposition to this earlier strike, expressed
through its own trade union organisation, the SIT, which called on workers to
disregard the UGTA's call, had been comprehensively ignored should perhaps
have indicated to the FIS the lack of influence they were able to exercise over
Algeria's workforce.72
The manifest failure of the tactic of a general strike created another
quandary for Abassi Madani. Not only had he tied himself and his leadership of
the party closely to the success of the strike, 73 but it also seemed clear that the
regime intended to continue with its plans for the legislative elections which were
to take place on 27 June with the campaign officially beginning on 1 June.
Despite his previous assurances to members of the Majlis Shura, Abassi decided
on May 28, the third and last day of the strike, to extend the strike. Whether this
decision was taken with formal reference to the party's Majlis Shura later became
the subject of intense debate with various members of the council claiming that
69 The Middle East 7.91
7° Burgat & Dowell pp.294-295; The Middle East 7.91
71 El Moudjahid 18.7.91. This figure was quoted by the Prime Minister but was
one that was not seriously disputed despite its origins.
72 Kapil: Les Partis lslamistes en Algërie p.107; AlgEirie Actualitè 14.3.91
73 As Le Monde Diplomatique observed, "Put purely and simply, an end to the
strike would have signified the political end of Abassi Madani." 7.91
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they had not been consulted. 74 Nonetheless, the same day two press agencies
received copies of a communique apparently signed by the members of the FIS
ruling council which called for an immediate end to the strike and which attacked
the original idea of a strike:
"The call to strike, especially at this time, constitutes a plan which works to
the interest of the authorities in undermining the FIS and preventing the
achievement of the Islamic way."75
Such an allusion to the complicity of those who called the strike with the
regime, was made more specific with the allegation of the presence within the FIS
of "certain personalities who work for the regime." 76 In response to such a thinly-
veiled personal attack on himself, Abassi Madani denounced the communique as
a fake. However, despite the fact that the authenticity of the document was never
subsequently proved, there was little doubting that its contents reflected the
views of at least some of the members of the Majlis Shura, as was later to
become apparent.
Aware that dissent within the party would mount the longer the strike was
extended, and that as the strike continued its failure to make any real impact
would damage himself and the FIS generally, Abassi Madani decided to change
tack The strike had amply demonstrated that the FIS's main popular support
certainly did not lie with Algeria's workers. The leader of the FIS thus decided that
it was time to mobilise what had always been clear was the party's main
constituency: Algeria's urban unemployed youth. By bringing this numerous
section of the population onto the streets of the capital, Abassi clearly hoped to
recreate the same impact its previous marches and demonstrations had had on
official opinion. In order to put pressure on the government, Abassi arranged a
74 Algerie Actualitd 1.8.91
75 Quoted in Charef p.115
76 Ibid.
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meeting with the Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, on May 29 where, as well
as restating the FIS's demands, he informed him of the FIS's intention to organise
demonstrations in Algiers. Hamrouche refused to make concessions but anxious
to avoid trouble and aware of how disciplined earlier FIS marches and rallies had
been, he gave verbal agreement to the FIS's peaceful occupation of four sites in
the centre of the capita1.77
6. Confrontation with the Regime
By the fourth and fifth days of the strike, the FIS's supporters had already
begun to emerge onto the streets to take part in marches and demonstrations.
Despite Abassi's peaceful intent (indicated by the agreement with Hamrouche78),
tension and friction began to mount in the capital between the demonstrators and
the police. The high level of discipline and organisation that the FIS had been
able to display for its previous set-piece one day shows of strength proved
difficult to maintain over an extended period and clashes became inevitable as
May proceeded into June. These clashes became increasingly serious and
violent, occasionally involving exchanges of gunfire, and spread across the city
as the FIS supporters began to occupy other districts of Algiers. As the original
strike moved towards the conclusion of its second week and injuries and even
deaths from the confrontations mounted, riot police moved to dislodge groups of
Islamists from both the squares in the capital they had occupied as well as from
the streets of Islamist strongholds elsewhere in the capital such as Be'court and
Bab el-Oued. These attempts by the state's regular forces of order, dramatically
gave way on the night of June 5 to the intervention of the Algerian army which
moved armoured cars into the capital to finally end the occupations. 79
7 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.469; Labat: La 'Grêve Sainte' p.142
78 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.469
79 Burgat & Dowell p.295
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This significant move on the part of the regime, which was accompanied by
President Chadli dismissing the Hamrouche government, postponing the
elections and declaring a four month 'state of siege', indicated a clear desire to
break the impasse. However, despite the use of force against the FIS, the
authorities appeared still willing to deal with the party's leaders. With battles
between Islamists and the army continuing on the streets, Sid Ahmed Ghozali,
Hamrouche's replacement as Prime Minister, met with Abassi Madani and All
Belhadj on 7 June.80 Later that day the two leaders declared to party supporters
gathered at the Al-Sunna mosque in Bab el-Qued that they had won sufficient
concessions from the government and thus the FIS would be calling off both the
general strike and the protest campaign. As Abassi Madani was to repeat later
that day in an interview:
" The talks which have taken place between us and the regime have resulted
in the agreement on holding early presidential as well as legislative elections
within these (next) six months, God willing. Mr. Ghozali has been appointed
Prime Minister of a government which will supervise free, legitimate elections
devoid of any suspicions of rigging. We tell all workers to go back to work
tomorrow:el
The following day Ghozali, appeared on television to confirm this
commitment (although he made no specific reference to presidential elections) as
well as indicating that he would seek revision of the electoral law:" I promise you
that I shall exert my utmost efforts to provide all the necessary guarantees for the
organisation of free and clean elections."82
The inevitable feeling by Abassi Madani that he had won a considerable
victory for the FIS came, however, to be short-lived as the authorities began to
gradually reassert themselves throughout the remainder of June. This reassertion
80 Labat: La 'Greve Sainte' p.143; Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.147
81 SWB ME/1094 N2 10.6.91
82 SWB ME/1095 N1 11.6.91
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took the initial form of arrests of members of groups on the radical fringes of the
FIS which were widely acknowledged as provoking much of the violence of the
first week of June. There was little reaction to this by the FIS, which perhaps felt
itself tainted by the activities of these groups, but alarm clearly grew as the
arrests and security swoops increasingly targeted members of the mainstream
party itself.83 Tensions mounted as the month progressed and the numbers of FIS
members arrested grew. Serious violence, however, did not occur until 25 June
when police and army, in what was clearly an attempt to test the strength of the
party, moved in to reinstate 'symbols of the Republic' (usually the FLN slogan: 'By
the people for the people') that had been removed from the front of town halls
controlled by the FIS.84
Aware that the authorities and the army clearly seemed to now have the
advantage, Abassi Madani, already furious that Chadli and Ghozali had appeared
to have reneged on their promise to announce a date for presidential elections
and reinstate sacked strikers, issued a warning stating that: "If the army does
not return to its barracks, the FIS will have the right to call for the resumption of
jihad like that of November 1954." 88 This combined threat of civil strife and appeal
to revolutionary history did not serve to deter the authorities who finally moved
against the leadership of the party itself in the final days of June. Leaders of FIS-
controlled councils, members of the Majlis Shura and finally, on 30 June, Abassi
Madani and Ali Belhadj themselves, were arrested.
The arrest of the party's two most senior figures represented a clear
triumph by the authorities who in the space of a month had dramatically reversed
their fortunes vis a vis the FIS. The fact that they were able to move so swiftly and
successfully against the party's leadership with such surprisingly little resistance
83 Burgat & Dowell p.296; Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.148
84 El Moudjahid 24.6.91; Le Monde 25.6.91
85 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algarie Actualita 4.7.91
86 Le Quotidien de Paris 30.6.91
205
and public reaction (there was some agitation but nothing approaching the near
popular insurrection that one may have expected 87) was largely due to the
removal first, by arrest, of the middle tiers of the FIS. This cut communication
links between the top leadership and the mass support and membership of the
party on the street. The disruption of the highly structured and hierarchical nature
of the FIS had further thwarted attempts to organise mass opposition and reaction
to the arrests.88
There was a determination on the part of the authorities to portray the
crackdown against the FIS as both necessary and within the law. The new prime
minister, Ghozali, emphasised that "the state of siege did not occur to stifle the
Islamic option but to save the country and the citizen." 89 Precisely what the
country and the citizen were being saved from was more specifically elaborated
at the military tribunal which was convened at Blida at the beginning of July to
charge Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj with specific crimes. The seven charges
that were formally levelled at the two leaders included ones alleging organisation
of rebellion, the setting-up of unauthorised armed forces, the obstruction of the
economy and incitement of citizens to take up arms against the state. 90 It was this
last charge which, officially at least, was the pretext for the arrest of Madani and
Belhadj. Abassi Madani's apparent call for jihad two days before his arrest was
offered as explanation for his detention as was Belhadj's more explicit call at the
87 Burgat & Dowell p.297 There were demonstrations reported in Mostaganem
and Constantine but the rest of the country remained quiet. Financial Times
3.7.91
88 Kapil: Les Parts lslamistes en Algerie p.107; Jeune Afrique 4.9.91
89 Horizons 21.7.91
99 The Guardian 13.7.91 It was also widely alleged that the FIS had abandoned
its electoral strategy and that the whole pre-planned aim of Abassi Madani's
tactics during the crisis was the overthrow of the whole regime. However, the
simple fact (amongst others) that the FIS had nominated candidates for all the
electoral districts and had had printed half-a-million election bills and posters
ready for the imminent National Assembly elections indicates that this was not the
case. Le Monde Diplomatique 7.91
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Al-Sunna mosque a week earlier on 21 June for people to stock up with "arms,
explosives and kalashnikovs."91 In addition to this, more detailed evidence was
offered in the case of Belhadj. On the basis of information supposedly obtained
by the authorities following the arrest on 9 June of a French convert to Islam,
Guyon Didier Roger, it was alleged that the FIS's number two had taken the lead
in the setting up of a clandestine armed grouping aimed at destabilising the
Algerian state.92 Belhadj's declaration of 21 June appeared to support such
allegations as did his expressed opinion three days earlier that "Islam
recommends us to have weapons and to use them against our enemies.'
As well as striking at the members and leaders of the FIS, several
thousand of whom had been arrested by the end of June94, the authorities also
moved against the institutional bases of the party. As well as putting pressure on
FIS-controlled local councils, the army acted against the mosques. Use of
mosques for political purposes having already been prohibited in the previous
Spring, many of the preachers of mosques which were known to be collecting
centres for financial contributions to FIS were detained. % Attendance at
mosques, it was officially ruled, was to be restricted to the mosque itself and must
not spill into the streets as had become the norm in many areas. % To this end
access to popular and militant FIS-controlled mosques in Kouba and Bab El-
Oued was controlled by the army - non-residents of the area being excluded. On
August 18 the party's two newspapers, El Mounqid and Al Forkane were banned
for alleged "appeals for civil disobedience and violence."97
91 La Presse 21.6.91
92 Le Quotidien de Paris 19.6.91; La Presse 19.6.91
93 SWB ME/1103 N15 20.6.91
94 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.149.
95 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.145; La Presse 4.7.91
96 Financial Times 28.6.91
97 Burgat & Dowell pp.297-298
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7. The Regime and the Military
The comprehensive nature of the regime's crackdown against the FIS,
which went some way beyond that needed to end Islamist agitation on the streets
and the activities of the party's militant fringes, indicated that there had been a
shift in official attitudes towards the FIS. The arrest of so many of the party's
activists and, most importantly, its two leading figures was evidence of a growing
belief within the regime that the F1S needed to be cut back. A significant
challenge had been mounted to the regime by the party and the regime needed to
respond. For President Chadli this challenge took the form of a threat to his own
personal power base, the whole crisis having resulted for the first time in the
leader of the FIS attacking Chadli personally and moreover, demanding early
presidential elections. 98 For other parts of the regime, notably the army, the FIS
had made a perceived insurrectionist challenge to the Algerian state itself,
something which the army was pledged to defend.
The re-entry of the Algerian army, the ANP (Arm6e Nationale Populaire) into
the political scene was a significant aspect of the crisis. It had formally exited the
political stage following its universally condemned role in the bloody repression of
the riots of October 1988 and had largely accepted the non-political role it had
been accorded in the new constitution of February 1989. Nevertheless, despite
the political changes that swept Algeria after 1988, the ANP remained, not least
in its own perception, central to the Algerian regime. It should not be forgotten
that both Chadli Benjedid and Houari Boumedienne before him, had moved
directly from the military into the Presidency.
The military's position on Chadli's push towards democratisation was never
unambiguously expressed, but it was certainly extremely wary of the FIS and had
98 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.469
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voiced its opposition to the party's legal recognition in September 1989.99
Largely trained abroad in secular states such as the Soviet Union and France,
most of Algeria's senior military figures were essentially hostile to the ideas of
Islamism which it saw as a threat to the foundations of the Algerian state as well
as to their own positions, should it achieve political power. The chief of the
military, General Mustafa Chelloufi, was privately critical of both the FIS and of
the Government's tolerance of its activities in the run up to the local elections of
1990. 100 He spoke several times of the army's intention "to defend the
Constitution", against elements which "want to exploit democracy" statements
which were rightly taken as implicit warnings to the Islamist party.101
From the FIS's point of view the antipathy the military felt towards it as
both a party and a movement was clearly mutual. Increasingly aware that it was
the army rather than the FLN which represented the ultimate potential threat to
their political ambitions, the leadership of the F1S were ready to issue counter
threats, when necessary, to those put out by the military. When Chelloufi banned
the wearing of the hedjab by women working in military hospitals in April 1990, Ali
Belhadj played on the military's fear of infiltration:
'There are in the army, the police, and the gendarmerie, civil servants who
adore God and they will be able to remember that."102
This mutual hostility persisted even following the replacement of Chelloufi
with a figure, Khaled Nezzar, who was generally perceived to be far less
fundamentally hostile to Islamism. None the less, Nezzar also proved unreluctant
99 Zoubir p.97
100 Ibid.
101 Quoted in Abdelkader Yefsah: Armee et Politique depuis les Evenments
d'Octobre: L'Armee Sans Hidjab in Les Temps Modemes (Janvier-Fevrier 1995,
No.580): Algerie: La Guerre des Freres p.161
102 Quoted in Burgat & Dowell p.292
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to re-state the military's position on any potential threats to the stability of the
country. On 13 September 1990 he confirmed the army's willingness to:
"..respond to any organized excesses that might jeopardise the national unity
of the country... (and) would not hesitate to intervene and to re-establish order
and unity so that force remains in the hands of the law."103
This implicit warning was issued in the growing climate of domestic tension
that followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait at the beginning of August, a period which
witnessed a further worsening of relations between the two forces as Ali Belhadj,
in particular, raged against the ANP's unwillingness to go to Iraq's defence.104
With this background of continued and rising antipathy, Abassi Madani, whilst
formulating his strategy of a general strike in the Spring of 1991, felt the need to
issue a warning to the military to prevent it intervening if his plans were
implemented. Thus, even before the intention to hold a strike was formally
announced, Abassi declared that:
"In the event of the military coming onto the streets, we will fight, I swear that
if a single drop of blood is shed, we will combat the military until its complete
annihilation."105
That this threat was not carried out following the army's eventual
deployment on the streets on the night of June 5 was, of course, due to the
calling off of both the general strike and the street demonstrations by the FIS
following the apparent concessions it had won from the government by 7 June.
103 L'Horizon 13.9.90 quoted in Zoubir p.97
104 Burgat & Dowell p.292 All Belhadj also made an unambiguous reference to
October 1988 (about which the army still felt defensive and vulnerable), speaking
of regimes which used their arms against their own people rather than in wars
against external aggression.
105 Quoted in Zoubir p.98
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How autonomous a role the ANP played in the run-up to the intervention of
June 5 is not entirely clear. Although President Chadli clearly welcomed and
supported their involvement, how far this involvement was solicited and to what
degree it was volunteered is difficult to ascertain. The President had regularly
hinted for some time at the possible return of the army if there was a crisis on the
streets, but this may have been a simple threat to keep the FIS in line rather than
a serious declaration of intent. 106 Nevertheless it was clear that in June 1991 both
the Presidency and the military were united on the need to restore public order
and reduce the power of the FIS. The military backed the striking of a 'deal' with
the FIS in order primarily to ease the mounting crisis, but whether at this stage
the army intended to use the ensuing calm simply to plan its later assault on the
party is less apparent. 107 Some Algerian commentators remarked on the fact that
the official instructions to remove the slogans from the front of the town halls
controlled by the FIS in late June came from the military authorities rather than
from the Government. This was potentially significant since not only did it indicate
the apparent independence of the military, but also it was this incident which was
acknowledged as having produced the violent response from the FIS's supporters
that led to and was officially quoted as a justification for the subsequent
crackdown against the party. 108 Chadli appeared to be in accord with this
approach, but vetoed the military's subsequent demand for the FIS to be
banned. 109 However, despite Chadli's wishes prevailing on this last issue, the
political re-emergence of the military constituted a potentially rival source of
authority and power to the President within the regime.
106 John P. Entelis: The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of
Algeria in Problems of Communism (May-June 1992) p.79
107 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.590
105 SWB ME/1109 N1 27.6.91 The FIS were subsequently to claim that Abassi
had explicitly told the FIS controlled local councils not to resist the removal of the
slogans (he had suggested they film it as evidence) but that the security forces
had deliberately provoked confrontations. La Cause 5.7.94
109 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.474
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8. The FIS Divided: June-July 1991
The escalating crackdown of June by the authorities and the realisation
that Abassi Madani's grand strategy had not, after all, succeeded in its objectives
opened up the divisions in the FIS that had been suspended during the height of
the crisis. For the first time dissent within the party was aired very publicly. On
June 23, as the arrests of FIS militants mounted, three founding members of the
FIS and members of its Majlis Shura, appeared on Algerian television to call for
an opening of dialogue with the authorities. More importantly, they collectively
denounced Abassi Madani who in the words of one of them, Bashir Fakih, was "a
danger for the FIS and for Muslims." Fakih also stated that he would suspend his
membership of the party if Abassi continued as leader of the FIS. The three
accused the leader of the RS of being autocratic and of ignoring decisions
reached by the Majlis Shura and called on people to heed only the statements of
the latter and ignore Madani. Another, Ahmed Merrani, argued that elements
within the party were deliberately pushing for violent confrontation with the regime
and the third figure, Hachemi Sahnouni argued that it was imperative that
dialogue be opened with the authorities "in order to save the blood of Muslims:110
These accusations precipitated a bitter and public war of words between
Abassi Madani and his three detractors. The leader of the FIS, with the backing of
his allies in the Majlis Shura announced the expulsion of both Fakih and
Merrani 111 from the party. Hachemi Sahnouni was spared this fate following a
public retraction of his criticism and the intervention of his close friend and ally,
All Belhadj. In response, Fakih denounced Abassi Madani as a "tyrant" accusing
him of participating in politics with the sole goal of becoming President. Fakih
110 La Presse 27.6.91
111 Merrani claimed himself that he had suspended his membership of the party
and announced his intention to withdraw from politics and concentrate on "study
of the Quran" and "adoration of God." Horizons 1.7.91
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also alleged that a number of members of the Majlis Shura had formally
demanded Abassi's resignation in May. 112 However, despite the seriousness of
these allegations and the relative political weight of figures like Fakih (who
headed the Oran branch of the FIS) and Merrani (who headed the influential
Social Affairs Commission of the party) 113, Abassi was skilfully able to isolate his
critics within the party and ensure that their call for the party's membership to
ignore his instructions was not heeded. In this he was significantly aided by the
public perception that the dissidents were stooges of the regime, an impression
that their appearance on state-run television had reinforced.114
This did not, however, put an end to dissenting opinion within the upper
reaches of the party expressing itself. Three other influential members of the
Majlis Shura, Mohammed Kerrar, Said Guechi and Achour Rebhi, who were
subsequently joined by Hachemi Sahnouni following his retraction, formed a
delegation which opened contacts with the government in an attempt to start
dialogue and secure the lifting of the state of siege and the release of the large
numbers of FIS members who had been arrested since the beginning of June.115
Kerrar and Guechi had been part of the faction of the Majlis that had opposed
Madani's plans for the general strike and they were also supported in their
subsequent search for dialogue with the authorities by Benazouz Zebda, the
112 Charef p.116
113 La Presse 4.7.91
114 Zoubir p.101 There were subsequent reports and allegations that the
dissenting figures in the Majlis Shura had colluded with the regime. Le Figaro
(4.7.91) reported rumours that certain members of the Majlis met secretly with
government officials with a view to forging a 'non-aggression pact' with the FIS.
Supporters of Abassi Madani were also to later claim that Kerrar, Zebda, Merrani,
Fakih and Sahnouni had been in contact with General Tewfik, the Head of
Military Security, well in advance of the general strike. It was this fact, it was
claimed, which explained Abassi Madani's reluctance to refer decisions to the
Majlis for fear of telegraphing his strategy to the authorities. La Cause 5.7.94
115 Le Figaro 5.7.91
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second vice-president of the FIS and editor of El Moun quid who saw it as the only
route out of the continuing crisis.116
The arrest and imprisonment of Abassi Madani and All Belhadj on 30 June,
in the midst of these developments clearly exacerbated the growing divisions and
factions within the FIS (which some argued encouraged and allowed the
authorities to arrest the two leaders 117) as the struggle appeared to open out
from discussion of strategy to that of control of the leadership of the party itself, in
the absence of the movement's two most prominent figures.
The question of succession to Abassi's and Belhadj's day to day leadership
of the party came to be contested by two forces. Within three days of the two
leaders' arrest, Mohammed Said, proclaimed himself Madani's successor during
prayer time at the Oued Koreiche mosque in the casbah of Algiers, claiming that
Abassi Madani had nominated him as his successor prior to his imprisonment.
This claim was vociferously disputed by members of the Majlis Shura, who
although fostering individual leadership ambitions of their own, asserted that
Abassi had in fact bequeathed authority to the Majlis itself. 118 Members of the
Majlis were particularly incensed at Said's claim to the leadership since he was
far from being an established figure within the party. Despite being a noted figure
in the Islamist movement, Said had not joined the FIS at its creation (see chapter
4) and instead had become active in the Rabitat Dawa in which after Ahmed
Sahnoun, he had become the second most influential figure. He had finally
joined the FIS in June 1990 at the invitation of Abassi Madani and thereafter rose
swiftly within the party.
116 Jeune Afrique 17.7.91
117 The editor of the independent daily, El Watan remarked: "If the FIS had been
united, Madani would not be in prison - it simply would not have been allowed to
happen." Trade Finance 9.91
118 Dèvoluy & Duteil p.132; Charef p.117
119 Khelladi: Algêrie: Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir p.152; Roberts: From
Radical Mission p.467; .
 Author's interviews.
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Antipathy towards Said inside the Majlis Shura was not just limited to his
late entry to the FIS (Hachemi Sahnouni even accused him of not possessing a
membership card at the time of his leadership proclamation 120) but was also
linked to the fact that he had been the acknowledged leader of the Djazaira
grouping since the early 1980s. The traditionally secretive and elitist nature of the
Djazaira (see chapters 3 and 4) made some suspect that Said was attempting to
seize the direction of the FIS for the grouping and its shadowy agenda. Such
accusations were sharpest from those on the more strictly religious and salafist
wing of the FIS who had always been suspicious of the Djazaira's pragmatic and
nationalistic agenda.
Mohammed Said's 'succession' was, however, short-lived. Having
threatened to launch a jihad unless the party's two leaders were released, he
himself was arrested by the authorities on July 7. Notably, though, the undisputed
leadership of the FIS did not then pass to the Majlis Shura but to a young hitherto
low-profile figure, Abdelkader Hachani, whom Said had nominated as his deputy
at the time of his own leadership claim. 121 That Hachani's claim was not disputed,
like that of Mohammed Said's, by the other members of the Majlis Shura, was due
to several factors. Although not a senior figure in the party, Hachani had been a
member longer than Said and had originally been part of Abdallah Djaballah's
organisation, rather than an adherent of the Djazaira. This, together with his
emphasis on the strictly provisional nature of his leadership whilst Abassi,
Belhadj and other leaders were still in prison, helped persuade the Majlis Shura
to accept his leadership which it formally confirmed at the end of July.
The nature and orientation of Abdelkader Hachani's leadership of the FIS
would later become more apparent (see chapter 6). However, the struggle over
both the direction and latterly the leadership of the party and its outcome had
120 Charef p.117
121 Devoluy & Duteil p.132
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revealed much about the hitherto concealed factions in the party. During the
period May - July 1991, the divisions within the party were widely interpreted from
the outside as being between moderates and hard-liners. The 'moderates',
represented by figures such as Fakih, Merrani and Sahnouni, were seen fighting
to prevent Abassi Madani and his supporters from pushing the FIS into a 'hard-
line' confrontation with the regime. A much more accurate characterisation of the
dispute would be, as has been indicated earlier, between those who had more
political objectives for the FIS and those who were more content with pursuing
specifically religious ends. Indeed, as Hugh Roberts points out, the struggle could
be seen as taking place between religious radicals and pragmatic moderates,
with Abassi Madani and his supporters comprising the second grouping. 122 That
the chief opponents of Abassi and his tactics were figures who had far from
'moderate' backgrounds (compared to the leader of the FIS) undermines the
notion of 'moderate' opposition to him. Several key adversaries, such as Fakih,
Mohammed Kerrar and Said Guechi had been involved in Mustapha Bouyali's
insurrectionist MAIA in the 1980s. 123 Hachemi Sahnouni was not only close to All
Belhadj but had frequently matched the deputy leader of the FIS's fiery and
intemperate rhetoric and discourse. 124 It was also remarkable that Sahnouni,
Fakih and Merrani had, in their famous television appearance, concentrated their
attacks on Abassi Madani, the perceived voice of moderation within the
leadership, and completely ignored All Belhadj whose immoderate
pronouncements Madani was forever having to explain and excuse.125
122 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.466
123 El Watan 1.3.94; Kapil: Les Pettis Islamistes en Algerie p.108
124 For example, according to one report Sahnouni had declared that if the FIS
were to win the planned national elections it would introduce "immediately the
Sharia, would ban secular and communist parties and would expel the President."
Charef p.130
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The claim of Mohammed Said to the leadership of the party produced
another interesting dimension to the internal politics of the FIS. Said's precise
ambitions in claiming the helm of the FIS were never fully elucidated during his
short (4 days) as 'leader.' He himself presented it as a simple and unselfish
response to a crisis, stating that: "I am neither an intruder or a seeker of
leadership. (But) Confronted by this vacuum, I have assumed my
responsibilities."126 Nevertheless, the speed with which the move was made and
the nature of the Djazaira and its agenda must confirm suspicions that Said
wanted to steer the FIS in a particular direction. It was notable that his main
critics came from the same group that had opposed Abassi Madani. Ahmed
Merrani, in particular, was unremitting in his accusation that Said, together with
Hachani, had perpetrated a 'coup' against the leadership of the FIS on the part of
the Djazaira. However, although Merrani portrayed Abassi Madani as being a
fellow victim of such a coup, it was noteworthy that Hachani had been one of
Abassi's closest allies in the Majlis Shura and had backed his plans for the
general strike. 127 It was thus clear that Hachani's accession to the leadership
represented a triumph for Abassi Madani (confirmed by Hachani's stressed
reference to the provisional nature of his own leadership, in deference to the
imprisoned Abassi) and his allies rather than for some shadowy third faction. If
Mohammed Said had planned some 'take-over' of the FIS on the part of the
Djazaira, his nomination of Hachani as his deputy and his loud demands for the
release of the FIS's leadership, indicated that his plans were closely allied to and
supportive of Abassi Madani. 128 It is clear that Abassi, Said and Hachani all
feared the leadership of the party falling into the hands of the more strictly
religious radicals of the party who might abandon the whole pragmatic, political
126 Charef p.117
127 Algeria Actuante 1.8.91
128 A
 communique signed by Said and Hachani explicitly acknowleged "the
authority of Abassi Madani as President of the FIS" FIS Communique 2.7.91
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and electoral strategy of the FIS. Like Abassi, the Djazaira's more intellectual and
modernist outlook convinced it of the efficacy and importance of such an
'electoralist' strategy.
C: THE FIS AS A PARTY: 1990 -1991
1. The Structure of the Party
The structure of the FIS changed somewhat following the party's success
in the local elections of June 1990 which had seen the party enter into
institutional frameworks in the public domain. The FIS installed throughout the
country a network of its own administrations that largely paralleled the official
administrations. 129 Thus executives of the party were established at both wilaya
level (Bureau Executive Wilaya - BEWs) and at the communal level (BECs).
These two levels formed the second and third tiers of the party's organisation
below that of the supreme BEN (Bureau Executive Nationale) and above those
centred around the mosques and the committees of the quarters. The top three
levels of the party continued to possess five commissions dealing with the issues
of organisation and co-ordination, education, social affairs, planning and
programming and information. An 'Islamic' trades union body was also
established by the FIS, the SIT (Syndicat islamique du travail), which comprised
nine different professional sections.130
In terms of the decision-making structure of the party, it seems quite clear
that this was a strictly top-down affair. Both the BECs and the BEWs were
129 Devoluy & Duteil p.126 In the Chief region FIS-controlled councils had
established 'parallel tribunals' to judge private, especially family, law, and in
Algiers the city hall had been effectively turned into the 'national seat' of the
movement where Madani frequently held press conferences. Liberation 16.7.90;
La Presse 4.7.91
130 Ghania Samai-Ouramdane: Le Front Islamique du Salut a travers son organe
de presse (Al Mounquid) in Peuples Mediterraneens No.52-53: Alger-le Vers L'Etat
Islamique? (Juillet-Septembre 1990) pp.158-159
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answerable to the BEN which dictated policy to the FIS-controlled local councils
"of which", Ghania Samai-Ouramdane remarked in 1990, "any freedom of action
is not permitted." 131 Officially the BEN was subordinate to the Majlis Shura of the
party, which remained the highest decision-making body within the party and
which was responsible for all strategic policy. However, as had become apparent,
Dóvoluy and Duteil characterised the decision-making process of the FIS as
oscillating "between a system of hazy consensus and the personal power of its
president, Abassi Madani." 132 Such a judgement would seem to be borne out by
the ongoing conflict Abassi had with certain elements of the Majlis Shura during
the early part of 1991, as he sought increasingly to make his own policy whilst
still formally recognising the Majlis's authority.
Much, however, remained unknown about the precise internal workings of
the F1S as a party. As has been indicated, until the crisis of mid-1991, very little
was known about the senior figures in the party apart from Abassi Madani and to
a lesser extent, All Belhadj. The party seemed intent on maintaining this secrecy.
When questioned in an interview in August 1990 about the membership of the
Majlis Shura, Abassi Madani replied evasively: "You will know them soon." 133 The
reasons behind this lack of frankness are unclear, although given the events of
1991, it seems likely that it was a policy which aimed at concealing the fractious
internal nature of the party from the public gaze.
2. Support for the FIS
Although there were no elections in this period to back observations up
with more empirical data, further information on the composition of support for the
FIS did emerge. The opinion polls that were published in May 1991, although
131 Ibid. p.158
132 Davoluy & Duteil p.126
133 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algerie Actualitè 30.8.90
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clearly not as unambiguous as election results, were able to give added insights
into the people who, publicly at least, lent their support to the F1S.
A poll conducted on behalf of Algórie Actualitè and published on 9 May
1991 recorded not only the levels of support for the various political parties but
also revealed the apparent levels of support the parties enjoyed within different
sections of the electorate. When broken down into different age groups, the FIS,
which had recorded an overall level of support of 38% across all age groups, saw
its support vary considerably between the age groups: enjoying the support of
55% of those aged 18 to 19, whilst recording only 28% for those electors between
the ages of 50 and 59. The figures revealed a declining level of support for the
party across the age bands covering the ages 20 to 59 thus indicating, with the
intriguing exception of those aged 60 plus (where the party recorded 36%), that
the older a voter was, the less likely he or she was to vote for the F1S. The survey
also reported findings about both the educational profile of the F1S's supporters
and the balance between men and women. On the first category the poll revealed
that the party received above average levels of support amongst those voters
who had just secondary, primary or no education at all, but that it performed
particularly badly amongst those with supplementary education. There was also a
notable imbalance in the share of men and women expressing support for the
party: 44% of men backing it compared to only 32% of women.134
A further poll published by the newspaper three weeks later on 30 May
analysed voting intentions, this time by region and occupation. The figures on the
regional pattern of the FIS's support did not reveal anything particularly dramatic.
The party's declared followers were spread across all of Algeria's four main
regions in proportions roughly similar to that of its main rival, the FLN. The party
134 Algarie Actualitê 9.5.91 The figures for the support for the FIS amongst the
different educational levels were 41% amongst those with no formal education at
all; 39% for those with just primary education, 44% for those with secondary and
23% for those possessing supplementary education.
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seemed also to enjoy similar levels of support in both urban and rural areas:
having recorded an overall level of support of 29%, the figures for the urban and
rural zones were 30.5% and 27% respectively. This appeared to demonstrate an
evening out of the party's support, since the local elections of June 1990 had
shown that the FIS's following was predominantly urban in character. The
breakdown of the FIS's supporters by profession revealed the similarly
widespread nature of the backing for the party: it being the only party to register
responses in all twelve of the categories of occupation in the survey. As with the
regional share-out of its potential vote, the FIS's figures roughly shadowed those
of the FLN with the exception of the unemployed where the Islamist party
received a significantly higher proportion of its support than the former single
party did.135
What explanations could be offered for these findings? The youthful
profile of the FIS's voters revealed by the first poll can largely be explained by
reference to two factors. Firstly, unemployment was significantly higher amongst
the young producing greater levels of disillusionment with the regime and a
corresponding desire to inflict defeat upon the FLN. Secondly, attachment to the
memory of the FLN victory in the war against the French was largely absent
amongst Algeria's young: those Algerians under the age of thirty having been
born after independence and thus having no residual nationalistic respect for the
historic achievement of the FLN. The FIS registered its lowest level of support
amongst those Algerians who were in their twenties when Algeria gained its
independence and were thus those most likely to have been directly involved with
the revolutionary struggle and the FLN. The poll revealed that the former single
135 Algêrie Actualite 30.5.91 The comparison with the profile for the FLN is made
not only because it is the only party recording over 10% support but also since
the figures regarding the region and occupation in the survey are expressed as
percentages of each party's total support rather than as percentages of the
region or the occupational group, thus making observations about the relative
levels of support between the parties in each category difficult to make.
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party still enjoyed its highest levels of support amongst this latter group, now in
their fifties. The apparent anomaly of the recovery in following for the FIS
amongst those Algerians over the age of 60 can not easily be explained, but
reference to the above mentioned factors may be useful. Those of retirement age
were hit possibly as hard as those without work by the economic crisis that the
country continued to experience. This group also remembered a time before
independence and before the FLN, thus holding the party in slightly less
reverence than the generation below them. The educational profile of FIS
supporters, with its relatively low share of those possessing supplementary
education (it was the only educational group in which it did not have a lead over
other the parties) can probably be linked again to the party's base in the poorer
sections of Algerian society, which are likely to be less well-educated. The third
finding of the first Algèrie Actualitè poll, that a significantly greater percentage of
men than women in the Algerian electorate backed the FIS, must be seen as
reflecting a belief or fear that women would be worse off under a Islamist-run
government. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the party that
campaigned on the most aggressively secularist platform, the RCD, received
more than twice as much support from women, in the poll, as it did from men
(11% compared to 5%)136.
The findings of the second opinion poll showed, as has been indicated, that
the FIS enjoyed an even wider pattern of electoral support across Algeria's
regions and in its urban and rural areas than that which it had received in June
1990, there being no notable relative concentrations or absences of support
between Algeria's four main regions (although, it should be noted that within
these huge regions there were still likely to be variations 137). The analysis by
136 See Algerie Actualita 9.5.91
137 The central region of the country contained both areas such as Algiers itself,
where the FIS had done particularly well in June 1990, as well as the Tizi Ouzou
area, where it had done demonstrably poorly. This appeared to be still the case
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occupation confirmed this comprehensive spread of FIS support, but the party's
relatively large proportion of followers from amongst the unemployed (and a
corresponding relatively low percentage, compared to the make-up of the other
major parties, amongst employees in the state sector) appears to confirm the link
suggested above between unemployment, youth and support for the FIS.
Overall, the two surveys appear to construct a picture of the FIS's base of support
continuing to come from the poorer, younger and less well-educated layers of
Algerian society.
The two opinion polls gave potentially valuable insights into the
composition of support for the FIS, but their findings need to be regarded with a
certain amount of caution given the failure of similar polls before the local
elections of June 1990 to predict the size of the FIS's victory. However, other
more observationally based evidence does seem to back up some of the finding
of the polls. The failure of the general strike called by the FIS in May to elicit any
significant response amongst Algeria's workforce did, as has already been
shown, demonstrate that the party did not enjoy substantial support amongst this
part of Algerian society. Conversely, the large numbers of unemployed youths the
party was able to mobilise for marches and demonstrations from the beginning of
June indicated that this was where the FIS's real strength lay.
Other evidence suggested that the nature of the FIS's following remained
consistent with that of previous conclusions about the backing for the party
before the June elections. Whilst the bulk of its activist base (as distinct from
people who would just vote for the party at an election) was clearly comprised of
the urban, male unemployed, the FIS continued to have a following in the
since the FFS, which was based in Tizi Ouzou, was shown by the poll to find
nearly 98% of its support (registered at 10% nationally) in the central region.
Algárie Actualite 30.5.91
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universities, particularly amongst science and technology students. Similarly,
many of the party's leaders were engineers or technicians and it appears that the
party enjoyed significant support generally from this type of profession. 133 Support
for the FIS continued to be found amongst merchants, businessmen and
entrepreneurs. It has been argued that it was these groups which helped to
cushion the financial blow the party received when Saudi funds were withdrawn
following the party's decision to back Iraq during the Gulf War. There was also
believed to be backing for the party amongst those traders involved in the
country's growing black market. One of the reasons advanced for the party's
popularity amongst this sector was the perception that the FIS backed free
market reforms.139
The FIS's attachment to populism ensured that none of these sections of
support were taken for granted by the party, particularly the urban unemployed
poor, whom the opinion polls had shown formed such an important part of the
following of the party. Projects were adopted to aid and thus guarantee the loyalty
of the populous bottom rung of the ladder of Algerian society. Ramadan of 1991
saw the establishment of 'Islamic' souks where Algeria's poor could buy basic
goods at lower than usual prices because the FIS arranged for transportation and
retail services to be given free.140
Evidence also appeared concerning the size and nature of the support for
the other Islamist parties. In the case of Mahfoud Nahnah's HAMAS it appeared
that its constituency of support differed from that of the FIS. The opinion polls
published in May 1991 indicated that HAMAS attracted a more middle class,
professional following than the FIS which drew the vast bulk of its popular support
138 Kapil: Les Partis Islamistes en Algerie p.106
139 Remy Leveau: L'Algerie en Etat de Siege in Maghreb-Machrek (No.133,
Juillet-Septembre, 1991) p.93; Kapil: Les Partis Islamistes en Algèrie pp.106-107
140 Benjamin Stora: Le FIS: A la Rechereche d'une Autre Nation in Cahiers de
L'Orient (No.23, 1991) p.85; Algerie Actualitè 11.4.91
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from the young unemployed. 141 Whilst HAMAS was able to attract such a
constituency, reflecting its more intellectual and less populist discourse, the fact
that it made few inroads into this mass popular base of FIS indicated that the
party was likely to stay on the political margins come election time. Despite
holding well-attended meetings in the south of Algeria and having notable
pockets of support across the country (the party soon had 916 local offices142),
particularly around Nahnah's hometown of Blida, opinion polls indicated that FIS
support was roughly ten times that of HAMAS. 143 In the case of Abdallah
Djaballah and Nanda, although initially observers believed that the party had
significant support in the east of Algeria around Djaballah's traditional base in
Constantine, opinion polls in the Spring of 1991 showed the party as failing to
register even 1% of voting intentions.144
3. Programme and Agenda
Despite the inevitable surge of interest in the nature and content of the
FIS's political programme following the party's victory in June 1990, precise
details remained difficult to identify and many of the old contradictions and
ambiguities remained.
L Pluralism and Democracy
Chief amongst these issues was the party's stance on pluralism and
democracy. Besieged by the national and foreign press in the wake of the local
elections, Abassi Madani, as the chief spokesman for the party, continued to
reiterate his line of liberal toleration of diversity. Questioned on other parties'
141 Alger-le Actuante 30.5.91
142 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.41 Of these local offices, 133 were women's
sections.
143 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.137; Algerie Actuante 30.5.91 & 9.5.91
144 Kapil: Les Partis lslamistes en Algórie p.110; Algerie Actuante 30.5.91 &
9.5.91
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stated fears about their possible fate under a (now more likely) FIS-led national
government, he claimed that 'The other parties are not our enemies, but our
brothers", arguing that they would, in fact, have a vital role to play under a future
FIS government:
"Islamic rule is not against opposition. There was opposition in the time of the
Caliphs and the companions of the Prophet. How would we be able to
discover our errors if there was not an opposition to point them out to us?
Must we relive a scenario like October 1988 to correct our mistakes?"145
The fact that the FIS had accepted co-existence with other parties in local
government, he argued, was evidence of the genuineness of this stance. Fears
about a return to the one party state he thus maintained were groundless and
pointed, in this context, to the participation of the communist PAGS in the
electoral process and asked, with reference to Stalin, Mao and Ceausescu: "Who
has mocked liberties as much as the communists?"146
On the issue of the imposition of the sharia and specifically its implication
for women, Madani claimed that it would only be introduced gradually. He stated
emphatically that he would "never, never" impose the wearing of the veil on
women, arguing that whilst the party strongly believed that this was the correct
form of dress for women:
"The problem is one of education. It is not one able to be resolved with penal
sanctions... .We struggle against the illness not against the person who is
ill. "147
145 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 25.7.90
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
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Such apparently unambiguous statements continued to contrast sharply
with those emanating from other parts of the party's leadership. Hachemi
Sahnouni, the party's second vice-president, stated on 8 May 1991:
"In the case of (the FIS achieving) a majority at the next legislative elections,
we suspend the constitution, we ban secular and socialist parties, we
immediately apply the sharia, we immediately get rid of the President of the
Republic"145
Such sentiments reportedly closely echoed statements made by Ali
Belhadj at this stage who continued to attack the notion of liberal democracy.149
Writing in El Moun quid the FIS's deputy leader declared:
"In Islam sovereignty belongs to the divine Law; in democracy, sovereignty
belongs to the people, to the mob and to charlatans."150
Once again these were not isolated utterances confined to a few radical
individuals. As one observer commented on Sahnouni's statement, "Declarations
of this sort had been the common currency of FIS preachers these last two
years."151 Nor did it appear that these views were restricted to figures within the
party's leadership: banners declaring 'Death to Democracy' appearing at F1S
demonstrations in the following June.152
Abassi Madani continued to be pressed by the media on the continuance
of such divergent views on these critical issues within the leadership of the party.
One interviewer put to him the reported view of Ali Belhadj that democracy was a
vehicle for communism and Berberism. The FIS spokesman replied that he had
not heard his deputy express such a view but if he had then he believed that it
148 El Watan 4.8.91 quoted in Kapil: Les Partis Islamistes en Algerie p.104
149 Charef p.130
150 El Moun quid No.23 reproduced in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.93
151 Kapil: Les Partis lslamistes en Algerie p.104
152 The Tablet 20.7.91
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was a "theoretical point of view", there being "several conceptions of
democracy."153 On another occasion Madani defended Belhadj by claiming that
the young imam's aggressive rhetoric when preaching (when most of his more
extreme statements were made) was not a true reflection of his overall character,
maintaining that in reality "Belhadj is very gentle. The problem is that he doesn't
show it."154 It was clear that despite the tactical need to retain the support of the
party's radical militants, the president of the F1S was discomforted by his deputy's
rhetoric. One broadly sympathetic political figure challenged Abassi on Belhadj's
belligerent proclamations:
"I told Abassi to tell Belhadj not to say such radical things. Abassi reddened
with embarrassment and replied that he had told him many times to do so, but
he could not control him."155
II. Economic Policy
On the subject of the economy and economic policy the FIS's stance
appeared to shift during this period. Its initial policy programmes, though lacking
in detail, had favoured, in accordance with much established Islamic economic
thought, more liberal economic practices (see chapter 4). As previously
explained, it was this stance which allowed the party to strike a deal with
President Chadli to help support him and his allies against those elements in the
FLN and the regime who were opposed to liberalising economic reforms.
Although this economic doctrine attracted the electoral and financial
support of merchants and entrepreneurs, Abassi Madani appeared to repudiate
this existing position in an interview at the beginning of May 1991 when he
launched a blistering attack on the government's reform programme:
153 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 25.7.90
154 Le Figaro 31.7.90
155 Author's interview with senior Algerian political figure.
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"...there will never be reforms. These things called reforms are in fact nothing
other than an operation to enable the regime to steal from the pockets of
citizens, make the poor still poorer and trying today to exhaust the money of
the wealthy."156
He criticised the government for failing to help traders and businesses with
exports whilst "opening all the doors and according all the facilities" to foreign
competition, a policy he termed "a dangerous deviation from Algerian history."
He directed his fire also at the International Monetary Fund which he blamed for
much of the escalating problems and poverty in Algeria saying that it had blocked
national solutions to the crisis and having "dictated its conditions and orders" had
left the Algerian people to "pay the bill."157
The reason behind this startling volte face by the leader of the FIS could be
discerned by the date that these remarks were made: early May 1991. April 1991
had seen the unveiling of the regime's new electoral code. It was this event
which, as has been shown, provoked the breach between Abassi Madani and the
President whom he believed had deceived him. Not only, therefore, did Abassi's
fury lead him to attack Chadli himself and call for early presidential elections, but
also clearly led him to dramatically terminate his tacit support for the President's
economic reform programme.
As for the FIS's own economic policy, little of any real substance was
added to its original proposals (see chapter 4) and the party proceeded to be
increasingly vague about its own position. Earlier in 1991, before Abassi's
outburst in May, the party held a symposium on the government's reform
programme but as one Algerian journalist attending remarked: "one tried in vain
to identify the content (of the FIS's economic view and programme)." 158 This
ambiguity and lack of definition on policy was a clear reflection of the increasingly
156 Interview with Abassi Madani, Horizons 5.5.91
157 Ibid.
155 Algèrie Actuante, 14.3.91
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populist direction in which the FIS moved following June 1990 and which had
been exemplified by its behaviour in the Gulf War. Because of its desire to
maintain its breadth of popular support, the party was forced into making often
inconsistent statements. Thus in the same interview Abassi Madani would
promise new housing and an expansion of social security as well as committing
the party to "seriously reducing taxation."159
4. Foreign Links and Influences
The question of foreign links and influences on the FIS continued to be an
issue in this period as its domestic enemies and many foreign commentators
sought to uncover a 'foreign hand' behind the activities of the party.
I. Saudi Arabia
The issue of links with Saudi Arabia came very much to the fore during the
Gulf Crisis with the party appearing to turn its back on its alleged Saudi sponsors
and FIS militants swapping the Saudi flags that had often been seen at rallies for
banners supporting Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 160 Whilst such a development
could be interpreted as demonstrating the absence or weakness of the FIS's
Saudi links, the announcement by the Saudi Prince Sultan Ibn Abdelaziz on 26
March 1991 that his country had been funding the party was judged by one
observer as revealing a fact that was "a secret to nobody." 161 The timing of the
declaration, following the end of the Gulf War, was perhaps chosen by the
Saudis, angered by the FIS's backing of their enemy in the war, as being that
which would cause maximum damage to the FIS, showing it to have not only
backed the losing side in the conflict but having also been supported by foreign
159 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrique 25.7.90
160 Leveau p.94
161 Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi pp.35-36
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money. The accusation of foreign sponsorship was clearly damaging in a country
where national independence was so highly regarded and, in the face of appeals
in the press for stricter prohibitions of foreign funding of political parties, Abassi
Madani strenuously denied the accusation stating that it was "a lie without
foundation" and if Prince Sultan did in fact say this "he did not mean it." 162
 He
claimed that the party had not received a penny from any known state and
alleged that such accusations were part "of a vast plan to de stabilise the FIS."163
All the available evidence, however, suggested that the FIS had been backed by
Saudi funds.
II. Iran
There continued to be little effective evidence of any real links between the
FIS and Iran, despite the latter's declared interest in seeing an Islamic regime
established in Algeria. 164 During the crisis of June 1991, the Iranian Ambassador
in Algiers had been summoned to the Algerian Foreign Ministry to explain his
country's ties with the FIS. 166 However, Ali Belhadj's already explained (see
chapter 4) theological differences with the Islamic Republic clearly served to limit
any such potential links. Abassi Madani, who was more willing to praise aspects
of the Iranian regime, when asked about links with Ali Akbar Mohtachemi, a
leading Iranian radical and key figure in the pan-national Hezbollah, asked in
return who Mohtachemi was. When told ("the spiritual guide of the Iranian
revolution"), he replied that he was still unaware of him. This denial appears to be
more genuine than that issued over links with Saudi Arabia. 166 In fact, Iran and
Hezbollah seemed to exercise their greatest influence with small specifically
162 Quoted in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau & Fregosi p.36
163 El Moudjahid 3.4.91
164 See Mohammed Mohaddessin: Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global
Threat (Seven Locks Press, Washington, 1993) p.87
/66 Middle East International 2.4.93
166 Algerie Actualite 7.3.91 & 4.7.91
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Shi'ite groups such as Sunna wal-Sharia.167 One foreign diplomat noted the
emergence of at least five mosques in late 1990 which were financed and
encouraged by the Iranians.168
III. Egypt
A third country which had alleged links with Algeria's Islamists, although
not at state level, was Egypt. Around the time of the June 1990 elections Egypt's
Ambassador to Algeria, Hussein Amin, was informed by the Egyptian intelligence
services of links being established between Egypt's radical Islamist groups such
as the Gamaat Islamia and Al-Jihad and members of the FIS. In a move to halt
such contacts, Hussein Amin re-introduced visa requirements for Algerians
wishing to visit Egypt, in June 1990, so that FIS members could be vetted. This
was swiftly reversed, however, on the orders of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak who Amin believes had been put under pressure by complaints from
Chadli Benjedid.169
Contact between the FIS and the more constitutionalist and less radical
sections of the Islamist movement in Egypt, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
were minimal. Adel Hussein, the Secretary General of the Egyptian Labour Party,
under whose banner the Muslim Brotherhood competed in elections, stated that
despite both groups' participation in elections, links between his party and the FIS
were "very limited."170 For the FIS's part, Abassi Madani expressly stated that "the
FIS is not a movement of the Muslim Brothers, its position is different." 171 This
167 Burgat & Dowell pp.289-290
168 Author's interview with Hussein Amin, 13.6.94
169 Ibid. Amin believes that Mubarak was heavily influenced by Chadli, who he
believes wished to aid a FIS victory in the electoral process. However, it seems
likely that the Algerian President took the imposition of visa requirements as a
slur on Algeria generally.
170 Author's interview with Adel Hussein, Secretary General of the Egyptian
Labour Party, Cairo, 19.6.94
171 Interview with Abassi Madani, Algeria Actuante. 30.8.90
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lack of contact and co-operation could be explained by the close relations
Mahfoud Nahnah continued to enjoy with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the
leader of HAMAS having originally established links with the organisation in the
1960s.
On a more theological level, the replacement of Sheikh Muhammad
Ghazali (see chapter 3) with Sheikh Yussef Al-Karadawy, a fellow Egyptian, as
rector of the Abdul Qadir mosque, in early 1989, was seen by some observers as
having a significant influence on the development of the Algerian Islamist
movement. More of an intellectual than his predecessor, Al-Karadawy deepened
the roots of Islamic ideas in Algeria although his more moderate approach made
only limited headway against the more hard-line and fixed views of Abassi
Madani and Ali Belhadj.172
General
Overall, the FIS seemed quite anxious to deny foreign links and influences.
Despite the presence of Rachid Ghannoushi, the influential leader of the Tunisian
Nanda party, in Algeria during 1990 and 1991, links with other Islamist
movements in the Maghreb were similarly denied. 173 The use of any 'models' for
a future FIS-run Islamic government was also rejected. When questioned in an
interview about the possible use of the examples of Iran and Saudi Arabia in this
context, Abassi Madani replied:
"Neither one nor the other. Our only model is the Prophet. We are equally
guided by the rightly-guided Caliphs. The systems of which you speak are not
able to be of any use to us. We respect them, certainly, but we have our own
model."174
172 Author's interview with Ibrahim El-Bayoumi Ghanem, National Centre for
Social and Criminological Research and observer at 1991 legislative elections in
Algeria, Cairo, 26.6.94
in Le Figaro 31.7.90
174 Interview with Abassi Madani, Jeune Afrigue 25.7.90
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This determination to be seen to be pursuing a rigidly independent line
free from any foreign influence and support can be seen as evidence of the
nationalistic influence of the Djazaira on the thinking and stance of the FIS, or
more likely a simpler populist desire to appear as a party beholden to its grass-
roots supporters. Nevertheless, the FIS was notable for being virtually the only
significant Islamist grouping in Algeria which did not assume a name already
used for or by another Islamist group outside of Algeria. HAMAS (the occupied
territories), Takfir Wa-Hijra (Egypt), Nanda (the more usual name for the MNI -
Tunisia) as well as many smaller groups, chose names that reflected the
importance of outside images and symbols.
D: BEYOND THE FIS: THE SECULAR AND MILITANT CHALLENGES
1. The Militant Fringe
The political reforms of 1989 had resulted in Algerian Islamism largely
shedding the covert forms it had assumed during the preceding two decades and
manifesting itself in more overt structures such as religious associations and
political parties. However, there remained elements of the movement that
preferred a more clandestine existence, particularly those groups that espoused
achievement of Islamic aims through force.
Initially it appeared that the opening of the electoral option to Islamism had
totally eclipsed the idea of a need for armed insurrection, such as that attempted
by Mustapha Bouyali, particularly following the FIS comprehensive election
victories of June 1990. Nonetheless, the period 1990-91 produced evidence to
suggest that such groups, although numerically small, were still present and
occasionally active. Beginning in 1990 a number of violent acts including armed
robberies, attacks on drinkers in a bar in Baraki, an assault on a military barracks
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in Blida and an exchange of fire with police in December 1990 occurred. 175 These
actions were often attributed, particularly by the media, to supporters and
members of the FIS, but it subsequently became clear that responsibility
predominantly lay with Islamists associated with the various radical groups,
particularly Takfir Wa-Hijra, which had been in existence since the 1970s (see
chapters 2 and 3). Augmented and now dominated by the returned volunteers
from the war in Afghanistan, groups such as Takfir became gradually more active,
particularly in the Be!court district of Algiers.176
The militants of Takfir and other similar groups had explicitly rejected, on
ideological grounds, the constitutional and peaceful path to the achievement of
an Islamic state that the Islamists in the FIS had apparently embraced. However,
despite this divide, it became clear during 1991 that Takfir was associating itself
increasingly closely with the FIS. A violent battle which took place for control of
the Abi Obeida mosque in Bachdjarah in May 1991 was fought between HAMAS
militants and members of Takfir who had allied themselves with the FIS in the
struggle against Mahfoud Nahnah's party. 17 Takfir also participated in the FIS's
protests against the electoral law the following month, their presence at
demonstrations being apparent, according to one observer, by the way its
supporters marched in tight squares with clenched fists wearing combat fatigues
under their traditional Islamic dress. The transformation of the largely peaceful
demonstrations into bloody confrontations with the security forces has been
blamed on the actions of Takfir militants who were also reported as being
175 Le Monde 12.6.91; Horizons 30.12.90; Le Temps 25.12.90
176 The organisation was also reported to be present in a belt to the south of
Algiers comprising areas such as Baraki, Eucalyptus and El Harrach, although
the leader of the group, alleged by a Tunisian newspaper, Le Temps, to be a Moh
El-Wahrani, lived in Belmourdes to the east of the capital. Le Monde 12.6.91;
Horizons 30.12.90; Le Temps 25.12.90
177 Ahmed Rouadjia: Le RS: A L'Epreuve des Elections Legislatives in Les
Cahiers de L'Orient (No.23, 1991) p.80
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responsible for the shooting of five members of the police and army on the first
night of the curfew.178
It was thus unsurprising that it was members of Takfir and other Afghan
veterans who were the initial targets of the arrests and security sweeps carried
out by the government from the beginning of June which reportedly uncovered
arms caches belonging to the group (who themselves claimed to possess in
excess of four thousand guns). 178 The army moved decisively to try and crush the
organisation, in what became known as the 'Battle of Belcourt, on the night of 30
June/ 1 July, seeking to flush its supporters out of their stronghold in the Khaled
Ibn Walid mosque (known locally as 'Kabul') in what proved a largely successful
operation. 180
That the FIS were not altogether happy with Takfirs association with their
activities was revealed by the lack of protest coming from the party's leadership
when the latter's members became the first to be arrested by the authorities at the
beginning of June. 181 This was in spite of the alleged links between the group and
Hachemi Sahnouni, the FIS's second vice-president. 182 There was clearly a
feeling that the provocative role of the group did not generally serve the ends of
the party. Nevertheless, despite their defeat in Belcourt and the arrest of a large
part of its membership (claimed to number 16,000 183), Takfir had reportedly
regrouped itself in another stronghold in Beni Mered to the east of the capita1.184
178 The Middle East 7.91
179 jeune Afrique 10.7.91; The Middle East 7.91
180 La Presse 4.7.91
181 Roberts: A Trial of Strength p.148
182 La Presse 27.6.91
183 Takfirs own claim. The Middle East 7.91
184 La Presse 4.7.91 .
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2. The Continued Failure of the Non-Islamist Opposition
Part of the reason for the scale of the FIS victory in the local elections of
June 1990 was seen to be the lack of an effective secular alternative for
Algerians to vote for: those secular opposition parties that did exist having either
boycotted the poll or proved too small, fractious and narrowly based to mount a
real challenge to the FIS and the FLN. It was hoped by many outside observers
that the entry of the two large opposition parties that had boycotted the 1990 poll,
the MDA and the FFS, together with a greater unity of purpose on the part of all
the opposition parties, galvanised by the results of June 1990, would break the
monopoly the FIS and the FLN had so far established on the electoral process.
The return of Ahmed Ben Bella, the MDA leader, to Algeria from exile in
September 1990 attracted considerable domestic and foreign media and popular
interest and speculation. It was thought that the first president of independent
Algeria and one of the original 'historic chiefs' of the liberation struggle might be
able to provide a charismatic alternative to the FIS: his revolutionary nationalistic
credentials together with his endorsement of Islamism (see chapter 3) offering the
necessary political ingredients for a winning political plafform. 185 As has been
shown, the MDA were the first political party to back Iraq and call for volunteers to
be sent there during the Gulf Crisis.
Ben Bella's populist instincts, however, were increasingly equated with
simple opportunism by most Algerians. Chief amongst such opportunism was his
stance towards the FIS itself which saw wild fluctuations over a short space of
time as he appeared to be deciding whether he stood to gain most by rallying to
the FIS or against it. 186 The lack of credibility Ben Bella and the MDA
185 Burgat & Dowell p.286
188 See, for example, Interview with Ahmed Ben Bella, Jeune Afrique 26.9.90; and
Anne Dissez: Les Partis 'Democrates': L'Impossible Coalition in Les Cahiers de
L'Orient (No.23, 1991).  p.100
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consequently appeared to enjoy with the electorate was indicated by the opinion
polls carried out in May 1991: the party failing to register 2% support in either
survey.187
More genuinely popular was the FFS led by another of the original 'historic
chiefs' of the war of independence, Hocine Ait Ahmed. A demonstration organised
by the party in Algiers in December 1990 was able to attract the support of an
estimated 500,000 people. However, whilst this was an impressive show of force
by the party, it appeared unlikely that the FFS would be likely to build on this
support since its power-base, despite its fervour, was largely restricted to
Algeria's Berber population. This was illustrated by the fact that the focus of the
rally in December 1990 had been to protest against the government's plans to
spread 'Arabisation', something the Berbers traditionally saw as a threat to their
own language and culture. 188
 Thus whilst galvanising significant support within
Berber areas, particularly Kabyle, it looked unlikely that the FFS could attract
enough support on its own to challenge the two major parties.
Given the shortcomings of the FFS and the MDA the most viable
alternative for those Algerians who were not Islamist and were opposed to the
government, was the construction of some form of united front for the secular
opposition parties. Such an attempt was indeed made in 1990-91 by some of the
largest opposition parties including the MDA, the RCD and various smaller
parties that had fought separately against each other in the June 1990 elections,
to form an alliance for the upcoming legislative elections.
However, this 'Group of Eight', as it became known, gradually broke up as
differences of policy, strategy and personality emerged to frustrate efforts to
create a coalition of the parties. The inclusion of the well-supported FFS as part
187 Algórie Actualitè 9.5.91 & 30.5.91. The actual figures for MDA support in the
two polls were 0.7% and 1.98% respectively.
188 Libèration 28.12.90
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of the group was clearly crucial to its success but despite an extended courtship
this was never achieved. One of the main reasons for this was undoubtedly the
presence of the RCD within the coalition which drew its main base of support
from the same source as the FFS, the Kabyle. The RCD had attracted the bulk of
the Kabyle vote that had not responded to Hocine Alt Ahmed's boycott call in
June 1990. Thus because of the rivalry between the two parties which extended
to the parties' leaders themselves, the leader of the RCD, Said Saadi, suspected
that withdrawal of his party would be a condition for FFS participation in the
alliance. The inclusion of the MDA, which had an Islamist fringe, also created
problems. Four MDA members started a hunger-strike to protest at (amongst
other things) the party's alliance with militantly secularist parties, such as the
RCD, which, in their view, did not recognise Islam. 189 Finally, the government's
plans for a new electoral law, revealed in the Spring of 1991, forced the parties to
contemplate what stance they should adopt in the event of a second ballot
producing a run-off between FIS and FLN candidates. For two of the 1:,1-ties, the
PRA and the MAJD, the defeat of the corrupt governing party, the FLN, was the
imperative and thus, in such a situation, the opposition candidate, even if
belonging to the FIS, must always be backed to remove the govemment. 193 The
militant secularism of the RCD compelled it, in contrast, to back any candidate
capable of defeating the Islamists of the F1S which it saw as a far greater threat to
Algeria than the FLN. Such a fundamental division on strategy and who the main
enemy of the proposed alliance should be, therefore seemed to ensure that a
common front between the parties could not be achieved.191
189 Dissez p.94 & p.98
190 PRA - Parti du Renouveau Algerien; MAJD - Mouvement Algerien pour la
Justice et le Development. Ironically, the MAJD was lead by the former FLN
Prime Minister (1988-89), Kasdi Merbah, who had primarily formed the MAJD to
combat his former party whose failings he now bitterly denounced.
191 Jeune Afrique 1.5.91
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The continued failure of the secular opposition parties to attract significant
amounts of support away from the FLN and particularly the FIS (opinion polls
revealed that even combined support for these parties was still well below that for
either of the two major parties) was due to their own failure to attract the core of
the Algerian electorate: the poor and unemployed. For Ahmed Rouadjia, their
essential constituency was rather different and largely "...confined to the narrow
universe of the cultured 'petite bourgeoisie' of the big cities." 192 Thus the FIS was
free to gather up the support of the populous bottom ends of Algerian society
whose opposition to the regime was clear. The FLN continued to exploit the
extensive networks of patronage within the state enterprises and institutions. The
opposition parties were also unable or unwilling to use their more educated
constituency to construct viable alternative programmes for the governing of
Algeria, a fact that was often ignored by those commentators who accused the
FIS of lacking a political and economic programme of any real substance.193
E:CONCLUSIONS
The year that stretched from the party's victories in the local elections in
June 1990 through to the crackdown on its activities the following June witnessed
the FIS taking centre stage in the unfolding drama of Algeria's ambitious
programme of political reform. Whilst a strong showing had been expected from
the party in the local elections, the scale of their triumph had not, which had
meant that attention had been more widely focused on other parties and actors.
The achievement of 55% of the vote signified to everyone that the FIS was the
clearest beneficiary of the electoral programme and thus stood the greatest
chance of wielding most political power following future national and presidential
elections.
192 Rouadjia: Le FIS: A L'Epreuve des Elections Legislatives p.76
193 Dissez pp.95-96
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It was this prospect of real political power that animated both the internal
and external dynamics of the FIS in this period. Abassi Madani became
convinced, in the wake of June 1990, that the party's primary objective must be
the achievement of maximum political power through the ballot box with all other
considerations making way for this greater goal. This explains both the FIS's
populist swing towards backing Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and its
precipitation of the crisis of May-June 1991. The first was necessary to ensure
that the party retained its mass electoral following and the second was viewed as
essential to prevent the regime effectively blocking the party's path to political
power through changes to the electoral law. In pursuing such a strategy, Abassi
Madani exposed rifts between himself and those in the F1S who did not see the
achievement of political power through elections as the primary objective of the
FIS. Ahmed Merrani, one of Abassi's sternest critics during the crisis, argued that
the FIS had been originally created to participate in party political competition as
a vehicle for propagating the Islamic movement's ideas rather than with the
objective of actually taking political power.194
For Abassi, victory rather than mere influence was the essential aim and
ultimate prize for the party. Whilst he may well have been motivated in part by
personal ambition, it was notable that firstly, his policy was the one carried
through and, more importantly, enthusiastically backed by the party's rank and file
on the streets. Secondly, it was his allies that were victorious in the struggle for
the party's leadership with those who sought to return the party to a more narrow
and religiously hard-line agenda.
The Spring of 1991 also witnessed the severing of the links and co-
operation between the F1S and the Presidency that had operated since January
1990. The precise effect that the crisis of May-June had had on the nature,
structure and stance of the regime and its composite faction were not fully
194 Interview with Ahmed Merrani, Le Figaro 12.1.92
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apparent in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The use of force, however, in
early June and more portentiously the re-entry of the ANP into the political scene,
indicated that a new configuration was emerging (see chapter 6). In the wake of
the local elections, President Chadli Benjedid had correctly perceived the FIS to
be the main threat to him as was shown by the increasing pressure he put on the
party in local government and ultimately in the amended electoral law of April
1991. It remained to be seen whether he would continue to perceive the FIS in
this way following the comprehensive repression the party had suffered during
June and July 1991.
6
THE EVE OF POWER: THE FIS AND THE LEGISLATIVE
ELECTIONS 1991 - 1992
A. THE POLITICAL SCENE JULY - DECEMBER 1991
The crisis of June 1991 created the greatest disturbance to the Algerian
political landscape since October 1988, surpassing the fall-out emanating from
the FIS's surprise victory in the local elections of June 1990. This time both the
Islamist movement and the regime were significantly affected by the crisis and
both sought to reorder and regroup themselves in the wake of the dramatic
events of the summer.
1. The Regime and the Government July - December 1991
Despite being generally acknowledged to have emerged in a superior
position to the FIS, given the repression the Islamist party had been subjected
to, the regime had been forced to change and reconstitute itself. The fall of
Mouloud Hamrouche's government at the height of the crisis in early June and
the appointment of Sid Ahmed Ghozali in his place brought to an end his twenty-
month old reformist administration. More fundamentally, it signified a further
breach in the separation of the state from the FLN as a political party. Not only
was this shown by the composition of Ghozali's new administration which
contained a large number of new and independent technocrats in preference to
members of the FLN who were largely excluded from the new government, but it
was also seen in Chadli Benjedid's resignation from the post of President of the
FLN on 28 June. These developments represented an attempt by Ghozali and
Chadli to distance and disassociate themselves and the new government from
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the previous regime. 1 The new Prime Minister, in particular, reinforced this
impression by proceeding to verbally attack the FLN at every possible occasion.2
Moreover it appeared that the President had abandoned his attempts to transform
the FLN into his own vehicle or 'Presidential party' believing that by appearing
more consensual and independent he would possibly attract broader popular
support.3
The image of independence that the regime wished to display, however,
was belied by clear indications that Chadli had allied himself with new forces
within the Algerian state. The exit of the overtly reformist Hamrouche and his
replacement by Ghozali, who had played a significant role in the economic
strategy of the Boumedienne era, indicated that more conservative forces had
returned to the fore. 4 Such forces were not, however, primarily constituted by the
old enemies of Chadli's economic reforms in the FLN, but rather by the army. The
ANP's re-entry on to the political scene in early June 1991 to quell the street
protests of the FIS had clearly signalled an intent to at least have more of a say in
political developments. It was the military that had primarily demanded the
departure of Hamrouche as Prime Minister, although for reasons of his perceived
failure to manage the escalating crisis rather than through any antipathy to his
programme of political and economic reforms.5
1 Keith Sutton and Ahmed Aghrout: Multi-Party Elections in Algeria: Problems and
Prospects in Bulletin of Francophone Africa (No.2, Autumn 1992) p.63; John P.
Entelis and Lisa J. Arone: Algeria in Turmoil: Democracy and the State in Middle
East Policy (Volume 1, 1992) pp.32-33
2 See Charef pp.204-205
3 Roberts: From Radical Mission pp.469-470
4 Entelis & Arone pp.32-33
5 Yefsah: ArmOe et Politique p.1 63n. Yefsah rightly dismisses suggestions that
the army had primarily demanded Hamrouche's resignation because his anti-
corruption initiatives had threatened some of its senior figures. Whilst this may
have been a consideration, the desire to restore order on the streets and political
stability was more important. Yefsah pp.163-164
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This primary concern with public order was reflected in the military's lack of
involvement in the day-to-day running of the government following the resolution
of the crisis by July 1991. Having failed to persuade President Chadli to ban the
FIS it made no attempt to interfere with initiatives to restart the electoral
programme that had been suspended following the disturbances of mid 1991.
Despite his 'Boumediennist' past, Sid Ahmed Ghozali and his government did
much to display liberal and reformist credentials over the following months,
casting some doubt on suggestions that the changes to the regime heralded a
return to old-style Algerian politics. Two inter-party conferences were organised
on 30 July and 24 August supposedly to provide a forum for dialogue between
the regime and the various political parties and to try to establish some
consensus on the future course of Algeria's political development and reform.
Although there was widespread scepticism about the government's aims and
sincerity with these moves (the FFS boycotted the first conference and the FIS
both - although dissident figures such as Mohammed Kerrar, Bashir Fakih and
Ahmed Merrani attended) and the conferences achieved little consensus on the
electoral law, there was an eventual declaration that the aborted legislative
elections should take place before the end of the year.6
It soon became apparent that both Ghozali and the Presidency were intent
on proceeding with the electoral programme. The lifting of the state of siege
which had been declared in June, on 29 September, a few days earlier than it
was due to end, was seen as an indication of this intent. Ghozali also embarked
on a concerted attempt to reform the most controversial aspects of the electoral
law of the previous April. September and October witnessed a fierce battle
between the Prime Minister and the National Assembly, as the exclusively FLN-
composed legislature sought to resist efforts to reduce the number of electoral
6 Jean-Jacques Lavenue: Algeria: La Democratic interdite (L'Harmattan, Paris,
1992) pp.157-161
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constituencies, to remove the right of husbands to vote on behalf of their wives,
and to make it easier for independent candidates to stand for election - all
measures perceived by the APN to be hostile to FLN interests. Despite Ghozali
frequently threatening to resign if the reforms were not endorsed, the new
electoral law emerged from the Assembly on October 13 with few of the changes
for which Ghozali had hoped. Constituency numbers were reduced from 542 to
430 (rather than to the preferred original number of 295) and there was no
concession on the issue of proxy voting. In response to this relative failure, the
Prime Minister attempted to get the Presidency either to have the electoral bill put
to a second reading or to organise a referendum on the subject. Chadli refused
both requests and announced on October 15 that the first round of the legislative
elections would take place on December 26. 7 However, Ghozali was
subsequently comforted by the fact that the Constitutional Court, to whom Chadli
had referred the proxy vote rule, ruled on 29 October that the rule was 'null and
void' on the grounds that it conflicted with other legal articles.8
Where the FIS fitted into this renewed commitment to the electoral process
following the party's comprehensive suppression by the regime in June-July 1991
appeared initially uncertain. The government had made no indication of wishing
7 The Economist 12.10.91 & 9.11.91; Financial Times 16.10.91. The APN was so
opposed to Ghozali's proposed reforms to the electoral law because many
deputies felt that they would damage the electoral prospects of the FLN of which
they were all still technically members. They were in favour of retaining the proxy
vote because it was believed to work to the FLN's advantage in the deeply
traditional south of Algeria where the party had performed strongly in 1990. Its
support for a larger number of constituencies reflected its desire to retain the
gerrymander of the original electoral law of April 1991 which created
proportionately more electoral districts in the FLN supporting areas. Despite the
reduction in seat numbers eventually achieved by Ghozali, large disparities
between electorates in various districts persisted. For example, the average
electorate size in the southern Saharan wilayate of Illizi was 3,633 compared to
that for Algiers which was 49,777 (there were similarly large figures for Oran and
Constantine). Sutton & Aghrout p.62
8 Summary of World Broadcasts ME/1212 A/15 29.10.91; The Guardian 18.10.91
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to ban the party despite its crackdown. It gradually became apparent, in the wake
of both the crisis and the failure of attempts to help the dissident members of the
Majlis Shura to win control of the party, that the new approach was to try and
'build bridges' with the new leadership of the party whilst keeping the old
leadership firmly under lock and key. This new approach was exemplified by
Ghozali himself in an interview in which he sought to draw a distinction between
the old and new leaderships of the FIS when questioned on the possible banning
of the party:
"It is not a question of banning any party. We made clear the distinction
between the party and certain of its leaders who have chosen a dead-end:9
This was borne out by the new prime minister's actions which included the
freeing in August of several hundred lower-ranking FIS militants arrested in June
whilst retaining most of the more senior members in detention. 10 The regime also
heavily publicised the discovery of 20,000 documents of an allegedly "subvrsive
nature" found at a printing works at Blida and signed by Ali Belhadj, seeking to
further justify his and the other FIS leaders' imprisonment.11
Despite the refusal of the new leadership of the FIS to take part in the two
inter-party conferences in July and August, the government kept up attempts at
dialogue with the party. The minister responsible for the electoral law asserted in
an interview in September that he had retained links with the party throughout the
crisis and had contacts with both the old Majlis Shura and the new Provisional
Executive Bureau (BEP). 12 It appeared that the regime was anxious that the FIS
participate in the forthcoming elections to the National Assembly. It released
9 E1 Moudjahid 18.7.91
10 Burgat & Dowell p.298; Ghozali also sought to persuade employers to take
back some of the 12,000 workers who had been sacked for responding to the
FIS's strike call in May Financial Times 28.6.91
11 El Moudjahid 18.7.91
12 Horizons 5.9.91
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Mohammed Said from prison on December 7 having released Abdelkader
Hachani, the provisional leader of the FIS, who had been taken into custody by
the authorities on 28 September, a week earlier. Hachani's release was viewed
by one Algerian newspaper "as an appeal to the FIS to participate in the
elections."13
This did not mean, however, that the government was any better disposed
towards the F1S than its predecessor. Ghozali had included in his new cabinet of
technocrats and independents, two women renown for their anti-Islamist views
which, in Robert Mortimer's view, "served notice that he intended to preserve a
liberal secular regime." 14 Nor was it implied that the regime would henceforth be
more tolerant of Islamist violence and street activism. Periodic warnings were
issued by the regime throughout the Autumn of 1991 about the consequences of
an attempted return by the FIS to the tactics of confrontation of the previous May
and June. When President Chadli announced the date of the elections on
October 15, he stated that despite the continuation of the electoral process
"neither the citizen nor the state will accept behaviour outside the constitution
and the law."15 Similarly, when the FIS announced its intention to hold a series of
marches across Algeria on December 6, Abdelkader Hachani was summoned to
the Interior Ministry and warned of a possible blood bath if the party went ahead
with its plans. 16 This robust stance reflected the influence of the army on the
government. Having failed to persuade Chadli to ban the FIS in June-July 1991
and having gone along with his plans to proceed with the elections, Algeria's
military chiefs were intent on seeing that the FIS could not repeat its challenge of
the previous May and June. The appointment of General Larbi Belkheir as new
13 Algdrie Actualitd 13.2.92
14 Mortimer: Islam and Multiparty Politics p.590
15 Financial Times 16.10.91
16 The Economist 14.12.91 All marches by political parties were banned in the
run-up to the election.
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Interior and Local Authorities Minister in December 1991, with responsibility for
overseeing the elections, indicated this resolve on the part of the ANP as did a
law passed on December 5 which allowed the regional wall administrations to call
upon the military in the event of a crisis.17
None of these developments appeared to aim at explicitly discriminating
against the FIS, merely to restrain its excesses, and the regime's commitment to
democratisation and the electoral process seemed uncompromised. Why the
regime had retained this commitment and in particular why it was so anxious to
secure the FIS's participation in the process, given the crisis of mid 1991, was a
matter of some debate. Chadli and Ghozali continued to publicly express their
belief in the virtue of persisting with democratisation. Ghozali's battles with the
National Assembly over the electoral law and his stated view that "You either
have 100% democracy or zero percent.. .You can't have exceptions to
democracy" when questioned on FIS participation, appeared to bear witness to
this conviction.18
The reality was that both men still adhered to the strategy of going ahead
with the elections in the hope and expectation of an inconclusive result, with no
single party achieving a majority. Such a result would allow the President (and
possibly the Prime Minister18) to play the influential role of adjudicator and
kingmaker. This divide and rule strategy was bolstered by the heightened
prospect of a failure on the part of the FIS to secure a majority in the legislative
elections. The disappointing opinion poll ratings for the HS of earlier in the year
(see previous chapter) were confirmed by Chadli's own polls in the Autumn of
1991 which continued to suggest that the FIS would not secure more than 30% of
17 Charef p.224 & p.229
18 Financial Times 28.6.91
19 There were suggestions that Ghozali harboured such ambitions for himself.
Jeune Afrique 4.9.91
249
the vote.20 This, aided by the absence, through imprisonment, of a large part of
the party's leadership, encouraged the regime to believe that the FIS could be
safely allowed to compete in the elections. As Francois Burgat comments:
"The general staff and the chancelleries in Algiers seemed convinced that the
elections were pushing towards that equilibrium that was the dream of all the
leaders in the region: an Islamist party that was domesticated and whose
integration in the institutional system would not call the political survival of the
regime into question."21
Furthermore, Ghozali and Chadli were convinced that exclusion of the FIS,
which was still clearly the most popular opposition party, from the electoral
process would greatly undercut the perceived legitimacy of the elections and
would provide the FIS with the excuse to adopt a more violent path of opposition
to the regime.
For these reasons it was concluded that continuation with the elections on
the broadest possible basis was the best route for Algeria. This was certainly
perceived as preferable to either the exclusion of the FIS or the abandonment or
suspension of the process altogether in the wake of the June crisis, both of which
would have led to violent confrontations with the Islamist movement.
2. The FIS July- December 1991
I. Recovery
As has been shown, the crisis of June 1991 affected the FIS far more than
it had the regime. Despite the initial apparent victory of securing in the first week
of June both the fall of the Hamrouche government and promised concessions on
the electoral law and presidential elections, the subsequent crackdown by the
army culminating in the arrest and detention of Abassi Madani, Ali Belhadj and
20 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.474
21 Burgat & Dowell p.299
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many of the party's senior figures swept away any perceived earlier gains. The
attendant splits in the party and the battle for its control during and immediately
after the crisis had, in the eyes of both the regime and the other opposition
parties, ended "the myth of the invulnerability of the FIS."22
Despite these significant reverses, the FIS was able to regroup itself
effectively over the late summer. A conference was held at Batna at the end of
July which gathered together the remaining members of the party's Majlis Shura
together with representatives from nearly all the regional BEWs. The gathering
produced a decisive victory for the supporters of Abassi Madani over the
dissenting voices in the party. Not only did the conference reaffirm the leadership
of Abassi and Ali Belhadj and formally recognise Abdelkader Hachani as
provisional leader, but also succeeded in suspending and marginalising most of
the dissidents. Having already formally expelled Ahmed Merrani and Bashir Fakih
from the Majlis on June 25 following their appearance on national television, the
Majlis confirmed at Batna the suspension of Benazouz Zebda, Hachemi Sahnouni
and Mohammed Kerrar from the Majlis. 23 The one remaining notable dissident,
Said Guechi, escaped this fate but realising the direction events were moving in,
left the conference before its conclusion. This, together with the complete
absence from the conference of Zebda and Sahnouni, gave Abdelkader Hachani
and his allies the narrow majority they needed to achieve these changes. In place
of these excluded figures the party co-opted twelve new members onto the Majlis
Shura, as representatives from the regions which included, significantly,
Mohammed Said (still at that time in official custody).24 Hachani characterised
22 Jeune Afrique 11.9.91
23 Lavenue p.165
24 Charef p.214
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these changes as "strictly functional"26 but it was clearly an attempt to bolster his
and his allies' majority on the party's ruling body.26
The new provisional leader of the party (who carried the official title of
President of the BEP) worked hard over the weeks following the conclusion of the
Batna conference to convince the party's grassroots that he and the new Majlis
Shura remained loyal to the line of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj. This together
with the recuperation that the party as a whole was undergoing in the aftermath of
the events of June, meant that nationally the FIS kept a very low profile
throughout the Summer of 1991.27
By the beginning of the Autumn, the FIS had sufficiently recovered itself to
begin to look outwards again and it rapidly became apparent that although the
leadership of the party may have received a severe blow during the crisis of the
previous Spring, the base of the party's activist support remained intact. Over the
following months the FIS was able to demonstrate its continued ability to mobilise
large numbers of its supporters. Within a week of the lifting of the state of 'siege
on September 29, the FIS staged a rally at the 20th August stadium in Algiers
which was attended by "scores of thousands" of people and four weeks later on 1
November an estimated 300,000 participated in a march held by the party
through the capita1.28
II. The Debate over Participation
These impressive displays of strength, however, concealed an intense
debate and uncertainty within the new leadership of the party over the future
strategy of the FIS. Central to this debate was the response the party should
adopt to the government's apparent determination to continue with the electoral
25 Interview with Abdelkader Hachani, Algèrie Actualitó 1.8.91
26 Charef p.214
27 Ibid. p.215
28 Jeune Afrique 20.11.91; The Economist 12.10.91
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process. Initially, in the immediate wake of the June crisis, the FIS's rejection of
the regime's invitation to the government-party conferences of 30 July and 24
August seemed inevitable and understandable given the recent crackdown on the
party and the imprisonment of its leaders. It branded the conferences as
disingenuous attempts on the part of the regime "to retrieve its lost credibility."29
However, as time progressed and as the FIS was not officially banned, the state
of siege was lifted and Ghozali made plain his desire for the FIS to participate in
the elections, the party faced more of a dilemma over whether it should respond
to the Prime Minister's overtures and announce its participation in the elections.
Abdelkader Hachani publicly reaffirmed the FIS's commitment to the
electoral route to power by stating that "We can not arrive in power other than
through free and proper elections."30 However, he and the new leadership of the
party made clear their conditions for rejoining the electoral process. Whilst initial
demands included the lifting of the state of siege and the reappointment of
workers sacked for their participation in the FIS-organised general strike of the
previous May, the central demand was and remained the release of Madani,
Belhadj and the other senior leaders of the movement. This primary pre-condition
for participation was continually restated whenever the question of FIS
involvement in the elections was raised. Moreover, Hachani stated that the party
would not only boycott the elections but would also "exert every available means,
within the framework of the law, so that there will be no elections.'91
This determination to prevent the holding of the elections if preconditions
were not met revealed the nature of the dilemma the FIS faced - in view of the
government's determination to proceed with the elections even in the event of a
FIS boycott. Neither boycott nor participation represented satisfactory stances for
29 FIS communique quoted in Lavenue p.163; El Moudjahid 27.7.91
3° Interview with Abdelkader Hachani, Algèrie Actualite. 1.8.91
31 Quoted in Entelis & Arone p.33n
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the party. Participation without securing concessions from the regime would
appear like compromised capitulation and weakness, whilst a boycott risked
marginalisation for the party and possibly invited repression from the regime
which could portray the party as being in reality anti-democratic. Rabah Kebir,
one of the group of younger figures which had risen to prominence in the
leadership of the FIS following the Batna conference, believed that Ghozali's
overtures towards the FIS were not genuine and that in reality the Prime Minister
hoped for a boycott by the FIS:
"The Government pretended that it wanted everyone to join the elections and
it did not want it to seem that the FIS was excluded. If the FIS did not
participate in the elections it wanted it to appear that it was the FIS's fault's2
This debate was played out within the leadership of the party with more
detailed strategic and tactical considerations being raised on both sides. Those
who favoured participation argued that it offered the ultimate prize of political
power. Since it appeared that the FIS's essentially urban support had remained
solid, they argued, this would be able to provide the party with, at the very least, a
significant voice in the new National Assembly and might even be sufficient to
secure an absolute majority.33 Furthermore, it was argued that failure to
participate would result in the FIS's support shifting, perhaps irretrievably, to the
other smaller Islamist parties such as HAMAS and the MNI who intended to run
candidates in the election.34
Such a view was disputed by those within the leadership who feared that
support had already begun to slip towards the other Islamist parties and that
together with the adverse impact of the June crisis would mean that the
32 Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
33 Jeune Afrique 20.11.91
34 Interview with Rabah Kebir, Algèrie Actualite 31.10.91; Lavenue p.126
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achievement of a majority by the FIS was an unrealistic scenario. 35 Being simply
the largest party was not to be seen as an advance for the Islamist cause, as
Hamza Kaida observed of the opponents of participation:
"For them, an electoral failure is not to be dismissed. It would be fatal, for it
would strike the FIS at its base, constituted by activists mobilised by their
rejection of the system, and would make the movement an ordinary
opposition party. In abstaining to participate in the elections, the FIS would
continue, instead, to channel discontent and would nullify the results because
of the poor turnout... "36
Whilst this debate continued, attempts were made to win concessions from
the regime; such concessions being of obvious particular importance to those
within FIS who backed participation, seeing them as a means of strengthening
their case in the internal debate within the party. On September 7 Abassi Madani,
All Belhadj and the six other senior imprisoned FIS leaders embarked on a short
hunger strike in an ultimately unrewarded effort to pressurise the authorities,
through the fear of creating martyrs, to release them or at least have themselves
accorded the status of political prisoners. 37 A second attempt to win concessions
took the form of trying to persuade the government to let the imprisoned leaders
appear before a civilian rather than a military court. Although President Chadli
appeared at one time to hint that this might be possible and that the leaders might
even be released following a deliberately public and humiliating admonishment in
front of the court, no concessions were wrung on the issue.38
At the same time, the FIS leadership proved anxious to portray itself as
operating within the law. This was demonstrated by Hachani's statement quoted
35 Jeune Afrique 20.11.91
36 Ibid.
37 Jeune Afrique 18.9.91; BBC African World Service News 10.9.91 The hunger
strike was eventually called off following the visit of a religious delegation who
advised the prisoners to abandon the strike. El Watan 19.9.91 referred to by
SWB ME/1182 N18 19.9.91
38 Middle East International 20.12.91; The Economist 9.11.91
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earlier about preventing the holding of the elections by using "every available
means, within the framework of the law." Such an approach was designed not
only to persuade the regime to make some form of goodwill gesture, but also to
avoid giving the regime and the army any excuse to crack down on the party. On
20 September, Hachani stated that FIS activists would not respond to
provocation, having disavowed violence and actions that might undermine
security.39 A week later when Hachani himself was arrested by the authorities
following Friday prayers at the Bab El-Oued mosque, the loudspeakers at the
mosque appealed to worshippers not to respond to provocation from the heavy
police and army presence around the area.40
In spite of these attempts and displays of restraint on the part of the FIS,
Madani and Belhadj remained in custody. With no public concessions to justify
their participation, the FIS continued to decline to join in the electoral process
even after the campaign for the first ballot for the National Assembly formally
commenced on December 5. Then, on 14 December, just tvvelve days before
voting was due to take place the party issued a statement declaring:
'To take a step towards the establishment of an Islamic state... the FIS will
take part in the forthcoming legislative elections."41
This decision obviously demonstrated that the ongoing debate within the
HS had been resolved, but what at this late stage had decisively shifted the
debate within the party? It seems clear that the arrangement of forces on either
side of the debate over participation was not a random affair and continued to
reflect the divisions in the FIS that had first come to light in the aftermath of the
June crisis.
% SWB ME/1184 N16 23.9.91
4° The Economist 12.10.91
41 The Guardian 16.12.91
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Ironically, given the closeness with which the debate over participation
echoed that which had occurred in the party over the general strike in May, it was
Abdelkader Hachani and his allies who pushed for participation. 42 The
explanation for this paradox lay in the fact that whilst Hachani and new senior
figures in the leadership such as Rabah Kebir and Othmane Aissani had
supported Abassi Madani's overall political and electoral strategy, they were even
more pragmatically inclined than the official leader of the FIS and recognised that
the tactic of confrontation had clearly failed in May and June.43
The final decisive shift in the debate over participation came with the
release by the authorities of both Hachani and Mohammed Said within a week of
each other in October-November. This development (as the Ghozali government
clearly intended) not only reintroduced two powerful voices for participation back
into the internal debate within the party, but also gave Hachani, in particular,
much greater weight and credibility within the FIS as someone who had suffered
for the party.44 Throughout November and early December, as well as embarking
on a campaign to persuade the party, Hachani remained in contact with the
regime as he made public and private hints that the FIS would compete in the
elections in an effort to induce further concessions from the authorities. It was
also notable that, following his release, Hachani refrained from repeating the
FIS's call for early presidential elections. In response to these overtures, the
FIS's two main newspapers, Al Mounqid and Al Forkane, banned since August,
were allowed by the authorities to publish again on 18 November. 45
42 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.472
43 The provisional leadership of the party was in contact with the original
imprisoned leadership, through lawyers and family visitors. (Author's interview
with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95). However, whilst it is known that the imprisoned
leadership was divided on the issue of participation in the elections, the exact
opinions of Abassi and Belhadj are unknown. Jeune Afrique 9.1.92
44 Lavenue p.42; Charef p.216
45 Charef p.220 & p.227; Roberts: From Radical Mission p.473
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It was evident, even before the official announcement on December 14, that
Hachani had already decided that, even without the achievement of the central
concession of the release of Abassi, Belhadj and the other imprisoned leaders,
the FIS should participate in the elections. The party had selected candidates for
all 430 constituencies to be contested in the election in advance of any other
party and at a rally on December 6 Hachani had spoken of the achievement of an
Islamic state through the ballot box. 46 The holding of the rally itself represented
evidence of the defeat of the faction within the FIS which was deeply opposed to
participation. Hachani's decision to hold a rally in preference to the planned
march, following the warning by the Interior Ministry of bloody consequences if a
march took place, marked a rejection of the hard-line alternative to participation,
which favoured confrontation with the regime on the streets.47
M. The Militant Fringe
There was evidence during late 1991 that suggested that parts of the
Islamic movement, including FIS members, had already begun to turn to more
violent alternatives to participation. The weeks preceding the declaration by the
FIS that it would enter the elections witnessed a number of violent incidents
involving Islamists. On November 1, the same day that the FIS held its last
march through the capital before such demonstrations were banned following the
opening of the electoral campaign, Islamist militants attacked a residence of the
FLN where the ex-prime minister, Mouloud Hamrouche was holding a meeting.
46 The Economist 14.12.91; Middle East International 20.12.91 The FIS had
actually submitted Abassi Madani, Ali Belhadj and its other imprisoned leaders as
candidates for the election and as possible means of putting pressure on the
government. However, their candidatures were officially rejected on the grounds
that candidates had to register in person. Jeune Aftique 20.11.91
47 Lavenue pp.124-125; Jeune Afrique 20.11.91
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Similarly, even before the campaign was underway, Ahmed Ben Bella had his
meetings disrupted by stone-throwing Islamists.
Far more serious, though, were a spate of related incidents that occurred
on Algeria's eastern borders at the end of November. Three policemen died in an
armed attack by an estimated sixty armed Islamists on a border post at Guemmar
on 29 November, following discoveries by the police of significant caches of arms
and exchanges of fire with militants in the surrounding El Oued region earlier that
week. These events, which the government claimed were indications of a planned
and widespread Islamist terror campaign against the state, were generally
acknowledged to have been instigated by Aissa Messaoudi, also known as Tayeb
al Afghani, whom the police had been seeking to hunt down. Although, as his
nomme de guerre suggests, Messaoudi was connected with the extremist wing of
the Islamist movement involving Afghan veterans in groups such as Takfir wa-
Hijra (see previous chapters) which were not controlled by the FIS, there were
indications that Messaoudi did, in fact, have connections with the FIS. Whilst
televised 'confessions' by captured members of his group, who claimed to belong
to the FIS and an armed organisation, should be viewed with some caution, it was
established that Messaoudi himself was an active member of the FIS-established
trade union, the SIT.
Despite the regime's ongoing efforts at this time to persuade the FIS to
participate in the elections, much was made by the authorities of this link to the
party. The Defence Minister, Khaled Nezzar, appeared on television to accuse
the FIS publicly of being directly or indirectly involved - a charge both the FIS and
43 Jeune Afrique 20.11.91; Reuters 28.11.91 Hugh Roberts suggests, rather
improbably, that these attacks were orchestrated by Ghozali and Chadli to
sabotage the electoral chances of both the MDA and the FIS. Roberts: From
Radical Mission p.473
49 Reuters 29.11.91; Associated Press 29.11.91; Jeune Afrique 11.12.91; BBC
African World Service News 10.12.91 The authorities claimed to have finally
wiped out the group following an attack by the security forces on December 9.
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the SIT were quick to rebut claiming that it would not serve the party's interests to
be involved in attempts at violent insurrection. 50 Abdelkader Hachani suggested
that the incidents may have in reality been the result of an intra-army feud, but he
effectively acknowledged the FIS involvement in the incidents when he stated
that "You don't punish the whole family for the misdemeanours of some
members."51 This comment appeared also to indicate his desire to avoid official
moves by the authorities against the FIS as a result of the incidents and in
addition he stated that 'Violence is not part of our methods. The FIS operates
inside the law.'52
These incidents were not the only testimony to the existence of a section of
the FIS that dissented from the FIS's official overall strategy of participating in
elections. The Batna conference of July witnessed the exclusion not only of
those individuals who had attempted rapprochement with the regime, but also of
two members, Said Mekhloufi and Kameredine Kherbane, who in contrast
advocated a more confrontational approach to the regime. At the beginning of
1991, Mekhloufi had published and distributed a pamphlet entitled "Principles
and Objectives of Civil Disobedience." As well as promoting civil disobedience,
Mekhloufi and his pamphlet implicitly criticised the whole 'democratic' electoralist
strategy of the FIS by asserting amongst other things that "The point of view of
the majority has not any value" and indicated that more direct methods should be
employed by Islamists to force the regime to relinquish power. He was publicly
criticised by Abassi Madani at the time, but it was not until the opportunity of the
Batna conference six months later that supporters of the electoral strategy were
able to oust Mekhloufi and his close ally Kherbane from the Majlis Shura. 53 It was
5° BBC African World Service News 9.12.91; Jeune Afrique 11.12.91
51 BBC African World Service News 2.12.91 & 10.12.91
52 Quoted in Charef p.221 It was argued that Hachani was wrong-footed and
embarrassed by the whole incident.
53 Charef pp.189-195
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notable that although neither Mekhloufi nor Kherbane were directly linked to the
incidents that were to occur later in the year, both, like Aissa Messaoudi, had
served as volunteers in the war in Afghanistan.
B: THE FIRST BALLOT: DECEMBER 26 1991
1. The FIS Campaign
Despite their late entry into the electoral contest, the FIS worked in the
twelve remaining days before the first ballot to ensure that the party would attract
a maximum level of support. The party fielded candidates of an unusually high
level of education (a quarter of them had post-graduate qualifications 54) and
fought a highly professional campaign, opting for lower-profile activities such as
door-to-door canvassing and continuing its social action programmes in the poor
areas to attract support. Sermons in mosques were used to get across the party
message rather than employing the more usual medium of mass rallies.55
Particular attention was focused on the multitudinous young urban unemployed,
who frequently made up 60% of their age group and whose desperation at the
still declining socio-economic conditions in Algeria and disillusion with the regime
could be turned, as it had in June 1990, into votes for the FIS. Much was made,
by the FIS in this context, of the revealed corruption of the ruling FLN and the
'missing billions' embezzled by corrupt officials and politicians of the regime.56
54 Fawzi Rouziek: AlOde 1990-1993: La D6mocratie Confisquèe? in Pierre
Robert Baduel (Editor): LA/gene Incertaine (Edisud, France, 1994) p.43 The FIS
fielded more post-graduate educated than any of the other parties contesting the
election. This indicated the growing influence of the better educated nationalist
wing of the FIS, this wing of the party providing in Abed Charefs view, the
"overwhelming majority" of the candidates in the election. Charef p.219
55 The Independent 17.1.92; Jeune Afrique 9.1.92
56 Jeune Afrique 9.1.92; The Independent 30.12.91 The FLN, in response,
portrayed itself throughout the campaign as a 'hostage' of the political system and
claimed that itself, as a party, had been the true initiator of political reforms after
1988.
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2. The Results
When the results of the 26 December poll began to appear it once more
became apparent that the hopes and expectations of the regime and the other
parties, that the FIS would struggle to get more than 35% of the vote, were
woefully misplaced. For the second time in eighteen months the FIS triumphed
massively. The party took over 47% of the total votes cast, even further ahead of
its nearest rival, once again the FLN, which secured less than 24% of the vote,
than it had been in 1990. No other single party succeeded in winning more than
10% of the votes cast. Indeed, it appeared that the voting patterns of the local
elections had persisted at the national level: the FIS totally dominating the urban
north (taking over 50% of the vote in Algiers, Constantine and Oran and most
other large towns); the FLN performing best in the large southern Saharan
wilayate; and the wilayate of the Kabyle rejecting both the FIS and the FLN and
voting for a third party (this time Ait Ahmed's FFS).57
What made this victory even more comprehensive than these voting
percentages suggest, was the number of seats in the new National Assembly the
FIS had been able to secure. It rapidly became clear, as the results were
announced following the December 26 poll, that the electoral system, despite the
efforts of the outgoing FLN-dominated Assembly, had dramatically favoured the
main Islamist party. Of the 430 seats to be contested 231 were won outright in
this the first ballot, by candidates who had been able to win 50% or more of the
vote in their individual constituencies; the remaining 199 proceeding to a decisive
second ballot to be contested by the leading two candidates from the first ballot. It
was a shock to everyone in Algeria, perhaps even to the FIS itself, when it was
57 For voting statistics see Sutton & Aghrout pp.76-77 Full and comprehensive
voting statistics of the results were, however, never fully published. Only those
relating to successful or near-successful (that is, proceeding to the second ballot)
were fully released. Sutton & Aghrout p.65
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revealed that the F1S had won no fewer than 188 of the 231 seats decided at the
first ballot. For the FLN, which the system had supposedly favoured58, the
outcome of the election in terms of seats was a disaster: securing just 16 seats
outright. This was less than the FFS which had managed to scoop 25 and which
had the second highest tally behind the massive gains of the FIS.
The results also made it clear that all the factors suggested in the period
since the 1990 elections to indicate that the FIS would fail to hold onto the
support it had garnered in those elections, had proved to be of little importance.
The return of the parties who had boycotted the 1990 polls had little effective
impact. Hocine Ait Ahmed's FFS votes, heavily concentrated in the Kabyle, came
overwhelmingly from RCD voters and abstainers in 1990, and Ahmed Ben Bella's
MDA won a derisory 2% of the popular vote. Similarly, the much vaunted
incursion of the smaller Islamist parties into the FIS's vote was in the event
marginal: Mahfoud Nahnah's HAMAS took 5.4% to the MNI's 2.2%. 59 The
supposed mobilisation of women, freed by the abandonment of the procuration
vote rule, against the 'threat' the FIS posed to women's rights similarly never
materialised. Despite the FIS's strong backing for the retention of the procuration
rule (Hachani describing its abandonment as "in reality a development for the
worse"60) it actually appeared not to hinder and possibly aided the party. In
traditional areas where, regardless of political or religious views, women voting
was frowned upon, one Algerian journalist noted that the only women voting in
any numbers on polling day were those from FIS-supporting households. 61 It
appears that the FIS instructed its supporters to ensure that all their female
58 Whilst some of the worst excesses of the electoral law had been mitigated,
glaring disparities in electorates still existed - see footnote 7.
59 The FIS even managed to secure five times the vote of HAMAS in Blida, the
hometown and stronghold of HAMAS's leader, Mahfoud Nahnah. Algeria Actuante
9.1.92
60 El Moudjahid 9.9.91
61 Algeria Actuante 2.1.92
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relatives went to the polling booths. 62 The much highlighted failings of the FIS-run
local councils also seemed to have made no effective difference: voters clearly
continued to blame their declining social and economic well-being on the central
government.
3. The Implications
The results of the 26 December ballot had clearly profound implications for
the political future. Having won 188 seats in the first round of voting, the FIS
needed to win just 28 out of the remaining 199 seats to be contested in the
second round of voting to achieve an absolute majority in the new National
Assembly. Given the fact that it was the leading party in 144 (and was the
challenging party in another 43) of these remaining seats, it also seemed entirely
feasible that the FIS eventually could win the 99 seats required to give it a two-
thirds majority in the Assembly which it could use to press for changes to the
Constitution. Furthermore, in the likely event that supporters of HAMAS and the
MNI in the first round would cast their votes for FIS candidates in the second
round, Keith Sutton and Ahmed Aghrout have estimated that the main Islamist
party would sweep two-thirds of the remaining seats. It is worth noting at this
point that although the percentage of the vote won by the FIS declined from
roughly 55% in June 1990 to 47% in 1991, the percentage fall (roughly 8%)
nearly exactly equalled that picked up jointly by the MNI and HAMAS in 1991
(7.5%) indicating that percentage of the voters backing Islamism had remained
constant at both elections. 63 (It should be added, however, that the overall turnout
62 Jeune Afrique 9.1.92
63 Sutton & Aghrout p.60 & p.70; MEED 24.1.92 On the issue of whether the
other Islamist parties' leaderships would have encouraged their supporters to
vote for the FIS in the second round, Abdallah Djaballah, leader of the MNI,
claimed that no such decision was taken because he believed that the electoral
process would be aborted before a second round could be held. Author's
interview with Abdallah Djaballah, London, 7.10.94
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at the two elections fell between 1990 and 1991 meaning that the total 'Islamist'
vote in 1991 was some half-a-million votes down on the earlier election)
Overall, as Sutton and Aghrout conclude:
"As the FIS were within 5% of an overall majority in many of the undecided
seats, any result other than a FIS government after January 16th (the date
fixed for the second ballot) seemed very unlikely."66
C: REACTIONS TO THE BALLOT: DECEMBER 1991 - JANUARY 1992
1. The Secular Opposition
For the secular opposition the elections had once again demonstrated
their failure to break the dominance of the FIS and the FLN at the ballot box.
Between them they had taken only just over 20% of the vote (if the figures for
HAMAS and the MNI are excluded) and won just 28 seats. Once again it
appeared that these parties' discourses had had little influence on the mass of
illiterate young that constituted so much of the electorate. 66 The reactions to their
relative failure and the massive gains of the FIS varied considerably between the
parties.
For several of the secular opposition parties it appeared imperative that
the electoral process must now be suspended and the second round of voting
cancelled to prevent the F1S achieving a majority in the new National Assembly.
Foremost among parties taking this line was the RCD which had won less than
3% of the vote in the elections (and thus could be seen as having nothing to
lose67) and the communist PAGS. Both parties, which had applauded the June
64 Roberts: From Radical Mission pp.475-476
66 Sutton & Aghrout p.66
66 Zoubir pp.102-103
67 Burgat & Dowell p.300
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crackdown by the authorities against the FIS, clearly saw the threat a FIS majority
posed to their own militantly secularist vision of Algeria as a far greater evil than
the suspension of the electoral process. 68 Working with other similar-minded
groups and parties such as Kasdi Merbah's MAJD, various women's associations
and elements of the League of Human Rights (LADH), 'Committees for the
Support of Republican Algeria' were created to call for the abandonment of the
second ballot. 69
 The first communique of the national Conseil National de
Sauve garde de l'Algórie (CNSA) declared, "It is improbable that democracy will
be saved by those who denounce it (the FIS)." 70 Said Saadi, the leader of the
RCD, called for strikes, demonstrations and the use of "any means, including
violence" to prevent the holding of the second round of voting which he claimed
would "bury Algeria... It would condemn us to chaos." 71 A similar line was adopted
by Abdelhak Benhamouda, leader of the national trade union, the UGTA, who
declared:
"We are legalists, but if the institutions do not fulfil their functions, it is our
duty to resist and to participate in all initiatives aimed at countering the
advance of the Islamists."
A different line, however, was taken by the largest and most successful
secular opposition party in the elections, the FFS. Its leader, Hocine Alt Ahmed,
called on the day after the first ballot for the continuation of the electoral
process. Despite being as politically opposed to the agenda of the FIS as most
of the other parties, he argued against annulment of the elections stating that: "A
68 Dissez p.100 The PAGS had always opposed the legalisation of parties based
on religion.
69 Lamchichi: Lislamisme en Algórie p.84 These committees almost certainly had
the backing of senior figures in the establishment. Financial Times 2.1.92
70 Algerie Actualitó 30.12.92
71 Daily Telegraph 2.1.92; Financial Times 2.1.92
72 Jeune Afrique 24.1.92
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crisis of democracy cannot be solved other than through more democracy."73
Accordingly, his strategy to block the likely FIS victory in the second round was to
mobilise the 'democratic camp' and ensure that it turned out in maximum numbers
to vote in the deciding 199 second ballots. An impressive rally and 'March for the
Defence of Democracy' was organised by the FFS together with the LADH and
women's associations, and was attended by an estimated 300,000 people on 2
January. At the rally Ait Ahmed called for the mobilisation of the 6.3 million
Algerians who had abstained or spoilt their papers in the first ballot. Together
with the fact that the FIS's total vote had fallen by 1.2 million since 1990 it was
highlighted that over three-quarters of the electorate had not voted for the FIS on
December 26 and thus could potentially be mobilised.74
The leader of the FFS also alleged that over 900,000 polling cards had
not been distributed before the election, thus disenfranchising a significant 10%
of the electorate. For some this and other irregularities on polling day held out
hope that a legal block to the FIS's advance could be found. In a[I, 341
complaints about irregularities in individual constituencies had been lodged with
the Constitutional Council which had the power to annul and re-run elections in
individual constituencies if the complaints were upheld. The majority of such
complaints (174) came from the FLN which made a variety of allegations of
malpractice against the FIS, most of which were reproduced in the pro-
government El Moudjahid newspaper. It was alleged that the FIS had used
intimidation and impersonation as well as arbitrary disqualifications of voters by
its local council officials, who were responsible for the running of the ballots, in
attempts to maximise their vote and minimise that of their opponents. Despite the
73 Burgat & Dowell p.300; Lamchichi: Lislamisme en Algêrie p.84
74 The Guardian 3.1.92; Burgat & Dowell p.301 There was an unusually high
number of spoilt ballot papers from the first poll, 924,906, which was almost
certainly due to the complicated nature of the ballot paper itself. Hugh Roberts
argues that this complexity was deliberately contrived by Larbi Belkheir to
sabotage the FIS's vote. Roberts: From Radical Mission p.475
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spurious nature of some of the FLN's complaints (against, for example the FIS's
provision of transport to the polling booths), Sutton and Aghrout believe that the
fact that the local councils, most of which were controlled by the FIS, were in
charge of the electoral process meant that the allegations should be taken
seriously. 78 It was also alleged, with undoubted justification in certain areas, that
FIS-controlled councils struck the names of voters who had abstained in 1990 off
election lists:78 Nevertheless, despite the large number of complaints lodged with
the Constitutional Council, it was unlikely that a sufficient number would have
been upheld to make an effective difference to the FIS's tally of seats. 77 As Jean-
Jacques Lavenue observes, the legal paths to blocking the FIS were largely
wishful thinking on the part of their advocates:
"...it rapidly became apparent that neither the annulment of the disputed
results, nor the mobilisation of the first round abstainers...would probably be
sufficient to prevent the FIS from obtaining a majority in the second round."78
2. The FIS Between the Ballots
The comprehensive nature of the FIS's victory in the first ballot and the
virtual certainty of the party achieving a majority at the second ballot (and,
through that, its first taste of national political power) excited the party and clearly
vindicated all those who had argued for participation in the elections. Whilst
delight and exuberant expectation at the prospect of power were evident amongst
the FIS's rank and file in the wake of the results of the December 26 vote, the
party's leadership was more restrained in its response to the startling victory they
looked set to achieve.
75 Sutton & Aghrout pp.67-68; El Moudjahid 22.1.92
78 Financial Times 2.1.92
77 In refusing to overturn the results of the first ballot, the Constitutional Court
ruled that challenges to the results were justified in as few as a dozen individual
constituencies. Burgat & Dowell p.302n
78 Lavenue p.174
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I. Tactics and Strategy
The reason for the FIS leadership's measured response to the party's
victory was due to a realisation on the part of the senior figures in the leadership
that the prospect of assuming power risked the intervention of the military. The
FIS had enjoyed a delicate and tacit truce with the ANP since the events of the
previous June when the army had made amply clear its continuing antipathy
towards the FIS and the implications of its programme. Whilst it had subsequently
appeared that the military would probably have been willing to tolerate a FIS
presence in the new National Assembly, it was far from certain that it would take
a similar attitude towards a FIS majority in the Assembly and particularly not one
of a size significant enough to be able to change a constitution that the army had
pledged itself to defend and uphold. It was in reference to this consideration that
Abdelkader Hachani warned crowds of party supporters that "victory is more
dangerous than defeat" and thus urged them to show once again moderation and
restraint and so avoid giving the army an excuse to move against them and curtail
the electoral process. 79 Similarly, Aissani Othmane, generally recognised as the
third most senior figure in the new leadership, argued that the period between the
two ballots was the most vulnerable time for the FIS: once the party had secured
a majority in the second ballot, the unambiguous legitimacy this would bestow on
the FIS would prevent both the army intervening and the President siding with it if
it did. He also reminded the party that it had been when Abassi Madani and Ali
Belhadj had warned the military against intervention that it had moved to arrest
both leaders.80 Hachani made it quite clear in a press conference following the
December 26 poll that he did not anticipate confrontations with the military:
79 Algèrie Actualitè 9.1.92 This response by Hachani revealed that he had
probably neither expected nor unambiguously welcomed the massive scale of the
FIS's victory.
80 Devoluy & Duteil pp.53-54
269
"There is no conflict between us and the armed forces. It is a supposition
which has no foundation. We say to the army, it is God who has led us to
power through the people, and it is time for the army to protect the people's
choice and we believe the army will not hold back in doing this.'81
The leadership sought to eschew partisan and triunnphalist predictions of
how they would operate once in the National Assembly. Hachani spoke openly of
the party's readiness to co-operate with both the Presidency and other parties in
the APN, calling at one point for the formation of a coalition govemment.82
Despite the struggle between the two parties that had been the central feature of
the election, it appeared there was considerable evidence, both before and after
the first ballot, that the FIS and at least elements of the FLN would be willing to
co-operate in government. The FLN's leader, Abdelhamid Mehri, had admitted in
November that the FIS "were a fact of Algerian political life" with which he hoped
he could form a government of national unity to guarantee for the country "a
period of stability of 2 or 3 years."83 For the FIS, Abdelkader Hachani declared his
willingness to work with the FLN claiming that the FIS was willing to make use of
all the available expertise in Algeria.84
Particular attention had focused, in this context, on the linking role certain
senior figures on the 'Islamic' wing of the FLN might play in any future such
arrangement. Most prominent of these were the former Prime Minister,
Abdelhamid Brahimi, and the former foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, who
had actually helped found a 'Committee of Support for Political Prisoners' in
October 1991 which called for the release of Abassi Madani and the other
imprisoned FIS leaders. 85 This development signified not only the movement of
81 The Independent 30.12.91
82 Jeune Afrique 9.1.92
83 Le Monde Diplomatique 12.91
84 El Moudjahid 30.12.91 Hachani also mentioned the FFS in this context.
85 Jeune Afrique 9.1.92; Lavenue pp.164-166
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the Islamic wing of the FLN towards the FIS, but more importantly clearly
reflected the more nationalist orientation of the FIS itself. The accession of
Mohammed Said, the leader of the Djazaira to the Majlis Shura in July 1991 had
had an impact on the party's new, younger and more pragmatic leadership as the
Djazaira's more nationalist ideas had become increasingly evident in the FIS in
the Autumn of 1991. Abdelkader Hachani had marked the nationalist anniversary
of the beginning of the liberation struggle on November 1 whilst Abassi Madani
had previously explicitly boycotted the celebrations. In its programme too, the
new leadership of the FIS abandoned traditional Islamist distrust of Berber culture
and began to use the Berber language, Tamazigh, in its propaganda as an
expression of the Algerian identity.86 Abdelkader Moghni of the FIS underlined
this new link with the FLN when he criticised those whom he claimed "want to sow
discord between the FIS and the patriots of the FLN. (Italics added)"87
A consensual approach was also adopted towards the presidency. The FIS
realised that Chadli's behaviour and role was not only vital in the inter-election
period, but that he would still wield considerable constitutional and political
powers vis a vis the National Assembly even if the FIS achieved an absolute
majority in the chamber. Hachani affirmed that although his party would call for
presidential elections following the conclusion of the legislative ones, it would not
seek to impose or force this objective, saying that this matter could be "left for
later."88 This thus implied, as Hachani also stated explicitly, that the FIS were
prepared to co-habit with Chadli following the legislative elections. Hachani
declared that "there would not have to be a problem with the President of the
Republic."88
86 Aissa Khelladi: Les Islamistes Algeriens a l'Assaut du Pouvoir in Les Temps
Modemes (Janvier-Fevrier 1995, No.580) pp.146-147
87 Algarie Actualita 9.1.92
88 The Independent 30.12.91; Devoluy & Duteil pp.52-53
89 El Moudjahid 30.12.91
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The fact that many of these statements declaring the party's willingness to
co-operate with other political forces were often carefully qualified, indicated that
the party still intended to push through its own political programme. Hachani's
willingness not to press for early presidential elections was thus conditional on
the FIS having "all the real guarantees to apply our programme, so as not to
betray people who voted for us and our aims."9° Similarly, whilst the FIS's
leadership affirmed that it would respect the Constitution, Hachani stated that he
would be "obliged to modify it" if the people demanded it. 91 Despite similar
promises to accept the National Assembly's rules once there, Abdelkader Moghni
t
indicated the party's desire to reduce the President's powers by loosening his
control of the Defence and Foreign Ministries. 92 This was all quite within the FIS's
constitutional rights, but it demonstrated the party's determination to make full
use of the political power it looked set to seize at the second ballot.
There were, however, indications that the party was also intent on
introducing changes that went beyond and outside the Constitution. The prospect
of the world's first democratically elected Islamist government had attracted
considerable foreign media attention to Algeria. Anxious to pick up on any
immoderate statements made by members or leaders of the FIS, these journalists
reported much that appeared to cast doubt on the liberal and pluralistic
credentials of the party. Plans and desires, once in power, to establish popular
tribunals to try the party's enemies; to ban the secular parties and secular press
and to allow only divorced, widowed and orphaned women to work, emerged.93
Hachani moved to explicitly deny many such stories stating, on the first issue,
that there would be "no popular tribunals, nor settling of scores, nor a blood
93 The Independent 30.12.91
91 Dóvoluy & Duteil p.55
92 The Times 31.12.91
93 Financial Times 30.12.91
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bath"94 However, his statements on the FIS's supposedly moderate and tolerant
plans for Algerian society were, like his statements on co-operation with other
political forces, carefully qualified:
'The FIS will guarantee individual and collective liberties in the framework of
Islamic law and will tolerate the existence of parties other than Islamic
ones."95 (Italics added)
Similarly, he spoke of upholding "the freedom of the press in keeping with
our Arabo-Islamic principles."96
The reasons for these qualifications and indications of a much more hard-
line FIS agenda, which may have seemed dangerously provocative to the army,
were connected with the fact that the party still had to keep its own radical
constituency in check by assuring this constituency that the FIS still planned to
radically transform Algerian society. This was a balancing act the party had kept
up throughout the Autumn of 1991. During Abdelkader Hachani's imprisonment in
October, Rabah Kebir and Abdelkader Moghni had (probably consciously)
recreated the roles played by Abassi Madani and All Belhadj in 1989-91 with
Kebir's public moderation being combined with Moghni's radical denunciation in
the mosques of democracy as "blasphemy."97 Similarly, after the first ballot, it
was at the Friday sermons at the mosques that the most uncompromising
speeches and declarations by the senior figures in FIS were made to the party's
militant faithful. The day after the first ballot, a Friday, Mohammed Said warned
that Algerians "must change their customs regarding clothing and food" and
another senior figure declared that the other parties and those who voted for
94 Jeune Afrique 9.1.92
95 Ibid.
96 El Moudjahid 30.12.91
97 Charef p.217; Jeune Afrique 20.11.91 Following All Belhadj's arrest, Moghni
had assumed his influential position as main preacher at the Al Sunna mosque in
Bab El-Oued.
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them "must announce (their) repentance publicly."98 On the following Friday,
January 3, at Bab El-Cued, Abdelkader Hachani himself was heard to pronounce
that: "these elections have demonstrated that there are only two parties - the
Party of God and the Party of the Devil" and similarly also affirmed that "Our fight
is between Islamic purity and democratic impurity: 199 Such statements appeared
to contradict the President of the BEP's other pronouncements on the importance
and intrinsic value of democracy.
Where the real convictions of the leadership lay is uncertain. Ibrahim El-
Bayoumi Ghanem believes the conflicting messages reflected the difficulties the
new more moderate post-June 1991 leadership faced in retaining its radical rank
and file support whilst remaining committed to a more thoughfful and genuinely
pluralistic agenda. Bayoumi quotes Hachani, in particular, as stating on the vital
issue of the FIS's willingness to cede power in a future election that:
"If the majority of the people voted against the Sharia and Islamic
Government, it would be through a failure of the FIS not because of the
apostasy of the people. Therefore we must cede power to someone else.'10°
However, there were many who doubted that this was in fact the case and
that the immoderate statements, as in the case of Abassi Madani and All Belhadj,
were the true face of the FIB which would be fully revealed once they had fully
secured their victory at the second ballot. Even if the party's leadership may have
had more liberal and democratic convictions, it is questionable whether they
would have been capable of restraining the radical and populist impulses of the
98 The independent 2.1.92; The Guardian 28.12.91
99 Algerie Actualitè 9.1.92; Financial Times 11.1.92
100 Author's interview with Ibrahim El-Bayoumi Ghanem, Cairo, 26.6.94
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party's militants both in parliament and on the streets once the second round of
voting had occurred.lol
II. The Agenda of the FIS
Besides the collection of often contradictory statements made by individual
F1S leaders, there were more tangible indications of the FIS's programme at this
time. The party issued a sixteen page manifesto following the first round, which
purported to give a more detailed and defined account of the FIS's agenda. The
document declared the party's intention to extend Islamic Sharia law to a highly
comprehensive number of aspects of Algerian public and private life: family law,
schools, associations between men and women, the police force, the army and
factories and firms. More specifically, the document indicated the party's desire
to regulate women's dress and work (expressed as an intent to "reinforce the
faith in women's morality") and "combat" sexual promiscuity. On the institutional
level the document called for reform of government at all levels.=
The period following the first ballot also saw the FIS indicating, usually
under questioning from foreign journalists, its priorities, once in government, on
less emotive and more technical issues such as the economy and foreign policy.
Overall the party appeared to stick to its general commitment to a mixed
economy, Rabah Kebir condemning equally the "impious capitalism of the last
few years and the state socialism that had preceded it."103 Correspondingly,
Hachani argued that he had no objections on "religious grounds" to privatisation
101 It appeared that this was already occurring. Several hundred Islamists, some
armed with knives, tried to disrupt the opposition march and rally of January 2.
The Guardian 3.1.92
102 Financial Times 8.1.92
103 The Independent 28.12.91 Kebir subsequently stated, "We didn't fully support
Chadli Benjedid's economic reforms.... His programme for reform was unclear. In
terms of decisions, sometimes it was socialist, sometimes capitalist. We rejected
this because we were seeking a rational solution to solve Algeria's economic
problems." Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
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of Algeria's state-owned industries and enterprises but was opposed to the
selling-off of "publicly-owned strategic industries." He was, however, much more
critical of foreign involvement in Algeria's ongoing programme of economic
liberalisation, terming the new hydrocarbons law in Algeria, which permitted
foreign companies to exploit the country's oil and gas resources, a "transaction of
shame." He was equally hostile to the ECU 400 million loan made by the
European Community the previous Autumn to aid Algeria's economic recovery,
which he denounced as being "made by countries who are enemies of Islam."104
Nevertheless, this antipathy to foreign involvement in Algeria which reflected the
new influence of more nationalistic Djazairist views within the leadership, were
tempered by commitments to maintain relations with the IMF and other foreign
creditors as well to standing by Algeria's existing international treaties and
agreements. Hachani assured that "Algeria is not going to be isolated from the
world."105 In this, the FIS's leaders were clearly acknowledging that if they did
achieve power they could not afford to alienate the outside world if they wanted to
attempt to solve Algeria's grave economic problems. It subsequently became
apparent that discreet contacts had been established by officials of the FIS with
Western governments and multinationals to assure them that their investments in
Algeria would be respected.106
3. The Regime and the Prospect of a FIS Victory
Most important of all in terms of reactions to the results of the voting on
December 26 was, of course, that of the regime itself.
104 Financial Times 8.1.92
106 Financial Times 8.1.92; The Independent 30.12.91 Hachani also criticised
foreign media reports forecasting the "Iranisation" of Algeria. El Moudjahid
30.12.91
106 Financial Times 30.12.91
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I. President Chadli Benjedid
From the outset it appeared that the FIS's triumph in the first ballot and
almost certain achievement of a majority in the second, whilst not being his
preferred or expected result, did not unduly alarm and perturb President Chadli
Benjedid and there was no suggestion that he wished to either interrupt or delay
the second round of voting. Two days before the election, he had declared
himself prepared to cohabit with an opposition government and he did not seem
to demur on this statement once it became apparent that such a government
would probably be an exclusively FIS one. 107 Furthermore, there were persistent
reports that either personally or through an intermediary Chadli had secretly
begun negotiations with the FIS on the framework of a cohabitation agreement
with a FIS dominated National Assembly and govemment.103
The explanation for why Chadli adopted this response to the FIS's
electoral advance, especially since such an approach appeared to go against the
advice of his closest advisors, was to be found in Chadli's awareness that as
President he was far from being in a politically weak position vis a vis the FIS.109
Even if the Islamists were able to secure a majority in the National Assembly, the
Presidency still, constitutionally, wielded considerable political powers. These
included the ability to appoint and dismiss governments and ministers as well as
the ultimate authority to dissolve the Assembly itself. 110 Institutionally, both the
army and the bureaucracy were subject to his control and both clearly were far
107 Lavenue p.256
we The reports and rumours circulating about such a deal varied from stories of
Abdelaziz Khelloufi, the secretary-general of the Presidency, or more neutral
figures acting as intermediaries for Chadli in negotiations with senior figures in
the FIS; through to a story about Chadli himself supposedly meeting FIS leaders
at a ski resort near Blida at the end of November. Lamchichi: Lislamisme en
Algerie pp.174-175; Dóvoluy & Duteil pp.43-44
109 Burgat & Dowell p.303
110 Jeune Afrique 9.1.92
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more likely to back him rather than the FIS in the event of clashes and
confrontations with a FIS-controlled Assembly and government. Moreover,
despite agitation by the FIS for presidential elections to be held as soon as
possible after the conclusion of the legislative ones, Chadli still had two years of
his presidency to run until his current mandate ran out in December 1993. It was
thus perhaps hoped by him that he would be able to control and even use and
weaken the FIS and therefore neutralise the threat of an Islamist agenda being
applied in Algeria.111
This said, it was possible that a further explanation for Chadli's espousal of
the idea of cohabitation was that the President viewed it as the legal and proper
response to the latest development in the programme of political liberalisation
and democratisation that he himself had instigated in 1988-89. Thus a personal
commitment to seeing the process through has been seen to play a role. Chadli's
own honour, which he had vested in the programme originally, was perhaps at
stake. 112 Such a view was not necessarily incompatible with the more probable
explanation that Chadli wanted to continue with the electoral timetable to retain
his position. It is certainly possible that Chadli believed that he could best ensure
the survival of his 'democratic project' by pressing ahead with the second ballot
and then using his powers to curb the potentially anti-democratic excesses of the
Fl S.
II. The Algerian Military
Chadli's sanguine response to the results of the election was not reflected
in the Algerian military's assessment of the implications of the ballot. Whether or
not the scale of the FIS's victory had been anticipated by the senior figures in the
army, it was clearly not welcomed by them. The historic antipathy between the
111 Ibid. 16.1.92
112 Ibid.
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Algerian military and the country's Islamist movement has already been explored
(see previous chapter), but the now very real prospect of FIS dominance of the
government and the National Assembly sharpened both the nature and intensity
of the army's hostility to the FIS and its agenda.
For many senior figures in the military, a FIS government would spell
disaster, politically and economically, for the Algeria they had pledged
themselves to defend. There were considerable fears for the already highly
fragile condition of the country's economy. Fear of the FIS coming to power
threatened to further deepen the nation's colossal debt (estimated at $25 billion
in December 1991 113) through capital flight and the cancelling by foreign petrol
companies, of agreements aimed at increasing exploitation of Algeria's oil and
gas resources.114
Politically, the Algerian military felt certain that the FIS would bring
instability and conflict to large areas of Algerian life, developments that the ANP
had historically pledged itself to prevent. The FIS's victory in the first ballot had,
as has been shown, produced great alarm amongst significant sections of
Algeria's population and there were indications that many opponents of the FIS
were already preparing for armed conflict with a future Islamist government. 113 Of
particular concern were the ethnically distinct areas of Mzab and Kabyle which
had decisively rejected FIS candidates at the elections of 1990 and 1991 • 116 The
threat of civil war could not be ruled out. 117 It was also probably the case that,
despite the ANP's past, at least some of the senior figures in the military had
become committed to the goal of democratisation as the best avenue for Algeria
113 mEED 27.12.91
114 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.175
115 Author's interviews with eyewitnesses.
116 The Mzabite areas had predominantly voted for independent candidates in
both elections, whilst the Kabyle, as has been shown, supported the RCD in 1990
and the FFS in 1991.
ill Charef p.253
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to achieve the traditional goals of development and modernisation to which the
ANP had always been publicly attached.118
More crucially and more importantly for the military were fears it held for its
own integrity and survival if the FIS were able to achieve a majority in the
National Assembly. There was considerable concern amongst the senior figures
in the army that once in power the Islamists would waste no time in seeking to
use their new political powers to attempt to neutralise their traditional foes, and
only truly powerful enemies, in the general staff of the military. Such fears were
also shared by more junior officers who also saw themselves as the potential
targets of the rumoured 'popular tribunals' and who, having often had a secular
and frequently foreign military training were similarly anxious for the survival of a
modern and secular state.119
The military were not reassured by Chadli's confidence that he could keep
the Islamists in check with the use of his constitutional and institutional powers.
They doubted his strength of will and ability to constrain the Assembly and feared
he might 'defect' to the Islamist camp to preserve his position. 120 Despite both
Chadli and Abdelkader Hachani's vehement denials 121 the ANP were already
highly suspicious of the rumours and reports circulating about the President
conducting secret discussions with the FIS, one of which alleged that the
dismissal of the senior personnel in the army had been conceded by Chadli in
return for a cohabitation agreement with the party. 122 Neither were they
persuaded by arguments that the FIS under Abdelkader Hachani's post Batna
Conference leadership was significantly more moderate than the leadership the
military had helped imprison the previous June. The military were aware that the
118 Zoubir p.106
1 1 9 Dóvoluy & Duteil p.45 & p.47
120 Charef p.254
121 Algerie Actualitê 30.12.92
1 22 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.84; Zoubir p.103; The Guardian 14.1.92
280
FIS continued to be influenced by directives coming via relatives and lawyers
from Abassi Madani and All Belhadj in prison in Blida and also believed that
whatever the intentions of the leadership of the party, the FIS's rank and file
would force the party to implement a radical agenda once in power.123
The leaders of the military were aware that their own position and room for
manoeuvre could be sharply reduced once the second ballot had taken place.
Any move the military might make against the FIS after the conclusive second
ballot could put severe strains on the integrity of the army, the loyalty of the
troops being confused and possibly divided by the election of an apparently
legitimate new Assembly. 124 The declared intention of the FIS to secure the
release of all its members and supporters arrested in June 1991 and prosecuted
by military courts under the state of siege represented a clear challenge to the
all-important authority of the military. 125 Given these factors, then, it was clear that
if the military were to move against the FIS and somehow block their achievement
of a legislative majority, it would have to do so before the holding of the second
round of voting scheduled for 16 January.
D: THE 'COUP DitTAT: JANUARY 1992
1. The Military Plot
A covert meeting was held at the end of December to discuss the options
available to the military. It was attended by all the senior military figures in the
country including Khaled Nezzar, the Defence Minister; Abdelmalek Guenaizia,
Chief of the General Staff; leaders of the navy, the Gendarmerie and the security
services; and the commanding colonels of the military regions. Little time was lost
123 Nouvel Observateur 16.1.92
124 DeVOIUy & Duteil p.45
125 Jeune Afrique 16.1.92
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in agreeing that the FIS's path to electoral victory should be blocked and
discussion then focused on how this was to be best achieved. Whether through a
genuine attachment to constitutional legality or, more likely, for tactical reasons, it
was decided that the FIS's progress to victory should, as far as possible, be
blocked by constitutional methods rather than by physical force.126
Chadli Benjedid, as President, held the key to such moves. It was his
determination to press ahead with the second ballot and then cohabit with the FIS
that so alarmed the military and he was clearly the main obstacle to any plan
aimed at averting a F1S government. For Nezzar, Guenaizia and the other figures
at the secret meeting, it was therefore evident that Chadli had to go. His
resignation would not only remove the personal obstacle he represented but
would also help force the suspension of the second round of the election. 127 In
order to persuade the President of the necessity of his resignation a
comprehensive petition of military officers began to be compiled to demonstrate
to Chadli the strength and solidarity of feeling within the armed forces.
The second question to which the military leaders gave attention was who
should then replace Chadli as President. According to the Constitution, in the
event of the death or resignation of the President, the Presidency should
provisionally pass, until proper elections could be held, to the President of the
National Assembly. This, however, constituted a problem to Nezzar and his
colleagues. The outgoing President of the Assembly, Abdelaziz Belkhadem,
despite being a member of the FLN, was perceived as being far too sympathetic
to the FIS. His efforts to act as peace broker during the crisis of June 1991, which
had involved him in several meetings with the leaders of the F1S, had earned him
the sobriquet of the 'valet of the FIS. 1128 Such a figure, with an established
125 D6voluy & Duteil pp.42-43
127 Burgat & Dowell p.303
128 Dèvoluy & Duteil p.60
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reputation for seeking compromise with the Islamists, was clearly even more
unacceptable to the military than Chadli and therefore a way (preferably
constitutional) had to be found around this obstacle. It was decided that Chadli, in
addition to tendering his own resignation, must also be persuaded to dissolve the
existing National Assembly before resigning, and thus prevent the triggering of
the constitutional mechanism which would lead to Belkhadem succeeding him as
President. Succession to the Presidency would then pass, by the military's
calculations, to Abdelmalek Benhabyles, the head of the Constitutional Council
and a far more acceptable figure to the military than either Chadli or Belkhadem.
The decision to pursue this strategy was concluded at another meeting of
the senior figures in the military on 4 January. According to a source close to the
Presidency, Khaled Nezzar went from this meeting to the offices of the President
where he then spent the night persuading Chadli of the unavoidable necessity of
his resignation. Having listened to Nezzar and having seen the list of 181 military
officers who signed the petition requesting his resignation, Chadli, having first
secured assurance that he would be replaced by a strong regime, then agreed to
step down.129
However, the military plotters' plans for a 'constitutional coup' suffered
something of a setback after they had successfully persuaded Chadli of their
designs. By January 5 it had become clear that the President of the Constitutional
Council, Abdelmalek Benhabyles, had refused to co-operate with the military's
plans to let him become interim president. 139 According to Benhabyles he could
1 29 Ibid. p.68 & p.70 There are differing accounts of the chronology of these
developments. Paul-Marie de la Gorce claimed that the military finalised their
plans on the 7th or 8th January and did not manage to persuade Chadli to step
down until a few days later - the President still convinced of the wisdom of
carrying on up until January 10. Jeune Afrique 16.1.92 The chronology offered
by Dóvoluy & Duteil has been used in the main text since it is the most detailed, it
appeared later (and is therefore more likely to be more considered and accurate)
and quotes a source close to the presidency for its details.
1 3° Ibid. p.75
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not assume the Presidency since the Constitution only provided for the President
of the Constitutional Council becoming President in the event of the death, not
the resignation, of an incumbent President.131
This development finally forced the military leaders to abandon their plans
to utilise the proper provisions of the Constitution to achieve their plans. They
remained, however, anxious to maintain, what Francois Burgat terms, "a legalistic
facade."132 Thus it was planned that following the official announcement of his
resignation, Chadli would cede power to the High Council for Security (HCS)
which would appoint his successor. Attachment to the appearances of
constitutionality was supposedly maintained since the HCS was an existing body
and was provided for in the Constitution. However, its defined role in the
Constitution was simply to act as a consultative body to the Head of State on
issues of state security and was clearly not intended to act, even in a provisional
capacity, as an executive or legislative body. 133 The planned defence for this
constitutional deviation, though, was to be that the Constitution itself did not
provide for the simultaneous absence of both the National Assembly (having
been dissolved by Chadli - supposedly five days before his resignation 134) and
the President. Therefore extraordinary powers needed to be granted to other
constitutional bodies such as the HCS which itself would specifically assume the
powers of the National Assembly. 136 The real explanation for the emergence of
the HCS into the political foreground was that it was dominated by senior military
officers including Nezzar, Guenaizia and Larbi Belkheir, the Minister of the
I nterior.136
131 Daily Telegraph 14.1.92
132 Burgat & Dowell p.302
133 Lavenue p.179
134 jeune Afrique 24.1.92 This was not known, however, until after Chadli's
resignation itself.
135 Burgat & Dowell pp.301-302
136 Middle East International 24.1.92
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2. The 'Coup': January 11-16 1992
Finally, on 11 January, just five days before the second ballot was due to
be held, the military's rapidly constructed plan to thwart the FIS was launched
with the appearance of President Chadli Benjedid on national television. In a
quiet voice and what one observer described as "sober informality" 137, Chadli
announced his resignation to the nation, declaring that:
"Given the difficulty and gravity of the current situation, I consider my
resignation necessary to protect the unity of the people and the security of
the country."138
The following day the HCS stepped to the fore, as planned, and issued a
statement announcing "the impossibility of continuing the electoral process until
necessary conditions were achieved for the normal functioning of institutions."13;
Tanks and troops moved onto the streets to guard important points and buildings
in Algiers. On the same day the HCS announced the appointment of a Haut
Comite d'Etat (HCE) which would function as a collective successor to President
Chadli. Despite the constitutional provisions that presidential elections must
follow within 45 days of the death or resignation of a president, the HCE
assumed, on the claimed advice of the Constitutional Court, the presidential
mandate Chadli had 'won' in 1988 and which was due to formally expire in
December 1993.140
The HCE was revealed as comprising five figures: Khaled Nezzar; All Kafi,
the leader of the Veterans Association; Tijani Haddam, the rector of the Paris
Mosque; and Ali Haroun, the Human Rights Minister in Ghozali's government.
137 The Guardian 13.1.92
138 middle East International 24.1.92
139 The Guardian 13.1.92
140 Burgat & Dowell p.302
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The fifth figure, and the one who was to assume the leadership of this new
collective presidency, was Mohammed Boudiaf, a veteran leader of Algeria's war
of liberation, who had been forced into exile in Morocco by Ben Bella in 1964.
Boudiaf duly returned to the country after nearly 28 years away on January 16 to
assume the daunting task that Algeria's military leaders had bestowed on him.
The composition of the HCE indicated what impression the military
planners of the 'coup' wished to give. One observer noted that each member
represented "a symbolic piece of the collective field" of Algeria. 141 All Kafi, as
secretary-general of the veterans association, the ONM (Organisation Nationale
des Moudjahidine) was chosen to provide the historic link with the suffering and
sacrifice of Algeria's birth through the war of liberation. All Haroun, a doctor in law
and Human Rights Minister, clearly represented the new regime's desire to
portray itself as concerned about legality and human rights, despite the nature of
its accession to power. The choice of Tijani Haddam was an evident attempt to
give the regime a degree of religious legitimacy and thus perhaps limit the
inevitable backlash and condemnation from the Islamists. This last choice of the
rector of the Paris Mosque also reflected a desire to emphasise the modem and
liberal tendency that Haddam supposedly exemplified. 142 Significantly, Ahmed
Sahnoun, the leader of the Rabitat Dawa and senior figure in the Islamist
movement, had also been approached to take this 'religious' seat on the HCE, but
had refused. 143 The presence of General '<haled Nezzar, as Defence Minister
and the figure widely perceived as the 'brains' behind the 'coup', on the HCE
needed little explanation.144
The choice of Mohammed Boudiaf, as the head of the new collective
Presidency, was perhaps the most significant of all. It appears that Nezzar and
141 jeune Afrique 24.1.92
142 jeune Afrique 24.1.92; Devoluy & Duteil pp.77-79
143 DeVOlUy & Duteil p.79
144 Jeune Afrique 16.1.92
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his fellow conspirators were aware of the need to give the regime a fresh image
and an enhanced sense of legitimacy, to counteract the negative impression of
the coup and perhaps even to reconstruct some kind of popular support for the
regime (which had all but vanished over the preceding years). A number of
different names were discussed but the choice of Mohammed Boudiaf, with his
high-profile historic revolutionary record, was felt to give the new regime the
image of legitimacy it required. More importantly, though, it was realised that
Boudiafs long absence from Algeria cleared him of any suspicion of the
corruption that was popularly perceived to be endemic within the Algerian
establishment and regime, and which had so aided the FIS's electoral triurriph.145
His choice as the new figurehead for the regime came relatively late on in the
coup plotters' plans. It came after Abdelmalek Benhabyles' refusal to assume the
presidency. From an interview given by Boudiaf in Morocco on January 9, it is
clear that he himself was unaware of plans regarding him at this point. 146 Less
than a week later he had returned to Algeria to take up his new position.
3. Reactions
News of the effective coup d'ëtat by the military against Chadli, the
electoral process and ultimately the FIS, came as no surprise to many inside and
outside Algeria. As Francois Burgat observed: "The uncertainty concerned only
the time when they would make their move - before or after the first round of
voting."147 Indications of the plans of the military were evident in advance of the
formal announcement of Chadli's resignation on 11 January. Abdelkader Hachani
voiced his concern on January 8 over troop movements across Algeria and the
145 Burgat & Dowell p.303; Lamchichi: Lislamisme en Algetie p.175; Dèvoluy &
Duteil pp.79-83
146 Jeune Afrique 24.1.92 According to Dèvoluy & Duteil, the decision finally to
contact Boudiaf was taken on 8 January. Devoluy & Duteil p.83
147 Burgat & Dowell p.298-299
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parallel lack of apparent preparation by the authorities for the holding of the
second ballot scheduled for January 16:
'We want to know what justification there is for this deployment. If it is
because of the second round, why have they deployed in regions where
seats were decided at the first poll?"145
For the FIS these fears were confirmed by the train of events that began
with Chadli's resignation. A journalist accompanying Hachani on an internal flight
he was making at the time, noted the F1S leader's tense if unsurprised reaction to
the news of the President's resignation, when informed of it mid-flight. 149 Rabah
Kebir later stated that 'We expected that the army may cancel the elections, but
our expectation was not 100%."150 The party's leadership was clearly aware of
the importance of formulating a careful response to these developments and the
need to prevent the initiative they had won from slipping, or being seized, away
from them. Thus whilst initially dismissing Chadli's resignation as "a piece of
theatre"151 (which it nonetheless took the credit for152) it was not until January 13,
following a secret meeting in the suburbs, that the FIS formally responded to the
developments of the previous three days. 153 The statement issued by the party
declared Chadli's resignation to be unconstitutional and the new 'regime'
illegitimate and the result of a comprehensive conspiracy. Attention was drawn to
the purely consultative function the Constitution accorded to the HCS which
consequently had no legal right to take over the reins of power. This treasonable
146 Financial Times 9.1.92
149 Nouvel Observateur 16.1.92
150 Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
151 The Independent 13.1.92
152 SWB ME/1280 N5 17.1.92
153 The Guardian 14.1.92
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act by a small clique, the statement declared, was a betrayal of both God and the
Algerian people and one which all Algerians should stand together against.154
The relatively restrained tone of the statement, especially with regard to
action to be taken against the new regime was remarked on by many observers
who expected a far more robust response, perhaps even a call to arms, from the
Islamists who were witnessing a transparent attempt to rob them of their electoral
victory. However, the FIS felt that their strength and therefore their legitimacy had
been proven during the first round of voting and there was no need for a
confrontation yet. 155 In addition there was the ever-present concern that the
military were simply waiting for another excuse to crackdown upon and this time
possibly ban the FIS altogether. Accordingly, the FIS continued to restrain itself
and avoid confrontation with the regime in the same fashion as it had since June
1991. A rally to be held by the party on hills outside Algiers was cancelled in the
wake of Chadli's resignation, and Abdelkader Hachani, whilst calling on the
party's supporters to oppose the coup, promised that the FIS "would pursue the
application of its programme in a peaceful manner and rejects the use of
violence."155 An official communique from the party on January 17 called on the
population not to respond to provocations from the security services, a message
that was backed by more hard-line senior figures in the party such as Abdelkader
Moghni, who implored crowds at the Al Sunna Mosque not to "furnish them with
the opportunity they are waiting for."157
Besides these initial reactions, the FIS was aware of the need to develop a
clear strategic response to the coup. Correspondingly, the party announced at a
press conference at Algiers Town Hall on 15 January three proposals which it
was putting to the regime. Firstly, that the electoral process be allowed to
154 MEED 24.1.92
155 lb Id
156 The Independent 13.1.92; Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.238
157 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.238; The Guardian 18.1.92
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continue. Secondly, that the presidency should be assumed by Abdelmalek
Benhabyles until the National Assembly elections were concluded, at which point
the new President of the Assembly would take over as Head of State. Presidential
elections should then be held as soon as possible. Thirdly, that all political
prisoners, including the FIS leaders at Blida, should be released.166
The FIS also entered into discussions with other political parties which
rejected the coup. This perhaps surprising move, may have reflected the sincerity
of Hachani's earlier calls for inter-party co-operation and even a coalition
government in the National Assembly, but more likely it demonstrated the FIS's
realisation that it must construct as broad a front as possible against the regime
so as to undermine its legitimacy. Whilst some parties, such as the RCD and the
PAGS openly and unambiguously applauded the termination of the electoral
process, other parties, notably those which had won seats in the first round,
shared the FIS's opposition to the coup. 169
 Hocine Alt Ahmed of the FFS refused
to deviate from his unwavering commitment to democracy and the elections,
despite having been approached to co-operate with the plotters before the coup.
He was now willing to co-operate with the FIS in order to attempt to have the
cancellation of the elections reversed. 103 More interestingly, the FLN joined the
FIS and the FFS in opposition to the HCE which the party's leader, Abdelhamid
Mehri, branded as "anti-constitutional", thus emphasising the separation of the
party from the core of the regime. 161 Meetings between the leaders of the three
parties took place through the 15th and 16th of January, the FIS announcing on
the first day its intention to form a parallel parliament consisting of the 231
deputies elected in the first round of voting.162
158 SWB ME11280 N5 17.1.92
159 Jeune Afrique 24.1.92
180 Dèvoluy & Duteil pp.50-51
161 Middle East International 24.1.92
162 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.85 & p.238
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4. Repression and Dissolution of the HS: January-March 1992
It soon became clear "that the initiative was fast slipping away from the
FIS.", as one Western journalist noted during Abdelkader Hachani's speech to
the party's faithful after prayers on Friday 17 January. 163 Indeed, in what
increasingly appeared to be a replay of the events of the previous June, growing
numbers of FIS militants began to be arrested by the authorities. This accelerated
following the first reported attack on the regime by Islamists, which occurred on
the night of 18 January when an army barracks was attacked at Sidi Mousse to
the south of Algiers, resulting in the death of a soldier. 164 On 22 January Hachani
himself was arrested after calling on soldiers to "give up their allegiances to
despots" a statement interpreted by the authorities as an illegal incitement for the
army to mutiny. 165
 The editor and various staff on the newspaper which printed
Hachani's call to the soldiers, El-Khaber were also arrested. Hachani's
successors to President of the Executive Bureau of the FIS, Othmane Aissani
and Rabah Kebir were also detained as soon as each attempted to assume the
position following the arrest of the previous holder. 166 Several FIS deputies
elected to the National Assembly in the first round of voting in December also
began to be arrested.167
The regime also struck, as it had done in June 1991, against the
institutional and organisational bases of the party. On 22 January Sid Ahmed
Ghozali, who had remained Prime Minister (having fully supported the coup)
announced measures that banned all political activity, including all speeches "of
163 Daily Telegraph 18.1.92
164 Rnancial Times 20.1.92
165 Lamchichi: Ulslamisme en Algdrie p.239
166 The Independent 24.1.92; Lavenue p.257 Rabah Kebir was officially arrested
for allegedly issuing a statement calling on people not to recognise the new
regime. Middle East International 7.2.92
167 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algèrie p.85
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a political nature", at mosques. 168 Decrees were passed prohibiting worshippers
spilling onto streets outside mosques, and the army began to turn away people
trying to attend the most popular mosques. It was as the army moved to replace
the imams of the estimated 8,000 mosques controlled by the FIS that the first
violent conflicts with the Islamist movement began. 1€9 In Batna on February 5
clashes erupted following the sentencing of an imam for breaking the
government's ruling on politics in mosques (this was the pretext for most of the
arrests and replacements of imams) which presaged similar incidents across the
country, particularly in the capital, as supporters of the FIS came onto the streets
to challenge the authorities' ruling. 17° Clashes over the weekend of 7 to 9
February left, according to medical services, 40 dead and at least 300 injured as
firearms began to be used by both sides.171
Finally, on 9 February in the face of a mounting tide of violence against
them, the authorities announced a state of emergency. Furthermore, the Minister
of the Interior, Larbi Belkheir, announced the beginning of legal procedures to
officially dissolve the F1S on the grounds that it had attempted insurrection
against the state. 172
 Whilst dissolution of the FIS had clearly been the ultimate
objective of the military from the start, it appeared that the new President of the
HCE was less committed to this end. Up until 3 February, Mohammed Boudiaf
denied that he wanted to ban the party but insisted that the F1S must operate
within the framework of the law. Six days later he declared that although he did
168 MEED 31.1.92; The Independent 24.1.92 Ghozali had established close links
with the military and attempted to portray himself as the civilian spokesman of the
new regime. He publicly made much of the "irregularities" of the first ballot and
bolstered the appearance of the legitimacy of the regime when he appeared on
television to claim that he, as Prime Minister, had ordered the tanks and troops
onto the streets in the wake of the coup. Jeune Aftique 16.1.92; Middle East
International 24.1.92
169 Middle East International 7.2.92
170 Middle East International 21.2.92; The Observer 9.2.92
171 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algêrie p.85; The Observer 9.2.92
172 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie p.85
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not wish to dissolve any party which respected democracy, dissolution was
inevitable since "the FIS wanted to use democracy to destroy it."173 It was clear
that Boudiaf had been swayed by both the mounting violence and pressure from
the military. Having been dissuaded once, by President Chadli in June 1991, from
breaking up the FIS, the ANP was determined that this time their will should
prevail.
The regime moved swiftly to defeat and dismember the FIS in the wake of
the 9 February announcements. Making full use of the extensive extra-ordinary
powers the state of emergency granted the security forces, which included wide-
ranging powers of arrest and curtailment of rights of association, the military
began large-scale arrests of FIS militants. 174 Five new 'detention centres' were
set-up on 17 February in the Sahara to house the between 5,000 (the official
figure) and 30,000 (the FIS's estimate) Islamists arrested in the security swoops
as clashes continued to occur across the country. 175 In response, the remains of
the FIS leadership attempted to rally support to the party by organising a rally for
February 14 but evidence of the intent of the military to prevent this occurring
forced the plan to be abandoned to avert a blood bath. 176 It proved to be the last
major act of the party. The FIS was formally dissolved, following the completion of
the procedures instituted by the Interior Ministry, by an Algiers court on 4 March
1992. It was found guilty of multiple violations of the law. 177
 However, as
Abderrahim Lamchichi remarked, by this stage there was not much left of the F1S
to dissolve:
173 MEED 14.2.92; Middle East International 21.2.92
174 Lamchichi: L'Islamisme en Algerie pp.85-86
175 Ibid. p.86 & p.240
176 Middle East International 21.2.92 The fact that this decision by the F1S
leadership to call off the rally was largely followed indicated the strength and
endurance of the communication lines in the party: the order being mainly
disseminated through the mosques following prayers on the previous Friday.
177 The Guardian 5.3.92
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"..its seat in Algiers had been shut, its newspapers banned, its 250 town halls
confiscated, its principal leaders imprisoned, its militants interned in security
camps. "178
E: CONCLUSIONS
The events of January to March 1992 finally brought to a close Algerian
Islamism's brief three-year foray into the arena of party political competition for
political power. The cancellation and annulment of the elections by the 'new'
regime formally signalled an end to Algeria's wider and similarly short-lived
experiment with democratisation and political pluralism.
The period since the events of the Summer of 1991 had seen the FIS
regroup itself under a younger more pragmatic and nationalistically oriented
leadership that ensured that the party continued with the electoralist strategy
pursued by Abassi Madani. It was, ironically, the remarkable success that this
strategy once again enjoyed at the ballot box on December 26, that proved to be
the undoing of both the strategy and the FIS. As Hugh Roberts observed, the FIS
were confronted in the wake of the ballot with "not an electoral triumph but a
strategic disaster."179
This disaster took the form of provoking the one force that could bring a
lasting halt to the whole electoral process and the FIS's chance of some national
political power, into doing precisely that. Having re-entered the political arena in
June 1991 the Algerian military had allowed themselves to be persuaded by
President Chadli that permitting the FIS to continue to function represented the
most sensible option for the retention of civil peace and stability. The results of
the first ballot demonstrated that the President's calculations and reassurances
about the reduced strength of the FIS been wildly inaccurate. Chadli's willingness
178 Lamchichi: Lislamisme en Algèrie p.86 The military had closed down the
Algiers headquarters of the party shortly before the announcement of the state of
emergency on 9 February. Financial Times 10.2.92
179 Roberts: From Radical Mission p.474
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to countenance a FIS dominated National Assembly which could plunge Algeria
into chaos and facilitate a concerted assault on the army's privileges and senior
personnel pushed the leaders of Algeria's military to act.
The resolution of the army and their apparent effectiveness in carrying out
the curtailment of the electoral process and the subsequent dismemberment of
the FIS did, however, obscure one important fact. The results of December 1991
had demonstrated the remarkable resilience of the FIS. Despite suffering serious
internal splits, the banning of its newspapers and the removal of many of its
leaders including its two most senior figures, the party had still nearly gathered as
many votes as all the other political parties combined. It had lost some 1.2 million
votes since June 1990 but had still managed to retain the support of more than
three-and-a-quarter million Algerians - nearly a quarter of the total electorate. By
simply discarding the electoral process and sweeping away the institutional
manifestations of the RS, the leaders of the Algerian military risked provoking a
substantial section of the Algerian population by ignoring the demands and
concerns they expressed in voting so massively for the FIS.
7THE DESCENT INTO CONFLICT: THE FIS, THE GIA AND THE
SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 1992 - 1994
A: THE BEGINNING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE
1. The New Regime: Boudiars Initiative - January-June 1992
The formal dissolution of the FIS at the beginning of March 1992 signalled
the effective closure of the period 1989-92 which had been dominated by the FIS.
The ending of this period also implied the need, on the part of the regime which
had established itself in January, to provide a workable alternative path for
Algeria in place of the turbulent one taken by Chadli.
It rapidly became apparent that the inspiration and driving force behind
such a new course would be provided by the new President himself: Mohammed
Boudiaf. Boudiaf was conscious of the need to act in three particular areas, civil
order, the economy, and political legitimacy, to set Algeria back on a stable path.
As has been shown in chapter 6 the new regime engaged swiftly in seeking to
'maintain public order', with a security clamp down and mass arrests and in
addition to these measures large-scale security operations were mounted to hunt
down armed opposition to the regime. 1 The government faced a daunting
challenge to revive the Algerian economy which struggled under a colossal
external debt of $25 billion (entailing a debt service ratio of over 70%), negative
growth and high unemployment, particularly among the young.2 For Boudiaf,
though, improvement in the economic situation was a priority. For him the
strength of the Islamist tide which the FIS had ridden so successfully over the
previous three years was a clear product of the economic crisis that had
I MEI 26.6.92 & 12.6.92
2 MEED 27.12.91
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continued to grip Algeria through that same period, and thus rapid economic
improvement would serve to cut back Islamism as swiftly as it had risen.3
Boudiafs third and most complex objective was the exclusion of Islamism
from the political field and its replacement with some form of alternative able to
attract the kind of popular support and legitimacy that the FIS had so clearly
shown itself able to attract. Following the official dissolution of the FIS, Boudiaf
made it clear that re-legalisation for the party was out of the question. He argued
that the party had put itself outside both the law and society by its actions, stating
that it had shown itself willing to "stop at nothing to monopolise power" and had
made murder "part of their philosophy of taking power." Consequently: "It has not
left any chance of reconciliation. Absolutely none." 4
Whilst Boudiaf s antipathy to the FIS as a party was unambiguous, he was
aware of the importance of winning over and avoiding the alienation of those
three-and-a-quarter million Algerians who had voted for the party on 26
December. The regime's tough response to unrest and violent oppositiOn, was
demonstrated by handing-out of thirteen death sentences to Islamists involved in
the attack on the border post at Guemmar in November 1991 (see chapter 6) and
the President's threat to send another 10,000 people to the detention camps in
the Sahara if deemed necessary for the salvation of Algeria. 5 This was, however,
mixed with clemency. Charges brought against Abdelkader Hachani and Rabah
Kebir were publicly rejected by the courts when they came to trial (although both
were still detained) and the regime progressively released many of the estimated
3 E1 Moudjahid 17.5.92
4 Ibid. The return of any substantially similar political grouping was also ruled out
by the President who pointed to the provisions of the 1989 constitution which
banned the establishment of political parties based solely on religion to justify his
repression of the FIS and promised that future constitutional revision would
further bolster this prohibition.
5 MEI 15.5.92; The Guardian 18.4.92
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9,000 people detained in the security clamp down of February-March, whom
Boudiaf described as "simple stone-throwers:6
In terms of more tangible measures to construct a more popular and
legitimate ruling order, Boudiaf and the HCE sought to widen the political base of
the regime. Aware that the coup d'etat of January and the HCE were widely seen
as illegitimate, having been explicitly condemned by the three parties which had
attracted the most votes in the first ballot (the FIS, the FLN and the FFS), the
regime consequently attempted to draw in former members of other political
parties and tendencies. In a clear appeal to the constituency of the FIS two
moderate Islamists, Sassi Lamouri (ex-HAMAS) and Said Guechi (co-founder and
former member of the FIS) were appointed to the ministries in the new
government. Hashem Nait Djoudi, former general secretary of the FFS was
appointed as transport and telecommunications minister. 7 In an attempt to fill the
void left by the dissolution of the National Assembly, elections to which were
postponed indefinitely by the regime8, a National Consultative Council (CCN) was
created. Launched on 22 April 1992, the CCN aimed to include a range of
prominent personalities who would advise the government despite not enjoying
any formal powers. However, attempts to tempt figures from other parties to join
this body proved less than successful: Hocine Ait Ahmed, the leader of the FFS,
turned down the government's offer of the chairmanship of the CounciI.9
Boudiaf also attempted to create a mass popular organisation in the country
at large capable of mobilising opinion and support. On its launch the
Rassemblement Democratique National (RDN) was heralded by the President as
"the framework to discuss difficulties at all levels of national life with the
6 MEI 15.5.92; Jeune Afrique 2.4.92; MEI 12.6.92
7 ME! 6.3.92
8 Boudiaf had stated that elections would be held within two years "provided the
circumstances are right for true democracy." (MEI 21.2.92) Hints also emerged
that Presidential elections could be held within the year. MEI 26.6.92
9 MEED 5.6.92
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authorities."10 The RDN encapsulated Boudiafs overall strategy for regaining
political consensus and legitimacy. Incorporating twelve other, albeit insignificant,
political parties the RDN began to set up branches across the country as Boudiaf
made a concerted pitch for the sort of personal and direct legitimacy that Houari
Boumedienne had been able to achieve during his presidency (see chapter 3).11
Boudiaf mounted extended tours across Algeria to popularise and explain both
the RDN and his ideas generally. It was during one of these tours at Annaba that
he was assassinated on June 29 1992.12
The death of independent Algeria's fourth President, gunned down by one
of his own bodyguards whilst making a speech, threatened to push Algeria even
deeper into political crisis and malaise. The crisis was magnified by the
widespread conviction, despite the apparent Islamist sympathies of the
bodyguard responsible for the killing and the obvious interest Islamists would
have in murdering such a resolute opponent of their agenda, that the
assassination had been planned and facilitated by senior figures within the
regime. The evidence behind these suspicions can not be fully listed here, but it
was widely accepted that during his five-and-a-half months tenure as President,
Boudiaf had succeeded in making several powerful enemies who had begun to
see him as a threat to their entrenched interests. The most widely endorsed
theory behind the President's death was that in seeking to accrue popular support
and legitimacy for the regime, particularly through his much-vaunted campaign
against endemic and large-scale government corruption, Boudiaf had threatened
the vital political and especially financial interests of important figures within both
the military and bureaucracy. Corruption trials had already begun; starting with
the prosecution of an ex-major general, Mustapha Belloudf. Despite accusations
10 MEI 10.7.92
11 MEED 5.6.92
12 MEI 10.7.92
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that he had become a symbolic scapegoat, there was significant concern in
several important quarters over whether other highly-placed figures would be
similarly indicted.13
Whoever was behind the assassination and whatever motives they may
have had, it did seem clear that the incident was not the orchestrated work of the
recently dissolved FIS or the wider Islamist movement. However, whilst FIS
figures explicitly denied allegations that the dissolved party was behind the
assassination, communiqués purporting to come from the party appeared to
welcome the development:
'The FIS announces the good news to the Algerian people and the
inevitability of the materialisation of their hopes of the installation of an
Islamic state."14
2. The Response of the Islamist Movement
L Initial Reactions
Following the official confirmation of the dissolution order by the Court of
Algiers, a number of the few remaining unimprisoned F1S leaders (including four
members of the party's Majlis Shura) appeared at the Arqam mosque in the
southern Algiers suburb of Chateau Neuf on 4 March. In front of an estimated
gathering of 5,000 and in contravention of the authorities' ban on political
messages at mosques, FIS Communique No.21 was read out. 15 Giving the party's
official reaction to the dissolution order the communique said that the party had
not been surprised by the move and robustly stated that:
13 For fuller accounts and theories behind the assassination of Boudiaf see
Devoluy & Duteil pp.190-215 and The Independent 24.7.92
14 Le Monde 2.7.92
15 Reuters, Algiers, 6.3.92
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"The FIS represents a case, a nation, a religion and a history which will not
die away due to a mere dissolution decision."18
More ominously the statement went on to declare that:
"The dissolution of the FIS is a return to the rule by the sword and the self-
interested elite domination which opens up the state to unpredictable
consequences and dangerous developments, as long as the country remains
in the control of a gang who has no respect for the Sharia or the
constitution."17
What was implied by "unpredictable consequences and dangerous
developments" appeared uncertain at this time. The communique stayed in line
with established FIS practice in avoiding making any appeal for public unrest
beyond calls to people to remain "steadfast."
In fact, popular reaction to the FIS's dissolution appeared remarkably
muted and that which did occur was suppressed. Small groups which tried to
protest in Constantine and the outskirts of Algiers were dispersed by tear gas and
gunfire. More structured forms of protest against the decision, such as the
formation by Islamist students of the MUDCP (Mouvement Universitaire pour la
Defense du Choix du Peuple) were similarly clamped-down on. 18 The apparent
lack of public reaction to events was the result of the efficiency of the security
operation by the regime against the FIS and the Islamist movement. As had been
the case in June-July 1991, the large scale arrests of both senior and
intermediate leaders of the party had deprived the FIS of its usually impressive
mobilisational powers.19
/ 6 FIS Communique No.21 5.3.92
17 Ibid.
18 MEI 20.3.92; Jeune Afrique 2.4.92
19 By April 1992, 109 of the FIS's victorious candidates in the December 1991
ballot (including those proceeding to the second round) were held in detention
along with 28 presidents of APWs, 200 presidents of APCs and 528 members of
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Clandestinely issued calls for armed resistance purporting to come from the
FIS appeared over the following few months. Whilst these elicited no direct and
immediate popular response, there was a quite clear and progressive increase in
violence generally during this period. 20 Increasing clashes between the police
and armed militants occurred in Algiers and bombs exploded outside newspaper
offices and at Constantine University in early May. There was also a growing
number of assassinations of members of both the security forces and the
judiciary: 70 police officers being killed, through either attacks on individual
officers or small stations, by the beginning of August.21
Such attacks appeared to indicate that resistance to the regime, albeit on a
relatively small scale, was becoming increasingly organised, despite the disarray
of the FIS and the absence of an unambiguous endorsement of a strategy of
armed resistance by any of its senior figures. The reason for this apparent
paradox was that it was groups outside the formal framework of the F1S that had
initiated organised armed resistance to the regime.
II. The Formation of the Armed Groups
The manifest failure of the FIS's 'legalist' strategy, following the January
coup, strengthened the conviction of those radical Islamist elements that had
remained outside the party, that only force of arms could achieve an Islamic
state. These elements thus became the immediate spearheads of attempts by the
wider Islamist movement to attack and bring down the new regime.
APWs who had assumed office following the FIS's victories in the elections of
June 1990. Jeune Aftique 2.4.92
2° An example of such calls appeared in a clandestine newspaper of the FIS on
20 April 1992 which issued an appeal "to pass on word of arms." The veracity of
this message was, however, questioned by some members of the FIS who
pointed to the fact that it was unsigned. Jeune Aftique 13.8.92
21 MEI 15.5.92 & 1.5.92; Algerie Actualite 13.8.92
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Elements of the shadowy Takfir wa Hijra and the various veterans of the
Afghan war that belonged to the organisation or operated close to it were at the
forefront of the initial attacks on the security forces in early 1992. They had
already demonstrated their eagerness to confront the regime by attacks on the
security forces during the disturbances of June 1991 and the subsequent assault
on the border post at Guemmar in November 1991 (see chapter 6). n However,
following the deaths and arrests of several prominent figures, including Aissa
Messaoudi (leader of the Guemmar attack) who was arrested in February, the
various groups associated with Takfir retreated by the summer of 1992 from their
urban bases around Algiers to the rural maquis.23
However, despite their established tradition and experience of armed
resistance Takfir wa-Hijra and the Afghans soon came to be overshadowed in the
maquis by the materialisation of a far more important grouping.
The year 1992 marked the reappearance of several of Mustapha Bouyali's
key lieutenants in the maquis under the banner of the MAIA, or just MIA
(Mouvement Islamique Arnie) as it was increasingly known. It indicated an
intention to relaunch the guerrilla war the grouping had waged against the
Algerian government between 1982 and March 1987 when Bouyali had finally
been killed by the security services and most of his small, but dedicated, band of
followers imprisoned. The release of the last of those convicted of being involved
with Bouyali and the MIA on 29 July 1990 following an amnesty led to the gradual
and clandestine re-formation of various cells of the organisation. This culminated
in a reconstitution of the MIA itself in January 1991. Despite the flight of some
figures abroad and the adhesion of some others to the F1S, senior figures in the
old MIA such as Abdelkader Chebouti, Mansour Meliani, Azzedine Baa and
Mouloud Hattab remained in Algeria and had kept their distance from the FIS. At
22 ME! 21.2.92
23 Jeune Afrique 23.12.93 & 11.11.93
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odds with the constitutionalist strategy of the FIS, they continued to hold to the
martyred Bouyali's belief in the efficacy and importance of armed struggle. 24 They
preferred not to attack the regime openly, as elements of Takfir wa-Hijra and the
Afghans did, in 1991, but by the summer of 1992 the veterans of the MIA had
moved to become the main source of organised armed resistance to the regime.
A third, and vital, strand to the organised armed Islamist opposition to the
regime was that connected with the two dissident members of FIS, Said
Mekhloufi and Kameredine Kherbane. Formally ejected from the party's Majlis
Shura at the Batna conference in July 1991 following their advocacy of a return to
armed struggle, Mekhloufi and Kherbane continued to enjoy an important array of
contacts with a wide variety of Islamist elements, both inside and outside Algeria.
Kherbane had been a former head of the Arab Mujahedin in Peshawar in
Pakistan during the war in Afghanistan and through this had numerous
connections and friends throughout both the Muslim and Western worlds. For his
part, Mekhloufi, also an Afghan veteran, had close and cordial relations with
Kamel Assamer, leader of Takfir wa-Hijra, and had spent time in Jordan 1990-91
as the chief co-ordinator of the Islamist effort to send volunteers to fight for Iraq
during the Gulf crisis of that period. These connections together with the
important positions the two had held within the FIS as members of the Majlis
Shura (Mekhloufi had also been head of security for the party) meant that both
had the potential to play crucial co-ordinational roles: between the various and
disparate components of the Islamist movement, the various emerging elements
of the armed resistance and ultimately between the armed groups and the FIS
itself.25
24 Algerie Actualitó 7.12.93 & 23.2.93
25 Jeune Afrique 13.8.92
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III. Attempts at Co-ordination
Attempts at co-ordination between the various factions began as early as
mid-January 1992 when Said Mekhloufi and several radical figures close to him
met with the Bouyalistes Abdelkader Chebouti and Mansour Meliani in Zbarbar in
the mountains. Despite the atmosphere of suspicion that prevailed at the
meeting, it succeeded in establishing an important precedent and the group met
again two weeks later at the beginning of February when they were joined in their
discussions by a prominent 'Afghan'. The beginning of the first violent clashes
with the security forces at the start of February 1992 (not unconnected with the
February meeting) and the subsequent clamp down by the regime sharpened the
debate in later meetings. There, the various representatives felt impelled to move
on from emphasising their own strength and importance vis a vis the others to
more serious discussions of how the armed factions could arm themselves and
how they could form some form of unified national structure. A meeting held
during Ramadan again in Zbarbar attracted a still-widening range of 'radical
figures representing the increasing number of independent armed groups. There
was a concerted attempt to give the burgeoning guerrilla resistance to the regime
some unity of organisation with operational sectors comprised of armed cells. At
the national level the leadership of the new organisation was to include a variety
of posts which would be shared out between the various groups. In recognition of
the central role being played by the MIA in the maquis, due to their organisation,
experience and use of hideouts and arms caches surviving from the 1980s, the
post of 'national emir' was offered to the most prominent and powerful figure in
the MIA: Abdelkader Chebouti.26
However, the decisions taken at this meeting and the posts allocated did
not represent the conclusion of an organised and fully-co-ordinated common front
amongst all the armed groups against the regime. Several factors worked to
26 Dèvoluy & Duteil pp.147-149 & pp.172-173
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ensure that despite the growing overall level of violence against the regime there
remained only minimal operational co-operation and co-ordination between the
various groups. The increasing effectiveness of security force operations against
the guerrilla groups in the rural maquis during the Spring and Summer of 1992
clearly hampered attempts at communication between the different, often
geographically isolated groups. In addition these operations succeeded in
damaging and splintering many of the organised groups, creating new groups
and cells and thus further complicating the process of co-ordination. A second
and ultimately more important factor inhibiting unity was the reluctance of many of
the groups to submit themselves to central authority. This did not just apply to the
growing number of small isolated bands which had emerged and which did not
align themselves to the major groupings represented at the meetings, but equally
to several individuals, even within the MIA, who attended the meetings but still
wished to retain the independence of their own groups.
Another meeting of the major groups was convened on 1 September at
Tamesguida, in a final effort to unite their efforts. Chebouti, in particular, was
concerned that attacks, notably a bloody bomb attack on Algiers airport on 26
August, had been carried out without his agreement. This could alienate ordinary
Algerians and create schisms between the groups. In response to these fears,
Nourredine Seddiki, the representative of the Afghans and Takfir wa-Hijra
formally agreed to unite under the banner of the MIA. The groups he represented
had been decimated by the security forces during the Summer offensive and he
thus saw little practical point in remaining technically independent. One influential
independent group leader, AIlal Mohammed (also known as Moh Leveilley),
having rejected an offer of a post in the organisational structure drawn-up at the
Ramadan meeting (because of suspected ambitions to lead the entire
organisation) proposed the creation of a majlis shura. However, these promising
indications of greater unity were swiftly shattered with an attack during the
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meeting by the security services who had learned of the location of the meeting
from a prominent activist captured just a few days earlier. Although both Chebouti
and Seddiki were able to escape the attack, Allal Mohammed and his senior
lieutenant were killed by the security services. v More importantly, the confusion
and suspicion which the attack provoked amongst all the armed groups meant
that the Tamesguida meeting would be the last of its type for the foreseeable
future. Thereafter the various armed factions continued to operate largely
independently of each other.
IV. The Role of the F1S
The precise role and attitude of the FIS itself towards the armed struggle
being conducted by other elements within the wider Islamist movement was
initially uncertain, given the confusion and disruption inflicted on the party in the
opening months of 1992. The arrest of so many of its senior figures, and the
forcing of the remainder of its leadership and membership underground f011owing
the formal official dissolution of the party at the beginning of March, meant that
authoritative statements from the party became more difficult to identify. Of the
group that had formed the provisional leadership of the party following Abassi
Madani and Ali Belhadj's imprisonment in June 1991, Abdelkader Hachani,
Rabah Kebir and Othmane Aissani were all arrested by the authorities, whilst
Abderrazak Redjam and Mohammed Said went into hiding.
Both Said and Redjam, however, continued to be active in clandestinity. In
concert with Ikhlef Cherrati, a former assistant to Aissani and an expert in
propaganda techniques, they became involved in the work of various clandestine
media which sought to put the Islamist message across and to condemn the
regime. Newspapers such as Minbar EI-Djoumma and Enna fir were established
and a radio station, Idaat El-Wafa, began transmitting at the beginning of August
27 Algerie Actuante 18.5.93; Davoluy & Duteil p.174 & p.238
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1992. It soon became apparent, not least by the detailed information that they
had access to, that these media had established close links with elements of the
armed resistance. 'Radio Wafa', as it became known, transmitted, in addition to
sermons and communiqués, reports on the "activities of the MIA", and at times it
appeared to be actually transmitting in the name of the MIA itself. 28 However,
whilst both the newspapers and the radio listed and justified the killings of
members of the security forces, neither Said, Redjam, who continued to sign both
El-Minbar and official FIS communiqués, nor Cherrati explicitly called for further
attacks on the regime and its servants either through these media or personally.29
Despite allegations that all three had joined the MIA, there seemed to be a
marked reluctance on the part of all three to depart from the established FIS line
that the party was neither perpetrating nor demanding violence against the
state.33
Other figures outside the central core of the leadership of the party,
however, departed from this plank of FIS policy with far greater ease and several
became quickly involved in the armed groups. Benazouz Zebda, the former vice-
president of the FIS and Hachemi Sahnouni accompanied Said Mekhloufi in his
initial meetings with members of the MIA and Takfir wa-Hijra in January and
February 1992.31 Various other FIS figures including former APC presidents and
National Assembly candidates elected in December 1991 became involved with
the armed groups acting as links between the F1S and the armed groups.
28 Algerie Actuante 16.2.92 & 2.3.93
29 Algèrie Actuante 16.2.92 & 23.7.92 An example of this stance of justifying but
not actually calling for attacks on the security services was provided in a
statement by Redjam on 13 March 1992: 'The FIS held out the hand of dialogue,
but the authorities responded with state violence. It was this which drove the
children of the people to resort to means other than that of dialogue. Jeune
Afrique 23.12.93
30 El Watan 28.2.94; Algerie Actuante 2.3.93 & 12.10.93
31 Devoluy & Duteil p.148 & p.172
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The unclear and ambiguous position and message of the FIS, resulting from
its official dissolution, was both eased and complicated by the emergence of a
number of FIS exiles abroad who began to be active and to speak on behalf of
the party in the later part of 1992. Two figures rapidly came to prominence: Anwar
Haddam, who had been elected as a deputy for the FIS in the December
elections, and Rabah Kebir, acknowledged deputy to Abdelkader Hachani, who
had miraculously escaped house arrest and fled the country in September 1992.
Establishing themselves in the USA and Germany respectively, Haddam and
Kebir both set about the task of lobbying popular and official opinion in the West
for the F1S's cause, drawing attention to the iniquities of the Algerian regime:
primarily its cancelling of the elections and, as its campaign against the armed
groups intensified, its increasingly dubious human rights record. 32 The fact that
both figures sported 'official' titles, Haddam as head of the FIS Parliamentary
Delegation to the USA and Europe thus representing the FIS 'parliamentarians'
(elected in December 1991) and Kebir as official representative of the FIS
abroad, led many to conclude that far from being in confusion and disarray, the
FIS was rapidly reconstructing itself. As one observer saw it, Mohammed Said
had become the recognised leader of the FIS in the wake of the events of early
1992, Abderrazak Redjam had become his deputy and Kebir and Haddam had
assumed important positions abroad. 33 The fact that all four of these figures came
from the young, technocratic group, often associated with the Djazaira, that had
assumed leadership of the party at the Batna conference of July 1991 further
reinforced this impression. However, it seems unlikely that such close co-
operation existed between the various elements, given both the clandestinity Said
and Redjam worked under and the remoteness of the representatives abroad.
32 Jeune Aftique 30.9.93
33 Liberation 14.3.94 There was also the dubious assertion that Kherbane,
Mekhloufi, Anas and Chebouti had also formally joined this structure.
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Indeed, the idea that a formal hierarchy or structure existed was called into
question by Anwar Haddam's description of Minbar EI-Djoumma (with which Said
and particularly Redjam were involved) as being "linked to us...but it does not
represent our policy."34 This statement represented primarily a desire on the part
of Haddam to distance himself from the rather equivocal stance taken by the
various media connected to Said and Redjam on the issue of violence against the
regime - a position shared by Kebir who was similarly involved in promoting as
attractive and innocent an image of the FIS abroad as possible. However, it also
indicated that Haddam, for one, did not recognise the leadership of Said and
Redjam.
Consequently, confusion and division emerged over who spoke officially
for the FIS, with differing lines being taken on key issues such as the armed
struggle. This apparent crisis of legitimacy seemed to be resolved by the
intervention of the figure who was formally recognised by both factions, inside
and outside Algeria, as the legitimate leader of the party: Abassi Madani. In a
statement smuggled out of the prison at Blida, Madani declared that henceforth
Rabah Kebir should be "the sole authorised spokesman of the FIS abroad."
Moreover, he ordered that the issuing and signing of official FIS communiqués
and statements should be the exclusive right of Kebir, and specifically instructed
that Redjam, who had continued to sign such communiqués, should no longer do
so.3s This decision was largely due to the senior position Kebir had held in the
party over the period of the legislative elections but was probably influenced by
the fact that Madani's two sons were close allies of Kebir as fellow exiles in
Germany. The official endorsement of Kebir did not, though, ease the divisions
and rivalries within the segmented Islamist movement. Despite having come from
34 The Independent 13.5.92
35 Algórie Actuante 23.3.93 Communications between the imprisoned leadership
and Kebir usually came via individuals who visited the prison in Blida. Author's
interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
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the same group that took on the leadership of the FIS in the summer of 1991,
Said and Redjam clearly balked at the new exclusive authority vested in Kebir
and continued to use the clandestine newspapers and radio within Algeria to
assert their authority. 36 Anwar Haddam was also clearly unhappy with Kebir's new
status. Statements issued from his base in Chicago, where he worked with an
estimated 40 exiled Algerian Islamists, became increasingly critical of Kebir and
his allies in Germany, accusing Madani's sons of trying to establish a family
hegemony over the FIS and Kebir himself of being sympathetic towards some
form of compromise with the regime. 37 Like Said, Redjam and Cherrati, Haddam
adopted an increasingly ambiguous and equivocal line on the issue of violence in
a departure from his previous statements which whilst expressing understanding
of the violence had argued that this was not a path endorsed by the FIS. 38 In
making this shift Haddam was clearly seeking to bolster his own popular
legitimacy with the armed groups inside Algeria whilst simultaneously
undermining the legitimacy bestowed on Rabah Kebir who stuck to the line
originally held by Haddam.
Despite the endorsement of Madani, Kebir inevitably found himself
politically isolated both inside the FIS and within the wider Islamist movement.
His differences with Mohammed Said, Redjam and Haddam represented ruptures
with close political associates, and it was clear that he was unlikely to find fresh
allies outside this grouping. Kebir's new authority was explicitly rejected by more
traditionalist figures in the FIS such as the 83 year-old sheikh Abdelbaki Sahraoui
who declared from France that "Kebir is illegitimate... He is not mandated to speak
36 Algerie Actuante 23.3.93
37 Ibid. 16.11.93
38In May 1992 Haddam had declared: "The armed groups support the free choice
of the people. They have chosen a certain way. We in the FIS don't want that.
We don't want violence. But more and more people are calling for that. They (the
armed groups) are our brothers in Islam. We understand their feelings." (The
Independent 13.5.92) A few months later he remarked that "We have no interest
in inheriting a country torn apart by civil war." Jeune Afrique 13.8.92
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in the name of our organisation."39 This lack of recognition by members of the FIS
for the official endorsement of the party's leader, Abassi Madani, indicated that
Kebir stood little chance of gaining the support of those Islamists who had never
been a part of the F1S and thus felt no need to recognise Madani's authority. This
was particularly true of many of the armed groups. Ikhlef Cherrati frequently came
into conflict with his fellows in the MIA over the issue of legitimacy: Cherrati
explicitly drawing his authority from Abassi and the original leadership of the FIS
whilst Chebouti, Azzedine Baa and other senior figures who had never joined the
FIS looked further back to their association with Mustapha Bouyali for their
legitimacy.40
The issue of legitimacy came to the fore again in January 1993 when a
statement emerged from the prison at Blida, this time from Ali Belhadj, who
declared:
"If I was outside the walls of this prison. I would be a fighter
	 in the ranks of
the army of brother Abdelkader Chebouti."41
This statement signified two important points. Firstly, it represented a clear
endorsement of the armed struggle by the FIS's original deputy leader. Secondly,
it indicated the F1S's recognition of and unity of purpose with Chebouti's MIA.
Whether Abassi Madani fully subscribed to his deputy's position, given his recent
endorsement of a figure reluctant to applaud the armed struggle, was unclear.
Perhaps, as before, Madani was acting to ensure that the FIS displayed a
39 Jeune Afrique 30.9.93 Sahraoui also appeared equally hostile towards Redjam
and Said, possibly also because of their Djazarist connections, condemning the
French version of El Minbar, La Critere as "a rag." (Le Monde 18.11.92). There
were even some suggestions that Sahraoui and Kamreddine Kherbane, who
enjoyed close relations as fellow exiles in France, had 're-grouped' the salafist
tendency of the FIS in France and had even supplanted allies of the Djazarist
there. Dóvoluy and Duteil p.287; Jeune Afrique 11.11.93
4° Algerie Actualitë 2.3.93
41 Jeune Afrique 21.1.93
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moderate, pragmatic face to the outside world in particular (Kebir being charged
with winning support for the party's cause in the West) whilst Belhadj busied
himself with securing robust rank-and-file support for the party with his more
hard-line and uncompromising rhetoric. Nevertheless, whilst in 1989-91
uncertainty had persisted over which line represented the real nature of the FIS,
Rabah Kebir, bereft of allies was steadily pulled towards adopting a less
moderate stance. Initially attempting to suppress Ali Belhadj's expression of
solidarity with Chebouti and the MIA by failing to make Belhadj's letter public
(copies of it were, nevertheless, distributed in Paris by Kameredine Kherbane),
Kebir relented by the time a second similar letter reached him and fully publicised
it. 42 A further step was taken in February 1993 following an assassination attempt
against Defence Minister Khaled Nezzar when Kebir, whilst not claiming FIS
responsibility for the attack, remarked that:
'This can be considered a clear warning from the mujahedin to the, tyrants
who openly fight God and his Prophet.'43
This closening of links between the FIS and elements of the armed
resistance presaged further attempts to unite the entire Islamist movement,
politically and militarily, in the struggle against the regime. In March 1993 a
unified military command was established for a number of the armed groups
headed by a troika of Chebouti, who became the supreme commander, Said
Mekhloufi, who had been operating his own independent group and became head
of operations, and Azzedine Baa of the MIA who became the command's deputy
leader. In the political field Mohammed Said was nominated as head of the
interior political leadership. The efforts at unification came to full fruition six
months later with the announcement of the formation of an 'Executive Authority of
42 Ibid.
43 The Economist 20.2.93
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the FIS Abroad,' which appeared to establish a unified political structure for the
hitherto fractious individuals active abroad. A four man leadership was unveiled
headed, significantly, by Rabah Kebir as president, Kameredine Kherbane was
vice-president, while Abdallah Anas (a prominent Afghan) and Anwar Haddam
assumed unspecified responsibilities. The creation of these bodies appeared to
represent the final unification of the three important strands of the Islamist
movement that had emerged in the wake of the January coup and now shared the
senior posts in the new bodies: the MIA, the Afghans and the FIS itself.44
3. The Emergence of the CIA
The creation of bodies such as the Executive Authority of the FIS and the
unified military command of the MIA did not, however, fully represent the
unification of all of the major elements of the Islamist movement. They
incorporated most of the major ones that had been in existence in the early
months of 1992, but by 1993 there had emerged a powerful and influential
tendency that remained firmly outside of these new bodies.
The GIA (Groupes Islamiques Armes), which became the main
embodiment of this tendency, represented a faction of opinion that espoused a
far more radical response to the crisis that beset the Islamist movement in the
wake of the January coup and accordingly gathered to it those Islamists who
shared such radical convictions.
I. Origins
In essence the GIA drew its inspiration, as well as its members, from that
part of the Islamist movement that rejected the idea that an Islamic state could be
installed by constitutional and legal means, believing that force of arms was both
morally and practically the right way to achieve this aim. As has been shown,
44 Jeune Afrique 30.9.93 & 23.9.93
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many elements that held this conviction joined the FIS in 1989 despite its
explicitly constitutionalist and electoral strategy. The blocking of the
constitutionalist path by the regime in January 1992 caused most of these
elements to break their tactical alliance with the party and join those seeking
armed confrontation with the government. Despite the effective renewal of this
alliance in 1993, with advocates of armed resistance such as Chebouti and
Mekhloufi willing to come together with 'political' figures such as Kebir and
Redjam on a new agenda of political unity and limited armed struggle, there
remained those for whom armed struggle of an increasingly unlimited nature had
become a political and ideological imperative which prevented them from joining
the new structures.
This radicalism and commitment to armed struggle inevitably led to
suggestions that groups such as Takfir wa-Hijra and Bouyali's original MIA were
the forerunners of the GIA. However, although there were links of ideology and
personnel the more concrete origins of the organisation did not emerge until after
the coup of January 1992.
The fragmented nature of early armed resistance to the regime inevitably
led to the formation of groups espousing varying ideologies and headed by
individual figures eager to establish their own leadership and ideology over the
other groups. Personal ambition and ideological differences played a significant
part in the formation of the dissident grouping that first set itself up as a radical
alternative and which was the first to formally employ the term GIA. This initial
GIA was formed by Mansour Meliani, the former Bouyalist, who used the name for
the three small groups he had gradually drawn together under his leadership by
July 1992. Meliani had been a close associate of Abdelkader Chebouti, the two
having fought alongside Bouyali and been imprisoned together. However,
following bitter rivalry between the two for leadership of the reformed MIA, Meliani
broke with Chebouti in January 1992, and withdrew his cells from the overall
315
leadership that Chebouti was establishing over the armed movement. Meliani's
GIA, however, lasted barely a few weeks before Meliani himself was arrested by
the security forces on 28 July 1992 and his groups dispersed.45
The idea of the GIA did not die with the arrest of Meliani. The name did
continue to appear in small clandestine newspapers and was formally revived in
January 1993 by another radical and independent figure: Abdelhak Layada. 46 A
lieutenant of Allal Mohammed, Layada had assumed control of Mohammed's
group following the death of its leader in the security force ambush of the armed
groups' summit at Tamesguida in September 1992. Like Allal Mohammed,
Layada sought to become the supreme commander of all the armed groups, and
kept his distance from attempts to draw him and his supporters into a Chebouti-
headed unified command. Layada brought in two further groups and having been
encouraged by military setbacks Chebouti's MIA had suffered in the Autumn of
1992, officially declared his independence from Chebouti and announced that his
new GIA would no longer obey orders issued by him.47
II. Ideology
The secession of Layada, despite being provoked by personal rivalries
and ambitions, swiftly developed into something of far greater substance both in
terms of ideology and strategy. Encouraged by the prominent role enjoyed by
Omar El-Eulmi, a radical ideologue who became the GIA's 'spiritual guide' on its
creation, the new GIA exhibited an extremely radical ideology from the outset.
Central to its ideology was a fundamental and unequivocal rejection not only of
constitutional Islamism but of the whole idea of democracy itself. El-Eulmi had
joined the FIS and had at one stage been a member of the party's Majlis Shura
45 Dèvoluy & Duteil pp.224-225
46 Algórie Actuante 13.8.92 & 2.11.93 Layada, however, denied authorship of
several tracts that appeared in the name of the GIA during this time.
47 Dèvoluy & Duteil p.250; Jeune Afrique 30.9.93; Algórie Actuante 23.3.93
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and a senior figure in the Islamist trade union, the SIT. He had disappeared from
the ranks of the FIS in mid-1991, marginalized and alienated by the rise in
influence of the Djazairists. He appeared briefly again before the legislative
elections of December 1991 to declare publicly that an Islamic state could not be
achieved other than through force of arms. 48 Such sentiments were re-iterated a
year later in December 1992, shortly before the formal re-creation of the GIA, by
Layada who asserted that:
"We reject the religion of democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is
equal to sedition. It has never been our intention to participate in elections or
enter parliament. Besides, the right to legislate belongs solely to God."49
III. Methods and Campaigns: The Use of Terror and Assassination
What increasingly began to mark the GIA out from the other armed
groups, as 1993 progressed, was a willingness to translate this extremist rhetoric
into actual policy. The struggle against the regime by the various armed groups
during the first year following the imposition of the HCE was characterised
predominantly by guerrilla warfare against the security services and by sabotage
and bomb attacks against state-run and related institutions.50 The GIA
demonstrated that it was willing to expand the armed struggle in much more
extreme and sinister directions.
March 1993 witnessed a series of assassinations of junior government
ministers and members of the National Consultative Council (CCN).
48 MEI 30.4.93; Algerie Actuante 27.4.93; El Watan 28.2.94. El-Eulmi had also
been the main spokesman for the FIS/SIT during the general strike of May-June
1991.
49 Jeune Afrique 27.1.94
50 Such attacks against post offices, financial institutions, telephone exchanges
(with the notable exception of the airport bombing of 26 August 1992 where it was
argued that their warning had not been acted upon quickly enough by the
authorities) usually took place outside working hours to avoid casualties. Jeune
Afrique 13.8.92; Devoluy and Duteil p.239
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Assassination had become an established instrument of the armed groups by
1993, but it had been used almost exclusively against members of the security
services and those government members directly involved in the anti-terrorist
struggle. The assassinations of March 1993 marked an effective expansion in the
definition of those apparently seen as 'legitimate' targets to include anybody more
generally a part of or representing the regime. Writers, journalists and those
involved in the media became increasingly the targets of assassination attempts:
a television reporter and a journalist on a state-run newspaper being killed in
August 1993.51 Figures who were neither involved with nor supportive of the
regime but who were seen as opposed to Islamism, particularly the secularist
press, also became subject to attack.
That it was the GIA which was primarily responsible for these attacks and
the escalation and expansion of the armed struggle seemed fairly clear. The early
months of 1993 had seen the circulation of cassettes in various mosques
containing calls for no mercy to be shown to anyone collaborating with the'regime
and the authorities. The suspected author of these calls was Omar El-Eulmi, who
also issued more explicit fatwas authorising the killing of not only members of the
security services and the government but also of individual intellectuals and
journalists in the name of the GIA; most notably Taher Djaout, a poet and
journalist who had been a strong critic of the Islamists and who was shot dead by
gunmen in May.52
The reasons for these attacks were mixed. Whilst the killing of all of those
perceived to be opposed to the idea of an Islamic state had obvious roots in the
GIA's radical ideology and was reminiscent of the stance taken by several
extremist Islamist groups elsewhere in the Muslim World, notably in Egypt, there
51 ME! 28.8.93
52 MEI 2.4.93; Jeune Afrique 11.11.93; Algèrie Actualitd 27.4.93; Devoluy &
Duteil pp.266-267
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were other tactical and strategic reasons for these campaigns. For some
observers the shift away from attacks on the security services represented an
attempt to enforce public support for the armed groups (and undercut support for
the regime) through the simple use of terror.53 However, it seems more likely that
the campaign of assassinations was part of an endeavour on the part of the GIA
to accrue notoriety and support through the killing of high-profile individuals who
clearly represented 'softer' and more accessible targets than members of the
security forces.54 Through this the GIA appeared to be making an attempt to seize
both the political and operational initiative from the other armed groups.
A further expansion of the conflict came with the targeting by the GIA of
foreign nationals living in Algeria. Hitherto physically untouched by the escalating
conflict in the country, Algeria's estimated 70,000 foreign residents first became
involved in the struggle when two French surveyors were kidnapped and killed on
20-21 September 1993 near Sidi Bel AbbOs. These deaths were followed in
October by the deaths of two Russian military advisers and three foreign Contract
workers employed by the state oil company SONATRACH. The responsibility for
these killings became known at the end of October when three kidnapped French
nationals were released by the Algerian security forces following the storming of
a prayer hall on 30 October.55 A note given by the kidnappers to one of the freed
captives (who were to be released with the note 56), signed by the GIA and
addressed to the country's foreigners, explained the new strategy of targeting
foreigners:
53 Jeune Afrique 1.7.93
54 Jeune Afrique 1.7.93; DOvoluy & Duteil p.251
55 ME! 8.10.93 & 5.11.93
56 Ibid. 5.11.93
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"Leave the country. We are giving you one month. Anyone who exceeds that
period will be responsible for his own sudden death. There will be	 no
kidnappings and it will be more violent than in Egypt."57
This assault on the expatriate community living in Algeria as with that
against prominent Algerians, had both ideological and strategic motivations. Like
their radical counterparts in Egypt, the GIA aimed to rid Algeria of 'corrupting'
non-Islamic influences. More importantly, they also sought to weaken the regime
by frightening-off the foreign companies and foreign investment that the
government was relying on so heavily to improve economic and social conditions
and so undercut support for the armed groups. The fact that an estimated 3,000
foreign nationals left the country within days of the release of the note warning
them to quit Algeria by the end of November, and continued to leave as killings of
foreigners began and continued following the expiry of the deadline, indicated
that the strategy's initial intention was succeeding.58
111 Structure
In June 1993 Echahada, a clandestine newspaper which first appeared in
January 1993 and which was clearly controlled by the GIA, set out the structure
of the organisation. Abdelhak Layada was listed as the party's leader and co-
ordinator as well as a member of the groups' four-strong Majlis Shura. Other
issues of Echahada claimed that the GIA contained an 'Islamic Legislative
Committee' led by an Islamic scholar, which was charged with pronouncing
fatwas in conjunction with the actions of the armed cells of the organisation.59
57 The Times 20.11.93 Foreigners, particularly tourists, had been targeted by
Egypt's radical Islamist groups since the summer of 1992 with predictably
catastrophic effects on the country's lucrative tourist trade.
58 MEI 5.11.93 & 17.12.93 The GIA explicitly claimed responsibility for these
attacks, vowing that it would continue to pursue the "enemies of Allah" - thus
emphasising the religious dimension of the campaign.
59 Algerie Actualitê 7.12.93
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It is doubtful that the organisation was in fact structured and ordered to
such a high degree. One observer concluded that the GIA was in reality a flexible
federation of at least four ideologically similar but distinct groups operating in
different regions. 60 Nevertheless, the organisation, such as it was, did appear to
display a significant degree of cohesion and resilience surviving both the death of
El-Eulmi at the hands of the security forces in April 1993 and the arrest of Layada
by the authorities in Morocco the following July. Despite the removal of the
group's two most important and charismatic figures, the GIA was still able to
continue its campaign of assassinations and, moreover, to launch its offensive
against Algeria's foreign community. The absence of both Layada and El-Eulmi
did not lead to the GIA reducing the radical tone of its pronouncements or
activities. Sid Ahmed Mourad (also known as Djaffar Afghani and a former
lieutenant of Meliani 61 ), who assumed the acknowledged leadership of the GIA
following Layada's arrest, made plain his commitment to the extremist line
established by Layada and El-Eulmi. He declared in an underground neWspaper
in November 1993:
"Our jihad consists of killing and dispersing all those who fight against God
and his Prophet."62
More specifically he added that:
"The journalists who fight against Islamism through the pen will perish by the
sword:1'33
60 Jeune Afrique 27.1.94
61 Ibid. This emphasises the continuity of personnel between Meliani's initial GIA
and Layada's later organisation.
62 Jeune Afrique 27.1.94
63 I bid.
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Abdelkader Hattab, who became the effective number two in the GIA,
expressed similar sentiments in a leaflet gruesomely entitled 'Throat-slitting and
murder until the power is God's.“64
As the GIA rose to increasing prominence there were accusations from a
variety of quarters that the group was simply a front and a puppet for other
interests and groups. A persistent charge, particularly from Islamists, was that the
GIA had become a cover for units of the security forces to perform two tasks.
Firstly, the discrediting of the Islamist movement in general and the FIS in
particular through the brutality of their attacks on usually unarmed individuals.
Secondly, and more sinisterly, it allowed the security forces to eradicate
prominent critics of the regime, particularly journalists and intellectuals, whilst
blaming it on the Islamist opposition. However, although it was increasingly
apparent that the security forces were involved with the GIA, this involvement
overwhelmingly took the form of infiltration by the security forces. Such infiltration
was facilitated by the recruitment strategy of the GIA which drew its members
predominantly from the young unemployed. This made it relatively easy to
introduce informers into the groups and explains the repeated successes the
authorities had in eliminating the senior figures of the group.66
The almost inevitable counter charge by the Algerian regime was that the
GIA was simply a convenient cover for the worst excesses of the FIS itself and its
allies and was in reality an integral part of the FIS. 66 However, this accusation too
had only a passing element of truth to it. Whilst there was some evidence of links
between the two factions, mainly abroad, the central reality within Algeria was
that the GIA had become a substantial threat and rival to the FIS.
64 Jeune Afrique 11.11.93
66 Libóration 14.3.94; Jeune Afrique 25.8.94 Layada had been particularly keen
to recruit young members as they were less likely to contest his authority. AlOtie
Actualitd 28.9.93
66 Jeune Afrique 27.1.94 The regime naturally accused the FIS of being behind
each attack and assassination.
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V. Relations with the FIS
The original leadership of the GIA aimed through its activities to seize
both the political and operational initiative of the struggle from the FIS and its
allies in the armed groups. Personal ambition and extremist ideological purity
both played their part in this and increasingly pushed the GIA into a growing
conflict with the more mainstream elements of the Islamist movement.
Politically, the GIA, from its revival in January 1993, sought to distinguish
itself from the FIS. Unlike all the other armed groups which either explicitly or
implicitly drew their legitimacy from or deferred politically to the FIS, the
leadership of the GIA made clear its rejection of the FIS. This may have been
encouraged by Ali Belhadj's endorsement of Chebouti, Layada's rival, in
December 1992. Omar El-Eulmi's expressed antipathy, though, to former
members of the FIS's BEP such as Redjam, Said, Kebir and Cherrati contained
clear elements of hostility towards the pragmatic tendencies of the DjaZaira to
which all of these figures were linked. In addition to accusations of un-Islamic
compromise and moderation, El-Eulmi also charged these figures with having
joined the FIS "for love of power" and accused Rabah Kebir and other leaders of
the FIS abroad of being responsible for the alleged disappearance of funds
gathered abroad to support the armed struggle.67
As with the terror campaigns, the stance of the GIA towards the FIS did not
essentially change with the removal of Layada and El-Eulmi from its head. Sid
Ahmed Mourad continued to denounce senior figures in the party and furthermore
began to heap scorn on both Abassi Madani and All Belhadj. 68
 The formation of
unified military and political structures by the FIS, the MIA and various individual
Afghans in 1993 increased the political stakes for the GIA which saw the initiative
67 Algdrie Actualitê 27.4.93
ea Jeune Afrique 23.12.93
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slipping away from itself. This perhaps explains the timing of its decision to
launch the campaign against foreigners which was begun just a week after the
announcement of the formation of the Executive Authority of the FIS Abroad on
14 September.
Up until the formation of the Executive Authority it had been the FIS that felt
it was losing the initiative to the GIA. The leadership of the party, already riven by
its own splits between moderates and hard-liners, even endorsed many of the
GIA's assassinations out of fear of being sidelined in the struggle against the
regime. 69 Anwar Haddam commented on the killing in June of Mohammed
Boukhobza, an academic and a member of the CCN, that: "It is not a question of
it being a crime, but a sentence of death carried out by the mujahedin."70
The opening of the campaign against foreigners living in Algeria was,
however, met with condemnation by several FIS figures. Influenced by the
disastrous impact this development had on the Islamist case they were pleading
in the West (and also by the effect this might have on their own status and
welcome in the West) senior figures abroad, such as Haddam and Abdelbaki
Sahraoui, demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the three
French hostages kidnapped in October. 71 Nevertheless, and despite the
formation of a common political front in September, members of the new
Executive Authority of the F1S Abroad and the leadership of the party inside
Algeria itself continued to justify the killings of minor officials, journalists and
intellectuals. Both Haddam and even Rabah Kebir began to argue that these
categories of people had become 'combatants' and thus legitimate targets by
supposedly siding with the regime. Members of the CCN and local administrators
69 Omar El-Eulmi had explicitly referred to these fears by claiming that the leaders
of the FIS had been "eclipsed" by the calls for jihad he had issued through
recordings on cassettes distributed in Algiers. Algerie Actuante 27.4.93
70 Jeune Afrique 1.7.93
71 Alger-le Actuante 2.11.93
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appointed in the place of sacked and imprisoned elected FIS officials had
similarly become liable to assassination because they had "usurped" the rightful
and elected authority of the FIS.72
This endorsement of the killings represented not only a desire to avoid
being outflanked by the GIA but also a need to justify the operations of the FIS's
own armed groups which had also begun to target individuals not directly
involved in the anti-terrorist campaign. 73 Figures such as Haddam and Kebir were
anxious to show they were not out of touch with the armed groups, but they were
more concerned to show that the FIS itself was not responsible for much of the
violence. In condemning the attacks against foreigners, Kebir stated that: "The
popular movement is very difficult to control." 74 and in an implicit reference to the
GIA, he indicated that the FIS did not control all the armed groups:
"Among those who responded to state violence there were undoubtedly
members of the FIS....(But) the organisations and groups (that) came into
being to defend the will of the people and resist the violence' of the
state... .cannot be said to be the FIS."75
For its part the GIA was considerably more forthright in its disavowal of
links with the FIS. A communique issued in its name on 20 November 1993
72 Middle East Watch, Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One is Spared
(January 1994) pp.56-59
73 Rabah Kebir, for example, had detailed procedures that were operated before
assassinations of individuals were carried out, including the convening of
committees of Islamic scholars to decide guilt, the ascertaining of facts about the
case and the issuing of warnings. "We can say that these (procedures) are really
akin to courts" he asserted. (Middle East Watch p.54n, p.55 and p.59). However,
whilst such knowledge of these procedures suggested complicity of the FIS, it
seems probable that Kebir was attempting to give a legalistic facade to what were
almost certainly fairly arbitrary killings, whilst at the same time attempting to claim
that they were under the direction of the FIS, a claim that was at best dubious
74 Financial Times 25.10.93
75 Middle East Watch p.54n
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declared that it "did not represent the armed wing of the FIS" and affirmed that it
was an "independent group.'76
Conflict between the GIA and those close to or part of the FIS also took
more direct forms than simple political and strategic manoeuvrings. In addition to
denouncing individuals such as Redjam, Kebir, Chebouti and Cherrati, Layada
and El-Eulmi had also issued death threats against these and other figures on the
grounds of treason. 77 These menaces were never actually carried out, but the first
indications that the leaders of the GIA were serious in their antipathy and rivalry
towards the leaders of the FIS came with the arrest by the authorities of Ikhlef
Cherrati on 26 February 1993. It was widely believed that Cherrati had been
betrayed to the security forces by either Layada himself or one of his lieutenants.
The death of Sid Ahmed Lahrani, a leader of one of the GIA groups, in a
prepared police ambush just a week later sparked a series of betrayals to the
authorities between the two sides. 78
 As the tension increased, Radio Wafa
stopped transmitting following death threats from Sid Ahmed Mourad . and his
deputy Abdelkader Hattab, and by the end of the year it had begun to appear that
the dispute between the two sides had spilled over into armed conflict. Armed
clashes between units of the GIA and the MIA in an area to the south-east of
Algiers in late November resulted in the deaths of nearly thirty Islamists.79
4. : The Regime and the Anti-Terrorist Struggle 1992-1993
The death of Mohammed Boudiaf at the end of June 1992, albeit
welcomed in various shadowy parts of Algeria's ruling elite, clearly deprived the
regime installed in January of the vision the assassinated president had had for
78 AFP 20.11.93 quoted in Middle East Watch p.54
7 Algeria Actuante 23.3.93 In his communique No.5, Layada also specifically
included figures not associated with Djazarist ideas such as Mekhloufi, Azzedine
Baa, Benazouz Zebda and Hachemi Sahnouni in his death threats.
78 Algeria Actuante 23.3.93; ME! 30.4.93
79 El Watan 22.11.93
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extricating Algeria from the crisis that had enveloped it. However, whilst no
comparable political strategy was either continued or drawn up in the wake of his
death, and no attempt was made to find another charismatic outsider to become
president (one of the other members of the HCE, All Kafi, was simply appointed
to the presidency), Boudiaf s commitment to eliminating violent resistance to the
regime was continued and became the main plank of the government's policy.
In military terms the 'anti-terrorist struggle' by the regime met with
considerable initial success. Having successfully repressed the FIS and Islamist
opposition in the early months of 1992 the authorities carried out a largely
successful campaign against the armed Islamists who had fled to the maquis.
Aided by good intelligence the security forces broke up many of the armed
groups and killed and arrested many of the senior figures in the armed
resistance.
These significant victories by the security services proved unable, however,
to stem the activities of the armed groups which continued to grow and spread
despite the setbacks of the summer. The break-up of larger groups led to the
formation of smaller more numerous and more secretive independent groups
which proved far more difficult to gather intelligence on. The reverses the armed
resistance had suffered during the summer of 1992 had led to a gradual flow of
guerrillas back to the urban areas of Algeria where recruitment, support and
anonymity were far easier to achieve.80 The passage of time since the dramatic
events of the opening months of the year had allowed Islamist and more general
opposition to the regime to coalesce and organise itself, fuelled by continued and
growing popular disgust at the failure of the new regime to deliver any significant
improvement in social or economic conditions.
The regime introduced a number of further measures aimed at eliminating
the armed opposition. These included increases in the authorities' legal powers of
80 Algeria Actuante 23.2.93 & 28.8.93
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trial and detention and the re-introduction of the death penalty. Large-scale
security sweeps began again in urban areas, where curfews were imposed and
in February 1993 the state of emergency that had been declared a year earlier
was formally extended for another twelve months. The last remaining institutional
bases of Islamism and the FIS were shut down, including various private
companies, labour organisations (notably the SIT), and cultural and charitable
organisations which the government saw as providing a network of support for the
FIS.81 In addition the last remaining local councils controlled by people elected
under the FIS's banner in June 1990 were dissolved by the government on the
grounds cited by the Interior Minister Mohammed Nardi that "these assemblies
had been transformed into logistical bases for subversion."82
The regime's determination to defeat the Islamist groups militarily, was
reflected in both its increasingly robust statements to this effect and by the
promotion of figures who were resolutely committed to the anti-terrorist struggle.
Mohammed Lamari, a notorious anti-Islamist, was appointed to head the special
anti-terrorist unit at the Defence Ministry in September 1992 and in July 1993 he
was promoted to the head of the armed forces as a whole.83
One of the doubts and concerns held by many in the senior echelons of the
Algerian regime was about the continued cohesion and integrity of the military in
the face of what was clearly becoming a long-running struggle. The loyalty and
stability of the army was obviously vital to the regime's survival in the face of
Islamist assault.
Initially, there appeared to be very limited grounds for concern. The army,
which had stayed loyal throughout the period of the January coup and its
81 Ibid. 4.12.92
82 El Moudjahid 16.3.93 There were accusations, for example, that the president
of the FIS-controlled APC in Jijel had used the mayoral budget to buy arms.
Alger-le Actuante 2.12.92
83 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU): Algeria 3rd Quarter 1993; MEI 23.7.93
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aftermath, witnessed few or no desertions or defections to the armed groups. A
more potent potential hazard to the army was of rebels remaining within the ranks
of the military and providing both intelligence and a destabilising influence for the
Islamist resistance. Several high profile terrorist operations such as the airport
bombing in August 1992 and particularly the assassination attempt against
Khaled Nezzar in February 1993 were of sufficient complexity and planning as to
indicate the use of specialised information from within the military itself. 84 This
fear was underlined by seventy members of the armed forces being put on trial at
the end of 1992 charged with plotting against the state. 86
At the same time reports emerged indicating that as many as 200 lower-
ranking officers had been dismissed from the military for allegedly having Islamist
leanings.86 This preventative action on the part of the regime reflected a growing
concern that a split could develop within the military itself and occur between the
senior and junior officer corps. Such fears were based on observations about the
backgrounds of the two corps. A large proportion of Algeria's senior officers had
experienced the nationalism of the liberation struggle and its aftermath and been
imbued with its ideals of modernisation, which were reinforced by having spent
time training abroad in the Soviet Union and the West. In contrast, most junior
officers had been educated under Algeria's Arabisation programme of the 1960s
and 1970s and thus often emerged with a more Islamic and traditional outlook.87
There were also fears that many junior officers with little political or financial
stake in the regime (unlike the senior officers) might feel that they had little to
lose by siding with the Islamist opposition. 88 As 1993 progressed there were
increasing reports of defections of junior officers to the maquis itself and by mid-
84 MEED 16.10.92; The Guardian 14.3.93
85 MEI 8.1.93 Two of these were reported to be officers with Islamist sympathies.
86 Ibid.
87 Jeune Afrique 21.4.94; Le Figaro 4.6.93
88 Jeune Afrique 22.7.93
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1993 it was estimated that a total of 500-800 officers, subalterns and junior
officers had deserted to the maquis over the preceding twelve months. 89 This
suggested that the number of 'other ranks' which were likely to have deserted (no
reliable estimates exist) was likely to run into four figures.
B: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE PURSUIT OF DIALOGUE AND
CONSENSUS 1993 - 1994
1. Regime Initiatives
The ongoing failure of the government to control the security situation and
defeat the threat posed by the armed Islamist groups meant that the regime was
forced to think increasingly in terms of adopting a political strategy towards the
crisis in addition to the simple military/security one they had pursued since the
death of Mohammed Boudiaf.
Efforts were made throughout 1992 to appeal to Islamist opinion by
showing relative leniency to many of those held in detention by the authorities.
Eight thousand of the estimated nine thousand activists detained by the
authorities in the camps in the Sahara were released by the beginning of 1993.
Many were released under new security laws introduced in October 1992 which
granted amnesties to those prisoners convicted of non-violent offences or those
deemed to have quit terrorist groups. 93 More importantly, the trial of Abassi
Madani, Ali Belhadj and the other leaders of the FIS arrested in 1991, which
finally took place in July 1992 resulted in much lighter sentences that might have
been expected. Madani and Belhadj received twelve years each with the other
defendants getting between four and six years each. Despite being convicted of
conspiring against the state, the FIS leaders were cleared of the more serious
89 Le Figaro 4.6.93
9 ° ME! 23.10.92; Amnesty International MDE 28/04/93 March 1993
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charge of plotting an armed insurrection.91 The sentences were interpreted as a
gesture to the Islamists as were other sentences that were given out by the
courts. This included the special anti-terrorist courts, which mixed death
sentences with light sentences and occasional acquittals to achieve an
impression of fairness. 92 No identifiable political concessions, though, were
offered or made to the Islamists or the FIS - Mohammed Boudiaf having already
ruled out the return of any political party based on Islamism.
A further attempt to create some form of consensus and legitimacy for the
regime involved official efforts from the beginning of 1993 to enter into dialogue
with the legal opposition parties. These efforts which purported to foreshadow a
return to some form of elections signally failed to make any progress. The
majority of the political parties had condemned the coup of January 1992 and
most of them withdrew from the dialogue sessions when it became clear to them
that the regime had no meaningful plans to return to the electoral process.
Dissent over the participation of HAMAS and the MNI in the discussions with the
government also provoked a boycott from anti-Islamist parties such as the RCD
and for a while led to the exclusion of the two Islamist parties themselves.93
Attempts at dialogue continued on into the Autumn of 1993, formally
being revived and restarted with the creation of a National Dialogue Commission
on 13 October which set itself the specific task of achieving a consensus with the
opposition parties on the nature of the new governing body that the HCE had
pledged itself to cede power to when its own two year 'mandate' expired at the
end of the year. However, efforts to produce a consensus continued to founder
91 Le Jeudi d'Algerie 16.7.92
92 MEI 5.3.93; Nvoluy & Duteil p.225
93 Although officially distant from the conflict neither HAMAS or the MNI had
been entirely immune from the regime's offensive against the Islamist movement
and the FIS and activists from both parties had been arrested and their
newspapers suppressed. Jeune Afrique 2.4.92
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over demands for an election timetable to be set and on the issue of the
participation of Islamists in the dialogue.
The impasse in the dialogue process appeared to be broken at the end of
November, when a statement from the Presidency declared that the regime
would be willing to talk to movements hitherto excluded from the multi-party talks.
Clearly referring to the FIS, the statement made the single qualification that only
individuals who had not broken the law could be invited to participate in the
dialogue.94 As one of the Generals who sat on the Commission declared:
"...there are leading figures of the dissolved FIS, who respect the law, and
who would like to express themselves on behalf of this tendency, the way will
be open for them to take part in the dialogue."%
This concession, accompanied by hints that curfews and house arrests
might be reduced96, appeared to have born few fruit, however, by the time of the
convening of the National Reconciliation Conference of January 1994 which met
to formally endorse the successor authority to the HCE. The Conference failed to
attract any of the major parties which had boycotted the event chiefly on the
grounds that it was a disingenuous and pointless function without the
participation of the FIS. Most of the parties, including the FFS and the FLN, had
become convinced that only the inclusion of the most popular party in the country
could begin to solve Algeria's worsening and increasingly bloody crisis. The
regime then abandoned any pretence that the Conference would somehow play a
role in producing a new political consensus and simply announced the formation
of a new three-year transitionary regime. This would be overseen by a new state
presidency until elections could be held at the end of the three year period. The
fact that this 'nevi/ regime was simply installed by the 'outgoing' HCE and had at
94 Ibid.
95 SWB ME/1869 MED/12 11.12.93
96 MEI 3.12.93
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its head the existing Defence Minister, General Lamine Zeroual underlined the
true military nature of the regime that had been in place since 1992.97
The offer to widen the dialogue to include figures from the FIS was,
however, reiterated by the new President. Within a week of being formally sworn
in, Lamine Zeroual declared on 7 February that he was committed to "reverting to
the path of democratic elections" and moreover stated that:
"We realise that the political crisis cannot be solved except through dialogue
and the participation of the national political and social forces without
exception.' 99 (Italics added)
2. The Response of the FIS
I. The Position of the FIS
The FIS's response to these public overtures was neither immediate nor
clear. The period in the immediate wake of the cancellation of the elections in
1992 had seen the party joining with most other parties in denouncing the move
and demanding the reinstatement and honouring of the results. Following its
dissolution by the regime, the FIS's official policy inevitably became less clear
and more ambiguous. As has been shown, the party had difficulty speaking with
one voice, its leaders spread across foreign countries, Algeria's prisons and the
various internal underground networks. The rise in importance of the armed
struggle and of actors such as Chebouti, the MIA and the GIA further complicated
matters and reduced the significance of the strictly political aspect of the FIS.
Nevertheless, the political demands of the movement continued to be
restated by senior figures. Following his escape from house arrest and flight to
Germany in August 1992, Rabah Kebir set out the party's conditions for dialogue
97 Ibid. 7.1.94 & 4.2.94
98 SWB ME/1917 MED 9.2.94
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with the regime. 99 The four conditions were: liberation of all detainees; an end to
all arbitrary arrests; reparation for all injustices committed with the reinstallation
of all FIS members who had been elected to official posts; and the organisation of
the second round of the elections to the National Assembly. 100 The apparent
continuing desire of the FIS to have dialogue with the regime was underlined by
Kebir's formal response to a rather ambiguous statement in early September
1992 by the Interior Minister, Mohammed Hardi, promising "Islamist brothers of
good faith" that the electoral process might be revived. Kebir responded by
saying that he had a mandate from the party to participate in "sincere
dialogue.mi
II. The Emergence of Dissent
The openly expressed hostility on the part of the regime to any discussions
with the FIS meant that the issue of participation in dialogue with the regime
never came to the fore. However, the shift in the HCE's position on this in the
Autumn of 1993 threw down a serious challenge to the FIS and its newly
confirmed allies amongst the armed groups. The overtures by the National
Dialogue Commission rapidly exposed the central fault line that existed between
those who saw the armed struggle as a means of putting pressure on the regime
to permit the FIS's re-entry into the political system and those who saw it as the
99 There were suggestions that Kebir's original mysterious 'escape' from house
arrest and flight to Germany was actually permitted by the authorities as a
possible "political investment for the future" in the shape of an articulate
moderate figure able to counter-balance the hard-liners of the Islamist movement
and more willing to compromise. (Dèvoluy and Duteil pp.226-227) However,
Kebir's subsequent conviction in absentia by an Algerian court for alleged
terrorist offences and resultant attempts to secure his extradition from Germany
cast doubt on this theory, or at least indicates a perceived miscalculation on the
part of the authorities.
100 Le Monde 18.9.92
101 MEED 16.10.92
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sole and proper means of establishing an Islamic State by militarily overthrowing
the illegitimate authority of the HCE.
Foremost amongst this latter group was Said Mekhloufi, who had been
ejected from the FIS in July 1991 over this very issue. Despite having supported
the familiar conditions that Mohammed Said and others voiced, through Radio
Wafa and other media, for dialogue with the authorities, the actual possibility of
such a dialogue drew a strong reaction from Mekhloufi. He issued a communique
on October 4 which denounced certain 'Djazairists' for having approached him to
establish contacts with the emerging National Dialogue Commission. 102 In this
and subsequent communiqués, he reprimanded figures such as Kebir and
Benazouz Zebda for having supposedly responded to overtures from the regime
and reaffirmed his belief in the "armed struggle" until the achievement of an
"Islamic Republic." He also claimed that the Djazairists, at the initiative of
Abderrazak Redjam, were planning a new conference at Batna to unite the
movement and formulate a response to the regime.103
It rapidly appeared that the so-called 'Djazairists' were far from united on
how to react to the National Dialogue Commission's initiative. In public, at least, a
common front was initially maintained. Rabah Kebir declared on 1 November that:
'The leaders of (the FIS) do not ask for a cease-fire.. Neither slogans about
dialogue nor repression are able to disunite us or discourage us."104
A similar response came from Abderrazak Redjam who issued a statement
which declared that the FIS "rejects all dialogue and reconciliation" with the
"putchist junta."105 However, the tone of Redjam's assertion, in its rejection of
reconciliation, was far harsher than that of Kebir and soon this difference in tone
102 Algerie Actualitè 30.11.93
1 °3 Ibid. 7.12.93
1 °4 Le Monde 21.9.94
105 Ibid.
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developed into differences of substance. These differences threatened a
resurrection of the old rivalries that had arisen between Kebir on the one hand
and Redjam and Mohammed Said on the other. More specifically they
represented Said and Redjam's closer involvement with the armed struggle inside
Algeria which had perhaps influenced them to adopt a more uncompromising line
towards the regime.
These differences became acute and undisguised by December when
Kebir responded publicly to the National Dialogue Commission offering a
negotiated end to the conflict and setting out the conditions for the attendance of
representatives of the FIS at the National Reconciliation Conference. Whilst
restating earlier demands that the leaders of the party be released, security
measures be relaxed and reparation for abuses perpetrated against the party be
made, the head of the Executive Body of the FIS Abroad significantly made no
mention of the need to respect the election results of December 1991. This had
hitherto been a primary demand and was intended to be seen as a concetsion to
the regime.106
Rabah Kebir was not the only senior FIS figure who responded publicly and
potentially positively to the approaches of the National Dialogue Commission. In
early December six founding members of the F1S, including most notably
Hachemi Sahnouni, published a communique stating that FIS participation in the
forthcoming National Conference was conditional on the approval of the party's
Majlis Shura which should be reconvened for that purpose. One of this group of
six subsequently went further claiming that one of them had actually already met
with Ali Belhadj and secured the deputy leader of the FIS's approval to enter into
106 Daily Telegraph 18.12.93; MEI 7.1.94; Author's interview with Rabah Kebir,
27.9.95. Kebir stated that the dropping of the demand for the 1991 results to be
respected was to overcome the regime's public stance that the election had been
rigged by the FIS and to show that the FIS was not afraid to submit itself to fresh
elections.
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dialogue with the authorities. However, whilst Sahnouni subsequently confirmed
that he had been the member of the group which had met with All Belhadj on 17
October, he stated that Belhadj had not yet made clear his position on dialogue
since the Commission had at that point only just started its deliberations.lw
These receptive responses to the idea of dialogue were not shared by
other elements within the F1S and its allies. Redjam, having already repudiated
Kebir in November for calling for a modern set of 'Evian Accords' to end the
conflict, issued a further statement in December calling for a continuation of the
armed struggle and dismissing the National Dialogue Commission as a
government manoeuvre to gain cross-party backing for its repression of the
FIS. 108 Radio Wafa, controlled by Redjam and Mohammed Said, in its broadcasts
rejected all dialogue and any truce with the regime unless the FIS was totally
rehabilitated. This reference to an (albeit unrealistic) condition suggested some
movement towards the position of Kebir and Sahnouni, but the fact that calls for
'jihad' against 'interlopers' who called for an end to the violence, were also
broadcast, suggested otherwise. lce Redjam warned those other parties already
participating in the dialogue that they could be open to attack by militants. Said
Mekhloufi made his threats more plain, and stated openly that he would not
hesitate to kill both Abdallah Djaballah and Mahfoud Nahnah for the participation
of the MNI and HAMAS in these and earlier talks.lio
107 Algdrie Actualitê 14.12.93
los El Watan 22.11.93; MEI 7.1.94
109 Algèrie Actualitd 28.12.93
110 mEl 7.1.94; El Watan 22.11.93
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3. The Zeroual Initiative: December 1993 - March 1994
L Overtures and Releases
Throughout December and January the authorities appeared to work hard
to try and secure some representation from the FIS at the National Reconciliation
Conference. Several hundred Islamists detained without trial were released by
the authorities in January in an effort to achieve participation by the FIS. Despite
welcoming the releases, however, Rabah Kebir said that on their own they were
not sufficient to get the FIS to join either the dialogue or the conference. 'We
must have the release of all political prisoners, first and foremost our leaders" he
demanded.111
Although the National Reconciliation Conference, when it took place, was
ridiculed by Kebir as the product of the "theatrics to seek legitimacy" the
appointment of Lamine Zeroual received a cautious welcome from other FIS
figures. 112 The party's representative in Sweden stated that Zeroual was a
potential De Gaulle with the ability to push the army "out of the era of Chadli."113
Those members of the FIS who hoped that Zeroual's appointment would signal a
111 Financial Times 21.1.94
112 The Guardian 31.1.94
113 El Watan 3.2.94 The relative warmth with which some FIS figures received
the news of Zeroual's appointment was related to the fact that the new President
was perceived to have comparatively 'clean' hands, having resigned from the
military in 1989 following differences with Chadli Benjedid. Furthermore, the fact
that Zeroual had not been a member of the French army during the liberation
struggle, unlike most of the other senior figures in the military who had defected
to the FLN fairly late on in the conflict, meant that he was immune from Islamist
charges that he was part of a conspiracy by the former French officers (Hizb-
France) to run Algeria for the French. L'Express 10.2.94; Roberts: Algeria
Between Eradicators and Conciliators. On FIS reactions to Zeroual's
appointment, Rabah Kebir commented: "I did not know Zeroual personally, but
those people who did know him spoke well of him and expected him to do some
good." Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
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break with the previous policy of the HCE towards them, were further encouraged
by the new President's commitment to have dialogue with all political forces
"without exception" that Zeroual made on 7 February. This optimism appeared to
be fully vindicated when on 22 February two of the seven leaders of the FIS held
in prison since the summer of 1991, Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham,
were quietly released from Blida jail. It was subsequently revealed that this was
the result of direct contacts between the regime and the prisoners at Blida.
Zeroual himself had visited Blida in December, in his then capacity as Defence
Minister.114
II. The Failure of the Initiative
Dialogue and possibly some form of truce then appeared to be in prospect.
General Tayeb Deradji, widely believed to be in charge of discreet contacts with
All Belhadj and Abassi Madani, remarked on suggestions that the two premier
leaders of the FIS be released: "If it puts an end to the violence, then why not?"115
However, optimism that an agreement could be struck faded with a presidential
statement on 30 March which announced that the dialogue had failed and that the
struggle against terrorism would now continue "without a break:n16
In the aftermath of the collapse of this initiative both the FIS and the
regime alleged that each other had reneged on commitments made when Zeroual
had met with the FIS leaders at Blida. According to the government, Djeddi and
Boukhamkham had failed on their release to call publicly for an end to the
campaign of violence by the armed groups, having previously agreed to this as a
condition for their release. For its part, the FIS claimed that Zeroual had gone
back on commitments to free most of the party's leaders, to release Madani and
114 MEI 15.4.94
115 Jeune Afrique 31.3.94
116 Ibid. 21.4.94
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Belhadj to house arrest, to close down the detention camps in the Sahara by mid-
March and to unban the FIS.117
4. Reactions to Failure: The Regime
The failure of the first attempt at dialogue with the FIS since the party's
dissolution was a setback for Lamine Zeroual, who had made this initiative the
centrepiece of his political strategy. The attempt at dealing with the FIS had
inflicted damage not just on his plans for breaking the impasse and halting the
escalating conflict, but had also exposed serious rifts inside the regime and
amongst its supporters. Some saw Zeroual's initiative as a betrayal of those who
had struggled against the terrorism of the armed groups. El Watan, a daily
newspaper highly critical of Islamism and firmly opposed to dialogue with the FIS,
argued on 1 March that the release of Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham
had struck a hard blow at the morale of "troops and other Algerians who believe
in democracy in this country."118 Opposition to Zeroual's initiative also' came
from more weighty sources within the regime itself. When official dialogue with
HAMAS and the MNI had been suspended in early 1993, this had indicated that
there were important elements within the military that were highly suspicious of
any discussions with any Islamists. Secret meetings of army chiefs held in mid-
March 1994 saw the growing strength of a dissident pole within the military, led
by Mohammed Lamari, the Chief of Staff, which believed that the only solution to
the Islamist threat to the regime was eradication, as ,
 opposed to the conciliation
proposed by Zeroual and his supporters.118
117 MEI 15.4.94 It emerged that the government had actually planned to release
four of the seven imprisoned leaders but two, Nourredine Chigera and
Abdelkader Omar, had declined to be freed because of restrictions set by the
authorities on their movements within Algeria once released. El Watan 1.3.94
118 El Watan 1.3.94
119 Jeune Afrique 31.3.94
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The divisions within the upper echelons of the regime appeared to affect the
prosecution of the campaign against the armed groups. The month of Ramadan
(February-March) witnessed a significant retreat on the part of the security forces
from areas of Islamist strength allowing in some areas the armed groups to
effectively take control. The end of the Muslim holy month, however, saw a
substantial 'counter-offensive' launched by the security services in both urban
areas and the rural maquis. An estimated 350 suspected militants were killed in
three weeks of operations. 120 These policy shifts were the result of dissent within
the army over Zeroual's policy. The abandonment of areas to the armed groups
could well have been part of a 'strike' tactic by the 'eradicator faction in the
military in protest at the softening line being taken by Zeroual. It also
represented a faltering in the purpose and morale of the military whilst
discussions with the FIS continued and the 'eradicator' and 'conciliator' factions
within the military leadership argued their respective cases. 121 The subsequent
counter-offensive by the security forces reflected either a clarifying of Purpose
with the failure of the dialogue or a triumph, within the military, by General Lamari
and his supporters who favoured an iron-fist policy against the groups.
The failure of the initiative of early 1994 did not signify a full defeat for
Zeroual and his policy of conciliation towards the FIS, nor a victory for Lamari
and the 'eradicators.' The President reordered personnel in both the government
and the military in April and May 1994 to replace many of the senior opponents of
dialogue with figures more supportive of his policy of dialogue. Mohammed
Lamari, however, retained his position and actually had his powers enhanced
with Zeroual ceding several of his own powers as Minister of Defence to the Chief
120 Liberation 14.3.94 & 28.4.94; MEI 15.4.94; The Guardian 7.4.94
121 Liberation 28.4.94 & 11.8.94; The Middle East 5.94
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of Staff. The President clearly did not feel strong enough to take on his most
robust opponent and felt the need to placate him with new powers.122
5. Reaction to Failure: The Islamist Camp
I. The GM and Dialogue: Violence and Hostility
The most vehement Islamist opposition to the idea of dialogue with the
government came from the GIA. From its creation the GIA had never hid its total
hostility to any other means than armed jihad to achieve the goal of an Islamic
state. The opening of its campaign of assassinations against intellectuals and
members of the CCN in the Spring of 1993 coincided with the beginning of the
HCE's first real attempts at multi-party dialogue and was clearly designed to halt
this process. 123 The assassination of the former Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah in
August 1993 was, despite other claims, almost certainly the work of the GIA and
almost certainly because of covert attempts he had been making to bring both the
government and the FIS to the negotiating table. 124 The GIA were particularly
hostile to any group or individual who tried to speak on behalf of the Islamist
movement. Mohammed Bousilimani, a founding member of HAMAS was
kidnapped, tortured and killed by the GIA in December 1993 largely because of
the central part his party had been playing in the ongoing dialogue with the
regime and in attempts to involve the FIS.125
122 The Middle East 5.94
123 MEI 2.4.93
124 Other theories behind the assassination suggested that Merbah had been
murdered by elements within the regime which, like the GIA, were totally opposed
to the idea of dialogue with the FIS. Another prevalent theory suggested that the
former prime minister had been killed, again by elements from within the regime,
to prevent him revealing damaging information on individuals he had compiled
and retained during his time as Chief of Military Security between 1979 and 1988.
Devoluy and Duteil pp.308-309.
123 It was suggested that Bousilimani had been kidnapped in an attempt by the
GIA to get a fatwa from an authoritative religious figure, such as Bousilimani, to
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The first indications that some figures from within the FIS might be willing
to talk to the regime were met with dark warnings and threats of violence from the
GIA. A communique issued by the grouping on 21 November 1993 threatened to
kill senior figures in the FIS over a supposed "manoeuvre destined to establish
contacts with the authorities" naming Redjam, Mohammed Said and Said
Mekhlouli in particular. For the two senior figures of the party abroad, Anwar
Haddam and Rabah Kebir, the communique grimly prophesied that: "Even if they
cling onto the walls of the Kaaba, they will suffer the worst of deaths.'
The prospect of a deal between the regime and the FIS heightened the
rivalry between the AS and its allies in the armed groups and the GIA. The
advent of the National Reconciliation Conference saw an upsurge in violence
from the GIA which was directed against the F1S as well as the regime. 127 This
campaign continued into the new year as speculation grew over whether the FIS
would deal with the authorities. The leader of the GIA, Mourad Sid Ahmed issued
a communique on 6 February claiming that 70 MIA militants had been "executed"
by the G1A. 128 Three weeks later, on 27 February, Sid Ahmed was himself killed
when security forces stormed a house in the Bouzareah district of Algiers where
senior GIA figures had been meeting. The facts that the security forces were
clearly well-informed about the location of the meeting and that the house
belonged to a former member of the executive bureau of the FIS suggested that it
support the groupings' argument for jihad and thus maintain unity within its ranks.
Bousilimani's refusal to agree to this, even under torture, led to his eventual
murder. (El Watan 2.2.94). HAMAS and its leader, Mahfoud Nahnah, in fact
appeared to enjoy the closest links of all the major political parties with the
regime, particularly in attempts to create a forum for national dialogue which
would involve elements from the FIS. Indeed, they appeared to know about the
negotiations that had taken place with the FIS before the other parties. El Watan
24.2.94
126 El Watan 22.11.93 & 28.2.94
127 El Watan 22.11.93; Algerie Actualit4 7.12.93
128 SWB ME/1917 MED 9.2.94
343
was sources close to or within the FIS which had provided the security forces with
their intelligence.129
IL Defections to the GM
The collapse of the attempt at dialogue between the authorities and the
FIS and President Zeroual's intention to resume the anti-terrorist struggle "without
a break."130
 forced the FIS to reappraise its political strategy. The failure of the
initiative confirmed the fears of many in the FIS who doubted that the regime
would ever be prepared to make real concessions in negotiations. There was
thus an increase in the number of defections to the G1A as members of the FIS
became convinced that the GIA's strategy of militarily defeating the regime was
the only way forward. 131
These defections achieved greatest significance at the beginning of May,
when Abderrazak Redjam and Mohammed Said announced that they were joining
the GIA. They were soon joined by Said Mekhloufi. The scale and importance of
the defections was further emphasised by a statement issued a few days later by
Rabah Kebir and the leadership of the party abroad. It declared that Anwar
Haddam and his close associate, Ahmed Zaoui, were no longer able to speak on
behalf of the FIS because they had joined the GIA. 132 The defection of the
maverick Mekhloufi, who had made known his opposition to the policy of
dialogue, was of no great surprise. The adherence of Redjam, Said and Haddam
was more unexpected. The precise reasons behind the defections were never
clearly elucidated, but it seemed likely that these figures saw the base of popular
support for Islamism shifting decisively away from the FIS and towards the GIA,
and thus feared being sidelined. The release of All Djeddi and Abdelkader
129 El Watan 28.2.94
130 jeune Afrique 21.4.94
131 El Watan 1.3.94
132 Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94; El Watan 3.8.94
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Boukhamkham from prison in February also posed a potential threat to the
primacy of Said and Redjam's leadership of the FIS inside Algeria as Djeddi and
Boukhamkham became the clear focus of government attempts at achieving a
political settlement. It is also likely that Said, Redjam and Haddam judged that
they could bring a significant degree of moderation and political leadership to the
GIA - assets that the grouping lacked and seemed happy to accept.133
III. The HS Counter-Offensive: the Formation of the AlS
These developments put the remainder of the F1S's leadership under
pressure to respond. Rabah Kebir publicly responded with a degree of
equanimity, stating that Said and Redjam were free as individuals to join the GIA
if they wished but that this did not commit the FIS as a whole, but there was
considerable anger at the nature of the defection. Of particular concern to Kebir
and the rest of the FIS's leadership (notably those in the prison in Blida) was that
the defections had been portrayed by those defecting as a unification of the FIS
and other elements under the banner of the GIA. This seen as an unacceptable
subsuming of the politically far more substantial FIS into what had been, until
comparatively recently, a small extremist grouping. It also threatened to dispense
with the name of the FIS, thus losing the valuable degree of popular legitimacy
and symbolic associations that the party had accrued since 1989.134
The F1S leadership was aware that condemnation of the GIA and
disassociation from it were insufficient responses to the challenge the GIA
presented. Those in the FIS who continued to hope for a deal with the regime
knew that the increasing strength of the GIA reduced the chances of such a deal
being struck. Firstly, there was the fear that by negotiating the FIS could lose
133Liberation 22.7.94; Paul Schemm, Hope for Algeria? in Middle East Insight
(September-October 1994)
134 Echoes of Truth 8.94
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more popular support to the GIA. Secondly, there was the concern that the hard-
liners within the regime could point to the increasingly bloody and indiscriminate
campaign being waged by the GIA as reason why no compromise with any
Islamist group should be contemplated.135
The leadership of the FIS therefore perceived there to be a need to create
an armed wing for itself to prevent the GIA dominating the armed struggle and
thus threaten the credibility of any commitments the party might make in
negotiations with the regime. The structures that had been set up by the F1S and
the MIA in 1993 to control the armed struggle had operated only very loosely and
had virtually disintegrated with the growing defections to the GIA, particularly that
of Said Mekhloufi who had been head of operations under these arrangements.
There was consequently a more concerted attempt by the FIS in 1994 to draw
together various armed groups and unite them under the explicit banner of the
FIS. The result of these efforts was revealed in July when the creation of an Arnie
Islamiques du Salut was announced. Increasingly known by its initials, AIS, this
new grouping was made up of elements of the old MIA together with a number of
other hitherto independent groups and groupings. Foremost of these was the
Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique (MEA) which joined the AIS after protracted
negotiations and brought in the two regional 'Emirs' of the movement from the
east (Madani Merzak) and the west (Ahmed Ben Aicha) of the country. Together
with other smaller groups from the still very fragmented armed resistance the
forces of the AIS were formally united under the leadership, once again, of
Abdelkader Chebouti. Chebouti's title as 'general' and commander of the AIS
was, however, largely symbolic due to his increasing ill-health and the desire for
the two regional emirs of the old MEA to retain a significant degree of
autonomy.136
135 ME! 5.8.94
136 Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94; Jeune Afrique 4.8.94
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The creation of the AIS differed from past attempts at uniting and unifying
the Islamist struggle in that, for the first time, the armed struggle within Algeria
was explicitly subordinated to the political leadership of the FIS. Madani Merzak
and Ahmed Ben Aicha, despite their desire for autonomy, affirmed that supreme
authority belonged to Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj. The choice of name for the
AIS, with its inclusion of the word Salut, was intended to underscore the affinity
and loyalty of the new grouping to the FIS. The declining influence of Chebouti
aided this process since despite enjoying close relations with many of the party's
senior figures, he had never been a member of the FIS and had always been
opposed to its constitutionalist strategy.137
IV. The GIA Response: The Formation of the 'Caliphate'
Sensing that the political and military initiatives were beginning to shift back
in the direction of the FIS with the creation of the AIS and the affirmation of the
primacy of the two historic leaders of the party, the GIA looked for ways"to raise
their profile. Militarily, this was done by stepping-up their campaign against
foreigners in Algeria. The most notable result of this was an assault on a
residential block in the Algiers suburbs housing French Embassy staff on 3
August which resulted in the deaths of five Frenchmen. 135 In the political field, the
GIA tried to consolidate the political capital it had gained through the defections
of senior FIS figures in May.
At the beginning of August, Anwar Haddam appeared to formally announce
his adherence to the GIA having hitherto only been accused by the leadership of
the FIS of having joined the grouping. He declared that FIS party militants were
joining forces with the GIA as a result of a decision taken by Islamist field
commanders at a meeting held in April (thus probably explaining the timing of the
137 jeune Afrique 4.8.94 & 25.8.94
138 jeune Afrique 15.9.94
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other defections at the beginning of May). In response, Rabah Kebir publicly
reiterated that the FIS would continue to exist as the FIS. 139 The political
initiative of the GIA went one step further at the end of August when it
announced, in a communique released on 26 August, the formation of an Islamic
government or 'Caliphate.' The communique went on to list the personnel in this
supposed 'Islamic government in-waiting.' In addition to the post of Commander
of the Faithful, which went to the leader of the GIA, Cherif Gousmi (who had
assumed the leadership following the death of Mourad Sid Ahmed in February),
eleven ministries and their heads were detailed. Mohammed Said was named as
head of government, Anwar Haddam was made responsible for foreign affairs
and Said Mekhloufi became the provisional Interior Minister.140
The creation of a credible political leadership to rival that of the FIS
threatened to greatly bolster the GIA in its struggle with the FIS-AIS. However,
the potential impact of the announcement was sharply reduced by the haste with
which many of the named ministers sought to disassociate themselves from the
declaration. Several even attempted to rejoin the FIS. Anwar Haddam denied all
knowledge of this 'Caliphate' and his inclusion in it, claiming it was a deliberate
invention of the Algerian and French security services. 141 He refuted the claim
that he was or ever had been a member of the GIA and asserted that he had only
ever spoken in the name of the FIS. The FIS leadership seemed willing to accept
the veracity of Haddam's renunciation of the GIA, but others, such as Mohammed
Said, experienced more difficulty in their attempts to backtrack and mend fences
with the FIS. Said's renunciation was clearly prompted by fears of being isolated
by the rejuvenated FIS and condemned by the respected leadership in Blida
prison. It was compromised, however, by the existence of an audio cassette
139 ME/ 5.8.94; El Watan 3.8.94
14° Le Monde 28/29.8.94
141 Ibid.
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recording of his original declaration of adherence to the GIA which had been
widely circulated both in Algeria and abroad. 142
 Said Mekhloufi simply
announced his intention to quit the GIA following his nomination as Interior
Minister.143
V. Continued Competition
The collapse of its attempt to mount a more political initiative pushed the
GIA into looking for other means of advancing their struggle both against the
regime and the FIS-AIS. More importantly, it sought to prevent these two
adversaries talking to each other. Operationally, the GIA continued to be both
robust and resilient, despite the regular loss of successive leaders (the grouping
had survived the disastrous blow of the security forces raid on its February
meeting in which it lost nine senior personnel in addition to Mourad Sid Ahmed).
It had established itself as the dominant armed group within Algiers and the
surrounding region. The adherence of the MEA, in particular, to the AIS had
given the FIS's armed wing primacy in the eastern and western regions of the
country, but the GIA still maintained a presence in these regions too. 144 The
regime's post-Ramadan counter-offensive had pushed some of its units out of the
capital and into the rural maquis which was largely controlled by the AIS. This
inevitably led to clashes between the two groups, in spite of instructions from
Madani and Belhadj to the AIS that this should be avoided. Although these
clashes led to important casualties on the GIA's side (notably Abdelkader Hattab
and nine of his lieutenants, according to both AIS and security services sources),
142 Schemm: Hope for Algeria?
143 ME! 9.9.94
144 Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94; Jeune Afrique 25.8.94
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the GIA remained able to prosecute well-planned attacks in the capital such as
that against the French Embassy staff residence.145
The GIA's need to maintain a high profile and, more importantly, receive
more substantial leadership was demonstrated in its kidnapping of two Arab
diplomats, the Omani and Yemeni Ambassadors, in July. Released unharmed a
few days after their capture, the diplomats carried a message to the authorities. It
offered an end to the assassination campaign against foreigners in return for the
release of the seminal leader of the GIA, Abdelhak Layada, who had been
imprisoned since his successful extradition from Morocco the previous Autumn.
The demand for Layada's release was a recognition by the GIA of its need for
leadership. Layada's charismatic influence had been instrumental in uniting the
G1A's constituent groups originally and could possibly galvanise once more the
GIA's still fairly loose structures. The authorities' failure to respond to this offer
led to the killing of sixteen foreigners over the following two weeks. This
demonstrated that even if it lacked leadership and unity, the G1A was still ' able to
carry out its threats.146
The increasingly extreme nature of the GIA's campaign appeared to serve
the interests of the newly unified FIS-AIS. It made the latter seem a more
moderate and pragmatic alternative to the G1A, both for ordinary people and the
regime. In a communique released on 31 August the AIS explicitly distanced itself
from a campaign recently launched by the GIA which threatened schools with
arson unless they changed their curricula, organisation and pupil dress codes to
comply with 'Islamic' requirements. 147 Rabah Kebir, in an interview with a western
145 Jeune Aflique 4.8.94; El Watan 1.8.94 There even appeared to be
competition between the GIA and AIS in certain areas over the control of
protection rackets and businesses. Le Monde Diplomatique 10.94
146 MEI 5.8.94; Jeune Afrique 4.8.94; Nouvel Observateur 11.8.94
147 Liberation 7.9.94 These threats, which were carried through against some
500 schools between June and September alone, resulted from a failed attempt
by the GIA to initiate a school strike in imitation of similar tactics used during the
liberation struggle (Jeune Afrique 15.9.94). The precise demands of the GIA on
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newspaper, made clear that the FIS differed from the GIA on the important issues
of the killing of foreigners, which it opposed, and participation in elections which it
remained in favour of. 148 He was also keen to distance himself from the GIA and
deny accusations of co-operation:
"We don't have any relations with the GIA because this group is only
pursuing the military option. They alone are responsible for what they are
doing inside Algeria."149
6. The Second Attempt at Dialogue: 1994
I. Political Initiatives: May-August 1994
Despite the collapse of the first attempt at dialogue with members of the
FIS and the consequent stepping-up of the anti-terrorist campaign, President
Zeroual remained intent on not excluding the possibility of further dialogue with
the party. His replacement in April and May of hard-line figures opposed to
dialogue with the FIS with pragmatic personnel who were personally loyal to him,
was an indication of this. For the FIS, Rabah Kebir remained uncertain as to how
genuine Zeroual's commitment to finding a solution was. He was unsure whether
the President's policy of "talking peace, whilst waging war" was due to Zeroual
being constrained by other forces within the regime or whether it was a deliberate
policy of deceit. 153 Nevertheless, he cautiously welcomed Zeroual's dismissal of
the anti-Islamist Prime Minister, Redha Malek, and described it as "a positive act
schools werethat they should end mixed classes and the teaching of music, and
that girls should no longer participate in gym classes and should wear hedjab.
/ 48 Le Monde 6.8.94
149 Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
150 Ibid.
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in the context of the search for a negotiated settlement" and emphasised that the
FIS was ready for such negotiations.151
Zeroual still faced considerable potential opposition to his plans for political
development from figures in the military, particularly those officers close to
Mohammed Lamari and who were supportive of his policy of eradication. At a
stormy meeting in July with the chiefs of staff, the President announced his plans
to relaunch attempts at national dialogue which would once again aim to include
Islamists. In support of his proposals he pointed to the evident failure of the 'total
security' policy launched at the end of Ramadan which had been the favoured
approach of the 'eradicators.' This had failed to noticeably curtail the activities of
the armed groups and had simply added to the violence and bloodshed which
had increased dramatically since the beginning of the year. 152 On August 8
Mokdad Sifi, the new Prime Minister, announced that the government would, once
again, be taking up dialogue with the political parties, although no mention was
made, at this stage, of participation by the FIS.
II. Overtures from the FIS
Attempts to include the FIS in the dialogue had in fact begun in April,
within weeks of President Zeroual's formal acknowledgement of the failure of the
new year initiative with the release of Djeddi and Boukhamkham. The instigator
this time, however, was the FIS. Persuaded perhaps by the initial effectiveness of
the security forces' post-Ramadan offensive that military victory for the AIS was
simply not possible, the leadership in Blida started to send letters to the
Presidency indicating terms on which dialogue and an agreement could be
reached. 153
151 mEl 29.4.94
152 Le Point 10.9.94
153 Jeune Afrique 4.8.94
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The first letters came from Ali Belhadj, on 7 April and 22 July. They stressed
primarily the importance of freeing the remaining leaders of the F1S before any
progress could be made or meaningful dialogue take place. Zeroual and the
authorities did not respond directly to these letters, but made it plain that the
primary condition they attached to engaging in dialogue with members of the FIS
was the letters' renunciation of violence. 154 Movement on the issue came with the
sending of two further letters from Blida prison, this time from Abassi Madani. FIS
figures abroad stressed the importance of these letters being signed by the
leader of the FIS himself (rather than just his deputy) and they provoked far
greater attention from the authorities than either of those sent by Belhadj.155
Both sent in the last week of August, the two letters resulted in government
representatives being dispatched to Blida to attain clarification of various points
following the receipt of each letter. Whilst awaiting this clarification the authorities
made known the contents of the letters which listed general principles, proposals
for a political solution and practical measures to be taken to achieve this 'solution.
That the letters contained moderate and clearly serious proposals that did not
fundamentally conflict with conditions set out by Zeroual for parties wishing to
participate in elections (notably respect for the Constitution and for the
irreversibility of democracy156) encouraged the President and the conciliators in
154 Libèration 15.6.94; Le Monde 23.8.94; MEI 26.8.94 Apart from the central
demand of his and the other leaders' release, All Belhadj called for a "return to
legitimate laws" (the Sharia?) and greater public information. He even challenged
the President to a televised debate.
155 Le Monde 6.9.94
156 Specifically, Madani in his letter had expressed his commitment "To abide by:
party pluralism and to allow free opinion and to encourage diversity of
programmes and forms of interpretation; the freedom of initiative and the
acceptance of the changes of government through elections.." and to support the
constitution which is "applicable in the way provided for in the constitution itself.."
(SWB ME/2095 MED/2 8.9.94) Zeroual had previously set out his conditions for
involvement in the political process as being: the end of violence as a
precondition for the return to elections, and respect for both the Constitution and
the irreversibility of democracy. Le Monde 23.8.94
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the regime. 157
 Stressing that the letters had been unsolicited by the authorities,
Zeroual publicly described several elements of the letters as "positive" and said
that they represented a significant "first step" by the Ft S.1 58 Abassi and Belhadj,
together with the three remaining leaders in prison, made it clear to the
Presidency's emissaries that no political initiative could be contemplated whilst
they remained in prison. On the evening of 13 September Abassi Madani and All
Belhadj were released to house arrest whilst the other three detained leaders
were simply allowed to go free.159
III. Opposition from Both Sides: The 'Eradicators' and the GIA
These releases were heralded as marking a possible beginning of an end
to Algeria's bloody conflict, but they were far from welcomed by those on both
sides who were resolutely opposed to the idea of dialogue. Opposition to the
initiative from within the regime made use of figures outside the government to
voice their own grave reservations. In collusion with Mohammed Lamari; Redha
Malek the former Prime Minister, spoke out publicly about what he regarded as a
"unilateral concession" on the part of the regime which "put in deadly danger the
Republic." He criticised Zeroual for appearing to suspend his condition that
Abassi Madani unambiguously condemn terrorism before being released. 160 The
anti-Islamist press, notably Le Matin, highlighted the fact that the releases had
not reduced the violence and argued that Abassi and Belhadj "no longer
controlled the armed groups."161 Criticism was also voiced from those political
parties who were similarly hostile to any compromise with the Islamists of the FIS.
Said Saadi the leader of the RCD, reacted to the releases of the FIS leaders by
157 SWB ME/2095 MED/1-3 8.9.94
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observing that: "A part of the army is ready to go for a walk on the backs of the
democrats."162 Even the FFS, which had long stipulated inclusion of the FIS in
dialogue as a condition for its own participation, maintained its distance from
discussions because of fears that a "secret pact" had been concluded between
the FIS and the government.163
The reaction of the GIA to the release of the FIS leaders was judged as
being crucial. Efforts had been made in the official media over the preceding
months to distinguish between extremists and pragmatic moderates in the
Islamist movement and thus increase popular acceptance of dialogue with the
FIS as representatives of the latter tendency. 164 However, the authorities still
clearly hoped that the GIA could be persuaded by the FIS to halt their campaign.
Rabah Kebir maintained that 80% of Islamist violence could be stopped by the
FIS's leadership since current or former cadres of the FIS could be found at the
heart of virtually every armed group (including, presumably, elements of the
GIA). 165 In a communique following the releases the AIS formally reaffirmed their
allegiance to the leadership of the FIS, stating that 'The Chiefs of the FIS are the
Chiefs of Jihad in Algeria" in a clear gesture of support for the leadership's
negotiating position. However, the communique also called on the "brothers in
the centre" to organise themselves "in order to design a national command and
bar the way to manipulations by the junta and its services." This clear appeal to
the GIA (who dominated the 'centre', the Algiers region, of Algeria) was, however,
vigorously rebuffed by the GIA. On 14 September, the day after the releases, the
GIA condemned all compromise with the "apostate regime" and restated their
established credo of "Neither reconciliation, nor truce, nor dialogue." 166 As a more
162 Jeune Afrique 6.10.94
163 Le Monde 16.9.94
164 Le Figaro 15.9.94
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tangible indication of the GIA's attitude towards events, Islamist violence
demonstrably increased in the aftermath of the releases, culminating in the
detonation of a car bomb in Algiers on 12 October as dialogue began. 167
IV. The Demands of the FIS
The FIS did not join the next round of multiparty talks scheduled for 20
September, despite hopes of early participation in formal dialogue. The FIS was
concerned about the lifting of both the ban on the FIS and the state of
emergency, and an amnesty for the substantial numbers of Islamists still in
prison. However, the main blockage to further participation by the freed leaders
in talks to break the impasse and end the conflict was the demand that they be
allowed to freely consult with the wider leadership of the party. 1€8 It became
evident that this implied direct consultations not only with the leadership of the
party abroad and other individuals still imprisoned, but also with the leaders of
the armed groups. As the freed leaders had declared in a letter:
"Since we are asked the opinion of the leadership it is right that we reunite
the leadership to give it....AII the leadership: the military leadership
imprisoned or at liberty, inside the country or outside."169
This demand which had been present in virtually all the FIS's previous
conditions for dialogue, did not just represent a tactic on behalf of the party to
wring more concessions from the Government. It also reflected a genuine need
on the part of the party to unite its ranks behind it before beginning negotiations
thus preventing the development of possible splits and schisms. 170
 As Rabah
Kebir explained: "A simple appeal for a truce, even if it comes from Abassi, will
167 Ibid. 13.10.94
168 i
	 Times 20.9.94
169 Jeune Afrique 2.9.94
170 The Guardian 15.9.94
356
not stop the bloodshed. We must gather together all our cadres in both political
positions and in the armed groups:171
V. The Collapse of the Initiative
The demand that the FIS be permitted to reunite its leadership proved
clearly unacceptable to a regime which was already under pressure from its hard-
liners over excessive concessions to the FIS. 172 Three sets of meetings between
the released leaders and government representatives on 15 and 29 September
and 23 October failed to resolve the issue and at the end of October the regime
formally announced the failure of the initiative. As with the collapse of the first
attempt in the previous March, the Government's statements were full with
recriminations and accusations of disengenuity on the part of the FIS. In sharply-
worded statements President Zeroual alleged that Abassi Madani and All Belhadj
had "gone back on their undertakings" which had formed the basis for their
release. They had also refused to issue a call to end the violence until they were
released from house arrest.173
More seriously, the regime released the texts of two letters allegedly found
on the body of the commander of the GIA, Cherif Gousmi, killed on 26 September
by the security forces. Purportedly signed by All Belhadj the letters seemed to
reveal the close nature of links between the GIA and the FIS's number two. They
thanked Gousmi and the GIA for contributing to pressures on the regime which
led to his and the other FIS leaders' release. They also urged Gousmi to "reach
an agreement" with the AIS and proposed that: "Pressures must be brought to
171 Le Matin 25.9.94 The Government had helped attempts at co-ordination
between Kebir and the imprisoned leadership by occasionally allowing direct
telephone calls between them. Following the collapse of the initiative, though, the
authorities tried to isolate Abassi and Belhadj and all contact was cut off. Author's
interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
172 This was despite rumours that the regime itself had been in contact with FIS
leaders living abroad. See Financial Times 5.9.94 and The Guardian 6.9.94
173 SWB ME12140 MED/11-15, 30.11.94 & ME/2142 ME/17-20, 2.11.94
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bear from outside by you through military operations and statements and by
us.. .through information and guidance." These letters, Zeroual argued, clearly
demonstrated that the FIS leadership was "trying to bolster extremism and
encourage crime." Furthermore: "With such behaviour those concerned have
demonstrated that they only have a dictatorial view of democracy" and thus
should no longer be allowed to participate in dialogue with the regime and the
other law-abiding forces.174
Whether both sets of allegations had any substance or were simply covers
for the regime to justify their abandonment of the dialogue over the real issue of
allowing the FIS to consult its wider leadership, is uncertain. Kamel Guemazi, one
of the three FIS leaders completely freed on 13 September, had asserted on 20
September, well in advance of the collapse of the initiative, that the authorities
had in fact set no preconditions for their release. 175 It seems likely that this was
the case given Zeroual's avoidance of the issue of explicit renunciation of
violence in the probable hope that the releases would prompt subsequent
concessions on the part of the FIS. The veracity of the letters found on Cherif
Gousmi's body is impossible to judge, but the texts of the letters revealed by the
authorities (if accurate) did appear to indicate that these were not the first that
had been sent from the deputy leader of the FIS to Gousmi ('This is my first
contact with you from the prison of house arrest" one of the letters says). The
extent to which these contacts may have been an individual initiative on the part
of Belhadj (as opposed to one endorsed by the other leaders) is perhaps
indicated by reference in the letters to some "dispute" within the Islamist camp.I76
Indeed, if, as Zeroual and the regime suggested, the FIS and the GIA were fully
co-ordinating their actions, it does not explain the GIA's violently expressed
174 Ibid.
175 The Independent 20.9.94
176 SWB ME12140 MED/12-13, 31.10.94
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opposition to the FIS leaders' attempt at dialogue with the regime. However, it
would lend credence to the controversial view that some of the violence attributed
to and apparently claimed by the GIA, was in reality the work of rejectionist
elements within the regime itself.177
The collapse of this second initiative in the late Autumn of 1994 coincided
not only with the rather muted celebrations marking the fourtieth anniverary of the
beginning of the insurrection against the French, but also with drawing to an end
of the third successive year of violent crisis in which Algeria had continued to be
mired since the dramatic sequence of events which had begun with the legislative
elections of December 1991.
C: DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISM
1. Counting Islamists: The Initial Base
The official dissolution of the FIS in March 1992 and the subsequent
suppression of Islamism made it difficult to assess the strength of support for the
party and the Islamist movement generally. The three-and-a-quarter million votes
the FIS had attracted in the first ballot of the legislative elections in December
1991 had given a very tangible indication of the level of support the Islamists
enjoyed. However, a survey carried out by the Algerian national research centre
argued that only half of those who had voted for the FIS in 1991 actually
espoused its central objective: the achievement of an Islamic state. The rest had
voted for the party as the best means of punishing and jettisoning the ruling
order. 178 Although such findings are inevitably open to scepticism, it could not be
denied that the depth of unpopularity of the regime and the FLN had contributed
massively to the success of the FIS. Therefore, if one assumes this assessment
177 Libóration 20.9.94
178 Financial "Times 30.1.92
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to be broadly correct (it may in fact be over generous to the FIS), it appears that
the Islamist goals of the FIS enjoyed the electoral support of just over one-and-a-
half million Algerians - about 12% of the adult population.
2. The Armed Groups
Expressing support for the FIS at the ballot box or sharing the party's aim
of the establishment of an Islamic state, did not, of course, indicate a belief in the
efficacy of taking up arms to achieve this, much less a willingness to participate in
such an action. Therefore it would be mistaken to assume that at the outset of
the armed groups' campaign they could rely on the active support of the
aforementioned and notional 12% of the population.
Given the fragmented and clandestine nature of the armed groups, any
assessment of the numerical support of these groups, let alone the popular
support they enjoyed, is difficult to gauge. Certainly in the early period of the
Spring and Summer of 1992, the membership of the groups appeared relatively
small scale. One Algerian newspaper estimated in the summer of 1992 that
roughly twelve groups had emerged over the preceding few months, each
consisting of up to a few dozen members, indicating an overall strength for the
armed groups of a few hundred. 179 However, intelligence sources judged there to
be at this time around 800-1,000 "hard-core terror fighters" in the Algiers area.180
The remarkable resilience and even expansion of the armed groups, despite the
successful campaigns of the security forces against them which frequently
decimated their ranks clearly demonstrated that they were continually able to
attract and involve new members.
I79 Algerie Actualitè 13.8.92
180 The Independent 30.6.92
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I. The Attraction of Youth: The Urban Male
The overwhelming majority of new recruits to the armed groups were
young men. This was not simply a function of the military and operational needs
of the armed groups, but also reflected the relative popular support Islamism
enjoyed amongst this section of the Algerian population. As has been shown in
earlier chapters, the lack of education and prospects enjoyed by the country's
youth, who found themselves to be amongst the main victims of Algeria's
continuing economic and social decline, meant that they were easy recruits for
the FIS's populist message. The fact that conditions singularly failed to improve
and demonstrably worsened after 1992, Algerians under the age of 30 making up
84% of the country's unemployed (estimated at around 30% of the working
population) by the end of 1993 181 , meant that whether through boredom,
frustration or anger, they remained more susceptible than most Algerians to the
propaganda and recruitment initiatives of the armed groups. The youthful profile
of those captured or killed by the security forces in clashes with the Islamist
groups bore testimony to this fact. 182
The GIA, in particular, appeared to attract young recruits and most of its
leaders were seldom older than 30. The two Arab diplomats kidnapped by the
group in July 1994 testified, following their release, that most of the group
members they had seen during their captivity and transportation had been
teenagers. 183 The reasons for this apparent preference by the GIA for younger
recruits are several fold and inter-linked. The concentration of the group's
activities in the urban 'centre' region of the country around Algiers not only
allowed it to carry out the type of operations it desired (mainly assassinations) but
181 mEl 17.12.93
182 See Jeune Afrique 8.4.93
183 Schemm: Hope for Algeria? The relative youth of the CIA's leaders was
mainly the result of the high mortality rate of most of the leaders of the group.
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also kept in touch with the Islamists' most fertile base of support: the young urban
unemployed. The sheer number of these jobless males (hittistes) on the streets of
the urban centres meant that, besides formal recruitment, their numbers would
allow a high degree of cover and anonymity for GIA operations. Perpetrators of
attacks were able to 'melt' into similarly aged and dressed crowds. Many of these
hittistes served 'apprenticeships' with the armed groups: watching, driving and
storing for them before formally being admitted to a cell or a unit. An added
advantage for the urban groups was that unlike their counterparts in the rural
maquis, logistical problems were few - young members simply returning to their
families for food and shelter. 184
Economic and social deterioration were not the only motivating factors
behind the steady flow of young unemployed recruits to groups such as the G1A.
The bloody and remorseless tactics of the GIA, in particular, provoked an equally
harsh response from the security forces against whom many of the attacks were
directed. Young men became the natural targets for police raids on localities
thought to have been responsible for a given attack. As the conflict progressed
their treatment at the hands of the authorities regressed from simple detention
without trial, through beatings, systematic torture and eventually arbitrary . killings.
By 1994, as the conflict escalated dramatically, collective punishments on
neighbourhoods involving the killings of large numbers of local youths became
common. It was thus unsurprising that young men who had either suffered
themselves in detention or who had had friends and brothers tortured or
murdered by the security services would hasten to the ranks of the GIA as a
means of exacting their revenge.185
184 Jeune Afrique 22.7.93; Algeria Actuante 28.12.93
185 Jeune Afrique 25.8.94
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IL Other Social Bases
Support for the armed struggle was not confined to young jobless men in
the cities. Whilst they clearly made up the greater part of it, other sections of the
population lent their support to it. There was a more middle-class element to the
Islamist campaign as indicated by the fact that of the several thousand Islamists
still detained in the Saharan prison camps at the end of 1992, there were 1,186
civil servants and 1,219 teachers. 186 In April 1993 a group of nearly fifty Islamist
were arrested by the authorities during an apparent attempt to sabotage a gas
pipeline near the southern town of Laghouat. Working in co-operation with the
MIA, this group consisted largely of professionals such as doctors and
teachers. 187
 The extensive use of fax machines to transmit messages and of
computers to store the names of targeted victims by the groups also appeared to
indicate that the groups enjoyed the expertise and advice of educated Algerians.
188
Another area of society identified by the security services as being a hot-
bed of Islamist activism was the black market. 189 Although identification of the
Islamists with illegality was clearly in the interests of the authorities, the
established links between the movement and the parallel economy have already
been explained (see chapter 6). It appears that this clandestine section of the
economy continued to be substantially controlled by the Islamists who drew funds
from it. 190 Protection rackets, bank raids and general theft increased massively in
Algeria from 1992. Many of these activities were carried out by Islamists trying to
finance their campaigns but they were also frequently the result of the more
186 Algerie Actualitd 2.12.92
187 The Middle East 7.93
188 AlOne Actualitè 2.12.92; The Sunday Times 30.10.94
189 Algèrie Actualitè 2.12.92
190 jeune Afrique 22.7.93
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general breakdown of law and order and government control that had been
precipitated by the conflict. Collapsing living standards provided a further impetus
for crime in this period.191
III. Geographic Bases
Geographically, the armed groups initially operated predominantly in the
east and centre of the country, but gradually spread into the west as well. 192
Much of the presence of the armed groups in individual areas was determined by
the activities of the security forces. The various shifts between the urban areas
and the rural maquis, detailed earlier, were largely the result of the intensity of
operations by the regime in each theatre.
The effective withdrawal of the security forces from large parts of the
country during Ramadan of 1994 (leaving only the three main cities of Algiers,
Constantine and Oran under the effective control of the authorities 193) gave some
indications of the regional strength of the armed groups. It was in the towns of the
Mitidja plain around Algiers that the Islamists came most quickly to the fore
following the pull-back by the forces of the state. The groups exercised, in the
view of one observer, "real control" in places such as Baraki, Larbaa and
especially Blida. There, the Islamists (of uncertain affiliation but most probably
allied to the GIA) set about imposing their vision of society upon the residents of
these areas. They dictated their own curfews and determined shop opening hours
and even the prices of goods in those shops. Private bus companies were
ordered to segregate their passengers, men from women (who were now required
191 Jeune Afrique 23.12.93; Algerie Actuante 7.12.93
192 Jeune Afrique 13.8.92
193 MEI 18.2.94
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to wear the hedjab), and smoking and the selling of French language newspapers
were effectively prohibited.194
Even after the counter offensive by the authorities after Ramadan and
away from the area around Algiers, Islamist control continued to be evident. The
two Arab ambassadors kidnapped by the GIA in July stated that their captors
seemed to be able to cross large parts of the country (with them as captives) with
impunity. 195 One witness from a village near the town of Tiaret claimed that the
"entire population is under the boot of the terrorists."196 One journalist argued that
it was this "air of influence" that the Islamists were able to exercise over a locality
which reliably indicated the strength of their support. 197 This influence even
extended to the authorities, it being notable that no attempt had been made to
revoke some of the new laws introduced by the FIS controlled councils after 1990
such as the ban on alcohol introduced in the Mitidja town of Módêa.198
One notable area of Algeria that remained largely outside the influence of
the armed groups was Kabylia. The elections of both 1990 and 1991 had
demonstrated the antipathy of the region to Islamism and despite the fact that the
Kabyle had been the mountainous heartland of the original maquis against the
French, the armed groups failed to establish a significant presence there.
Attempts to do so had led to clashes between the groups and local villagers by
the Autumn of 1994. 199
194 Financial Times 22.2.94; Liberation 14.3.94 & 28.4.94; MEI 4.3.94 & 1.4.94;
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3. The General Population: Abstention and Neutrality
The importance of winning the backing of the mass of the ordinary
population to their side in order to defeat the regime clearly figured in the
calculations of the armed groups. The example of the revolution in Iran in 1978-
79, where Islamists came to power on the back of a genuinely popular revolution
provided an unignorable precedent for them. However, despite the steady flow of
recruits to the Islamic militias, there was little evidence of the Islamists being able
to mobilise large numbers of people in street demonstrations in the way that had
contributed so decisively to the fall of the Shah in Iran. Such a point was not
missed by a senior officer in the Algerian military who suggested that:
"If they had brought 500,000 of their supporters onto the streets, at the time,
for example, of Zeroual becoming head of state, or the release of Abassi
Madani and All Belhadj, the army would never have been able to open
fi re.. "203
He thus concluded that:
"If they have not tried to mass their power on the streets, it is because they
do not have the necessary troops behind them."201
The apparent reluctance or indeed unwillingness, of significant numbers of
the Algerian populace, even those who must have voted for the FIS, to
demonstrate their support for the Islamist opposition was a notable feature of the
growing conflict. Despite the worsening economic and social conditions for most
Algerians during this time, the attitude of ordinary people to the regime was one
of "passive hostility rather than active support for the fundamentalists." 202 Instead,
200 Le Figaro 1.11.94
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202 The Middle East 7.93
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the majority of Algerians seemed to try to avoid involvement or association with
either side in the conflict, realising that in the increasingly violent and bloody
battle any expressed sympathies were liable to invite retribution from the other
side. 203 As one Algerian journalist remarked one year into the conflict: "The street
remains strangely impassive, as if this does not concern it."204
4. The Growth of the Conflict
The longevity of the conflict testified to the fact that it was no low-level,
sporadic guerrilla war of the sort witnessed in Ulster or the Basque region. 226 The
grim parade of statistics of casualties and deaths bore witness to the size and
escalating intensification of the struggle. Deaths from the conflict rose from
approximately 600 at the end of 1992 to 3,000 by December 1993. 206 The
exponential growth of these horrific casualties, which included an increasing
proportion of non-combatants, continued throughout 1994 and in October 1994
Amnesty International calculated that the overall death total had exceeded
10,000, with unofficial estimates, which became increasingly credible, suggesting
that the real figure could be twice that.207
These figures reflected the growth in size and support for the armed
groups, even if the mass of the population tried to stand back from the conflict.
The regime claimed in May 1993 to be looking for just 1,100 fugitive guerrillas,
but foreign diplomats estimated that the number was probably in the region of 10-
2°3 Jeune Afrique 25.2.93
204 Algdrie Actuate 23.2.93
206 This was how the regime tried to portray the conflict. Author's interview with
Algerian diplomat, Tunis, 24.5.94
206 Amnesty International: Political Killings in a Human Rights Crisis (Al MDE
28/01/94) January 1994
207 Amnesty International: Repression and Violence Must End (Al MDE 28/08/94)
October 1994
367
15,000.208 The further intensification of the conflict over the following eighteen
months undoubtedly boosted this figure to the point that by September 1994
confidential government figures recorded that attacks by Islamist groups had
risen to roughly 100 each day.208
D: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIST CAUSE
1. Iran
Iran continued to be the target of most official Algerian suspicions and
accusations over aid and support to the country's Islamists. The new HCE had
recalled its Ambassador to Tehran in the immediate aftermath of the coup of
January 1992 amid complaints that a "virulent press campaign" had been
mounted by Iran against Algeria and allegations that Tehran had contributed $3
million to the FIS's recent election campaign. Although these charges were
denied and dismissed by the Iranians, relations between the two countries
declined throughout 1992 resulting in a complete severing of diplomatic ties with
Iran by Algeria in March 1993.210
The Algerian authorities alleged that Iran had had a direct hand in training,
funding and supplying the armed Islamist groups in their struggle against the
regime. In November 1992 Qasim Naamani, an attaché at the Iranian Embassy in
Algiers, was expelled along with nine others for allegedly co-ordinating efforts to
send Algerian Islamists to Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon. One Algerian
newspaper claimed that Naamani had been the official liaison between the majlis
shura of the FIS and Mohammed Kasem Khansari, the mullah responsible for the
208 The Guardian 20.5.93 Figures for the different groups at this time are difficult
to ascertain, although Le Monde estimated in August 1994 that the GIA had
about 2,500 men in the central region of Algeria. Le Monde 28/29.8.94
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Maghreb states at the Iranian Foreign Ministry. There were also accusations that
the Iranian Embassy had let Islamists use their facilities to print their clandestine
newspapers and communiquós.211
The truth of these claims is difficult to judge, although it was clearly in the
interests of the Algerian government to play up the foreign links of the Islamists in
order to discredit them in the eyes of nationalistically minded Algerians and also
to reassure people that the Islamist struggle had limited domestic support. In
addition to the very small radical Shi'ite groups (see earlier chapters) which Iran
had strong links with but which were inevitably rather marginal because of their
size, there were links with more prominent Islamist groups. Takfir wa-Hijra had
had links with the Islamic Republic since the 1980s and several of its senior
figures had visited Tehran, including Kameredine Kherbane who travelled there
on several occasions from 1992. 212 However, whilst Iran undoubtedly did help
supply at least some weapons and material to the armed groups in Algeria after
1992, the ideological influence and leadership they perhaps hoped to exert was
restricted, as before, by its Shi l ite theology which even Sid Ahmed Mourad of the
GIA acknowledged as a brake on more extensive links.213
2. Egypt
The issue of links between Algeria and the influential Islamist movement in
Egypt from 1992, revolved mainly around attempts by the two governments to co-
ordinate efforts to prevent links being established between the two movements.
Egypt had itself witnessed a resurgence of the Islamist challenge to the regime
from the Summer of 1992. In November 1992, Sassi Lamouri, the Algerian
Minister for Religious Affairs, led a delegation to Cairo where he met with his
-
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Egyptian counterpart, Mohammed Ali Maghoub, to discuss ways of combating the
Islamist threat. For Algeria, Lamouri secured an agreement from Egypt to re-open
a mission bureau of Al-Ahzar (the esteemed Islamic university) in Algeria and to
send around fifty professors and imam trainers to work, under the guidance of the
Ministry of Religious Affairs, against "Shi'ism and fundamentalism." 214 It was no
coincidence that shortly after this meeting Algeria announced its expulsions from
the Iranian Embassy and Egypt launched verbal attacks on alleged Iranian
interference in its domestic politics. 215
 Co-operation between the two countries'
security services remained close and in March 1994, citing security reasons,
Egypt announced that the number of Algerian pilgrims allowed to travel across
Egypt to attend the Hajj in Mecca would be reduced by more than 90%.216
3. Tunisia and Morocco
Algeria's two Maghrebi neighbours, Morocco and Tunisia, were clearly
likely to be affected by the growing crisis across their borders. Algeria had
traditionally been the dominant state, politically and geographically, in the region.
For Tunisia's President Abidine Ben Ali, developments had vindicated his unease
over Chadli Benjedid's programme of political liberalisation. He robustly
supported the Algerian regime's suppression of the Islamists which he had
foreshadowed with his clamp down on Tunisia's own Nanda party. A more
ambiguous stand was taken by the Moroccan Government. Several Algerian
newspapers claimed that Algeria's western neighbour provided the main route for
Islamist funds, materiel and personnel into Algeria. Although bribery of border
officials was seen as the primary means of operating this route, El Watan argued
that the Moroccan authorities themselves had "closed an eye" to the networks of
......e.
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supply on their territory.217 Nevertheless, the Moroccan Government arrested the
GIA's Abdelhak Layada in July 1993 and allowed the Algerian authorities to
extradite him back to Algeria.218
4. Other Arab States
Other states that appeared to have links with the conflict in Algeria were
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. In Jordan these links took the form of contacts
with the country's Muslim Brotherhood. Said Mekhloufi spent time there in the
Summer of 1992 cementing links and the Jordanian Brotherhood offered to send
a team of lawyers to Algeria to defend Abassi, Belhadj and the other FIS leaders
during their trial in July 1992. 219 Saudi Arabia become once again, following the
hiatus of the Gulf War and its aftermath (see chapter 5), a source of funds for the
Islamists. Individual Saudis were approached by Algerian Islamists for support.
This support was frequently given despite official assurances to the contrary that
were given to the Algerian Defence Minister, Khaled Nezzar, when he visited
Riyadh. 220 Sudan was regularly accused by the Algerian regime of supplying the
armed groups inside Algeria, and although there was no real concrete evidence
for this, Algeria recalled its Ambassador to Khartoum in March 1993.221
Overall, it appears that there was a concerted effort on the part of certain
Islamists to set up international sources of support for the armed struggle.
Figures such as Kameredine Kherbane accompanied by Abdallah Anas travelled
from country to country seeking funds and training for the struggle. 222 In contrast
to these efforts and the approaches made to individual Saudis, which came
predominantly from those on the salafi wing of the Islamist movement, it was
-
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argued that Djazairist-aligned figures such as Rabah Kebir preferred to accept
funds only from other Algerians and thus retain their nationalist credentials.223
Indeed, it was argued that through domestic 'donations' and crime the FIS-AIS
were more or less financially self-sufficient. 224 For his part, Kebir stated on
relations with other foreign Islamist movements that:
"There are some contacts, but only discussions, not close relations.
Sometimes we meet some of them in Europe, by chance. Our members are
under siege abroad, so we cannot move freely and contact other Islamic
organisations."225
E: CONCLUSIONS
The period 1992 to 1994 witnessed the Islamist movement entering what
could be described as its 'post-constitutionalist' period. This transition was not
chosen of its own volition, however much some Islamists may have welcomed it,
but was rather imposed on it by the regime through the cancellation of the
elections and the dissolution of the FIS. There were two notable observations
about the movement during this phase.
The effective exclusion of the FIS from Algeria's constitutional and electoral
processes, with explicit assurances from the regime that it, or any similar
successor party, would not be permitted to rejoin these processes at some future
stage, vindicated those elements in the Islamist movement who had either
explicitly rejected or otherwise tactically gone along with the electoralist strategy
of the FIS. The cancellation of the elections and the dissolution of the FIS were
signals to these elements that the movement should resort to the more fitting
means of acquiring power through armed struggle. However despite the initial
intransigence of the regime, what is remarkable was the persistence of that part
223 D6voluy & Duteil pp.245-246
224 jeune Afrique 23.12.93
225 Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27.9.95
372
of the Islamist movement which believed in both the efficacy and correctness of
pursuing a constitutional strategy for the acquisition of power. This did not simply
imply the leaders and members of parties such as HAMAS and the MNI, but more
importantly applied to several senior figures within the FIS. There was a marked
reluctance to either call for or endorse armed resistance to the regime, and even
when figures such as Rabah Kebir eventually appeared to do so, it was with
much qualification and occasional criticisms of the armed campaign. For some
critical observers this reluctance was undoubtedly interpreted as the movement
keeping its options open. The option of constitutionalism appeared increasingly
attractive with the growing realisation that the armed struggle alone would not be
enough to facilitate the accession of Islamists to power.
The second notable feature of the three year period following the events of
early 1992 was that whilst support for the Islamist movement remained significant
and resilient despite the pressures of the regime, the movement signally failed to
mobilise the ordinary population against the regime. This was in spite of the
manifest lack of popular legitimacy the various post-1992 regimes enjoyed and
more importantly the steady and continuing decline of social and economic
conditions experienced by the mass of ordinary Algerians during this period.
Despite contempt for the regime and its inefficiency, corruption, illegitimacy and
growing brutality, the vast majority of Algerians seemed unconvinced that their
best course of action would be to throw their collective support behind the
campaign of the armed groups. Whether this was because of fear of reprisals
from the regime or because of an aversion to the prospect of the installation of an
Islamic state is uncertain, but wariness of the consequences had not stopped
mass defiance of the state authorities occurring in October 1988 or indeed in the
years between 1954 and 1962. As had been the case in the elections of 1990
and 1991 the polarisation of the options had left little room for any third option,
leaving Algerians to choose between two unpalatable options, their choice being
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determined by the relative distaste they felt for one over the other. Whilst in
December 1991 over a third of the adult population had decided to abstain from
making any choice at all, an even greater percentage of Algerians chose this
option with the onset of the post 1992 conflict.
CONCLUSION
The collapse of the second initiative for dialogue between the FIS and the
Algerian regime at the end of October 1994, signalled that the Algerian crisis was
to continue for some time to come. In the aftermath of the failure the two sides
launched their own separate initiatives to try and break the bloody impasse.
President Zeroual announced the regime's intention to hold presidential elections
before the end of 1995, whereas the FIS entered into talks with most of the other
major opposition parties to construct some kind of common front and platform. By
the Autumn of 1995, neither of these initiatives appeared to have broken the
deadlock. The FIS, represented by Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam, had
participated in talks with six other political parties, notably the FLN, the FFS, the
MDA and the Nanda party which had resulted in the drawing up of a joint platform
and peace plan signed by all the participants. Launched in Rome in January
1995, the 'Platform for a Peaceful and Political Solution to the Algerian Crisis'
declared the parties' commitment to political pluralism and free elections and
called upon the regime to revoke the repressive measures it had introduced since
1992 and organise fresh legislative elections in as short a time as possible.1
Despite the fact that the platform contained a commitment to renounce violence,
the regime rejected the document out of hand and spoke of "foreign interference
in Algeria's internal affairs.' 2 In response the signatories of the Rome Accord
denounced the regime's plans for presidential elections. Persisting with these
plans, the regime failed to attract the participation of any major opposition party in
the poll that became scheduled for 16 November 1995. Any credibility the plans
may have had disintegrated with the announcement on 13 September that
1 Platform for a Peaceful and Political Solution to the Algerian Crisis, St. Egidio,
Rome, 11.1.95
2 The Times 11.1.95
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Lamine Zeroual would stand as a candidate. 3 During this time Algeria's death toll
continued to mount remorselessly.
This deadlock meant that Algeria's Islamist movement continued to remain
in a state of fractured flux. Physically, its leadership was split between Algeria
and abroad. Within Algeria it was divided between those figures in prison, those
at liberty and those engaged in the armed struggle. Politically and ideologically it
was divided between those willing to reach some form of agreement with the
regime on the one hand, and those, on the other, who were committed to armed
struggle as the sole legitimate means of achieving their ends.
Nevertheless, the Islamist movement remained, as it had done since 1990,
the key element in all of Algeria's political equations. It had been the electoral
success of the FIS which had precipitated the abandonment of the electoral
process. Participation of the FIS remained the primary and most divisive issue in
any attempt to relaunch the process and armed Islamist opposition to the regime
was the cause of the colossal bloodshed that Algeria had witnessed since 1992.
Social and economic decline, crime and official failures and corruption were all
part of Algeria's ongoing travails, but it was the country's Islamists who remained
at the hub of the whole crisis.
What remained remarkable was the swiftness of the Islamist movement's
rise to prominence in Algeria. As has been shown, an Islamist tradition had been
present in the country since the early part of the century with the creation of the
Association of Algerian Ulama, but the two decades following independence had
seen the movement virtually vanish from the Algerian stage. The 1980s had
witnessed a noticeable re-emergence of the movement, but had it not been for
the events of 1988-89, it would have simply remained a vocal but ultimately
peripheral force. The events of this period allowed certain figures in the
movement, notably Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, to construct a truly mass
3 Libèration 14.9.95
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popular base for the movement through, firstly, the upheaval of October 1988 and
secondly through the formation of the Front Islamique du Salut. This project
revolutionised Algerian Islamism and transformed it into something quite different
from the sort of movement it had been since the 1920s.
In fact, it would be true to say that the FIS was essentially an offspring of the
Islamist movement rather than an organic part of it. It is highly significant that so
many senior Islamist figures (Sahnoun, Nahnah, Djaballah) did not participate in
the creation of the party. The party was instead headed by the maverick Abassi,
who had no organisational base of support and the young, inexperienced Belhadj.
Other senior Islamist figures did join the party in 1989, but it was notable that it
was these individuals who formed the bulwark of opposition to Abassi and his
strategy in the Majlis Shura in early 1991 and who either left or were ejected from
the party the following summer. The true, historic Algerian Islamist movement can
be seen as surviving in the Rabitat Dawa and in the organisations and parties
established by Mahfoud Nahnah and Abdallah Djaballah. Wary of politics and
confrontation, and holding as a primary aim the 're-Islamisation' of the Algerian
people through education and preaching, these organisations remained closer to
the ideals of Abdelhamid Ben Badis than did the FIS.
In contrast the FIS had become simply a populist political movement. This
was not to say that Abassi, Belhadj or any of their successors in the party's BEP
were not committed to Islamist ideas and ultimate goals, but the FIS became a
means for achieving political power and, through that, these goals. The FIS's
populism successfully drew to its banner the swelling numbers of Algerians who
saw the party as the best means of overthrowing the existing, deeply unpopular
ruling order. A large proportion of such people believed in the party's millenialist
promises of a FIS-run Algeria, but given the fact that the core of the party's
support were the undereducated and unemployed urban young, it is unlikely that
there was any widespread understanding of the FIS programme or Islamist ideas
377
generally. To get an idea of the true extent of real Islamist influence, support and
ideas in Algeria in the 1990s, it is necessary to look harder at the votes HAMAS
and the MNI attracted in the December 1991 ballots than those accrued by the
FIS.
The armed struggle that developed from 1992 was a mutation of this
phenomenon. For the vast majority of those in the armed groups, the ultimate
stated goal of an 'Islamic State' is really only an icon representing other more
basic desires - the overthrow of the regime and the end of official repression and
economic and social deprivation. The armed struggle has not had the same
populist appeal as the FIS had, drawing millions of Algerians to it, but has
attracted the most militantly disillusioned section of the population. It is significant
that the most militant of all the elements of the armed struggle, the GIA, is
composed overwhelmingly of young unemployed youths.
The future course of Algeria and its Islamist movement, in both its populist
and more traditional forms is impossible to accurately predict. The' issue of
Islamist and FIS participation will remain a constant feature of the Algerian
political scene, irrespective of future shifts in its popular support and ideology,
since it had played the predominant role in Algeria's first experiment with political
pluralism and electoral democracy. After nearly four years of bloody conflict it is
abundantly clear that a military 'solution' to the impasse is highly unlikely, the
armed resistance being at the same time insufficiently powerful to defeat the
significant resources of the Algerian military whilst remaining too strong and
resilient to be decisively crushed by its adversary. Despite the substantial
opposition to any agreement between the regime and the FIS by hard-line
elements in both the regime and the armed groups, such a deal is the only viable
way of breaking the impasse.
What sort of deal might emerge from agreement with the regime is difficult
to judge. In the unlikely event of the regime accepting the proposals of the Rome
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Accord, elections are set to occur. How the FIS and Islamism will fare in such
contests can only be guessed at - the events of the past few years possibly
having driven as many supporters away as attracted new ones. It seems more
likely that the carnage of the last four years will, however, prevent anything
approaching a return to the sort of status quo ante be//urn envisaged in the Rome
document. Too much blood has been spilled for this to realistically happen.
What lessons and implications have the experiences of Algeria and its
Islamist movement had for the rest of North Africa and the Arab and Muslim
Worlds?. Perspectives differ considerably. For most of Algeria's neighbouring
governments in North Africa, Algeria's current predicament is testimony to the
dire consequences of firstly, excessively fast political liberalisation, and secondly,
permitting Islamism to compete in multi-party elections. Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia have all have allowed some degree of multi-party participation in
elections. All three, though, have ensured that firstly, such participation is
controlled to a degree necessary to prevent a challenge to the ruling order, and
secondly, that no explicitly Islamist political party is allowed to compete in
elections under its own banner. It was notable that as events in Algeria unfolded
in the 1990s both the Tunisian and later the Egyptian government clamped down
on even the hitherto tolerated organisational manifestations of Islamism in their
countries. Significant coverage of the horrors of the Algerian conflict is given in all
the states' media, in the hope that this will discourage the significant, latent
Islamist sympathies that are present across North Africa.
In contrast to this view are the lessons drawn from Algeria's experiences by
Islamists internationally as well as a tranch of Western liberal opinion. For the
first group Algeria has shown that when given open elections Islamism is shown
to be a hugely popular political option, even in a country formerly thought of as
being peripheral to the international Islamist movement. The armed conflict has
demonstrated that even abandonment of elections and repression is not sufficient
379
to stifle Islamist demands and popularity. For those Western liberals who were
not relieved by the apparent lifting of the perceived threat of an intolerant Islamist
regime coming to power in January 1992, the aborting of elections could never be
justified. The liberal democratic belief in popular electoral sovereignty could not
be abandoned simply because a potentially illiberal force had triumphed at the
ballot box.
Besides demonstrating the startling success Islamist movements can have
in multiparty elections, Algerian Islamism, as a movement has had surprisingly
little impact beyond its own borders. As has been shown, the movement was
ideologically, largely the product of external influences. The founders of the
Association of Algerian Ulama were all driven by ideas and experiences they had
gained whilst studying outside the country. Imported Arabic teachers from the
Eastern Arab World fed Islamist sentiment in Algeria's schools during the
Arabisation programmes of the 1970s. Many of the main Islamist organisations
that emerged in Algeria borrowed the names of other foreign Islamist 'groups -
HAMAS, Nanda, Takfir wa Hijra. Algeria itself produced little that was
ideologically new to the wider Islamist movement. The radical and violent
statements and stance of some of the armed groups, particularly the GIA, were
just crude and confused re-workings of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. For its part the
FIS, in its populist bid for political power, preferred vacuous propaganda to
anything more precise or innovatory. The one Algerian Islamist thinker of any
significance in independent Algeria, Malek Bennabi, was largely ignored by most
other Islamists who elected to look beyond Algeria for their inspiration.
There are other wider lessons to be drawn from Algeria. Many observers
both in the Muslim World and the West have argued that Algeria represents part
of the ongoing re-assertion of the Islamic faith world-wide. Some in Europe have
seen it as evidence of a coming conflict between the 'Christian' northern
Mediterranean and the Muslim-dominated southern shore - immigration and trade
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set to become the flash points. In Algeria's case this can be seen to be only
partially true. Algeria's conversion to 'Islamism' is relatively patchy and
superficial. As has been shown, the real driving force behind both the successes
of the FIS and the ongoing armed struggle has not been a desire for an Islamic
state, as such, but a wish to escape from the spiral of economic, social and
political decline that Algeria has locked itself in since the late 1970s. Should the
FIS ever attain political power, it would be the success it had in breaking this
spiral of decline, rather than the ardency with which it applied 'Islamic values',
which would determine its popular legitimacy. Should it fail, as must be likely,
there is a potential opening for some other movement or ideology to launch a
populist crusade against the ruling order, using the same methods that the FIS
had used to such great effect.
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RACHID GHANNOUSHI - Leader and founder of the Tunisian Nanda Party. Senior
figure in the North African Islamist movement. In exile in Algeria 1990-1991
London, 18.4.95
ADEL HUSSEIN - General-Secretary of the Egyptian Labour Party allied to the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Cairo, 19.6.94
RABAH KEBIR - Official Representative of the FIS Abroad 1992 until present.
Temporary head of the Provisional Executive Bureau of the FIS September -
October 1991. Member of the Majlis Shura of the FIS since 1991. Islamist
activist since 1980s
Germany, 27.9.95 (By telephone)
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